ORDER 1. Since both the petitions carry same factual tenor and texture, and subject matter is also same therefore, both these criminal revision petitions taken into consideration simultaneously and are decided by the common order. For convenience sake, facts of Cr. R. No. 87/2017 are taken into consideration. 2. The instant criminal revisions have been preferred by the petitioners/accused against the order dated 10.1.2017 (in Cr. R. No. 87/2017) and order dated 6.2.2017 (in Cr. R. No. 447/2017) passed in Case No. 208/2016 whereby, in sum and substance, the respective applications of petitioners under section 227/228 of CrPC for discharge have been rejected. 3. The brief facts necessary for adjudication are that on 1.5.2014 marriage was solemnized between Pradumn Dubey (son of present petitioners), i.e., petitioner No. 1 in Cr. R. No. 447/2017, and respondent No. 2 Smt. Richa Bhargawa as per Hindu rites and rituals at Guna. It appears that due to some domestic incompatibility, respondent No. 2/ wife started living at her parental home at Kolaras, District Shivpuri (M. P.) since 24.2.2015. The dispute between the couple could not be resolved, therefore, on alleged grounds of living adulterous life as well as cruelty committed by respondent No. 2, then husband Pradumn Dubey filed a divorce petition against the respondent No. 2/wife on 5.4.2016. 4. In his petition, he levelled specific allegations about leading adulterous life and prior to marriage, conceiving from some other male and later on aborted. Husband levelled specific allegation against respondent No. 2 of having relationship with one Ashutosh Pandey. As per allegations, she lived with Ashutosh Pandey at his village Nohrikala as his wife for some time and after dispute with him, she came back to her parental home and thereafter, marriage with Pradumn Dubey (petitioner No. 1 of Cr. R. 447/2017) solemnized. Later on, this fact came to the knowledge of husband through call details of her mobile as well as from other source. All details of leading adulterous life by respondent No. 2 have been narrated in divorce petition. Respondent No. 2 contested the case and led her part of evidence. 5. After considering the rival submissions and evidence, Principal Judge, Family Court, Guna, vide judgment dated 6.9.2017, allowed the petition under section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act filed by the petitioner Pradumn Dubey and decree of divorce was issued and by way of divorce couple declared separate. 6. Respondent No. 2 contested the case and led her part of evidence. 5. After considering the rival submissions and evidence, Principal Judge, Family Court, Guna, vide judgment dated 6.9.2017, allowed the petition under section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act filed by the petitioner Pradumn Dubey and decree of divorce was issued and by way of divorce couple declared separate. 6. It is worthwhile to mention the fact that on 5.4.2016, divorce petition was filed and on 5.5.2016 wife caused her appearance in the Court and immediately thereafter, on 15.5.2016 she lodged FIR under section 498A of IPC and section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, showing the dates of alleged offence between 1.5.2014, i.e., date of marriage, to 12.10.2015, the date from which she started living separately. In the said FIR, there is not even a whisper in respect of allegation of committing attempt to rape and outraging her modesty by her brother-in-law Rahul Dubey (petitioner No. 2 in Cr. R. 447/2017). 7. On 23.6.2016, she lodged another FIR vide Crime No. 327/2016 at Police Station GunaKotwali for the offence under sections 376 and 511 of IPC against all the petitioners for committing the offence of attempt to rape and outraging her modesty. In the said FIR, period of incident shown to be from 5.6.2014 to 28.2.2015. Perusal of FIR indicates the date of event as 5.6.2014 at Haridwar and thereafter, one more incident of attempt to rape by her brother-in-law Rahul Dubey around one year back from the date of FIR. 8. Investigation carried out and charge-sheet submitted. Trial Court framed the charges against all the petitioners (except petitioner No. 2 in Cr. R. No. 447/2017) in respect of sections 498A, 376/109, 354/109 of IPC, and brother-in-law Rahul Dubey (petitioner No. 2 of Cr. R. 447/2017) was saddled with sections 498A, 376/511 and section 354 of IPC. 9. Meanwhile, divorce petition filed by the husband Pradumn Dubey was allowed vide judgment and decree dated 6.9.2017, in which this fact has been considered that respondent No. 2 lodged a false FIR to the offence of attempt to rape to exert pressure over the petitioners. 10. R. 447/2017) was saddled with sections 498A, 376/511 and section 354 of IPC. 9. Meanwhile, divorce petition filed by the husband Pradumn Dubey was allowed vide judgment and decree dated 6.9.2017, in which this fact has been considered that respondent No. 2 lodged a false FIR to the offence of attempt to rape to exert pressure over the petitioners. 10. Meanwhile on 26.9.2019, during the pendency of present petitions, first FIR lodged against all the petitioners under section 498A of IPC and section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act also resulted in acquittal of all the petitioners on merits and the said judgment dated 26.9.2019 is on record. 11. Therefore, through this revision petition, petitioners have challenged the rejection of application for discharge preferred by them under sections 227/228 of CrPC. In Cr. R. No. 447/2017, petitioners (husband and brother-in-law of respondent No. 2 wife) also preferred revision against order dated 6.2.2017 whereby charge has been framed against the petitioners in respect of offence under sections 498A, 376/511 and section 354 of IPC for Rahul Dubey and section 498A, 376/109 and 354/109 of IPC against Pradumn Dubey. 12. It is the submission of counsel for the petitioners that it is factually clear that FIR of leveling allegations of attempt to rape and outrage her modesty are complete abuse of the process of Court and such process cannot be allowed for harassment. He relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal and Ors. [ AIR 1992 SC 604 ]. 13. It is further submitted that after filing of divorce petition by the husband, as counter blast, respondent No. 2 lodged FIR under section 498A of IPC without mentioning therein any allegations of attempt to rape, whereas she filed the said FIR on 15.5.2016 and at that point of time, if subsequent FIR is seen then it is clear that she referred the incident dated 5.6.2014 and the incident is of one year thereafter. Therefore, she could have narrated the said allegations in her first FIR filed under section 498A of IPC. Therefore, she could have narrated the said allegations in her first FIR filed under section 498A of IPC. It appears that when she realized that she is not getting sufficient material to harass the present petitioners only on the basis of offence under section 498A of IPC, then she resorted to another FIR including the offence under sections 376 and 354 of IPC, which is clear abuse of process of law and she cannot be permitted to start litigation at her whims on flimsy pretext and harass the petitioner till eternity. He referred the vagueness made by the prosecutrix in her written complaint, FIR and police statement/statement under section 161 of CrPC. He further submits that although this is revision petition but since this Court exercises the inherent jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC also, then scope of revision is not limited. He relied upon the case of Rajiv Thapar & Ors. v. Madan Lal Kapoor [(2013) 3 SCC 331] to submit that even in revisional jurisdiction if the injustice is caused then same can be taken care of. Here in the present case petitioners are constantly harassed by the wife. FIR is a delayed FIR and an afterthought. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent opposed the prayer and prayed for dismissal of petition. 15. Counsel for the complainant also raised the point regarding merits of the case and submits that trial Court would decide the case and allegations prima facie apparently exist and therefore, same needs to be tried through leading evidence. 16. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the case dairy/documents. 17. In the present case, petitioners have filed the revision petitions in which one is against order of discharge and another is against order of framing charge. Scope of revision is not so limited as tried to be projected by the counsel for respondent because revisional Court can see the correctness, legality or propriety of any order passed as well as the regularity of any proceeding of any Court below. 18. Therefore, looking to the scope as provided in section 397 and 401 of CrPC, this Court has sufficient jurisdiction to look into correctness or propriety of any order passed by the Sessions Court. So far as present case is concerned, respondent No. 2 lodged the FIR on 23.6.2016 by filing a written complaint. Contents of written complaint and FIR are almost identical. So far as present case is concerned, respondent No. 2 lodged the FIR on 23.6.2016 by filing a written complaint. Contents of written complaint and FIR are almost identical. Later on, her police statement was taken on same day, i.e., 23.6.2016 then also she repeated the allegations but next day in her statement under section 164 of CrPC before the Magistrate, she made her statement only in one para and the same is reproduced as under for ready reference: vkj{kh dsUæ-------------ftyk xquk] vijkèk Øekad-------------xokg uEcj-------------dh /kkjk&164 nŒÁŒlaŒ dFku-------------rjQ ls 'kgknr vkt rkjh[k-------------dks yh xbZA xokg djhc------------lky dh mez dk ekywe gksrk gSA gyQ ls tokc djrk gS & esjk uke---------------iq=------------- tkfr-------------is’kk-------------irk---------------------------- uksV %& Qfj;knh ds dFku ysus ds iwoZ ;g lqfu’fpr dj fy;k x;k gS fd dksbZ iqfyl deZpkjh ,oa U;k;ky;hu deZpkjh ekStwn ugha gS] rnksijkar esjs psEcj esa dFku vafdr fd, x, rFkk Qfj;kfn;k ls iwNus ij mlus dFku LosPNkiwoZd fcuk fdlh /kkSal] ncko] èkedh ds fn;k tkuk crk;k gSA ¼1½ fnukad 1-5-2014 dks esjh 'kknh Á|qEu nqcs ls gqbZ FkhA 'kknh ds ckn esa gh esjs ifr vkSj lkl&llqj eq>s ngst ds fy, 'kkjhfjd ,oa ekufld :i ls ÁrkfM+r djrs FksA ¼2½ fnukad 5-6-2014 dks tc ge ifjokj lfgr gfj}kj x, Fks] rc nsoj jkgqy nqcs us eq>s idM+ dj esjs lhus dks nckus dk Á;kl fd;kA blds ckn yxkrkj esjk nsoj esjs lkFk NsM+dkuh djrk jgk vkSj ekSdk ikdj v'yhy gjdrsa vkSj esjs lkFk v'yhy ckrsa djrk FkkA yxHkx ,d lky igys nksigj dks eSa vius dejs esa lks jgh Fkh] rks nsoj jkgqy vkdj esjs Åij ysV x;k vkSj lkMh [khapyh vkSj Cykmt QkM fn;k vkSj nq"deZ djus dk Á;kl fd;k ml le; ?kj ds lHkh yksx ?kj esa ekStwn FksA eSa fpYykdj vius ifr ds ikl xbZ rks mUgksaus nsoj ls dqN ugha dgk vkSj ckdh ifjokj okyksa us dqN Hkh ugha dgkA lk{kh dks dFku i lgh gksuk Lohdkj fd;kA 19. Perusal of the said statement indicates that she referred the role of her brother-in-law Rahul Dubey but she nowhere refers the role of her husband or her father- and mother-in-law (petitioners of Cr. R. No. 87/2017). The statement recorded just after one day, i.e., 24.6.2016 therefore, it cannot be assumed that by the efflux of time, she forgot the details of incident. R. No. 87/2017). The statement recorded just after one day, i.e., 24.6.2016 therefore, it cannot be assumed that by the efflux of time, she forgot the details of incident. She tries to improve upon some contents qua Rahul Dubey which were not earlier lodged in the written complaint, FIR or police statement. Material contradictions and omissions exist in all her statements and contents of her written complaint as well as FIR. This shows her intention. 20. This fact has material bearing that after marriage (on 1.5.2014) her brother-in-law Rahul Dubey started misbehaving with her and first incident is of date 5.6.2014, one month after the date of marriage. Apparently, such allegation comes under the doubt for the reason that if she was so upset by the advances of her brother-in-law then she should have immediately reported her family members, husband as well as father/mother-in-law or to the police. She left her matrimonial home on 24.2.2015 and the said fact reflected in the judgment and decree dated 6.9.2017 passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Guna. When she left her matrimonial home within 10 months of her marriage on 24.2.2015 and thereafter, if any advances were made by the brother-in-law Rahul Dubey then she had one more opportunity to raise her voice and/or to mention the said fact in earlier FIR. The Police Station Kolaras, District Shivpuri registered the case vide Crime No. 204/2016 against all four petitioners of the instant case for alleged offence under section 498A of IPC and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, on which trial was conducted before the JMFC,Kolaras, District Shivpuri and vide judgment dated 26.9.2019, the said case resulted into acquittal of all the four petitioners/accused. 21. Reference of one compromise deed (Ex. P-3 of the said case) also finds place in judgment of the trial Court in which she accepted the fact that she was not allowed/restrained by the petitioner/husband to go to the place of her brother-in-law (Akhil) because her husband did not like the idea of going and staying for days together at her sister and brother-in-law’s place. In the said compromise deed dated 3.12.2014, she accepted that she wants to live happily with her matrimonial family and she would not be restrained by the family members/petitioners. 22. In the said compromise deed dated 3.12.2014, she accepted that she wants to live happily with her matrimonial family and she would not be restrained by the family members/petitioners. 22. The facts of misbehavior by Rahul Dubey could have reflected in the settlement deed dated 3.12.2014 because as per the allegations, first incident of misbehavior by brother-in-law Rahul Dubey was committed on 5.6.2014 at Haridwar therefore, on 3.12.2014, she could have referred this fact in compromise deed and could have ensured her modesty and chastity but same does not find place in the settlement deed or in the judgment dated 26.9.2019 passed by the JMFC, Kolaras. On this ground also, it appears that she filed the instant cases on false pretext just for harassment. 23. Interestingly, first FIR under section 498A of IPC was filed by the prosecutrix at Police Station Kolaras on 15.5.2016 and after one month she again filed an FIR with same allegations of dowry demand but with addition of section 354 and 376 of IPC. Second FIR was filed at Police Station GunaKotwali, District Guna. This shows the bend of mind and motive of respondent No. 2 to keep harassing the petitioners on one pretext or the other. These facts create sufficient doubt about the actual disposition of respondent No. 2 and her intention to wreak vengeance. Criminal law cannot be used as a tool for oppression, harassment and embarrassment to the common man. Here respondent No. 2 tried to misuse the process of law for extending harassment to the petitioners. She knows that all petitioners are government teachers and their entanglement in criminal proceedings would cost them heavily. Therefore, she is enjoying peevish pleasure. 24. When divorce proceedings successfully pursued by the petitioner/husband Pradumn Dubey and when all four petitioners successfully contested the trial of section 498A of IPC then again relegating them back for the trial for same offence under section 498A of IPC would be travesty of justice because long drawn litigation itself is a type of punishment or at least harassment to the common man which cannot be permitted in those cases where malice of complainant is apparent on record. 25. 25. Even otherwise on merits, no allegations of attributes of section 376 or 354 of IPC existed or reiterated by the complainant in her statement under section 164 of CrPC qua other petitioners because allegations are only against Rahul Dubey but since the mens rea or ill-motive is apparent which is being established by the documents available on record, therefore, this Court cannot sit with blind eyes to allow the continuation of the abuse of process of law. Interestingly, her case suffers from delay and laches also because she could not explain delay and factual inconsistency in her complaint and statements. 26. In the case of Sh. Satish Mehra v. Delhi Administration & Anr. [ (1996) 9 SCC 766 ], the Hon’ble apex Court has reiterated the scope of section 227 of CrPC which is reproduced as under : “15. But when the Judge is fairly certain that there is no prospect of the case ending in conviction the valuable time of the Court should not be wasted for holding a trial only for the purpose of formally completing the procedure to pronounce the conclusion on a future date. We are mindful that most of the Sessions Courts in India are under heavy pressure of work-load. If the Sessions Judge is almost certain that the trial would only be an exercise in futility or a sheer waste of time, it is advisable to truncate or snip the proceedings at the stage of section 227 of the Code itself.” 27. In the cumulative analysis and going through the judgment of the apex Court in the case of Rajiv Thapar (supra) and in the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds that it is case where interference would advance the cause of justice therefore, this Court intends to allow both the revisions filed by the petitioners. 28. Even otherwise, this Court does not find any ground to proceed further in the litigation and trial Court erred in rejecting the application under section 227/228 of CrPC for discharge as well as erred in framing charge as per impugned order dated 10.1.2017 (in Cr. R. No. 87/2017) and order dated 6.2.2017 (in Cr. R. No. 447/2017) and both the impugned orders are hereby set aside and no case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. 29. R. No. 87/2017) and order dated 6.2.2017 (in Cr. R. No. 447/2017) and both the impugned orders are hereby set aside and no case for trial has been made out by the prosecution. 29. Resultantly, petitioners are discharged from the clutches of charges under sections 498A and 376/109, 354/109 of IPC and petitioner Rahul Dubey for the offence under sections 498A, 376/511 and section 354 of IPC. They are set free. 30. E-copy/certified copy, whichever is available, of this order be provided to the petitioners and E-copy of this order be sent to the trial Court concerned for compliance. It is made clear that E-copy of this order shall be treated as certified copy for practical purposes in respect of this order. 31. Both the revision petitions stand allowed and disposed of accordingly.