JUDGMENT 1. Heard Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners. Also heard Mr. D. Bhattacharjee, learned G.A. appearing for the State of Tripura and Mrs. S. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel appearing for the Tripura State Electricity Corporation Ltd. [2] All these writ petitions being WP(C) No. 1656 of 2017 [ Prafulla Shil v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1657 of 2017 [ Dipankar Das v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1658 of 2017 [ Kazi Mosaraf Hossain v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1659 of 2017 [ Tarun Ch. Das v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1660 of 2017 [ Ershad Ullah v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1661 of 2017 [ Swapan Kr. Saha v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1662 of 2017 [ Rathindra Narayan Bhattacharjee v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1663 of 2017 [ Dulal Debnath v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1664 of 2017 [ Rana Majumder v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1665 of 2017 [ Monoranjan Debnath v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1666 of 2017 [ Nani Gopal Debnath v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1667 of 2017 [ Braja Gopal Debnath v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1668 of 2017 [ Abhilash Das v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1669 of 2017 [ Sujit Pal v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1670 of 2017 [ Ranjan Nath v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1711 of 2017 [ Biplab Bhowmik v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1712 of 2017 [ Satyabrata Chakraborty v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1713 of 2017 [ Joydal Hossain v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1714 of 2017 [ Chandan Majumder v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1715 of 2017 [ Sajal Das v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1716 of 2017 [ Bikram Sarkar v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1717 of 2017 [ Tapas Kr. Das v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1721 of 2017 [ Laxman Debnath v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1722 of 2017 [ Prabir Kr. Roy v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1723 of 2017 [ Litan Sarkar v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1724 of 2017 [ Bidhan Das v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1725 of 2017 [ Pradyut Chakraborty v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1726 of 2017 [ Jayanta Bhowmik v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1727 of 2017 [ Amar Chakraborty v. The State of Tripura & Others ], WP(C) No. 1728 of 2017 [ Nibash Das v. The State of Tripura & Others ] and WP(C) No. 1729 of 2017 [ Narayan Ch. De v. The State of Tripura & Others ], are consolidated for disposal by a common judgment, as an identical controversy wades through these writ petitions. [3] The petitioners having held the posts of Junior Electrician/Junior Operator under the erstwhile Power Department (Respondent No.1) later on merged with Tripura State Electricity Corporation Ltd.(Respondents No.3 & 5) being established as a separate entity under G.O. No. 1(6)/CAB/99 dated 24.12.2004 have claimed for pay parity with those of Junior Draftsman/Junior Surveyor, working under the Public Works Department (PWD) the Government of Tripura, on the ground that the qualifications for entry as well as the duties and responsibilities are similar and identical. But, the Government i.e. respondents No. 1 & 2 have created artificial distinction in prescribing two different pay-scales for the Junior Electricians/Junior Operators and Junior Draftsman/Junior Surveyors. [4] The petitioners were appointed as Junior Electrician in the scale of pay of Rs. 970-2400/- on various dates between 1996- 1999. [5] It is the case of the petitioners that the posts of Surveyors or Draftsman and the posts of Electrician/Operator were having the same pay-scale in the year 1975 with a pay structure of Rs.300-600/-. In the revised scale of pay of 1982, the scale of pay for the posts of the Surveyors/Draftsman was determined at Rs.560- 1300/- whereas the Electrician/Operator was provided with scale of pay of Rs.430-850/-. [6] However, under the ROP Rules, 1988, the posts of Electricians/Operators being re-designated as Junior Electricians/Junior Operators and were provided the pay scale of Rs. In the revised scale of pay of 1982, the scale of pay for the posts of the Surveyors/Draftsman was determined at Rs.560- 1300/- whereas the Electrician/Operator was provided with scale of pay of Rs.430-850/-. [6] However, under the ROP Rules, 1988, the posts of Electricians/Operators being re-designated as Junior Electricians/Junior Operators and were provided the pay scale of Rs. 970-2400/-, whereas the posts of Surveyors or Draftsman being redesignated as Junior Surveyors/Junior Draftsman were given pay scale of Rs.1300-3220. This dissimilarity of pay runs ahead in the ROP-1999, ROP-2009 and ROP-2017. According to the petitioners, they were entitled to the scale of pay of Rs.1300-3220/- in terms of ROP-1988, thereafter, Rs.4200-8650/- in terms of ROP-1999; and Rs.5700-2400/- with Grade Pay of Rs.2800/- in terms of ROP-2009; and also in accordance with ROP-2017 with all financial benefits retrospectively. [7] Mr. Somik Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the qualifications prescribed for entry into the posts of Junior Electricians/Junior Operators and the posts of Junior Draftsman/Junior Surveyors are same and identical. To say more specifically, the required qualification as per recruitment rules prescribed under the Power Department, Government of Tripura for appointment to the posts of Junior Operators, is Madhyamik or equivalent examination with I.T.I passed in Electrician Trade. For the post Electrician under the department of Science & Technology having pay scale of Rs. 1300-3200/-, the required qualification is ITI Diploma Certificate in Electrician Course/Radio Television Trade with working experience preferable. [8] By the notification dated 15.03.1997, issued by the Public Works Department, Government of Tripura, the Recruitment Rules for the posts of Junior Draftsman, the pay scale was prescribed as Rs.1300-3220/-. The respondent Tripura State Electricity Corporation Ltd. ('TSECL' for short) have filed counter affidavit and have stated that prescribing same qualification for recruitment of different posts under different departments cannot be the ground for claiming the enhancement of pay scale. A specific pay scale is prescribed in the Recruitment Rule against a particular post of the respective department, considering the nature of duties and responsibilities for employees holding the said particular post. She further argued that burden lies upon the petitioners to prove that the duties and responsibilities of the Junior Electricians/Junior Operators are similar and identical to those of Junior Draftsman/Junior Surveyors. She further argued that burden lies upon the petitioners to prove that the duties and responsibilities of the Junior Electricians/Junior Operators are similar and identical to those of Junior Draftsman/Junior Surveyors. According to the respondent-TSECL, the job profile of the petitioners having Junior Electrician/Junior Operator is quite different and distinct from those of Junior Draftsman and Junior Surveyors. [9] Mrs. S. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel for the respondents contended that all the petitioners had entered into service according to the respective Recruitment Rules framed under Article-309 of the Constitution of India, where specific pay scales are prescribed for the posts of Junior Electrician/Junior Operators. The petitioners had applied for the posts knowing fully well the particular pay scales prescribed for the post they were applying for. Having accepted, the said prescribed pay scale, now the petitioners are estopped from raising any grievance for redetermination of their pay scale. To confront the said submission, Mr. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that at the time of joining, the petitioners did not have any bargaining power. [10] In support of her submission, Mrs. Deb (Gupta), learned counsel had relied upon a decision of a Co-ordinate Bench [A. Kureshi, CJ.] of this Court in Raja Saha v. The State of Tripura & Others in WP(C) No. 625 of 2019 dated 19.12.2019 . Further, she relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court in Punjab State Electricity Board and Another v. Thana Singh and Others , reported in AIR 2019 SC 354 . [11] On the other hand, Mr. Deb, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab and Others v. Jagjit Singh and Others , reported in (2017) 1 SCC 148 , where different parameters to attract the doctrine of equal pay for equal work were laid down. Mr. Deb, learned counsel for the petitioners also relied upon a decision of the Apex Court in Union of India and Others v. Rajesh Kumar Gond, reported in (2014) 13 SCC 588 , to substantiate his submission that when the petitioners had no opportunity to bargain, then, they have ample power to raise this issue subsequently. [12] Mr. Deb, learned counsel has submitted that before introduction of ROP Rules, 1988, the subject post and the reference posts were carrying the same scale of pay. [12] Mr. Deb, learned counsel has submitted that before introduction of ROP Rules, 1988, the subject post and the reference posts were carrying the same scale of pay. He further submitted that subsequently, many posts relating to senior Draftsman /Draftsman/Draftsman (Architect)/Surveyor/Junior Research Asstt./Junior Water Analyst/Junior Surveyor/Junior Draftsman were clubbed together and the posts of Jr. Mistry (Pipe Line)/Jr. Fitter/Jr. Operator (Plan)/Operator (UT Crane)/Jr. Winder/Jr. Mistry (Elec.)/Jr. Operator (D.C.,S.B.O.)/Jr. Meter Tester/Jr. lineman/Jr. Mistry (Sanitary)/Jr. Cable Jointer/Jr. Mechanic-cum-Operator/Jr. Rigger/Jr. Operator (Garden)/Jr. Operator (Dozer)/Jr. Operator /Jr. Operator (Crane)/Jr. Electrician/Jr. Welder/Jr. Mechanic/Jr. Operator (Switch Board)/Jr. Turner/Welder/Jr. Carpenter/Jr. Machanic (VHF)/Jr. mechanic (Workshop)/Jr. Upholsterer/Jr. Operator (Turboiler)/Jr. Operator (Compressor)/Jr. Operator (Barber Mixture)/Jr. Mason/Jr. Blacksmith/Jr. Operator (Bardma) were differently clubbed together in column-24 having different pay scale. [13] In the case of Raja Saha (supra), His Lordship (Hon'ble the CJ. A. Kureshi) enumerating the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' had observed thus: '8. It is well settled by the Supreme Court in number of cases that the principle of ?equal pay for equal work cannot be applied in abstract. Basically prescription of pay scales is to be decided by the Government duly assisted by the expert bodies such as Pay Commissions. Unless and until there is strong ground of discrimination, merely because two posts carry similar nomenclature, would not be the basis for granting upgradation of pay scale.' [14] Here, I may profitably refer the case of J. Singh (supra), where the Apex Court on consideration of catena of decisions had delineated the following parameters for invoking the principles for equal pay for equal work as follows: ' (i) The 'onus of proof', of parity in the duties and responsibilities of the subject post with the reference post, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', lies on the person who claims it. He who approaches the Court has to establish, that the subject post occupied by him, requires him to discharge equal work of equal value, as the reference post (see the Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case10, Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh v. Manju Mathur15, the Steel Authority of India Limited case16, and the National Aluminum Company Limited case18). (ii) The mere fact that the subject post occupied by the claimant, is in a 'different department' vis-a-vis the reference post, does not have any bearing on the determination of a claim, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. (ii) The mere fact that the subject post occupied by the claimant, is in a 'different department' vis-a-vis the reference post, does not have any bearing on the determination of a claim, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work'. Persons discharging identical duties, cannot be treated differently, in the matter of their pay, merely because they belong to different departments of Government (see the Randhir Singh case1, and the D.S. Nakara case2). (iii) The principle of 'equal pay for equal work', applies to cases of unequal scales of pay, based on no classification or irrational classification (see the Randhir Singh case1). For equal pay, the concerned employees with whom equation is sought, should be performing work, which besides being functionally equal, should be of the same quality and sensitivity (see the Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognized) case3, the Mewa Ram Kanojia case5, the Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers Union case6 and the S.C. Chandra case12). (iv) Persons holding the same rank/designation (in different departments), but having dissimilar powers, duties and responsibilities, can be placed in different scales of pay, and cannot claim the benefit of the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' (see the Randhir Singh case1, State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association9, and the Hukum Chand Gupta case17). Therefore, the principle would not be automatically invoked, merely because the subject and reference posts have the same nomenclature. (v) In determining equality of functions and responsibilities, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', it is necessary to keep in mind, that the duties of the two posts should be of equal sensitivity, and also, qualitatively similar. Differentiation of payscales for posts with difference in degree of responsibility, reliability and confidentiality, would fall within the realm of valid classification, and therefore, pay differentiation would be legitimate and permissible (see the Federation of All India Customs and Central Excise Stenographers (Recognized) case3 and the State Bank of India case8). The nature of work of the subject post should be the same and not less onerous than the reference post. Even the volume of work should be the same. And so also, the level of responsibility. The nature of work of the subject post should be the same and not less onerous than the reference post. Even the volume of work should be the same. And so also, the level of responsibility. If these parameters are not met, parity cannot be claimed under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' (see - State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia4, and the Grih Kalyan Kendra Workers Union case6). (vi) For placement in a regular pay-scale, the claimant has to be a regular appointee. The claimant should have been selected, on the basis of a regular process of recruitment. An employee appointed on a temporary basis, cannot claim to be placed in the regular pay-scale (see the Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology case10). (vii) Persons performing the same or similar functions, duties and responsibilities, can also be placed in different pay-scales. Such as - 'selection grade', in the same post. But this difference must emerge out of a legitimate foundation, such as merit, or seniority, or some other relevant criteria (see - State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia4). (viii) If the qualifications for recruitment to the subject post vis-a- vis the reference post are different, it may be difficult to conclude, that the duties and responsibilities of the posts are qualitatively similar or comparable (see the Mewa Ram Kanojia case5, and Government of W.B. v. Tarun K. Roy11). In such a cause, the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', cannot be invoked. (ix) The reference post, with which parity is claimed, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', has to be at the same hierarchy in the service, as the subject post. Pay-scales of posts may be different, if the hierarchy of the posts in question, and their channels of promotion, are different. Even if the duties and responsibilities are same, parity would not be permissible, as against a superior post, such as a promotional post (see - Union of India v. Pradip Kumar Dey7, and the Hukum Chand Gupta case17). (x) A comparison between the subject post and the reference post, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', cannot be made, where the subject post and the reference post are in different establishments, having a different management. Or even, where the establishments are in different geographical locations, though owned by the same master (see the Harbans Lal case23). (x) A comparison between the subject post and the reference post, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', cannot be made, where the subject post and the reference post are in different establishments, having a different management. Or even, where the establishments are in different geographical locations, though owned by the same master (see the Harbans Lal case23). Persons engaged differently, and being paid out of different funds, would not be entitled to pay parity (see - Official Liquidator v. Dayanand13). (xi) Different pay-scales, in certain eventualities, would be permissible even for posts clubbed together at the same hierarchy in the cadre. As for instance, if the duties and responsibilities of one of the posts are more onerous, or are exposed to higher nature of operational work/risk, the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' would not be applicable. And also when, the reference post includes the responsibility to take crucial decisions, and that is not so for the subject post (see the State Bank of India case8). (xii) The priority given to different types of posts, under the prevailing policies of the Government, can also be a relevant factor for placing different posts under different pay-scales. Herein also, the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' would not be applicable (see - State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association9). (xiii) The parity in pay, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', cannot be claimed, merely on the ground, that at an earlier point of time, the subject post and the reference post, were placed in the same payscale. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is applicable only when it is shown, that the incumbents of the subject post and the reference post, discharge similar duties and responsibilities (see - State of West Bengal v. West Bengal Minimum Wages Inspectors Association14). (xiv) For parity in pay-scales, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', equation in the nature of duties, is of paramount importance. If the principal nature of duties of one post is teaching, whereas that of the other is non-teaching, the principle would not be applicable. If the dominant nature of duties of one post is of control and management, whereas the subject post has no such duties, the principle would not be applicable. If the principal nature of duties of one post is teaching, whereas that of the other is non-teaching, the principle would not be applicable. If the dominant nature of duties of one post is of control and management, whereas the subject post has no such duties, the principle would not be applicable. Likewise, if the central nature of duties of one post is of quality control, whereas the subject post has minimal duties of quality control, the principle would not be applicable (see - Union Territory Administration, Chandigarh v. Manju Mathur15). (xv) There can be a valid classification in the matter of pay-scales, between employees even holding posts with the same nomenclature i.e., between those discharging duties at the headquarters, and others working at the institutional/sub-office level (see the Hukum Chand Gupta case17), when the duties are qualitatively dissimilar. (xvi) The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' would not be applicable, where a differential higher pay-scale is extended to persons discharging the same duties and holding the same designation, with the objective of ameliorating stagnation, or on account of lack of promotional avenues (see the Hukum Chand Gupta case17). (xvii) Where there is no comparison between one set of employees of one organization, and another set of employees of a different organization, there can be no question of equation of pay-scales, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', even if two organizations have a common employer. Likewise, if the management and control of two organizations, is with different entities, which are independent of one another, the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' would not apply (see the S.C. Chandra case12, and the National Aluminum Company Limited case18). ' [15] Now, it is well-settled proposition of law that burden of proof entirely lies upon the petitioners to prove that the duties and responsibilities of the posts are qualitatively similar or comparable. When the petitioners had failed to discharge their liabilities, then, the principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be invoked. In J. Singh (supra), relying upon the judgment of State of West Bengal v. W. B. Minimum Wages Inspector Assn, reported in (2010) 5 SCC 225 the Apex Court at para-20.2 [SCC p.181.para-20.2 of para-20] had held thus:- '20.2 In the above adjudication, this Court recorded the following observations [see pp.222-23 para 20-25] 20. In J. Singh (supra), relying upon the judgment of State of West Bengal v. W. B. Minimum Wages Inspector Assn, reported in (2010) 5 SCC 225 the Apex Court at para-20.2 [SCC p.181.para-20.2 of para-20] had held thus:- '20.2 In the above adjudication, this Court recorded the following observations [see pp.222-23 para 20-25] 20. The burden to prove disparity is on the employees claiming parity vide State of U.P. v. Ministerial Karamchari Sangh, (1998) 1 SCC 422 ; Associate Banks Officers Association v. SBI, (1998) 1 SCC 428 ; State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal Staff Association, (2002) 6 SCC 72 ; State of Haryana v. Tilak Raj, (2003) 6 SCC 123 ; S.C. Chandra v. State of Jharkhand, (2007) 8 SCC 279 and U.P. SEB v. Aziz Ahmad, (2009) 2 SCC 606 . 21. What is significant in this case is that parity is claimed by Inspectors, AMW, by seeking extension of the pay scale applicable to Inspector (Cooperative Societies), Extension Officers (Panchayat) and KGOJLRO (Revenue Officers) not on the basis that the holders of those posts were performing similar duties or functions as Inspectors, AMW. On the other hand, the relief was claimed on the ground that prior to ROPA Rules 1981, the posts in the said three reference categories, and Inspectors, AMW were all in the same pay scale (Pay Scale 9), and that under ROPA Rules 1981, those other three categories have been given a higher Pay Scale of No.11, while they Inspectors, AMW - were discriminated by continuing them in the Pay Scale 9. 22. The claim in the writ petition was not based on the ground that subject post and reference category posts carried similar or identical duties and responsibilities but on the contention that as the subject post holders and the holders of reference category posts who were enjoying equal pay at an earlier point of time, should be continued to be given equal pay even after pay revision. In other words, the parity claimed was not on the basis of equal pay for equal work, but on the basis of previous equal pay. 23. It is now well-settled that parity cannot be claimed merely on the basis that earlier the subject post and the reference category posts were carrying the same scale of pay. In other words, the parity claimed was not on the basis of equal pay for equal work, but on the basis of previous equal pay. 23. It is now well-settled that parity cannot be claimed merely on the basis that earlier the subject post and the reference category posts were carrying the same scale of pay. In fact, one of the functions of the Pay Commission is to identify the posts which deserve a higher scale of pay than what was earlier being enjoyed with reference to their duties and responsibilities, and extend such higher scale to those categories of posts. 24. The Pay Commission has two functions; to revise the existing pay scale, by recommending revised pay scales corresponding to the pre- revised pay scales and, secondly, make recommendations for upgrading or downgrading posts resulting in higher pay scales or lower pay scales, depending upon the nature of duties and functions attached to those posts. Therefore, the mere fact that at an earlier point of time, two posts were carrying the same pay scale does not mean that after the implementation of revision in pay scales, they should necessarily have the same revised pay scale. 25. As noticed above, one post which is considered as having a lesser pay scale may be assigned a higher pay scale and another post which is considered to have a proper pay scale may merely be assigned the corresponding revised pay scale but not any higher pay scale. 25. As noticed above, one post which is considered as having a lesser pay scale may be assigned a higher pay scale and another post which is considered to have a proper pay scale may merely be assigned the corresponding revised pay scale but not any higher pay scale. Therefore, the benefit of higher pay scale can only be claimed by establishing that holders of the subject post and holders of reference category posts, discharge duties and functions identical with, or similar to, each other and that the continuation of disparity is irrational and unjust.' Based on the above consideration, this Court observed, that Inspectors (Agricultural Minimum Wages), had neither pleaded nor proved, that they were discharging duties and functions similar to the duties and functions of the Inspectors (Cooperative Societies), Extension Officers (Panchayats) and Revenue Officers, and therefore held, that their claim for pay parity, under the principle of 'equal pay for equal work', could not be accepted.' [16] In the case of Raja Saha (supra) the Court taking note of the case of Union of India and Another v. P.V. Hariharan and Another , reported in (1997) 3 SCC 568 has observed that 'unless a clear-cut case of hostile discrimination is made out there should be no judicial interference with pay scales fixed by the Government on the recommendation of the Pay Commission. It was further observed that the fixation of pay scales is a function of the Government and not that of the Administrative Tribunals.' [17] While enumerating the legal position on the subject in the case of Raja Saha (supra), it was observed that: '12. In case of Union of India v. Tarit Ranjan Das reported in (2003) 11 SCC 658 it was observed that principle of equal pay for equal work cannot be applied merely on the basis of designation or nature of work. Following observations may be noted: '9. Strangely, the Tribunal in the review petition came to hold that the Commission had not based its conclusion on any data. It is trite law that it is not open for any Court to sit in judgment as on appeal over the conclusion of the Commission. Further the Tribunal and the High Court proceeded as if it was the employer who was to show that there was no equality in the work. It is trite law that it is not open for any Court to sit in judgment as on appeal over the conclusion of the Commission. Further the Tribunal and the High Court proceeded as if it was the employer who was to show that there was no equality in the work. On the contrary the person who asserts that there is equality has to prove it. The equality is not based on designation or the nature of work alone. There are several other factors like, responsibilities, reliabilities, experience, confidentiality involved, functional need and requirements commensurate with the position in the hierarchy, the qualification required which are equally relevant. ****************** 11. In the case of State of U.P. v. J.P. Chaurasia, (1989) 1 SCC 121 it was pointed out that whether two posts are equal or should carry the equal pay, depends on several factors. It does not depend just upon either the nature of work or the volume of work done. Primarily it requires among others, evaluation of duties and responsibilities of the respective posts by the competent authorities constituted for the purpose and courts cannot ordinately substitute themselves in the place of those authorities. The quantity of work may be the same but the quality may be different. That cannot be determined by relying upon averments in affidavits of interested parties. It must be determined by expert bodies like Pay Commission and the Government, who would be the best judges, to evaluate the nature of duty, responsibility and all relevant factors. The same view was reiterated in the case of State of M.P. v. Pramod Bhartiya, [ (1993) 1 SCC 539 ] by a three-Judge Bench of this Court. In the case of Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India [ (1994) 2 SCC 521 ] a claim for equal pay by a group of Pharmacists was rejected saying that the classification made by a body of experts after full study and analysis of the work, should not be disturbed except for strong reasons which indicate that the classification made was unreasonable.' [18] In the same judgment, it was further observed as under: '19. Having considered the authorities and the submissions we are of the view that the authorities in the cases of Jasmer Singh, Tilak Raj, Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology and Tarun K. Roy lay down the correct law. Having considered the authorities and the submissions we are of the view that the authorities in the cases of Jasmer Singh, Tilak Raj, Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology and Tarun K. Roy lay down the correct law. Undoubtedly, the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" is not an abstract doctrine and is capable of being enforced in a Court of law. But equal pay must be for equal work of equal value. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" has no mechanical application in every case. Article 14 permits reasonable classification based on qualities or characteristics of persons recruited and grouped together, as against those who were left out. Of course, the qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved. In service matters, merit or experience can be a proper basis for classification for the purposes of pay in order to promote efficiency in administration. A higher pay scale to avoid stagnation or resultant frustration for lack of promotional avenues is also an acceptable reason for pay differentiation. The very fact that the person has not gone through the process of recruitment may itself, in certain cases, make a difference. If the educational qualifications are different, then also the doctrine may have no application. Even though persons may do the same work, their quality of work may differ. Where persons are selected by a Selection Committee on the basis of merit with due regard to seniority a higher pay scale granted to such persons who are evaluated by competent authority cannot be challenged. A classification based on difference in educational qualifications justifies a difference in pay scales. A mere nomenclature designating a person as say a carpenter or a craftsman is not enough to come to the conclusion that he is doing the same work as another carpenter or craftsman in regular service. Page 9 of 11 The quality of work which is produced may be different and even the nature of work assigned may be different. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. It is not just a comparison of physical activity. The application of the principle of "equal pay for equal work" requires consideration of various dimensions of a given job. The accuracy required and the dexterity that the job may entail may differ from job to job. It cannot be judged by the mere volume of work. There may be qualitative difference as regards reliability and responsibility. Functions may be the same but the responsibilities made a difference. Thus normally the applicability of this principle must be left to be evaluated and determined by an expert body. These are not matters where a writ court can lightly interfere. Normally a party claiming equal pay for equal work should be required to raise a dispute in this regards. In any event the party who claims equal pay for equal work has to make necessary averments and prove that all things are equal. Thus, before any direction can be issued by a Court, the Court must first see that there are necessary averments and there is a proof. If the High Court, is on basis of material placed before it, convinced that there was equal work of equal quality and all other relevant factors are fulfilled it may direct payment of equal pay from the date of the filing of the respective Writ Petition. In all these cases, we find that the High Court has blindly proceeded on the basis that the doctrine of equal pay for equal work applies without examining any relevant factors.' [19] Bearing in mind the above principles thus enunciated, this Court may conclusively hold that determination of parity or disparity in duties and responsibilities is a complex issue and the same should be left to the expert body. When the expert body considered revision of pay for various posts, it did not revise the pay scale of Jr. Electricians/Jr. operators that of Jr. Surveyors/Jr. Draftsman. When the expert body has taken such a view, it is not for the court to substitute its views and interfere with the same and take a different view. When the expert body considered revision of pay for various posts, it did not revise the pay scale of Jr. Electricians/Jr. operators that of Jr. Surveyors/Jr. Draftsman. When the expert body has taken such a view, it is not for the court to substitute its views and interfere with the same and take a different view. [20] In the context of the present case, in my opinion, the forceful submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners that since in the year 1975, the posts of Junior Draftsman/Junior Surveyors (Surveyor or Draftsman before redesignation) and the posts of Electricians/Operators re-designated Junior Electricians/Junior Operators, were carrying the same scale with a pay structure of Rs.300-600/- the State Government is under obligation to maintain pay parity of those posts in future pay revision, is bereft of any merit. [21] In furtherance thereof, similar mode of recruitment and similar qualification prescribed also cannot be the determining factor to demand equal pay scale. The Apex Court in the case of Steel Authority of India Limited v. Dibyendu Bhattacharya , reported in AIR 2011 SC 897 has held at para-24 that: '29. It is a well legal proposition that it is not always impermissible to provide two different pay scales for the same cadre on the basis of selection based on merit with due regard to experience and seniority' (vide State of U.P. and Others v. J. P. Chaurasia and Others (1998) 1 SCC 121; ( AIR 1989 SC 19 ) and Mew Ram Kanojia v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences and Others (1998) 2 SCC 235; ( AIR 1989 SC 1256 ) 'Non-uniformity would not in all events violate Article 14'. Thus, a mere difference does not always amount to discrimination (vide Madhu Kishwar and Others v. State of Bihar and Others (1996) 5 SCC 125 '. ( AIR 1996 SC 1864 ) , Associate Banks Officers Assn. v. SBI and Others (1998) 1 SCC 428 : ( AIR 1998 SC 32 ) and Official Liquidator v. Dayananda and Others (2008) 10 SCC 1 : (AIR 2008 SC (Suup) 1177) . [22] In the instant case, the petitioners have failed to produce any materials to justify how the duties and responsibilities discharged by them are similar and identical to those of holding the posts of Junior Surveyors/Junior Draftsman under the TSECL. [22] In the instant case, the petitioners have failed to produce any materials to justify how the duties and responsibilities discharged by them are similar and identical to those of holding the posts of Junior Surveyors/Junior Draftsman under the TSECL. Mere statement, in the petition, cannot serve the purpose that the petitioners being Junior Electricians/Junior Operators discharge similar and identical duties and responsibilities as those of Junior Draftsman/Junior Surveyors under the TSECL. [23] In furtherance thereof, this Court has no expertise to evaluate the similarities to the nature of duties performed by the petitioners as Jr. Electricians/Jr. Operators to those of Jr. Draftsman/Jr. Surveyors. From the nomenclature of the posts as stated above, in my considered view, the nature of duties and responsibilities performed by the Jr. Draftsman/Jr. Surveyors cannot be equated with the duties and responsibilities assigned to the Jr. Electricians/Jr. Operators. The Government in its own wisdom classified the posts of Jr. Surveyors/Jr. Draftsmen as a separate entity and put them with a higher pay scale than that of the petitioners having holding the posts of Jr. Electricians/Jr. Operators. In that case, in considered view, interference of this Court with such exercise of the State authority would tantamount to over-step the well-thought decision of the Government and its functionaries which exclusively are within their domain. As I said earlier, this Court has no such expertise or mechanism to examine the parameters evolved by the expert body as well as Pay Anomaly Committee appointed by the Government to determine the adequate pay scales of the employees holding different category of posts or different cadres under different organisations of the government. [24] For the same reason, I cannot accept the submission of Mr. S. Deb, learned counsel for the petitioners that the duties and responsibilities performed by the petitioners as Jr. Electricians/Jr. Operators are similar and identical to that of Junior Draftsman/Jr. Surveyor or that of Overseer (Garden)/Jr. Overseer/Jr. Overseer (Garden) having the benefit of higher pay scale. The petitioners have failed to establish their functionalities and activities are equal to those of Jr. Surveyors/Jr. Draftsman. Even if the functions are same, by no stretch of imagination, this Court in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction under Article-226 of the Constitution of India would not measure the difference or evaluate the degree of responsibilities which matters a lot in determining the pay scales. Surveyors/Jr. Draftsman. Even if the functions are same, by no stretch of imagination, this Court in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction under Article-226 of the Constitution of India would not measure the difference or evaluate the degree of responsibilities which matters a lot in determining the pay scales. [Emphasis supplied] [25] In the above conspectus, I find no merit in this bunch of writ petitions and accordingly, all the writ petitions are dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.