JUDGMENT : Anil Kshetarpal, J. 1. The defendant/appellants have filed the present regular second appeal against the concurrent finding of fact arrived at by the Courts below while decreeing the suit for symbolic possession by way of specific performance of the agreement to sell with a consequential relief of permanent injunction. 2. The plaintiffs filed a suit claiming that late Sh. Charan Pal had entered into an agreement to sell on 24.05.2004 on receipt of Rs.9,50,000/- out of the total sale consideration of Rs.10,00,000/-. The possession of the land measuring 77 kanals 4 marlas, agreed to be sold, was also delivered to the plaintiffs. It was pleaded that in the agreement to sell, it was recited that the sale deed would be executed after the decision of the pending suit i.e. Civil Suit No. 564-C of 1994 titled “Sukhpal Singh v. Charan Pal”, when the land was mutated in his favour. The aforesaid suit came to be decided by the learned trial Court on 11.05.2006. The first appeal was dismissed by the first Appellate Court on 02.03.2009, whereas the second appeal was dismissed by the High Court on 28.04.2011. Ultimately, the Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 17.10.2011. After the decision of the case, the plaintiffs requested the defendants to sign the agreement to sell, but on their refusal, after serving a notice dated 14.01.2013, the suit was filed on 15.02.2013. 3. The defendants contested the suit by pleading that there was no agreement to sell and in fact, Charan Pal had engaged a counsel to defend the suit titled as “Sukhpal Singh v. Charan Pal” and his thumb impressions/signatures have been taken on that pretext. 4. Both the Courts below, after analyzing the evidence led, decreed the suit. It will be noted here that the defendants failed to prove that the plaintiffs have any connection with the counsel engaged by Charan Pal. The Court also found that the plaintiffs are co-villagers with Charan Pal. 5. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length and with their able assistance, gone through the judgments passed by the Courts below and the requisitioned record. 6.
The Court also found that the plaintiffs are co-villagers with Charan Pal. 5. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties at length and with their able assistance, gone through the judgments passed by the Courts below and the requisitioned record. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the suit filed by the plaintiffs was barred by limitation as pursuant to the dismissal of the previous suit by the learned trial Court on 11.05.2006, mutation of the land was sanctioned in favour of Charan Pal Singh on 28.02.2006. He submitted that the reckoning date from where the limitation begins to run would be the date when the revenue record was updated. Learned counsel further submitted that the Courts have erred in failing to frame a specific issue on the limitation. He further submitted that plaintiff No.3, when appeared in evidence, admitted that he had not signed any notice. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submits that from the plain reading of the agreement to sell, it is apparent that the sale deed was to be registered after the decision of the Court. He, hence, submitted that the reckoning date would be the date when Special leave to Appeal (Civil) was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 17.10.2011. He further submitted that both the Courts below, even in the absence of the specific issue, have dealt with the aforesaid question of limitation and found in favour of the plaintiffs and, therefore, no prejudice has been caused to the defendants. He further submitted that notice dated 14.01.2013 has been proved and, therefore, the statement of plaintiff No.3 to the contrary is to be ignored. 8. This Court has analyzed the arguments of learned counsel for the parties and is of the considered view that there is no substance in the present appeal. 9. On careful reading of the agreement to sell, which is in Devanagari script (Hindi), shows that the parties had agreed to get the sale deed executed after the decision of the Court, when the property, in the revenue record, is transferred in the name of Charan Pal. Once it has been provided that after the decision of the pending case, in the absence of any intention to the contrary, would mean the decision of the final Court.
Once it has been provided that after the decision of the pending case, in the absence of any intention to the contrary, would mean the decision of the final Court. In the present case, finally the suit was decided on dismissal of the Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) by the Supreme Court on 17.10.2011. Hence, the reckoning date, from where the limitation is begin to run, cannot be read in the manner suggested by the learned counsel for the appellants. 10. A careful reading of Article 54 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, it is apparent that the time from which the period begins to run has been divided into two parts. The first part is when the same date has been fixed for performance, whereas the second part is when no such date is fixed, then the reckoning date would be the date when the plaintiff has noticed that performance is refused. 11. Even if it is assumed that the present case falls in the first part, still the date on which the litigation was finally decided is to be taken as the date from which the limitation would begin to run. A purchaser, who has paid 95% of the amount and delivered possession of the property is justified in waiting for final decision of the litigation. The plaintiff cannot be expected to file the suit immediately on decision by the trial Court, particularly when the appeal has been filed. 12. With regard to the next argument, it will be noted that the Courts below have no doubt erred in failing to frame a distinct issue on the question of limitation, however, once both the Courts have examined this aspect and this Court has also examined the question of limitation, no prejudice has been caused to the defendants on account of non-framing of the issue of limitation. 13. As regards the last argument, it will be noted that the plaintiffs, no doubt, under the stress of cross-examination, have erred, however, it is established on the file that notice dated 14.01.2013 (Ex.P19) was served on the defendants. In any case, the law does not require that service of a prior notice is necessary before filing of the suit. 14. Keeping in view the aforesaid facts, there is no ground to interfere. 15. Dismissed. 16. The miscellaneous applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.