JUDGMENT : 1. Heard, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Rahul Kumar and learned counsel for the respondent/Caveator of Caveat No. 81/2018, Mr. Rohit Kumar Singh. 2. The appellants have preferred this appeal against the order dated 07.02.2018 passed by learned Jharkhand Education Tribunal, Ranchi in Case No. 36/2016 (JET), whereby the purported notification issued vide Memo No. CIT/VCO/119/16 dated 30.07.2016, by which, respondent's service has been laid off without payment of salary and additional benefits has been set aside by the learned Jharkhand Education Tribunal by the impugned order directing the appellants to re-instate the respondent in service from the date of impugned notification and pay 50% of the back wages. 3. Learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Rahul Kumar, has submitted that the impugned order is not a stigmatic nor it is a termination order, rather it is only an order of informal stop doing something by the teacher/respondent. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants has strengthen his argument on the submissions that because of no admission and poor admission in the academic session, such stand was taken by the appellants, whereby 27 teachers have been laid off and subsequently two of them have been reinstated, as such, it is not a letter of termination. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance upon paragraph-12 to 17 of the counter affidavit filed by appellants before the learned Tribunal to buttress his argument. Paragraph nos. 12 to 17 of the counter affidavit are quoted hereinunder: 12. That it is also very pertinent to mention here that the after bare perusal of the said notification, it is crystal clear that the list does not contain the sole name of this petitioner rather altogether 27 faculties are there in the list who have been sent on lay off. 13. That it is also very relevant to mention here that these faculties have not been terminated rather they have been sent on lay off making it clear that they will be called whenever required means after attaining the stability in its financial position. 14. It is further stated that prior to this also there was a time when some of the faculties were sent on lay off and they have been called back which is very well within the knowledge of this petitioner. 15. 14. It is further stated that prior to this also there was a time when some of the faculties were sent on lay off and they have been called back which is very well within the knowledge of this petitioner. 15. It is also important to mention that merely notification in the newspaper does not conclude that the institute is not going through the financial crisis because the reason for the said publication is completely different and it is also important to state that no recruitment in the department of Electronics and communication engineering have been done against the cited notification rather the intake in this department has been reduced from 60 to 30 students as such curtailment in the faculty strength is but obvious as per the AICTE norms. 16. It is also stated and submitted that the approving authority i.e. AICTE from time to time has made several communication with the institute providing technical education that they are focusing on quality education for which quality teachers are required and also in order to get NBA, qualified professors having doctorate degree in the relevant discipline are required and unfortunately the petitioner is not a Ph.D holder. 17. It is also relevant to state that a number of opportunities have been given to the existing faculty to upgrade their qualification and obtain a Ph.D degree but all in vain in case of this petitioner. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Rahul Kumar, has further submitted that the Tribunal has directed the appellant – Cambridge Institute of Technology to pay 50% of the back wages. In calculating the back wages, liberty has been given to the appellants to deduct a sum of Rs. 43,500/- which the respondent has earned by engaging himself elsewhere during the period of “lay off”. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that this fact has not been controverted by learned counsel for the respondent by filing any cross-appeal nor any pleading was there on behalf of the respondent that Prof. Prem Shankar was not gainfully engaged elsewhere. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the instant appeal has been filed on 04.04.2018 against the judgment dated 07.02.2018 passed by Jharkhand Education Tribunal, but the office has wrongly pointed out the delay of 55 days in preferring the appeal. 8. Prem Shankar was not gainfully engaged elsewhere. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the instant appeal has been filed on 04.04.2018 against the judgment dated 07.02.2018 passed by Jharkhand Education Tribunal, but the office has wrongly pointed out the delay of 55 days in preferring the appeal. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that though he has preferred I.A. No. 2501 of 2019 for condonation of delay, but in view of judgment passed by Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Rana Tirkey Vs. DAV College Trust and Management Society & Ors. reported in 2010 (3) JLJR 190 (HC), wherein it has been held by this Court that no period for preferring an appeal has been mentioned in Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act, 2005. The Coordinate Bench of this Court relying upon the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of Santosh Kumar Shivgonda Patil V. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale reported in 2009 (9) SCC 352 has held that if a statute does not prescribe the time for exercise of revisional power, it does not mean that such power can be exercised at any time; rather it should be exercised within reasonable time. It is so because the law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long lapse of time. Where the legislature does not provide any length of time within which the power of revision is to be exercised by the authority, suo moto or otherwise, it is plain that exercise of power within reasonable time is inherent therein. 9. Thus, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has held in Rana Tirkey case that: Thus for that purpose, the Court is required to see the facts and circumstances of the case under consideration. In that case, there was a delay of 428 days' in filing appeal from the date of impugned order. The applicant has stated that after receiving the order, he went to his village for attending his ailing mother and after return from there, he filed the present appeal. Thus, it appears that appellant has been prevented from sufficient cause from filing the appeal at the earlier point of time. The applicant has stated that after receiving the order, he went to his village for attending his ailing mother and after return from there, he filed the present appeal. Thus, it appears that appellant has been prevented from sufficient cause from filing the appeal at the earlier point of time. Under the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the Coordinate Bench of this Court has considered that the appeal was filed within a reasonable period and copy of the order has been served upon the Registrar General and Stamp Reporter for future course of action. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that in a different case, Coordinate Bench of this Court i.e. in A.C. (S.B.) No. 18 of 2011, on 05.10.2015 has held that period of limitation shall be six months. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that subsequently the Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act has been amended w.e.f. 07.01.2019, whereby this discrepancies and anomaly has been amended by incorporating Section 15 of Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act itself, by specifying the period for preferring appeal as 90 days. As such, in view of the above judgment as well as new amendment in the Act, subsequent to the judgment passed by the Tribunal, the defect pointed out by the office with regard to the limitation may be ignored as it is not sustainable in the eyes of law and because of Coordinate Bench judgment at that relevant point and subsequent to that, because of amendment made in the Act itself. 12. Learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Rohit Kumar Singh, has nothing to say on the interlocutory application which has been filed for condonation of delay. Under the aforesaid circumstance, petition is considered within time. I.A. No. 2501 of 2019 is hereby allowed and disposed of. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Rohit Kumar Singh, has supported the impugned judgment passed by learned Jharkhand Education Tribunal. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that that “lay off” cannot be used in such a manner as submitted by learned counsel for the appellants. The Oxford Dictionary says “lay off” means dismiss a worker because of shortage of work or informal stop doing something. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the issue has been dealt by the learned Tribunal in the impugned order at paragraph no. The Oxford Dictionary says “lay off” means dismiss a worker because of shortage of work or informal stop doing something. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that the issue has been dealt by the learned Tribunal in the impugned order at paragraph no. 9, which may be taken note of, relying upon the judgment passed in the case of A. Sundarambal v. Govt. of Goa, Daman and Diu and Others reported in 1988 (4) SCC 42 and para 9, 10 & 11 of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced here below:- 9. We are concerned in this case primarily with the meaning of the words “skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work”. If an employee in an industry is not a person engaged in doing work falling in any of these categories, he would not be a workman at all even though he is employed in an industry. The question for consideration before us is whether a teacher in a school falls under any of the four categories, namely, a person doing any skilled or unskilled manual work, supervisory work, technical work or clerical work. If he does not satisfy any one of the above descriptions he would not be a workman even though he is an employee of an industry as settled by this Court in May and Baker (India) Ltd. v. Workmen [ AIR 1967 SC 678 : (1961) 2 Lab LJ 94, 97 : (1961-62) 20 FJR 147] . In that case this Court had to consider the question whether a person employed by a pharmaceutical firm as a representative (for canvassing orders) whose duties consisted mainly of canvassing orders and any clerical or manual work that he had to do was only incidental to his main work of canvassing could be considered as a workman as defined in the Act. Dealing with the said question Wanchoo, J. (as he then was) observed thus: “A ‘workman’ was then defined as any person employed in any industry to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward. Therefore, doing manual or clerical work was necessary before a person could be called a workman. This definition came for consideration before industrial tribunals and it was consistently held that the designation of the employee was not of great moment and what was of importance was the nature of his duties. Therefore, doing manual or clerical work was necessary before a person could be called a workman. This definition came for consideration before industrial tribunals and it was consistently held that the designation of the employee was not of great moment and what was of importance was the nature of his duties. If the nature of the duties is manual or clerical, then the person must be held to be a workman. On the other hand if manual or clerical work is only a small part of the duties of the person concerned and incidental to his main work which is not manual or clerical, then such a person would not be a workman. It has, therefore, to be seen in each case from the nature of the duties whether a person employed is a workman or not, under the definition of that word as it existed before the amendment of 1956. The nature of the duties of Mukerjee is not in dispute in this case and the only question therefore is whether looking to the nature of the duties it can be said that Mukerjee was a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) as it stood at the relevant time. We find from the nature of the duties assigned to Mukerjee that his main work was that of canvassing and any clerical or manual work that he had to do was incidental to his main work of canvassing and could not take more than a small fraction of the time for which he had to work. In the circumstances the tribunal's conclusion that Mukerjee was a workman is incorrect. The tribunal seems to have been led away by the fact that Mukerjee had no supervisory duties and had to work under the directions of his superior officers. That, however, would not necessarily mean that Mukerjee's duties were mainly manual or clerical. From what the tribunal itself has found it is clear that Mukerjee's duties were mainly neither clerical nor manual. Therefore, as Mukerjee was not a workman, his case would not be covered by the Industrial Disputes Act and the tribunal would have no jurisdiction to order his reinstatement. We, therefore, set aside the order of the tribunal directing reinstatement of Mukerjee along with other reliefs.” 10. Therefore, as Mukerjee was not a workman, his case would not be covered by the Industrial Disputes Act and the tribunal would have no jurisdiction to order his reinstatement. We, therefore, set aside the order of the tribunal directing reinstatement of Mukerjee along with other reliefs.” 10. The court held that the employee Mukerjee involved in that case was not a workman under Section 2(s) of the Act because he was not mainly employed to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for hire or reward, which were the only two classes of employees who qualified for being treated as “workman” under the definition of the expression “workman” in the Act, as it stood then. As a result of the above decision, in order to give protection regarding security of employment and other benefits to sales representatives, Parliament passed a separate law entitled the Sales Promotion Employees (Conditions of Service) Act, 1976. It is no doubt true that after the events leading to the above decision took place Section 2(s) of the Act was amended by including persons doing technical work as well as supervisory work. The question for consideration is whether even after the inclusion of the above two classes of employees in the definition of the expression “workman” in the Act a teacher in a school can be called a workman. We are of the view that the teachers employed by educational institutions whether the said institutions are imparting primary, secondary, graduate or post-graduate education cannot be called as “workmen” within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Act. Imparting of education which is the main function of teachers cannot be considered as skilled or unskilled manual work or supervisory work or technical work or clerical work. Imparting of education is in the nature of a mission or a noble vocation. A teacher educates children, he moulds their character, builds up their personality and makes them fit to become responsible citizens. Children grow under the care of teachers the clerical work, if any they may do, is only incidental to their principal work of teaching. We agree with the reasons given by the High Court for taking the view that teachers cannot be treated as “workmen” as defined under the Act. Children grow under the care of teachers the clerical work, if any they may do, is only incidental to their principal work of teaching. We agree with the reasons given by the High Court for taking the view that teachers cannot be treated as “workmen” as defined under the Act. It is not possible to accept the suggestion that having regard to the object of the Act, all employees in an industry except those falling under the four exceptions (i) to (iv) in Section 2(s) of the Act should be treated as workmen. The acceptance of this argument will render the words ‘to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or clerical work’ meaningless. A liberal construction as suggested would have been possible only in the absence of these words. The decision in May and Baker (India) Ltd. v. Workmen [ AIR 1967 SC 678 : (1961) 2 Lab LJ 94, 97 : (1961-62) 20 FJR 147] precludes us from taking such a view. We, therefore, hold that the High Court was right in holding that the appellant was not a “workman” though the school was an industry in view of the definition of “workman” as it now stands. 11. We may at this stage observe that teachers as a class cannot be denied the benefits of social justice. We are aware of the several methods adopted by unscrupulous managements to exploit them by imposing on them unjust conditions of service. In order to do justice to them it is necessary to provide for an appropriate machinery so that teachers may secure what is rightly due to them. In a number of States in India laws have been passed for enquiring into the validity of illegal and unjust terminations of services of teachers by providing for appointment of judicial tribunals to decide such cases. We are told that in the State of Goa there is no such Act in force. If it is so, it is time that the State of Goa takes necessary steps to bring into force an appropriate legislation providing for adjudication of disputes between teachers and the managements of the educational institutions. We hope that this lacuna in the legislative area will be filled up soon. 15. If it is so, it is time that the State of Goa takes necessary steps to bring into force an appropriate legislation providing for adjudication of disputes between teachers and the managements of the educational institutions. We hope that this lacuna in the legislative area will be filled up soon. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that notification cannot be issued by an Institute run by a Trust, in view of Article 13 of the Constitution of India, which is quoted here under : 13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of fundamental rights. - (3) In this article, unless context otherwise requires,- (a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, by-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having in the territory of India the force of law; 16. Learned counsel for the respondent has thus submitted that though the issue of notification mentioned in the impugned order of “lay off” is of no relevancy, they might have used it for general awareness to all, considering the dictionary meaning of notification, but a Institute like Cambridge Institute of Technology cannot be so callous in using the term “notification” and “lay off” for the teachers. Lay off in impugned notification is a legal jargon. A word amenable under the labour laws, knowing fully well that teachers are not labourers. The legal jargoning has only be done to mislead the Court. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent has thus submitted that even if the appellant has taken a stand that “lay off” does not mean termination, then it is another way of terminating a person, contrary to the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Dipti Prakash Banerjee Vs. Satyendra Nath Bose Natiional Centre for Basic Sciences, Calcutta & Others reported in (1999) 3 SCC 60 and in the case of V.P. Ahuja Vs. State of Punjab & Others reported in (2000) 3 SCC 239 as well in the recent case, without initiating any proceeding or following the principles of natural justice, in arbitrary manner. As such, the termination order in the form of “lay off” cannot sustain in the eyes of law, which has rightly been set aside by the Tribunal. 18. State of Punjab & Others reported in (2000) 3 SCC 239 as well in the recent case, without initiating any proceeding or following the principles of natural justice, in arbitrary manner. As such, the termination order in the form of “lay off” cannot sustain in the eyes of law, which has rightly been set aside by the Tribunal. 18. So far contention that there was a financial crisis in the Institute because of no admission and poor admission are concerned as taken by the appellants, no material has been brought on record, rather, contrary material is on record that this respondent, who has joined the service pursuant to due process of appointment initiated on 23.10.2003. He joined service on 16.11.2003, as he was having a decree of B.Sc. Engineering (Electronics and Communication), 2002 equivalent to B. Tech., 1st Class from Bihar Institute of Technology, Sindri, a Government College of Jharkhand. After joining on 16.11.2003, the respondent Professor Prem Shankar pursued higher education within knowledge of the Cambridge Institute of Technology (appellant) and completed Master Degree in Engineering in the year 2009 i.e. M.E. in Electronics & Communication equivalent to M. Tech, with 2nd Class CGPA of 7.03 i.e. 70.3%. He was given charge of senior faculty members and subsequently became In-charge Head of the department vide letter dated 15.04.2009. Subsequently, the respondent because of his work got promotion to the post of Assistant Professor on 23.02.2011. His work has been appreciated by the Cambridge Institute of Technology (appellant) on 16.01.2012. The respondent was made Deputy Head of the Department No. 1 for first shift in the Department of Electronics & Communication Engineering vide letter no. 14.05.2013. It is only when respondent started demanding, promotion to the post of Professor, this type of act has been adopted by the Institute to remove a teacher, who has contributed in Cambridge Institute of Technology by his hard labour for more than 13 years, instead of asking him to have a degree of Ph.D., the Institute has taken a draconian step by removing the respondent from service in the name of “lay off” on the plea that it is not a termination. 19. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent thus submitted that Institute like Cambridge Institute of Technology cannot be allowed to play with legal term in such a fanciful manner, whereby the right of a person, who was appointed after due process of appointment, has been removed in such a way the daily wagers are not removed. 20. Learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that in support of the para-12 to 17 of the counter affidavit as referred by learned counsel for the appellants, nothing has been brought on record to say that financial position of the Institute has deteriorated or the number of students admission in the sessions have reduced, rather on the plea that vide impugned notification of the “lay off” has been issued against 27 teachers, but none have filed case, this will not give any breathing space to the Institute by asking the respondent to waive his rights which is accrued after long hard work, if other persons are not coming before Court, it does not mean that Citizen of India is not allowed to raise his rights in individual capacity. 21. Learned counsel for the respondent thus submitted that no document has been brought on record by Institute before the Tribunal or before this Court to suggest that the Institute has ever given any warning to the respondent/petitioner to upgrade his qualification and obtain Ph. D. Degree. 22. Learned counsel for the respondent/petitioner has submitted that if the respondent/petitioner has not obtained Ph.D. Degree, he may not be entitled for the post of Professor as per AICTE norms, but he cannot be thrown out from the service in such a fanciful manner, which is arbitrary, showing colourable exercise of power. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that no where respondent/petitioner has pleaded that during the “lay off” time, he was engaged elsewhere which entitle the Tribunal to pass an order for deduction of Rs. 23. Learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that no where respondent/petitioner has pleaded that during the “lay off” time, he was engaged elsewhere which entitle the Tribunal to pass an order for deduction of Rs. 43,500/-, rather as per counsel himself, he has submitted that he has only said before the Tribunal that a person having knowledge cannot die in starvation, rather he will earn something to eat, which never means, that he was ever gainfully employed for any sum of money, as mentioned by the Tribunal, though learned counsel has fairly admitted that he has not preferred any cross-appeal against said part of the order, whereby the Tribunal has directed the appellant-Cambridge Institute of Technology to deduct Rs. 43,500/-considering that respondent has earned by engaging himself, as such, he is waiving off that right. 24. Learned counsel for the respondent has further submitted that soon after the impugned notification dated 30.07.2016, the same Institute has again issued notification on 10.08.2016, the wording used in the same may be taken note of, which will show the contrary stand taken by the Institute (appellant) in passing and supporting such impugned order. The notification dated 10.08.2016 at Annexure-12 is quoted hereinbelow: Post Date : 10th August 2016 Institution Name : Cambridge Institute of Technology About Institution : Cambridge Institute of Technology is located at Tatisilwai, Ranchi, in the State of Jharkhand, is approved by All India Council for Technical Education (AICTE) New Delhi, Government of Jharkhand and affiliated to Ranchi University, Ranchi. The Range of Hillocks overlooking the Campus provides a scenic surrounding most suited for academic pursuits. The building house contains Academic Block, Administrative, Central Library, Computer Laboratories, Workshops with State-of-The-Art Equipments, Conference & Seminar Hall and students amenities like Lounge, Gardens and well-laid play grounds, Physical education centre and Canteen. The major industries in the vicinity help to provide Practical training to out students. The success story of out students speaks volumes about the Quality of Education imparted here. CIT has already established a reputation as an Institution fee from the evil of ragging. This has become possible because of atmosphere of Comradely being cultivated assiduously among students from various nearby states. Job Position : Professors/Associate Professors/Assistant Professors/Principal Departments : Civil Engineering Computer Science and Engineering Electrical and Electronics Engineering Electronics and Communication Engineering Mechanical Engineering Mathematics English Chemistry Physics. This has become possible because of atmosphere of Comradely being cultivated assiduously among students from various nearby states. Job Position : Professors/Associate Professors/Assistant Professors/Principal Departments : Civil Engineering Computer Science and Engineering Electrical and Electronics Engineering Electronics and Communication Engineering Mechanical Engineering Mathematics English Chemistry Physics. Qualification : ME/M.Tech./Ph.D and as per UGC and AICTE Norms. Job location : Jharkhand. 25. Learned counsel for the respondent on the above basis has submitted that even in the department in which the respondent was working and was “lay off” by the impugned notification by the Cambridge Institute of Technology again they have invited vacancies of Assistant Professors, Associate Professors, on which the respondent/petitioner was working in the Department of Electronic and Communication Engineering. As such, the counter affidavit filed by the appellants before the learned Tribunal in para15 that no recruitment in the department of Electronic and Communication Engineering have been done against the cited notification is contrary and misleading, for which the appellants should have been suitably deprecated by imposing a heavy cost to mislead the Court. 26. Learned counsel for the respondent, thus submitted that the impugned order of “lay off” has been rightly set aside by the Jharkhand Education Tribunal in its judgment dated 07.02.2018 passed in Case No. 36/2016 (JET), which does not require any interference by this Court in appeal under Section 15 of Jharkhand Education Tribunal Act. 27. Heard, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Rahul Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent, Mr. Rohit Kumar Singh and perused the materials brought on record. The word “lay off” is used by the appellants not in legal sense, rather has been used by the Cambridge Institute of Technology in common parlance, being such a prestigious Institute in the State of Jharkhand, such Institute must be cautious and careful while using the legal terms such as notification, which means something different in the Constitution of India. “Lay off” is used in the Industrial Disputes Act for stopping, removing or terminating. The Hon'ble Supreme Court of Indian has dealt this issue in the case of Miss. A. Sundarambal v. Govt. of Goa, Daman and Diu reported in (1988) 4 SCC 42 as discussed above. A teacher, who has served for 13 years and has given his contribution in the Institute, this Court deprecate the act of Cambridge Institute of Technology in playing/jargoning with the legal terms. A. Sundarambal v. Govt. of Goa, Daman and Diu reported in (1988) 4 SCC 42 as discussed above. A teacher, who has served for 13 years and has given his contribution in the Institute, this Court deprecate the act of Cambridge Institute of Technology in playing/jargoning with the legal terms. If it was “lay off” for a temporary period then why the Cambridge Institute of Technology before issuing advertisement dated 10.08.2016 did not reinstate the respondent Prof. Prem Shankar. Nothing has been brought on record to show any financial crisis to the Institute, rather the subsequent notification shows that the Institute only crushing those teachers who are claiming their rights, before the Authority. From perusal of the same, it appears that petitioner was appointed after due process of appointment initiated by the appellants/Cambridge Institute of Technology after being satisfied. He joined service on 16.11.2003 and pursued his higher education within the knowledge of the Institute and completed Master in Engineering in the year 2009, which is equivalent to M.Tech. in Electronics and Communication Engineering. He was made Senior Faculty member and In-charge Head of Department on 15.04.2009, promoted as Assistant Professor on 23.02.2011, given appraisal letter on 16.01.2012 mentioning therein that : “He has contributed to overall development of department and established laboratories for B. Tech. Course. He is energetic person with pleasing manner. I wish him all success in his professional career.” 28. This letter was issued by Principal of the College Professor (Dr.) A. Bhattacharyya. The respondent/petitioner Prof. Prem Shanker was made Deputy Head No. 1 for the first shift in the Department of Electronics and Communication Engineering, but without any show cause and without any adverse report, he has been removed on fictitious ground by using a wrong word “lay off”. The stand taken by the appellants regarding financial crisis or short fall in admission of the student at the time of issuance of letter dated 30.07.2016 is not acceptable to this Court as because soon thereafter only on 10.08.2016, the Cambridge Institute of Technology (appellant) again published advertisement for appointment on several post in the Institute, including in the Department of Electronics and Communication from where respondent Dr. Prem Shankar has been laid off. Thus, stand taken by appellants is not convincing and acceptable to this Court. Prem Shankar has been laid off. Thus, stand taken by appellants is not convincing and acceptable to this Court. Thus, the Tribunal has rightly passed an order setting aside the notification dated 30th July, 2016 directing the appellants to re-instate the respondent with 50% back wages. So far with regard to the deduction of Rs. 43,500/- is concerned, though there is no material, but in absence of any cross appeal by the respondent/petitioner, this Court is also not interfering with the same. Accordingly, the appeal being devoid of any merit, is hereby dismissed with a direction to the appellants to comply the order as early as possible.