ORDER : 1. The petitioner, represented by his legal representatives, have filed the present writ petition for a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 25.9.2019 made in Rev.Misc.Petition No.7/2019, Annexure-E and to set aside the order dated 3.10.2016 passed in Appeal No.701/2012, AnnexureD by the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal, Bengaluru dismissing the appeal for default. 2. It is the case of the petitioners that their father and their ancestors were in unauthorized possession, cultivation and enjoyment of the land bearing Sy.No.18 measuring 2 acres situated at Konasandra village, Harohalli Hobli, Kanakapura Taluk continuously for more than six decades and the revenue records also stand in the name of their father; the Deputy Commissioner granted an extent of 20 guntas of land out of 2 acres in Sy.No.18 of the said village which was challenged before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal by filing Rev. Appeal No.701/2012 and the same was dismissed for non-prosecution on 3.10.2016. Against the said order, the petitioners preferred a Rev. Misc.Petition 7/2019 before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal for restoration of appeal which came to be dismissed on 25.9.2019 on the ground of delay and not on merits. Hence, the present writ petition is filed. 3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties to the lis. 4. Sri C.M. Nagabushana for Sri B.R. Srinivasa Gowda, learned Counsel for the petitioners contended that the impugned order passed by the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal dismissing the Miscellaneous Petition mainly on the ground of delay without considering the case on merits is not sustainable, in view of the fact that when the rights of the parties are involved in respect of the immoveable property, the Tribunal ought to have decided the case on merits instead of dismissing the Miscellaneous Petition on technicality. He further contended that because of the mistake committed by the learned Counsel for the petitioners before the Tribunal, the parties should not suffer. Since there was a delay of 2 years, 3 months and 27 days in filing the restoration petition, the same was explained by filing an affidavit in support of the application, which has not been considered by the Tribunal. Therefore, he sought to allow the writ petition. 5. Per contra, Sri Y.D. Harsha, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent Nos.1 to 4 sought to justify the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, he sought to allow the writ petition. 5. Per contra, Sri Y.D. Harsha, learned Additional Government Advocate for respondent Nos.1 to 4 sought to justify the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. He mainly contended that in the absence of proper explanation, the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the Miscellaneous Petition. Therefore, he sought to dismiss the writ petition. 6. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties, it is the case of the petitioners that the land bearing Sy.No.18 measuring 2 acres situated at Konasandra Village, Harohalli Hobli, Kanakapura Taluk had been in cultivation by their father and ancestors for more than six decades. Though the Tahsildar recommended for grant of 2 acres of land, the Deputy Commissioner has proceeded to grant only 20 guntas of land. Therefore, the father of the petitioners filed an appeal before the Tribunal for the remaining extent of land. Unfortunately, before the Tribunal when the matter was posted on 3.10.2016, it was rejected for nonprosecution and the relevant portion of the order reads as under: “When case called called again, no representation for appellant. Along with appeal the appellant has filed IA No.1 for limitation, IA No.2 and 3 seeking permission. Inspite of it, neither appellant nor their counsel is appeared before the court, to argue the case and for on admission. Thus it appears that the appellant not interested in this case. Therefore the appeal is rejected for non prosecution” 7. In Rev.Misc.No.7/2019 an application for condonation of delay and also for restoration of the appeal No.701/2012 was filed before the Tribunal explaining the circumstances at paragraph 7 of the affidavit, which reads as under: “7. I further state that neither I nor my counsel were aware of the posting of the above case on that day for consideration and therefore it has been prevented us from appearing before this Hon’ble Tribunal, consequently the same came to be dismissed for default. It is submitted that very recently in the month January 2019, I had been to Bengaluru and contacted my advocate to know about the state of the original appeal, and since, my counsel was also not aware of the date of disposal of the above Appeal, and therefore my self and my advocate went to the office of this Hon’ble Tribunal and after enquiry came to know that the above appeal was dismissed for default. That immediately my counsel has advised me to file Miscellaneous Petition seeking restoration of the original appeal to its original file. Accordingly my counsel has obtained the certified copy of the order passed by this Hon’ble Tribunal and took the step of filing the above Miscellaneous Petition. That under these circumstances there is little delay caused in filing the above Miscellaneous Petition. I state that the delay caused in filing the Miscellaneous Petition is neither intentional nor deliberate, but the same is due to the facts and circumstances stated above deserves to be condone.” 8. The Tribunal by the impugned order dated 25.9.2019 without considering the explanation offered, proceeded to dismiss the petition mainly on the ground of delay. 9. It is well settled that, when the rights of the parties are involved in respect of immoveable property, it is the duty of the Court to decide the case on merits and when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done on technicality. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. 10. The Tribunal considering the said principle, ought to have allowed the application as well as petition by condoning the delay of 2 years 3 months and 27 days by imposing some costs in the interest of justice. It is also relevant to state at this stage that when an appeal is filed by the petitioners before the Tribunal, it is duty of the learned Counsel to take care of the appeal and to ensure that justice is being done to his client and because of the mistake committed by the learned Counsel for the parties, the parties should not suffer. My view is fortified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rafiq and Another vs. Munshilal and Another reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 wherein at paragraph3 it has held as under: 3. My view is fortified by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Rafiq and Another vs. Munshilal and Another reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 wherein at paragraph3 it has held as under: 3. The disturbing feature of the case is that under our present adversary legal system where the parties generally appear through their advocates, the obligation of the parties is to select his advocate, brief him, pay the fees demanded by him and then trust the learned Advocate to do the rest of the things. The party may be a villager or may belong to a rural area and may have no knowledge of the court's procedure. After engaging a lawyer, the party may remain supremely confident that the lawyer will look after his interest. At the time of the hearing of the appeal, the personal appearance of the party is not only not required but hardly useful. Therefore, the party having done everything in his power to effectively participate in the proceedings can rest assured that he has neither to go to the High Court to inquire as to what is happening in the High Court with regard to his appeal nor is he to act as a watchdog of the advocate that the latter appears in the matter when it is listed. It is no part of his job. Mr A.K. Sanghi stated that a practice has grown up in the High Court of Allahabad amongst the lawyers that they remain absent when they do not like a particular Bench. Maybe, we do not know, he is better informed in this matter. Ignorance in this behalf is our bliss. Even if we do not put our seal of imprimatur on the alleged practice by dismissing this matter which may discourage such a tendency, would it not bring justice delivery system into disrepute. What is the fault of the party who having done everything in his power expected of him would suffer because of the default of his advocate. If we reject this appeal, as Mr A.K. Sanghi invited us to do, the only one who would suffer would not be the lawyer who did not appear but the party whose interest he represented. The problem that agitates us is whether it is proper that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanour of his agent. The answer obviously is in the negative. The problem that agitates us is whether it is proper that the party should suffer for the inaction, deliberate omission, or misdemeanour of his agent. The answer obviously is in the negative. Maybe that the learned Advocate absented himself deliberately or intentionally. We have no material for ascertaining that aspect of the matter. We say nothing more on that aspect of the matter. However, we cannot be a party to an innocent party suffering injustice merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. Therefore, we allow this appeal, set aside the order of the High Court both dismissing the appeal and refusing to recall that order. We direct that the appeal be restored to its original number in the High Court and be disposed of according to law. If there is a stay of dispossession it will continue till the disposal of the matter by the High Court. There remains the question as to who shall pay the costs of the respondent here. As we feel that the party is not responsible because he has done whatever was possible and was in his power to do, the costs amounting to Rs 200 should be recovered from the advocate who absented himself. The right to execute that order is reserved with the party represented by Mr A.K. Sanghi. 11. In view of the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the parties should not suffer because of the mistake committed by the learned Counsel for the parties and ultimately, when the rights of the parties are involved in respect of the immoveable property, it is the duty of the Court to decide the case on merits instead of technicality, the petitioners have made out a ground to interfere with the impugned order passed by the Tribunal dismissing the petition on the ground of technicality i.e., delay and laches. 12. For the reasons stated above, writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 25.9.2019 passed by the KAT in Ref.Misc.Petition No.7/2019, Annexure-E upholding the order dated 3.10.2016 dismissing Appeal No.701/2012, Annexure-D for default is set aside and the appeal is restored subject to payment of costs of Rs.2,000/(Rupees Two Thousand Only) by the petitioners to the Advocates Welfare Fund within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 13. 13. On production of acknowledgement for having deposited the costs by the petitioners, the Tribunal shall restore appeal No.701/2012 and proceed to consider the appeal on merits and strictly in accordance with law.