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2020 DIGILAW 570 (KER)

State of Kerala, Represented by the District Collector v. Raghavan Achary, S/O. Paramu Achary

2020-07-03

P.SOMARAJAN

body2020
JUDGMENT : A suit for declaration of title and injunction was decreed by both the courts below against which the defendant-State Government, came up with this appeal. The plaintiff claims adverse title over an extent of 14.350 cents of property, the 'B' schedule in the plaint, on the allegation that it was the part of 35 cents of property in the possession and enjoyment of his father for more than 50 years and that his predecessor had planted several trees in that property. In the year 1965, his father had obtained Pattayam over 19 cents of property out of the large extent of 35 cents from the Government. It is out of that 19 cents, the plaint 'A' schedule-2 cents was given to the plaintiff by his father under Ext.A1 settlement deed dated 29.06.1990, wherein the plaint 'B' schedule was also included. The plaintiff claims that he had perfected title by adverse possession and limitation by his long, continuous and hostile possession of 'B' schedule property for a period of more than 50 years in continuation of his predecessor-in-interest, his father. The Commissioner who visited the property prepared Exts.C3 to C5 and reported that the plaint schedule property is lying as a single compact plot with four different terraces. Trees ranging from 10 to 35 years old age situated in the property also reported. Based on the age of the trees and the building constructed in the year 1970 abutting into the 'B' schedule, the trial court found the possession of plaintiff in continuation of his predecessor-in-interest for a long period of 50 years and decreed the suit declaring acquisition of title by adverse possession. In appeal, the first appellate court found possession for the required period of 30 years and concurred with the decree of trial court and dismissed the appeal based on the age of trees, building construction and also on the ground that the State Government did not auction the right to collect usufructs from the said property periodically. 2. In appeal, the first appellate court found possession for the required period of 30 years and concurred with the decree of trial court and dismissed the appeal based on the age of trees, building construction and also on the ground that the State Government did not auction the right to collect usufructs from the said property periodically. 2. The essential questions came up for consideration are : (1) whether a clandestine act of possession in secrecy over an immovable property would constitute an “open assertion” of act of possession in derogation of the interested persons so as to acquire a prescriptive title and (2) what would be the quality of “open assertion” of hostile animus to hold the property, when it is against the Government or public property. 3. Both the courts below committed a very serious mistake in appreciating what actually amounts to acquisition of adverse title. A mere possession for a long period itself will not constitute adverse title. The classical requirement nec vi nec clam nec precario mandates an open assertion of hostile animus to hold the property in derogation of all interested persons including the owner of the property. The exercise of hostile animus to hold the property in derogation of the original owner and all interested persons should be an open assertion coupled with specific act of possession over the property. It should be capable of giving notice to all concerned including the original owner. As against the State Government or the property belonged to the Government, the open assertion should also satisfy its quality to bring the hostile possession to the notice of the officials, who are bound to protect the property of the Government. The Government cannot maintain day- to-day vigil over all its properties. It is impracticable to put all the properties of the State Government including poramboke land under close surveillance against encroachment or trespass. A mere planting of some seedlings in the property by itself may not be sufficient to give notice of factum of exercise of hostile possession in derogation of title and interest of the Government or the general public. But as against a private property, a trespass or encroachment by planting some plants or seedlings would be sufficient to give notice of factum of possession and exercise of hostile animus against its owner and all interested. But as against a private property, a trespass or encroachment by planting some plants or seedlings would be sufficient to give notice of factum of possession and exercise of hostile animus against its owner and all interested. But the quality of open assertion in the matter of public property or Government land requires something more akin to a declaration of intention to hold the property as against the whole society, the general public and the State Government. The mere fact that there were trees ranging from 10 to 35 years old age in the Government land does not by itself constitute an open assertion of animus to hold the property to the notice of the Government. Further, the fact that the Government did not auction the right to collect usufructs periodically by itself will not constitute or support an assertion of animus to hold the property by the person who planted it, unless the same by its nature is capable of giving notice of factum of possession to all concerned. Equally, the fact that the Government property was lying unattended by itself will not constitute any act of dispossession in the hands of a stranger in derogation of the State Government or the general public and as such the failure to conduct periodical auction to collect usufructs, if any, from the property has no much significance in the matter of adverse possession. What is important is the exercise of open animus to hold the property for the required period in derogation of the interest of its owner and the interested persons. There should be satisfactory evidence to show that the trees such as Teak, Anjali and Mango are not the result of natural vegetation, but planted by the father of the plaintiff. The oral evidence tendered through PW2 that the said trees (Anjali, Teak and Mango) were planted by the father of the plaintiff years back by itself is not sufficient to bring the same within the purview of adverse possession unless the possession is qualified to the extent of giving notice of factum of exercise of hostile animus to the officials under the State Government, empowered to protect the said property. The possession hence must satisfy something more akin to a declaration of open assertion to hold the property in derogation of the general public or the State Government. The possession hence must satisfy something more akin to a declaration of open assertion to hold the property in derogation of the general public or the State Government. Hence, a mere planting of some seedlings or plants may not be sufficient to give notice of assertion of factum of possession as against the Government or the general public. There cannot be an adverse possession in secrecy. The construction of building in the year 1970 though constitute an act of possession to the notice of all concerned, the required period of 30 years was not established from the year of construction. 4. Yet another reason is also available to non suit the plaintiff regarding adverse title. The father of the plaintiff applied for getting Pattayam over 19 cents of property in the year 1965. The fact that he had applied for getting pattayam over 19 cents only would itself probabilise the case of the defendants that his father was in possession of 19 cents only in the year 1965 when he had applied for getting pattayam. There is hardly 30 years between the year 1965 and the date on which the suit was filed in the year 1996. If it is a subsequent encroachment made by the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiff, there should be concrete evidence to show hostile possession of property for the required period of 30 years at the time when the suit was filed in the year 1996. The fact that there is only 30 years gap between the year 1965 and the date on which the suit was filed in the year 1996 would further weaken the case of the plaintiff regarding the alleged possession for the required period of 30 years. Both the courts below went wrong in applying the principle governing adverse possession as against the Government property and its requirement. Hence the decree and judgment of both the courts below cannot be sustained and liable to be set aside. 5. The nature of property claimed is 'puthuval land'. It is not clear from the plaint whether it is an 'accretion' or a mere 'reclaimed land'. The plaint was drafted very poorly without disclosing the nature of the 'puthuval land' and whether it would constitute an 'accretion'. 5. The nature of property claimed is 'puthuval land'. It is not clear from the plaint whether it is an 'accretion' or a mere 'reclaimed land'. The plaint was drafted very poorly without disclosing the nature of the 'puthuval land' and whether it would constitute an 'accretion'. The 'doctrine of accretion' is well recognized both under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act dealing with the right and liabilities of lessor and lessee and under Section 90 of the Indian Trusts Act dealing with the liability of mortgagee and the tenant to return the accretion or any advantage (accession) gained over the property. The 'doctrine of accretion' stands for a land annexed to the registered holding by slow and gradual natural process imperceptible by its nature due to its slowness. The doctrine would come into play when there is slow and gradual natural changes, especially when the registered holding lies on the side of a natural stream, river, lake or a water body. When a portion or a part of registered holding permanently merged in a water body by slow and gradual natural process such as erosion or diluvion (advancement of water body), it would cause loss of that portion. If there is any addition to the landed property by natural, gradual and slow process imperceptible due to its slowness, the addition so acquired would acquire the character of 'accretion' to the registered holding and the registered owner will get title over the accreted portion of land. As per Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, the lessee is bound to return the benefit by way of “accretion” to the lessor. Likewise, a mortgagee, a co-owner or a tenant is liable to return the advantage including “accretion” obtained over the property by availing their position as such, to the owner of the registered holding and in the case of co-ownership, liable to be shared among the co-owners in proportionate to their respective shares. The principle underlying the provisions dealing with “accretion” and “accession” under Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 90 of the Indian Trusts Act gives a legal recognition and sanctity to 'accretion' and right to get that 'accretion' by the owner of the registered holding. A 'puthuval land' would stand for a 'reclaimed land' by artificial means or a land annexed by natural changes. A 'puthuval land' would stand for a 'reclaimed land' by artificial means or a land annexed by natural changes. The land developed and added to the registered holding by artificial means cannot be brought under the purview of 'doctrine of accretion' and it will not get the character of 'accreted property'. In order to get the status of 'accretion' by the operation of 'doctrine of accretion', the land which was annexed or obtained must be by the effect of gradual and slow natural process imperceptible due to its slowness. A sudden natural addition or an addition which is not gradual or slow to the extent of making it imperceptible or an addition to the registered holding by artificial means cannot be brought under the purview of 'doctrine of accretion'. To qualify an 'accretion', it should be slow and gradual enough so as to make it imperceptible due to its slowness and it should be by natural changes due to the change in the adjoining water bodies such as stream, river, lake etc. An encroachment or a trespass over a water body by reclaiming the land by artificial means is not an 'accretion' and hence an 'accretion' has to be distinguished from any attempted encroachment or trespass either over the property of Government or the adjoining water body. 6. In the instant case, the nature of property was not so far assessed so as to ascertain whether the 'puthuval land' is an accreted property or a reclaimed land. The suit is one for declaration of title over the property and when there is acquisition of title otherwise than by adverse possession, the question of inconsistent plea would pale into insignificance and the title cannot be defeated merely on the defect in the framing of the suit, especially when the plaint was drafted very poorly. In the said circumstances, the learned counsel for the respondent pressed for a remand of the matter to the trial court so as to afford an opportunity to the plaintiff to amend the plaint and adduce additional evidence to adjudicate the existence of “accretion”, if any. As such, the decree and judgment of both the courts below are set aside. The matter is remanded back to the trial court for fresh disposal. The parties shall appear before the trial court on 03/08/2020. The appeal is allowed in part accordingly. No costs.