JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Mr. Dharmesh V. Shah, learned advocate waives service of notice of rule on behalf of the contesting respondent. 2. The present petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India is filed by original defendant no. 1 for challenging the legality and validity of the order dated 03.12.2012 in Civil Revision Application No. 11 of 2011, passed by the learned Appellate Bench of Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad. 3. The background of facts in which the present petition came up for consideration is that the petitioner – Trust is a landlord of the suit premises which was originally let out to respondent no. 1 – original plaintiff, namely Smt. Godavariben Venshimal, who died during the pendency of the proceedings, and thereafter to original plaintiff no. 2. However, a written contract was entered into and with the consent of the landlord, the property in question was sublet to respondent no. 2, who is original defendant no. 2, namely the UCO Bank and for that purpose tri-partite agreement came to be entered into on 19.01.1974. 4. The original contract stated above was initially for tenure of 15 years and it was thereafter agreed that the renewal at the interval of every five (5) years twice to be effected and as such, accordingly, both tri- agreements were for a period of 20 years in total. However, the agreement which was executed for which permission was sought from the Charity Commissioner was obtained. 5. It appears from the assertion in the proceedings that the landlord had issued a notice calling upon defendant no. 2 – UCO Bank to vacate the suit premises and hand over the possession of the same. Despite the termination of tenancy, the landlord was accepting the rent from original defendant no.2 for September, 1999. It is the say of the petitioner that this has generated multiple litigations, but then renewal was required to be executed from the year 2000 onwards the landlord had withdrawn the suits which were filed at the relevant point of time. Despite the termination of tenancy, the landlord was accepting the rent from original defendant no.2 for September, 1999. It is the say of the petitioner that this has generated multiple litigations, but then renewal was required to be executed from the year 2000 onwards the landlord had withdrawn the suits which were filed at the relevant point of time. Subsequently, Wakf Act, 1999 was brought into effect and Wakf Board refused to give necessary permission for renewal of lease since the same cannot be renewed for a period beyond three (3) years and despite the fact that the period has expired, there was no renewal of lease and according to the petitioner, as per the facts on record, after 24.07.2003, there was no renewal of lease. As a result of this, the situation has resulted into filing of H.R.P. Suit No. 220 of 2002 filed by the landlord for eviction of the suit premises against respondent nos. 1, 2 and 3 as well. The said suit was withdrawn and the lease of original tenant came to be terminated and subsequently on account of the said situation, original plaintiff filed the present suit bearing H.R.P. Suit No. 477 of 2008 for recovery of rent and possession. During the pendency of the present proceedings, when the evidence came to be led, by that time, an application came to be filed at Exhibit-29 under Section 11(4) of the Bombay Rent Act with a prayer that defendant no. 2 – UCO Bank to pay rent of Rs.1,27,896/- and to go on paying the same regularly in the Court. This application at Exhibit-29 appears to have been contested and after full-fledged hearing and its adjudication, the said application came to be dismissed vide order dated 27.04.2011 passed below Exhibit-29, by the Small Causes Court, at Ahmedabad. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the said order at Exhibit-29, respondent nos. 1 and 2 herein have filed a revision application before the learned Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad being Civil Revision Application No. 11 of 2011. After hearing, the learned Appellate Bench was pleased to allow the revision application by granting relief in terms of para 11(a) of the application at Exhibit-29 vide order dated 03.12.2012. 7. It appears further from the record that in the main suit, amendment was already carried out and three new trustees have been appointed and brought on record. After hearing, the learned Appellate Bench was pleased to allow the revision application by granting relief in terms of para 11(a) of the application at Exhibit-29 vide order dated 03.12.2012. 7. It appears further from the record that in the main suit, amendment was already carried out and three new trustees have been appointed and brought on record. But when respondent nos. 1 and 2 did not bring the said new trustees on record, vide purshis at Exhibit-24, an objection was raised and it was noticed that new trustees were already there in the suit proceedings and even the plaint was also amended and as such, in revision application no alteration was effected. Hence, with this background, original defendant no. 1 has challenged the impugned order dated 03.12.2012 passed by the learned Appellate Bench before this Court by way of present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 8. This petition appears to have been entertained by issuing notice on 28.12.2012 with notice as to interim relief, but then, it further appears from the record that when it was noticed by the Court on 11.01.2013 that though served respondent nos. 1/1 to 1/3 have refused to accept the writ of this Court who are the legal heirs of original tenant – Godavariben, the Court was constrained to grant an interim order and the same has throughout been continued from time to time. During this proceedings, certain civil applications have also been filed at a frequent intervals, but since the main Special Civil Application is finally heard, the details of these civil applications are not mentioned in detailed in the present order. Hence, with this background of fact, the present Special Civil Application is taken up for final disposal with the consent and request of the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. 9. Mr. M.B. Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr. Chinmay Gandhi, learned advocate for the petitioner has raised multiple contentions in the present petition. Learned counsel has submitted that the learned appellate Bench has not properly appreciated the legal issue involved in the present proceedings and has brushed aside the real controversy. It has been further contended by Mr. 9. Mr. M.B. Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr. Chinmay Gandhi, learned advocate for the petitioner has raised multiple contentions in the present petition. Learned counsel has submitted that the learned appellate Bench has not properly appreciated the legal issue involved in the present proceedings and has brushed aside the real controversy. It has been further contended by Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel that there is a difference in scope of revision under Section 29(3) of the Bombay Rent Act and Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and as such, the revisional Court has exceeded its jurisdiction and committed a serious error in exercising the jurisdiction. Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel has further contended that while dealing with the revision application and passing the impugned order, the learned appellate Bench has not taken into consideration the relevant documents on record. The learned Appellate Bench has also further failed to appreciate that there is no existence of landlord and tenant relationship and undisputedly, after the termination of agreement, the head tenant who is not at all in possession and whose tenancy is no longer in existence, the suit for possession itself is not maintainable. According to Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel, if that be so, there is hardly any merit available for passing order in favour of the applicants. 10. Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel has further contended that the learned trial Court has failed to appreciate that after the termination of original agreement, a new contract, with fresh terms has been executed and entered into with UCO Bank i.e. defendant no. 2 and, therefore, there is a clear difference seen of relationship of landlord-tenant and head tenant and therefore, in view of this subsequent development also, the main suit proceedings itself are not maintainable and there is no question of granting any relief in favour of the revisional petitioner. Shri Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that all these circumstances are not in dispute and, therefore the real question which arose for recovery of rent when tenancy agreement is no longer in existence and therefore, in a situation like this, there is hardly any question of applicability of Section 11(4) of the Bombay Rent Act. 11. Mr. Shri Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that all these circumstances are not in dispute and, therefore the real question which arose for recovery of rent when tenancy agreement is no longer in existence and therefore, in a situation like this, there is hardly any question of applicability of Section 11(4) of the Bombay Rent Act. 11. Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that the suit premises is undisputedly not a residential premises and the premises in question was used purely for commercial purpose and though at one point of time it was sub-let with the consent of the original landlord, but later on when such consent is no longer in existence, it is not open to submit any claim of recovery of rent, since direct agreement has already been entered into and defendant no. 2 i.e. UCO Bank is paying rent to the petitioner directly and as such the original erstwhile tenant claiming to be a head tenant has no right even to file a suit, apart from claiming any recovery of rent. Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that it has rightly been appreciated by the Small Causes Court, at trial level and correct conclusion is arrived at, which could not have been disturbed by the appellate Bench sitting in revisional jurisdiction. Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that there a stiff difference between the scope of revision and scope of appeal. Hence, in a situation like this, there appears no option for revisional court to substitute any finding based upon the very same material. Hence, there appears to be clear error in passing the impugned order. Accordingly, the impugned order is required to be quashed and set aside. 12. Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Advocate has submitted that ultimately, even if the head tenant is aggrieved by any breach of contract, then, at the best, a suit can be maintained for claiming the damages and cannot resort to such kind of application for claiming right, which is otherwise payable to the petitioner and hence right now, respondent no. 1 appears to be stranger to the subsequent contract, so no relief could have been granted. 13. Mr. 1 appears to be stranger to the subsequent contract, so no relief could have been granted. 13. Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that ultimately what had been claimed is a relief in the form of monetary claim, which after full-fledged adjudication can be granted even if the stand of the original plaintiff is found to be just and proper and as such, at this stage, invoking provisions under Section 11(4) of the Bombay Rent Act is nothing but intercepting the suit proceedings, which are otherwise at the stage of recording of evidence. Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel has submitted on instructions that at the best the suit proceedings can be expedited to which, his client is ready and willing to co-operate with the adjudication of the main proceedings and as such has submitted that the petition be allowed by quashing and setting aside the impugned order. In addition to this, Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the petitioner – Trust is receiving every month a rent payable by defendant no. 2 i.e. UCO Bank and the Trust has no other source of income. Resultantly, Mr. Gandhi submitted that the reliefs claimed in the petition be granted in the interest of justice. 14. As against this, Mr. Mehul Shah, learned Senior Counsel appearing with Mr. Dharmesh V. Shah, learned advocate representing respondent no. 1/1 to 1/3 has vehemently opposed the stand of the petitioner. It has been contended that there was a clear tri-partite agreement with a term of renewal has been executed between the parties and the parties are bound to obey the said signed agreement. It has been contended that despite the aforesaid situation, a direct agreement came to be executed by the Trust with defendant no. 2 – Bank on 10.10.2007, which clearly indicate that there is some remote right related with the respondents about reality and accidental claim to a tenancy. It has been contended by Mr. Shah, learned Senior Counsel that there is no termination in the eye of law to the effect of agreement of 2000, which arrived at between the parties to the proceedings and, therefore, in this situation, respondent nos. 1/1 to 1/3 cannot be said to be stranger in any form. On the contrary, the stand taken by defendant no.2 – Bank, the last four lines in their reply has also indicated the interest of respondent no. 1. 1/1 to 1/3 cannot be said to be stranger in any form. On the contrary, the stand taken by defendant no.2 – Bank, the last four lines in their reply has also indicated the interest of respondent no. 1. It has further been contended that on the contrary, a separate suit has been instituted by the petitioner – Trust being H.R.P. Suit No. 285 of 2000 and by referring to page 32 of petition compilation, a contention is raised that status of respondent nos.1/1 to 1/3 by virtue of pendency of this suit itself continues. As a result of this, there is no error committed by the revisional court in passing the impugned order. Mr. Shah, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that surrendering of the tenancy cannot be presumed too easily as there is no termination of tenancy. Apart from that a further agreement which took place by the trust with defendant no. 2 i.e. UCO Bank in the year 2007 is behind the back of original head tenant Godavariben and, therefore, the said unilateral agreement of 2007 cannot be resorted to deprive the legitimate rent from defendant no. 2. Mr. Shah, learned Senior Counsel has further submitted that adequate reason is assigned by the revisional court i.e. by the appellate Bench of Small Causes Court and as such, such a well-reasoned order cannot be disturbed in exercise of extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. In substance, Mr. Shah, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the conduct of the petitioner in filing separate suit, inference about the legitimate right of respondent nos. 1 and 2 is easily curled out and as such by referring to certain documents Mr. Shah, learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the petition is meritless and the same is required to be dismissed. To strengthen his submission, Mr. Shah, learned Senior Counsel has cited few decisions (i) in the case of V.S. Thiagarraja Mudaliar v. Bava C Chokkappa Mudaliar reported in AIR 1974 SC 944 , and thereby has vehemently opposed the petition and requested the Court to dismiss the same. 15. To counter this submission, Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Advocate has referred to Section 111(F) of the Transfer of Property Act and has ultimately contended that by virtue of agreement dated 10.10.2007 with defendant no. 15. To counter this submission, Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Advocate has referred to Section 111(F) of the Transfer of Property Act and has ultimately contended that by virtue of agreement dated 10.10.2007 with defendant no. 2, there is implied surrendering by original opponent and, therefore, even if original head tenant was not party to the said agreement of 2007, there is an implied surrendering which oust respondent nos. 1/1 to 1/3 to claim any relief and that too at this stage of the proceedings. Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Advocate has further submitted that this property in question is a Wakf property and hence, by virtue of Section 56(c) of the Wakf Act, lease can be for a limited period of time and certainly not beyond a period of three years. On the contrary, Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Advocate has submitted that this concept of implied surrendering can be easily inferred at this stage of the proceedings, particularly, when an agreement has already taken place and therefore, by referring to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of P.M.C. Kuunhiraman Nair v. C.R. Naganathan Iyer & Ors., reported in AIR 1993 SC 307 a contention of implied surrendering has been substantiated. A reference is made to para 8, 9, and 10 to 13 of the said decision. 16. Yet another decision has been pointed out by Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Advocate in the case of Gohil Amarsing Govindbhai (decd.) by L.Rs. v. Shah Mansukhlal Chhaganlal (Decd.) by L.R., reported in AIR 2003 9(Guj) 78 and has vehemently contended that unless an agreement is enforceable, no right can be claimed out of it and by referring to Section 14 (a) (c) of the Specific Relief Act, a contention is raised that the order in question deserves to be set aside. 17. As against this submission, Mr. Shah, learned Senior Advocate has further submitted that the implied surrendering concept should be between the parties to the contract and undisputedly, respondent nos. 1/1 to 1/3 and even Smt. Godavariben was not party to the agreement dated 10.10.2007 and therefore, the concept of implied surrendering cannot be pressed into service. Mr. Shah has further submitted that these contentions of Mr. Gandhi in fact are pari delicto. So it is not open for the petitioner to raise any plea of implied surrendering. 1/1 to 1/3 and even Smt. Godavariben was not party to the agreement dated 10.10.2007 and therefore, the concept of implied surrendering cannot be pressed into service. Mr. Shah has further submitted that these contentions of Mr. Gandhi in fact are pari delicto. So it is not open for the petitioner to raise any plea of implied surrendering. In fact, a separate suit has already been filed for claiming reliefs, and if to be viewed from that angle, there appears to be no merit in the petition. By referring to para 29 of the decision of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1974 SC 994 , Mr. Shah, learned Senior Advocate has submitted that even if the petitioner is prejudicially affected by the order, then the present petitioner has no locus so long as share of original respondent as a tenant is generated from tri-partite agreement of 2000 and therefore, even if the relief which has been granted by the appellate Bench is allowed to operate, the rights claimed by the petitioner cannot be prejudicially affected and, therefore, also the petitioner has no right to agitate and the entertainment of petition according Mr. Shah, learned Senior Advocate is out of place. However, be that as it may, Mr. Shah, learned Senior Advocate has submitted that the effect of execution of agreement between the parties will have to be gone into and till then the reliefs which have been granted by the appellate Bench does not deserve to be interfered with. Hence, Mr. Shah submitted that the petition be disposed of as having no merit. However, Mr. Shah, learned Senior Advocate on instructions has submitted that if the suit is to be expedited, the parties will co-operate with the hearing of the suit. With this background of submissions, Mr. Shah, learned Senior Advocate has requested the Court to dismiss the petition. 18. Having heard the learned senior counsels appearing for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record, few circumstances are not possible to be unnoticed by the Court. 19. Undisputedly, a fresh agreement has already been entered into and is in existence, namely agreement dated 10.10.2007 between the petitioner and defendant no. 2 and by virtue of the said agreement, the petitioner – Trust is receiving regularly rent from defendant no. 2. 19. Undisputedly, a fresh agreement has already been entered into and is in existence, namely agreement dated 10.10.2007 between the petitioner and defendant no. 2 and by virtue of the said agreement, the petitioner – Trust is receiving regularly rent from defendant no. 2. From the record, it further appears that this controversy in question about the lease agreement to the suit property has generated multiple suit proceedings and undisputedly, the property in question belongs to the Trust. From the record, it appears that there is a serious question involved in the proceedings with regard to adjudication of legality and validity of lease deed marked as Mark 4/25 and Mark 18/1 i.e. lease deed dated 10.10.2007 and undisputedly, this Mark 18/1 is already operative so far and, therefore, when the said adjudication is yet to be undertaken, the learned trial court has rightly observed that it is difficult to grant Exhibit-29 at this stage of the proceedings, particularly, when the evidence is yet to be adduced by the parties to the proceedings. At this stage, granting of relief as prayed for in Exhibit-29 would tantamount to grant of substantive reliefs which rightly has not been considered by the learned trial Court. It appears to this Court that the learned trial Court while passing the impugned order on 27.04.2011 rejecting Exhibit-29 has assigned cogent and proper reasons and had passed after proper scrutiny of material on record and in consonance with the proposition of law and after examination, the said exercise of jurisdiction is not possible to be construed by this Court as perverse in any form. 20. It is clearly visible from the record that the learned trial court has considered both these agreements while taking a particular view at this stage and as such it is not correct to say that this order is passed by ignorance of any such documents and therefore, on the basis of same material, to arrive at a conclusion there must be some convincible distinguishable material to indicate that serious error is committed. In absence thereof, it is not possible by the revisional court to unturn the conclusion which is based on appreciation of material. 21. It has further been found that undisputedly, original plaintiff no. In absence thereof, it is not possible by the revisional court to unturn the conclusion which is based on appreciation of material. 21. It has further been found that undisputedly, original plaintiff no. 1 i.e. Godavariben is not in possession of the rent premises even at the time of her death, so the serious question arose with regard to acquisition of tenancy rights in the suit proceedings by virtue of even Section 5(11)(c)(ii) of the Bombay Rent Act and this question can be examined only upon leading of evidence, which has rightly been observed by the trial court. Therefore it appears to this Court that all these issues which are involved being examined at length to grant relief at this stage, despite the amount as desired by Exhibit-29 is depriving the petitioner from those rights which are conferred by virtue of separate agreement dated 10.10.2007. So unless and until validity of said 2007 agreement can be dealt with properly, granting of relief appears to be not desirable, which view taken by the trial court is sounding confidence in case of the petitioner. 22. Now, it appears from the bare reading of the order passed by the appellate Bench of Small Causes Court which has taken view that by virtue of Section 5(3) of the Bombay Rent Act, applicant – original plaintiff being head tenant should be treated as landlord and UCO Bank being sub-tenant is to be treated as tenant of the plaintiff as indicated in para 15 of the judgment impugned. This opinion which has been expressed at this stage is an opinion appears to be pre-judged, when the suit is at the stage of leading of evidence. This is more so in view of the fact that separate agreement has already been executed on 10.10.2007 and the said agreement is fully in operation through the passage of time and as such, the validity of discontinuance of original agreement is not to be pre-judged at this stage as the same is requiring appreciation of evidence to be led before the trial Court and so keeping in view this undisputedly existence of subsequent agreement dated 10.10.2007, this Court is of the opinion that the view taken by the appellate Bench is not just and proper. 23. So far as the scope of revisional jurisdiction is concerned, the same is well defined by catena of decisions of the Apex Court. 23. So far as the scope of revisional jurisdiction is concerned, the same is well defined by catena of decisions of the Apex Court. Hence, considering the reasons which are assigned by the learned trial judge on the basis of analysis of material on record, while exercising the revisional jurisdiction, the view ought not to have been substituted and, therefore, when the trial Court’s view is not possible to be construed as perverse in any form, there is hardly any justifiable reason to allow the conclusion of the appellate Bench to sustain in the eye of law. Even the Court found that the conclusion arrived at in para 16 of the judgment is that the original plaintiffs are entitled to receive rent from the sub tenant, is a conclusion which is dehors the undisputed circumstance of execution of fresh agreement dated 10.10.2007 and so long as the same is not declared as invalid, it appears to this Court that to grant relief claimed in Exhibit-29 is to grant a substantive relief at this stage without allowing the parties to adjudicate the proceedings in a free and fair manner. Resultantly, the view expressed by the appellate Bench is not appearing to be sound enough to sustain. Further, the conclusion which is based upon the decisions which are described in para 17 are also not proper at this stage, as the Court is not expected to undertake mini trial while examining relief at Exhibit-29. Resultantly, the Court found that the order under challenge appears to be not just and proper. 24. Even from reading of overall orders as well as even the operative part of the orders, which indicate the manner in which jurisdiction is exercised, the appellate Bench has indicated that Civil Revision Application is allowed not only by exercising powers under Section 29(3) of the Bombay Rent Act, but also under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This itself is indicating the self-explanatory manner of exercising jurisdiction which in considered opinion of this Court not just and proper. 25. From the overall circumstances which are visible from the record as indicated, a perusal of the documents precisely, lease deed dated 25.07.2000, as well as fresh agreement dated 10.10.2007, and further from the reply of defendant no. This itself is indicating the self-explanatory manner of exercising jurisdiction which in considered opinion of this Court not just and proper. 25. From the overall circumstances which are visible from the record as indicated, a perusal of the documents precisely, lease deed dated 25.07.2000, as well as fresh agreement dated 10.10.2007, and further from the reply of defendant no. 2 – Bank reflecting on page 125 of the petition compilation wherein observations made in para 5 is on the contrary, dislodging the stand of respondent nos. 1/1 to 1/3. This paragraph has clearly asserted on oath that fresh agreement has already been come into existence, which is registered before the office of the sub-registrar, at Gheekantha and the Bank is enjoying the property by virtue of that. The said para 5 reads as under :- “5. It was suggested at the Bar that the UCO Bank may give the pursees. Accordingly, the UCO Bank submits this pursees stating specifically to the effect that recently, the Original Owner Trust has executed the lease deed in favour of UCO Bank and same is registered before the office of Sub Registrar at Ghikanta, Ahmedabad and according to the s aid lease deed, the UCO Bank is completely enjoying the said property. It is further stated that there are no remote and proximate chances of vacating or handling over possession of the said property to anybody including the Original Owner Trust.” 26. It further appears from the record that no doubt, the stand regarding applicability of provisions of Wakf Act are the question which requires to be considered not at this stage, but then from the record of the parties to the proceedings, it appears prima facie that the question of continuance of plaintiff being tenant is seriously at stake. Therefore, in considered opinion of this Court, so long as agreement dated 10.10.2007 is not found to be invalid and to grant the reliefs at Exhibit-29 would be to grant a substantive relief by prejudging the so called right of respondent no. 1 i.e. respondent nos. 1/1 to 1/3 at this stage before allowing the parties to lead evidence properly. 27. It is not possible to be inferred with, since the Bank has shown readiness to deposit anywhere, but that would not give leverage to respondent nos. 1 i.e. respondent nos. 1/1 to 1/3 at this stage before allowing the parties to lead evidence properly. 27. It is not possible to be inferred with, since the Bank has shown readiness to deposit anywhere, but that would not give leverage to respondent nos. 1/1 to 1/3, particularly, but undisputedly, UCO Bank is a nationalized Bank would not like to be prejudiced by the stand of rival parties to the proceedings and as such, that isolated assertion cannot give any benefit to respondent no. 1. Resultantly, the view expressed by the appellate court in revision application is sounding no confidence. Hence, the order deserves to be set aside in the interest of justice. 28. Additionally, it is by-now well settled by the Apex Court in catena of decisions that at an initial stage of trial of the suit, no substantive relief can be granted, especially when the main issue is yet to be adjudicated upon. This view has also been reiterated by the Apex Court in a decision reported in (2015) 2 SCC 156 . As a result of this, considering the aforesaid principle as well, this Court is of the opinion that the order impugned is not sustainable in the eye of law. Apart from that, the principle of perversity is also well propounded by series of decisions which are reported in (2015) 9 SCC 443 as well as (2016) 6 SCC 672. Considering the aforesaid principles in mind, this Court is of the considered opinion that the views expressed by the trial court are not sustainable. Accordingly, the impugned order deserves to be corrected. 29. Considering the aforesaid situation which is prevailing, this Court is in addition to the rival submissions has also examined the proposition of law which has been laid down by various decisions cited before the Court, but since the facts and circumstances are visibly different, the Court without much expressing any opinion is of the view that on such issue, no final conclusion to be reflected to avoid any effect on adjudication of trial of the main suit and, therefore, the judgments which have been cited since are of the different background of facts, the same are not directly applicable. Resultantly, without much discussing on the said issue, the Court is of the opinion, that the petitioner has made out a case to consider the relief in their favour. Resultantly, without much discussing on the said issue, the Court is of the opinion, that the petitioner has made out a case to consider the relief in their favour. Additionally, it further appears that the application Exhibit-29 which has been submitted if to be viewed closely, the same appears to have been under Section 11 sub section(4). Now if provisions of Section 11 is to be seen, the same is related to standard rent, permitted in certain cases, and sub section 4 of Section 11 empowers the Court to pass the order provided the Court is satisfied that the tenant is withholding the rent of more than that, the same is ex-facie excessive and standard rent should be fixed. So, applicability of said provision is also seriously in doubt and according to this Court, cannot be pressed into service to get the relief. 30. Another eventuality which is postulated is “in any other case’ now these words are to be given the meaning in the context of earlier word which has been mentioned, so the relief, prima facie which is sought in Exhibit-29 is not to be granted. So, to that extent the petition about maintainability of application under Section 11(4), Mr. Gandhi, learned Senior Advocate has made out a point successfully. Further, here is a case in which, there is a description or relationship of head tenant by virtue of subsequent agreement dated 10.10.2007 and, therefore, also, unless and until the right of respondent no. 1 to be established, no such relief at this stage can be granted on application Exhibit-29 and as such, it appears to this Court that a case is made out by the petitioner. 31. However, while parting with the present order, this Court is of the clear opinion that this issue which has been interwoven between the parties to the proceedings and continuing since long, the suit proceedings itself are required to be expedited and to be disposed of within the stipulated period. This is more so, when a clear stand is taken by the petitioner that the suit is at evidence stage. Therefore, without much examining the rival submissions at length, this Court is of the opinion that instead of granting substantive relief to the applicant at Exhibit-29, at this stage it would be desirable that the suit itself be disposed of at the earliest without creating any further complication in the proceedings. Therefore, without much examining the rival submissions at length, this Court is of the opinion that instead of granting substantive relief to the applicant at Exhibit-29, at this stage it would be desirable that the suit itself be disposed of at the earliest without creating any further complication in the proceedings. Resultantly, this petition stands allowed with the following directions, which would meet the ends of justice : (1) The impugned order dated 03.12.2012 passed in Civil Revision Application No. 11 of 2011 is hereby quashed and set aside with a consequential direction that the main suit i.e. being H.R.P. Suit No. 477 of 2008 is ordered to be expedited and the learned trial court shall see to it that as far as possible the main suit shall be disposed of preferably within a period of one year from the date of receipt of writ of this Court. (2) It is needless to state that while deciding the main suit the trial court shall not be influenced by any of the observations which are made either by this Court or by the appellate Bench which is hereby set aside. The parties are at liberty to raise all permissible contentions in accordance with law. 32. With the aforesaid observations and directions, the petition stands disposed of. Rule is made absolute.