JUDGMENT : ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J. 1. Heard the parties through video conferencing. 2. This revision petition is directed against the order dated 03.12.2019 passed by the learned District Judge-II-cum-Special Judge (A.C.B.) Dhanbad in Special Case No. 16 of 2013, M.C.A. No. 1760 of 2019 (C.N.R. No. JHDH01-009196-2019) whereby and where under, the learned court below has rejected the prayer of the petitioner to be discharged. 3. The brief facts of the case is that petitioner is admittedly a lady who is not a public servant and the allegation against the petitioner is that her husband took a loan of Rs. 3,50,000/- in her name for admission of their son and daughter from Sidharth Jha @ Raman Jha. It is further alleged that this case has been instituted on the direction of Lakayukta, Ranchi. The written complaint to Lokayukta was made by Sidharth Jha @ Raman Jha who is the younger brother of the Partha Sarthi Jha. Partha Sarthi Jha is a contractor who carries out his work in the name and style of Usha Enterprises. The said loan amount was transferred to the bank account of the petitioner. The husband of the petitioner did not return the said money to Sidharth Jha @ Raman Jha and it is also alleged that the husband of the petitioner has earned money disproportionate to his known source of income. It is also the case of the prosecution that the said Sidharth Jha @ Raman Jha filed Money Suit No. 01 of 2012 against the petitioner in the court of Sub Judge-I, Bokaro, though in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Anti-Corruption Bureau in this revision, it has wrongly been mentioned that the petitioner was not a party to the said money suit. It is also the case of the prosecution that earlier the said Sidharth Jha @ Raman Jha filed complaint case no. It is also the case of the prosecution that earlier the said Sidharth Jha @ Raman Jha filed complaint case no. 167 of 2011 in the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bokaro against the petitioner and her husband alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 420, 406/34 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, basing upon which FIR was registered but the said case has ended in compromise and the offences were compounded by the trial court of that case in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 320 of the Cr.P.C. It is also the case of the prosecution that the husband of the petitioner lodged a case for the offences punishable under the penal provisions of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act,1989 being SC/ST P.S. Case No. 2 of 2011 against the said Sidharth Jha @ Raman Jha and Manish Kumar Jha. In the present case after investigation charge sheet has been submitted inter-alia against the petitioner for having committed offences punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 as well as under Section 406/420/120B/34 of the Indian Penal Code. 4. Mr. Anil Kumar Kashyap, the Learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that admittedly the petitioner is not a public servant and the only allegation against her is that her husband has obtained a loan of Rs. 3,50,000/- in her name and for that earlier a money suit as well as criminal proceeding vide complaint case no. 167 of 2011 has already been instituted. Drawing attention of this Court to page nos. 5-6 of the supplementary affidavit which is a copy of the order dated 18.05.2018 passed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bokaro, in G.R. Case No. 410 of 2011, it is submitted by the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner that the said complaint basing upon which later on G.R. Case No. 410 of 2011 was instituted, has been compounded in exercise of the power under Section 320 of Cr.P.C. by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate. It is next submitted that the husband of the petitioner was working as an Executive Engineer in Rural Work Department, Government of Jharkhand and during his tenure as such in the year 2007, the proprietary firm of the brother of Sidharth Jha @ Raman Jha was black listed and in this respect, learned Senior Advocate appearing for the petitioner draws the attention of this Court to the copy of the relevant orders of the governments authorities. It is then submitted by the learned senior counsel that the FIR of this case was registered under the direction of the Lokayukta and the husband of the petitioner filed a writ application inter-alia challenging the institution of the FIR, wherein vide order dated 03.09.2012, a coordinate Bench of this Court has ordered that until further orders no coercive action shall be taken against the husband of the petitioner. It is next submitted that framing of charge against the petitioner will amount to abuse of process of the Court as the same is intended to settle score with the husband of the petitioner and to malign the petitioner. It is next submitted that the petitioner has independent source of income and she has filed Income Tax Return much before the lodging of the FIR and she cannot be held responsible for the act of her husband. In this respect, learned Senior Advocate relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh vs. J. Satyanarayana, (2017) 6 SCC 628 where in a case of disproportionate assets; when it was urged on behalf of the prosecution that the wife’s income should not be taken into consideration the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under in Paragraph-7: “7........... It was argued before the High Court that Ext.P-17, income tax return of the wife should not be relied upon and that it was an afterthought, brought into existence to save the respondent. The High Court rightly rejected it. We fail to understand how the income tax return, Ext.P-17, filed by the wife on 2-1-1986 could be labelled as an afterthought when it had been filed much prior to even the registration of the case against the respondent by ACB........” Hence, it is submitted that the impugned order being illegal and perverse be set aside and the petitioner be discharged. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. T.N. Verma, learned counsel appearing for the Anti-Corruption Bureau defended the impugned judgment and submitted that as the husband of the petitioner has taken a loan of Rs. 3,50,000/- in her name which shows her involvement in the offence and the same is sufficient to constitute an offence punishable under Section 13(1)(e) of Prevention of Corruption Act and the learned trial court having relied upon the settled principle of law that at the stage of considering the petition for discharge, a mini trial cannot be done by the trial court and thus has rightly rejected the prayer for discharge of the petitioner, therefore, it is submitted that the impugned order ought not to be interfered with by this Court. 6. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it is pertinent to mention that it is a settled principle of law as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of M.E. Shivalingamurty vs. Central Bureau of Investigation, Bengaluru, (2020) 2 SCC 768 wherein, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated the settled principle of law regarding discharging an accused as under in Paragraph-17: “17. This is an area covered by a large body of case law. We refer to a recent judgment which has referred to the earlier decisions, viz. P. Vijayan vs. State of Kerala and Another, (2010) 2 SCC 398 and discern the following principles: 17.1. If two views are possible and one of them gives rise to suspicion only as distinguished from grave suspicion, the Trial Judge would be empowered to discharge the accused. 17.2. The Trial Judge is not a mere Post Office to frame the charge at the instance of the prosecution. 17.3. The Judge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. Evidence would consist of the statements recorded by the Police or the documents produced before the Court. 17.4. If the evidence, which the Prosecutor proposes to adduce to prove the guilt of the accused, even if fully accepted before it is challenged in cross-examination or rebutted by the defence evidence, if any “cannot show that the accused committed offence, then, there will be no sufficient ground for proceeding with the trial.” 17.5. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion. 17.6. It is open to the accused to explain away the materials giving rise to the grave suspicion. 17.6. The court has to consider the broad probabilities, the total effect of the evidence and the documents produced before the court, any basic infirmities appearing in the case and so on. This, however, would not entitle the court to make a roving inquiry into the pros and cons. 17.7. At the time of framing of the charges, the probative value of the material on record cannot be gone into, and the material brought on record by the prosecution, has to be accepted as true. 17.8. There must exist some materials for entertaining the strong suspicion which can form the basis for drawing up a charge and refusing to discharge the accused.” (Emphasis Supplied) 7. It is crystal clear from the facts of the case that there is series of litigation between Sidharth Jha @ Raman Jha and the husband of the petitioner and it is an admitted case of the prosecution that the money suit was also filed for the selfsame cause of action of the loan being taken by the husband in her name and so far as the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 406 of Indian Penal Code are concerned a separate case was filed which has ended up in compromise and deemed acquittal under Section 320 of Cr.P.C. of the petitioner and admittedly the petitioner is not a public servant and admittedly the amount in her name taken by her husband is a loan amount so this Court is of the considered view that in the absences of any material or allegation of any criminal conspiracy entered into by the petitioner with the co-accused person; there is insufficient material in the record to frame charge under section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, or for that matter any other offence against the petitioner in this case. Thus, the impugned order passed by the trial court not discharging the petitioner is indefensible and the petitioner is entitled to be discharged. 8. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 03.12.2019 passed by the learned District Judge-II-cum-Special Judge (A.C.B.) Dhanbad in Special Case No. 16 of 2013 being not sustainable in law is set aside and the petitioner is discharged. 9. In the result, this criminal revision is allowed.