JUDGMENT Lok Pal Singh, J. - Present second appeal has been filed assailing the judgment dated 14.03.2019 and its decree dated 25.03.2019, passed by First Addl. District Judge, Haldwani, in Civil Appeal no. 34 of 2018, Virender Singh Chadha Vs Shri Guru Tag Bahadur Senior Secondary School & others, whereby the judgment and decree dated 10.07.2018, passed by Civil Judge (Senior Division), Haldwani in Civil Suit no. 10 of 2015, Shri Guru Teg Bahadur Senior Secondary School Vs Harvinder Singh Chadha & other, was set aside and the suit has been dismissed. 2. Genesis of the present dispute relates to a meeting dated 28.02.2015, wherein the first respondent alleges to have become unopposed Chairman of a private Society-School namely Shri Guru Teg Bahadur Senior Secondary Public School, Haldwani for a term of five years, although there was colossal opposition of the first respondent and when other names were proposed of the post of Chairman, the said meeting was disbursed. The first respondent lost the last election from one Pramajeet Singh @ Shanty, who was elected Chairman of "Khalsa National Girls Inter College' and 'Shri Guru Teg Bahadur Sr. Secondary Public School' in a common election held on 30.11.2009 for both the schools for a term of five years i.e. till 30.11.2014. However, since one of the school namely 'Khalsa National Girls Inter College' is a Govt. aided Institute, the third respondent (brother of first respondent) made a representation before the competent authority to conduct separate elections for the said school, after expiry of three years in terms of Uttaranchal School Act, 2006. Said representation was rejected. Thereafter, the third respondent filed Writ Petition no. 2268 (M/S) of 2012. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.11.2012 held that since the term of the existing Committee of Management would come to an end on 29.11.2012, the authorities shall ensure taking steps to appoint an 'Authorized Controller', who may conduct the elections. However, in Special Appeal no. 403 of 2012, the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 05.12.2012 modified the aforesaid order by permitting the elected Committee of Management to hold elections within three months and handover the charge to the newly elected Committee of Management. Being aggrieved, SLP (Civil) no. However, in Special Appeal no. 403 of 2012, the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 05.12.2012 modified the aforesaid order by permitting the elected Committee of Management to hold elections within three months and handover the charge to the newly elected Committee of Management. Being aggrieved, SLP (Civil) no. 9172 of 2013 was preferred, wherein the Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated 01.03.2013 directed that until next date, elections of committee of management shall not be held. 3. It is stated that the Manager of the appellant School namely Raghuvir Singh Gujral (since deceased) expressed his inability to perform the duties as Manager due to his ailment. The request so made was accepted by the Committee of Management vide Resolution dated 15.08.2013. It is further stated that the third respondent moved various applications before the Hon'ble Supreme Court seeking vacation of aforementioned interim order dated 01.03.2013, but the said interim order was not vacated till the final disposal of the SLP. It is averred that in the aforesaid backdrop and as per the bye-laws, the term of the Committee of Management which was to expire on 30.11.2014 was extended for a further period of one year vide Resolution dated 07.11.2014. It is stated that the Resolution dated 07.11.2014 has attained finality inasmuch as it was not challenged by anyone before any competent forum / court. Vide Resolution dated 24.01.2015, Raghuvir Singh Gujral (since deceased) was expelled from the post of Manager of the appellant School. It is stated that Resolution dated 24.01.2015 has also attained finality. 4. Under aforesaid circumstances, the first respondent in collusion with the expelled Manager and by misrepresenting one Jogendra Singh, Advocate (Life Member of the Society) published an information in the newspaper for conducting a meeting on 28.02.2015 in the school campus. Since, Board Examinations were going on, the appellant filed civil suit no. 10 of 2015, for restraining the defendants and their agents to conduct the said meeting. However, the third respondent submitted an application that the meeting would be conducted in a peaceful manner. In the said meeting, the first respondent got himself declared unopposed Chairman of the private school, despite the fact that there was no unanimous consensus in his favour. Mr. However, the third respondent submitted an application that the meeting would be conducted in a peaceful manner. In the said meeting, the first respondent got himself declared unopposed Chairman of the private school, despite the fact that there was no unanimous consensus in his favour. Mr. Jogender Singh, Advocate (Life Member of the Society) who presided over the said meeting deposed before the trial court that there was no agenda of election in the said meeting. After the meeting dated 28.02.2015, the first respondent tried to put his locks in the school office, but could not succeed in doing so. The first respondent then represented the Sub Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Haldwani for approval of his alleged Committee of Management, which was declined vide order dated 16.06.2015 and the said authority even refused to refer the matter to the Prescribed Authority / Sub Divisional Magistrate under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 mainly on the ground that the legality of the meeting dated 28.02.2015 is already under challenge before the civil court. The first respondent challenged the aforesaid order dated 16.06.2015 before this Court by filing WPMS no. 2536 of 2015, but could not succeed in obtaining any interim order and the matter is pending before this Court. 5. Meanwhile, one 'Haldwani Sikh Central Committee' filed an intervention application before the Hon'ble Apex Court, inter alia, seeking disposal of the Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) no. 9172 of 2013, so that elections could be conducted. The Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 23.02.2016, finally disposed of the said SLP, with the following directions: "Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we are of the considered opinion that as the term is over, the controversy should be allowed to rest as far as the present Committee of Management is concerned. Be it clarified that the matter relates to the duration of the Management Committee whether it is three years or five years. In any case, five years period is over. In course of hearing, we have been apprised by Mr. Sanpreet Singh Ajmani, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the Committee of Management, petitioner herein, has already filed a civil suit no. 10 of 2015 in the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Haldwani, District Nainital where it has called in question the legal propriety and justifiability of the meeting dated 11.02.2013 convened by the respondent no. Sanpreet Singh Ajmani, learned counsel for the petitioner, that the Committee of Management, petitioner herein, has already filed a civil suit no. 10 of 2015 in the court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Haldwani, District Nainital where it has called in question the legal propriety and justifiability of the meeting dated 11.02.2013 convened by the respondent no. 1, Harvinder Singh Chadda. In our considered opinion, the civil suit should be disposed of in quite promptitude and accordingly we direct the learned civil Judge to dispose of the civil suit within four months from today and send a compliance report to the Registry of this Court. The special leave petition is accordingly disposed of. As a sequel, all the interlocutory applications stand disposed of." 6. Thereafter, the third respondent filed an IA before the Hon'ble Apex Court seeking deletion of directions issued to the civil court and also made allegations of perjury etc. against the counsel representing the appellant before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which was dismissed vide order dated 12.07.2016. 7. After recording the entire evidence, the civil court decreed the civil suit no. 10 of 2015 by a well reasoned judgment dated 10.07.2018. Issue no. 6 regarding maintainability of suit was decided earlier vide order dated 15.03.2016. However, the learned first appellate court without even recording any perversity in the order of the trial court, allowed the first appeal vide judgment and decree dated 14.03.2019 / 25.03.2019 mainly on the ground that the said suit is barred by Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act and also on the ground that there is no cause of action, for the reliefs subsequently brought by way of amendment. Hence, present second appeal. 8. The Second Appeal was admitted on 21.06.2019, and following substantial questions of law were framed: (i) Whether the first appellate court has erred in law in allowing the appeal filed by the respondents, without reversing / setting aside the findings recorded by the trial court? (ii) Whether the first appellate court has erred in law in allowing the appeal in violation of the mandatory provision of law contained in Order 41 Rule 31 of CPC? 9. In the meantime, till the next date of listing, the parties were directed to maintain status quo qua the nature and possession of the property in dispute. Said interim order dated 21.06.2019, was made absolute by this Court vide order dated 02.08.2019. 9. In the meantime, till the next date of listing, the parties were directed to maintain status quo qua the nature and possession of the property in dispute. Said interim order dated 21.06.2019, was made absolute by this Court vide order dated 02.08.2019. 10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the entire material available on record. 11. Learned counsel for the appellant placed reliance on the following judgments in support of his contention: i) Malluru Mallappa (D) through LRs Vs Kuruvathappa & others,2020 SCCOnLine 174 ii) Santosh Hazari Vs Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 iii) U Manjunath Rao Vs U. Chandrashekhar & another, (2017) 15 SCC 309 iv) All Saints College Society Nainital & others Vs State of Uttarakhand & others, 2014 1 UD 266 v) Kuldeep Kumar Dubey & others Vs Ramesh Chandra Goyal, (2015) 3 SCC 525 . 12. Hon'ble Apex Court in Malluru Mallappa, Malluru Mallappa (D) through LRs Vs Kuruvathappa and others,2020 SCCOnLineSC 174 has held as under: "15. A first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC is entirely different from a second appeal under Section 100. Section 100 expressly bars second appeal unless a question of law is involved in a case and the question of law so involved is substantial in nature. 16. Order XLI Rule 31 of the CPC provides the guidelines for he appellate court to decide the matter. For ready reference order XLI Rule 31 of the CPC is as under:- "31. Contents, date and signature of judgment. The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled; and shall at the time it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein." 13. A three Judges Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Santosh Hazari, Santosh Hazari vs Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC 179 in paragraph 15 of said judgment has held as under: "15. the appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of facts and law. the appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of facts and law. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind, and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court. The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial court is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the Court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandini Devi and others vs Bijendra Narain Choudhary, (1967) AIR SC 1124). We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate Court for shirking the duty cast on it." 14. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of U. Manjunath, U. Manjunath Rao vs. U. Chandrashekhar and another, (2017) 15 SCC 309 has held that it is the duty of the first appellate court to record its own independent findings in case of affirming the findings of the trial court. While reversing the findings of fact recorded by the trial court, the first appellate court should be vigilant in recordings its own findings. 15. This Court in paragraph 6 of the judgment rendered in All Saints College Society All Saints College Society Nainital & others Vs State of Uttarakhand & others, 2014 1 UD 266 has held that since in all the writ petitions complicated question of fact pertaining to the membership and right to management is involved, which requires discussion of lengthy evidences to be produced by the parties, therefore, same should not be decided in a writ jurisdiction or in a summary proceedings under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act. 16. 16. Hon'ble Apex Court in Kuldeep Kumar Dubey, Kuldeep Kumar Dubey & others Vs Ramesh Chandra Goyal, (2015) 3 SCC 525 while discussing the scope of ambit of Section 99 of the Code has held that no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any misjoinder (or non-joinder) of parties or cause of action or any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. 17. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents vehemently argued that the first appellate court has recorded reasons while recording its finding on issue no. (iii) and, thus, there is sufficient compliance of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code'). He would further submit that since sufficient compliance has been made by the first appellate court, the substantial question of law is liable to be answered in negative i.e. in favour of the respondents. 18. In support of his contention learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on paragraph 25 of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Mahendra Gupta, State of Madhya Pradesh through Principal Secretary & another Vs Mahendra Gupta & others, (2018) 3 SCC 635 . Paragraph 25 is excerpted hereunder: "25. Two more cases, which were relied upon by the appellant and noticed by the High Court need to be noted. The Privy Council judgment in Gokal Chand-Jagan Nath Vs Nand Ram Das-Atma Ram,1938 SCCOnLinePC 58 is relevant for the present case. In the appeal before the Privy Council, judgment of the High Court was assailed on the ground that the two Hon'ble Judges of the High Court heard the matter, although, both Judges concurred with the judgment, but one Judge went on leave before signing the judgment, which was signed by only one Judge. The Privy Council repelled that contention and held that signing by one of the Judges at best was only irregularity, not affecting the merits of the case. Following was laid down in paras 6, 7 and 8: 6. A further point was raised by the appellants. They urged that the judgment of the High Court appealed from was not a valid judgment because it failed to comply with Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code. Following was laid down in paras 6, 7 and 8: 6. A further point was raised by the appellants. They urged that the judgment of the High Court appealed from was not a valid judgment because it failed to comply with Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code. The relevant facts on this issue are that the hearing in the High Court was before two Judges, Harrison and Agha Haider, JJ., and was actually delivered by the former Judge, the latter agreeing. The judgment was delivered on 22.02.1935, but Harrison, J., went on leave before signing the judgment, which was signed by Agha Haider, J., the Deputy Registrar appending a note that Harrison, J. had gone on leave before signing the judgment he delivered. 7. Order 41 Rule 31, requires that the judgment of the appellate court shall be in writing and shall state various matters, and 'shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein'. 8. The rule does not say that, if its requirements are not complied with, the judgment shall be a nullity. So startling a result would need clear and precise words. Indeed, the rule does not even state any definite time in which it is to be fulfilled. The time is left to be defined by what is reasonable. The rule from its very nature is not intended to affect the rights of parties to a judgment. It is intended to secure certainty in the ascertainment of what the judgment was. It is a rule which Judges are required to comply with for that object. No doubt in practice Judges do so comply, as it is their duty to do. But accidents may happen. A Judge may did after giving judgment but before he has had a reasonable opportunity to sign it. The court must have inherent jurisdiction to supply such a defect. The case of a Judge who has gone on leave before signing the judgment may call for more comment, but, even so, the convenience of the court and the interest of litigants must prevail. The defect is merely an irregularity. But, in truth, the difficulty is disposed of by Section 99 and 108 of the Code. The case of a Judge who has gone on leave before signing the judgment may call for more comment, but, even so, the convenience of the court and the interest of litigants must prevail. The defect is merely an irregularity. But, in truth, the difficulty is disposed of by Section 99 and 108 of the Code. Section 99 provides that "no decree shall be reversed or substantially varied, nor shall any case be remanded, in appeal on account of any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court". That section comes in the part dealing with appeals from original decrees. But Section 108 applies the same provision to appeals from appellate decrees, and it is always in the discretion of the Board to apply the principle on appeal to his Majesty in Council. In their Lordships' judgment, the defect here was an irregularity not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court, and is no ground for setting aside the decree." 19. The submission of learned Senior Counsel for the respondents is misconceived. The ratio of the judgment cited by learned Senior Counsel does not apply to the facts and circumstance of the case in hand as the first appellate court did not record any finding on any of the issues and the first appeal was allowed while recording the findings on issue no. (iii). The ratio of the law laid down by three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Santosh Hazari7 case is applicable in the present case. Answer to substantial question of law no. (i): 20. A perusal of the impugned judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court would depict that neither the first appellate court has formulated any point of determination nor has recorded its findings on the issues so framed by the trial court. 21. The trial court while deciding the suit of the plaintiff (appellant herein) has recorded its finding in favour of the plaintiff on issue nos. 1, 2, 3 and 7 and decreed the suit. But, surprisingly the first appellate court without reversing the findings, recorded by the trial court has allowed the appeal of the defendants and recorded its own findings without formulating any point of determination or recording its findings on any issues. 1, 2, 3 and 7 and decreed the suit. But, surprisingly the first appellate court without reversing the findings, recorded by the trial court has allowed the appeal of the defendants and recorded its own findings without formulating any point of determination or recording its findings on any issues. Thus, the first appellate court has committed illegality in recording its finding, without reversing the finding of trial court and recording its own finding without indicating any issue and question of law. 22. In the opinion of this court, the learned first appellate court, without pointing out any perversity in the impugned judgment and decree had reversed the findings recorded by the trial court and as such committed patent illegality in recording its findings on surmises and conjectures. The substantial question of law no. (i) is thus answered in favour of the plaintiff/appellant. Answer to the substantial question of law no. (ii): 23. The first appellate court has recorded its finding only on issue no. 3, which stipulates that the suit of the plaintiff was barred by the provisions of Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, 1860 is quoted hereunder: "25. Dispute regarding election of office-bearers. (1) The prescribed authority may, on a reference made to it by the Registrar or by at least one-fourth of the members of a society registered in Uttar Pradesh, hear and decide in a summary manner any doubt or dispute in respect of the election or continuance in office of an office-bearers of such society, and may pass such orders in respect thereof as it deems fit: [Provided that the election of an office-bearer shall be set aside where the prescribed authority is satisfied (a) that any corrupt practice has been committed by such office-bearer; or (b) that the nomination of any candidate has been improperly rejected; or (c) that the result of the election in so far as it concerns such office-bearer has been materially affected by the improper acceptance of any nomination or by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void or by any non-compliance with the provisions of any rules of the Society. Explanation. Explanation. A person shall be deemed to have committed a corrupt practice who, directly or indirectly, by himself or by any other person (i) induces, or attempts to induce, by fraud, international misrepresentation, coercion or threat of injury, any elector to give or to refrain from giving a vote in favour of any candidate, or any person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being, a candidate at the election; (ii) with a view to inducing any elector to give or refrain from giving a vote in favour of any candidate, or to inducing any person to stand or not to stand as, or to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate at the election, offers or gives any money, or valuable consideration, or any place or employment, or holds out any promise of individual advantage or profit to any person; (iii) abets (within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code) the doing of any of the acts specified in clauses (i) and (ii); (iv) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or elector to believe that he or any person in whom he is interested will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure; (v) canvasses on grounds of caste, community, sect or religion; (vi) commits such other practice as the State Government may prescribe to be a corrupt practice. Explanation II. A promise of individual advantage or profit to a person includes a promise for the benefit of the person himself or of any one in whom he is interested. Explanation III. Explanation II. A promise of individual advantage or profit to a person includes a promise for the benefit of the person himself or of any one in whom he is interested. Explanation III. The State Government may prescribe the procedure for hearing and decision of doubts or disputes in respect of such elections and make provision in respect of any other matter relating to such elections for which insufficient provision exists in this Act or in the rules of the society.] (2) Where by an order made under sub-section (1), an election is set aside or an office-bearer is held no longer entitled to continue in office or where the Registrar is satisfied that any election of office-bearers of a society has not been held within the time specified in the rules of that society, he may call a meeting of the general body of such society for electing such office-bearer or office-bearers, and such meeting shall be presided over and be conducted by the Registrar or by any officer authorised by him in this behalf, and the provisions in the rules of the society relating to meetings and elections shall apply to such meeting and election with necessary modifications. (3) Where a meeting is called by the Registrar under sub-section (2), no other meeting shall be called for the purpose of election by any other authority or by any person claiming to be an office-bearer of the society. Explanation. For the purposes of this section, the expression 'prescribed authority' means an officer or court authorised in this behalf by the State Government by notification published in the Official Gazette." 24. Section 9 of the Code is also relevant in the context of present case. The same is reproduced hereunder: "9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred. -The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Explanation I.- A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. Explanation I.- A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies. Explanation ll.- For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place." 25. Since the controversy is in regard to adjudication of dispute of elections of the office bearers of the plaintiff Society and the first appellate court has exceeded its jurisdiction by reversing the findings of the trial court mainly on the ground that the suit is barred by Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act, and also in ignoring the fact that the legality of the meeting dated 28.02.2015 is already under challenge before the civil court, which cannot be decided by the Sub Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Haldwani or the Prescribed Authority and there is no bar either express or implied which excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court. In so far as the jurisdiction of Prescribed Authority is concerned that is merely a preferential jurisdiction and not the exclusive jurisdiction which does not exclude the jurisdiction of the civil court. 26. My view is fortified by the judgment of three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Nagri Pracharini Sabha, Nagri Pracharini Sabha & another Vs Fifth Addl. District and Sessions Judge, Varanasi & others, (1991) Supp2 SCC 36 wherein it has been held that a litigant having a grievance of a civil nature has, independently of any statute, a right to institute a suit in the civil court unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is not to be readily inferred and such exclusion must be either express or implied. 27. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Parimal, Parimal Vs Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545 have held as under: "25. Order XLI, Rule 31 CPC provides for a procedure for deciding the appeal. The law requires substantial compliance of the said provisions. 27. Their Lordships of the Hon'ble Apex Court in Parimal, Parimal Vs Veena, (2011) 3 SCC 545 have held as under: "25. Order XLI, Rule 31 CPC provides for a procedure for deciding the appeal. The law requires substantial compliance of the said provisions. The first appellate Court being the final court of facts has to formulate the points for its consideration and independently weigh the evidence on the issues which arise for adjudication and record reasons for its decision on the said points. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on question of law and on facts. 26. The first appellate Court should not disturb and interfere with the valuable rights of the parties which stood crystallised by the trial Court's judgment without opening the whole case for rehearing both on question of facts and law. More so, the appellate Court should not modify the decree of the trial Court by a cryptic order without taking note of all relevant aspects, otherwise the order of the appellate Court would fall short of considerations expected from the first appellate Court in view of the provisions of Order XLI, Rule 31 CPC and such judgment and order would be liable to be set aside." 28. It is settled proposition of law that the first appellate court is the final court on facts and law. While confirming the findings of the trial court, the first appellate court may record the reasons of its confirmation. If the first appellate court is of the view to reverse the judgment of the trial court, duty casts upon the first appellate court to give its findings on all the issues or alternatively frame the points of determination involved in the appeal and record its finding on the points so framed. But, if the first appellate court did not discharge its legal obligation in deciding the first appeal being the last court on facts and law in consonance of Order 41 Rule 31 of C.P.C., the judgment of the first appellate court cannot sustain. 29. A perusal of the record would reveal that the matter has already been considered by the trial court and the trial court has recorded categorical findings on all the issues, including issue no. (iii). 29. A perusal of the record would reveal that the matter has already been considered by the trial court and the trial court has recorded categorical findings on all the issues, including issue no. (iii). The first appellate court without reversing the findings of the trial court dismissed the suit only on the ground that the suit is barred by Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act without even recording any perversity or illegality in the judgment passed by the trial court. Unless the findings recorded by the trial court are reversed, the first appellate court has no right to record its finding. If the first appellate court is of the view to reverse the judgment of the trial court, a duty casts upon the first appellate court to give its findings on all the issues or alternatively frame the points of determination involved in the appeal and record its finding on the points so framed. But, if the first appellate court failed to discharge its legal obligation as per the mandate of Order 41 Rule 31 of the Code, the judgment of the first appellate court cannot be sustained. Thus, the substantial question of law no. (ii) is answered in affirmative, i.e., in favour of the appellants and against the respondents. 30. In view of the above, the second appeal deserves to be allowed. The same is hereby allowed. The impugned judgment / decree dated 14.03.2019 / 25.03.2019, passed by the first appellate court is set aside. 31. Since the first appellate court had failed to record its findings either on the point of determination or the issues so framed by the trial court and without reversing the findings recorded by the trial court the first appeal was allowed on the basis of findings recorded on issue no. (iii), it would not be appropriate for this Court to decide the second appeal likewise the first appellate court. Thus, the matter is remanded back to the first appellate court to decide the first appeal in accordance with law. Since, the judgment has been delivered by the First Addl. District Judge, Haldwani, District Nainital it would not be appropriate to remand the matter to the same Presiding Officer again as the same may prejudice the interest of the parties. Thus, the matter is remanded back to the first appellate court to decide the first appeal in accordance with law. Since, the judgment has been delivered by the First Addl. District Judge, Haldwani, District Nainital it would not be appropriate to remand the matter to the same Presiding Officer again as the same may prejudice the interest of the parties. Therefore, the first appeal is remanded back to the first appellate court i.e. the court of learned District Judge, Nainital, who may hear and decide the first appeal preferably within a period of one month from the date of production of certified copy of this judgment. 32. It is apt to note here that since the matter has been remanded back to the first appellate court, any observation made by this Court in its judgment, will not prejudice or influence the first appellate court while deciding the first appeal as per its merit and in accordance with law. 33. Since the parties are being represented through their respective counsel and no notice is required to be issued by the first appellate court, the parties shall appear before the first appellate court on 22.12.2020, whereafter learned first appellate court shall proceed with the case, as per law. It is further directed that no unnecessary adjournments shall be granted to any of the parties. 34. Let the lower court record be sent back immediately.