JUDGMENT : Karunesh Singh Pawar, J. 1. Heard Sri Paritosh Kumar Trivedi, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Sri Gopal Kumar Srivastava, learned Standing Counsel for all respondents/State. 2. By means of this petition, the petitioner is praying for the following relief’s:- "(i) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned Judgment and Order dated 5.11.2019 (Annexure No.1) passed by the opposite party No.1. (ii) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 14.8.2017 (Annexure No.2) passed by the opposite party No.3 retiring the petitioner compulsorily from service on the post of Assistant Consolidation Officer (ACO) and the report dated 5.8.2017 (Annexure No.3) made/submitted by the Screening Committee headed by the opposite party No.3. (iii) issue writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 12.2.2018 (Annexure No.4) passed by the opposite party No.2 dismissing the appeal dated 28.8.2017 against the impugned order dated 14.8.2017. (iv) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents and directing them to reinstate petitioner in service without any break providing entire service benefits including promotion etc. and other pecuniary benefits, due to him. (v) issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus directing the respondents to provide all the Assured Career Promotions (A.C.P.) due and available to petitioner as per service rules, the arrears of salary, including revised salary with full allowance, annual pay increments and post retiral benefits including pension, gratuity etc. after proper fixation of salary due on full length of his service upto the age of superannuation in the year, 2021. (vi) issue any other suitable writ, order or direction which this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper under the facts and circulation of the case. (vii) Award the cost of petition against the respondents." 3. In nutshell, the case of the petitioner is that initially, the petitioner was appointed on the post of Kanoongo in the year 1988 and thereafter, he was appointed on the post of Assistant Consolidation Officer on 19.12.1997. From 1997 to 2017, the petitioner faced nine departmental proceedings, but he was not charged with any allegation of financial irregularity, corruption, inefficiency or misconduct including immoral acts. From 1997 to 2017, the petitioner faced nine departmental proceedings, but he was not charged with any allegation of financial irregularity, corruption, inefficiency or misconduct including immoral acts. Out of nine departmental proceedings, he was exonerated in five cases whereas admittedly, four matters still remain pending before the State Public Services Tribunal for its consideration. Considering all these aspects of the matter, the matter has been referred to the Screening Committee. Thereafter, vide order dated 14.8.2017, the petitioner has been compulsorily retired from service on the post of Assistant Consolidation Officer. The petitioner has challenged the same before the Appellate Authority who also rejected it vide order dated 12.2.2018. Consequently, the petitioner has filed a claim petition before the State Public Services Tribunal which has been dismissed vide impugned order dated 5.11.2019. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued that though nine department proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner on frivolous charges, yet five matters have been closed in his favour. So far in none of the proceeding, he has been punished. Therefore, the case of the petitioner has not been considered by the Screening Committee in accordance with law. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner has extensively argued that the entries awarded to the petitioner is good and integrity has also been certified. 6. Further, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that no evidence has been placed before the Screening Committee for compulsorily retiring the petitioner from service. Therefore, the action of the respondents is mala fide and arbitrariness and the guidelines framed by the Apex Cour in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das and another v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada and another, [ (1992) 2 SCC 299 ] have not been followed in its letter and spirit. 7. Lastly, he submits that even the Tribunal has not been considered the above aspects of the matter and therefore, the petition is liable to be allowed and in support of his submissions, he has relied upon the citations of Apex Court in the cases of Brij Mohan Singh Chopra v. State of Punjab [ AIR 1987 SC 948 ] and R. P. Malhotra v. Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Patiala and others [1990 (Supp) Supreme Court Cases 771]. 8. 8. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel supports the impugned order of the Tribunal on the ground that the Tribunal has considered each and every aspect of the matter minutely and dismissed it. Therefore, the writ petition deserves dismissal. 9 Before entering into the rival submissions of the parties, it is necessary to peep into the guidelines framed by the Apex Court in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra) which are as follows:- "32. The following principles emerge from the above discussion: (i) An order of compulsory retirement is not a punishment. It implies no stigma nor any suggestion of misbehaviour. (ii) The order has to be passed by the government on forming the opinion that it is in the public interest to retire a government servant compulsorily. The order is passed on the subjective satisfaction of the government. (iii) Principles of natural justice have no place in the context of an order of compulsory retirement. This does not mean that judicial scrutiny is excluded altogether. While the High Court or this Court would not examine the matter as an appellate court, they may interfere if they are satisfied that the order is passed (a) mala fide or (b) that it is based on no evidence or (c) that it is arbitrary - in the sense that no reasonable person would form the requisite opinion on the given material; in short, if it is found to be perverse order. (iv) The government (or the Review Committee, as the case may be) shall have to consider the entire record of service before taking a decision in the matter - of course attaching more importance to record of and performance during the later years. The record to be so considered would naturally include the entries in the confidential records/character rolls, both favourable and adverse. If a government servant is promoted to a higher post notwithstanding the adverse remarks, such remarks lose their sting, more so, if the promotion is based upon merit (selection) and not upon seniority. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interfere. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. (v) An order of compulsory retirement is not liable to be quashed by a Court merely on the showing that while passing it uncommunicated adverse remarks were also taken into consideration. That circumstance by itself cannot be a basis for interfere. Interference is permissible only on the grounds mentioned in (iii) above. This aspect has been discussed in paras 29 to 31 above." 10. Further, the Tribunal has elaborately discussed and observed in paras 16 to 19 of the order, which read as under:- "16. It's the clear opinion of the Hon'ble Supreme Court that the decision of compulsorily retiring a Government Servant depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the competent authority, which should however be based on objective facts. The Court's can review such a decision on grounds of being either mala-fide, based on no evidenced or arbitrariness. 17. In the present case there is no allegation of mala fide either on the part of Screening Committee or the Competent Authority and hence there is no occasion to examine this aspect. The petitioner has also not adduced any evidence to establish prejudice or mala fide in this regard. Facts also do not bear out the contention of the petitioner that he had 'best' or excellent annual entries throughout. The respondents have clarified that in the 10 years prior to compulsory retirement the petitioner had only one outstanding entry while 7 were Good and one average entry. A perusal of record also shows that there were a number of punishments awarded to him, some of which still continue to exist in his record. The petitioner has himself admitted in his petition that punishment orders dated 03-02-2001, 23.08.2012, 10-03-2015 and 25.04.12 continue to exist, though they have been challenged in the U. P. Public Services Tribunal by way of Claim Petitions Nos. 1862/12, 2332/16, 1628/15 and 2103/16 respectively. No stay order exists in favour of the petitioner in any of these Claim Petitions. Punishment order dated 10-03-2015 also casts a shadow on his integrity. Another punishment order dated 02-09-2001 continues to exist on record in a watered down form in spite of partial modification in Appellate Order dated 04-09-2015. 18. The adequacy and sufficiency of these grounds lies entirely within the subjective satisfaction of the competent authority and beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny. 19. Another punishment order dated 02-09-2001 continues to exist on record in a watered down form in spite of partial modification in Appellate Order dated 04-09-2015. 18. The adequacy and sufficiency of these grounds lies entirely within the subjective satisfaction of the competent authority and beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny. 19. In view of the above discussion we find that the competent authority retired the petitioner compulsorily following the procedure laid down in law after due examination of service record of the petitioner. We thus find no merit in the petition which deserves to be dismissed." 11. In view of the guidelines framed by the Apex Court, the limited scope for review of the order of compulsory retirement is that if the evidence or arbitrariness and mala fide is attached to it. Here in the case, the petitioner has admitted that during his service period, nine departmental proceedings have been initiated by the department. Out of nine, in five matters, favourable decision has been taken. From perusal of Screening Committee's order and from the pleadings of petition, it is abundantly clear that the evidence relied upon by the petitioner has been placed before the Committee. Therefore, it cannot be said that the evidence has not been placed before the Screening Committee. 12. Next, learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the action of the respondents is mala fide and arbitrariness. By saying this, strings cannot be attached to the impugned order of compulsory retirement. Even otherwise, the appeal preferred against this order has been rejected which also ends in dismissal of claim petition. 13. A bare perusal of paragraphs 16 to 19 of the impugned order, dated 5.11.2019 it is evidently clear that the Tribunal has conspicuously touched all points raised by the petitioner including entires of last ten years from the date of passing of the compulsory retirement order and gave its verdict which need not be reviewed in the appellate jurisdiction. Furthermore, the guidelines framed by the Apex Court in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra) have been followed and the impugned order of compulsory retirement has been passed in accordance with law. 14. In view of above, the case laws cited by the petitioner are not at all attracted on the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Furthermore, the guidelines framed by the Apex Court in the case of Baikuntha Nath Das (supra) have been followed and the impugned order of compulsory retirement has been passed in accordance with law. 14. In view of above, the case laws cited by the petitioner are not at all attracted on the facts and circumstances of the instant case. Since the petitioner's counsel is unable to establish his claim or point out any illegality or infirmity in the impugned order, we are not inclined to entertain this petition. 15. For all the aforementioned reasons, the writ petition filed by the petitioner has no force and is accordingly dismissed.