JUDGMENT Hon'ble Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. (Via Video Conferencing) Though, this writ petition carries a very intricate controversy to be adjudicated in a proceeding under Section 7A of the Act of 1952, which was instituted as against the petitioner's organization under the provisions of Employees Provident Fund and Misc. Provisions Act, 1952. 2. The challenge given by the petitioner in the present writ petition, is to the impugned orders dated 13.09.2004, which was passed by respondent no.2, and an order dated 22.02.2005, which was yet again passed by respondent no.2, in a proceedings which is said to be allegedly held before him for the determination of the liability on the petitioner for its dereliction in making its contribution to the EPF fund, on the issuance of notices for the proceedings under Section 7A of the Act of 1952. However, as per the said determination, which was made by respondent no.2, the challenge was given by the petitioner, to the impugned orders before Employees Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, which too had adjudicated the matter by way of an impugned order dated 13.09.2007; against the petitioner and thereby affirming the judgment of respondent no.2 dated 13.09.2004. To be précised the manner in which the relief has been modulated is referred to hereunder:- Prayer “In the above circumstances, it is most respectfully prayed that the Hon'ble Court may be pleased to; i. Issue an order, direction or a writ in the nature of certiorari calling for the records of the entire proceedings in pursuance of which the Order dated 13.09.2004 of the respondent no.2 (Annexure-3) of the writ petition) and the Order dated 22.02.2005 of the respondent no.2 (Annexure-2) of the Writ Petition) and quashing and setting aside the impugned order dated 19.08.2010 of the learned Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi (Annexure-1 of the writ petition), the order dated 13.09.2007 of the respondent no.2 (Annexure-2 of the writ petition) and the order dated 22.02.2005 of the respondent no.2 (Annexure-2 of the writ petition) and ii. Issue an order, direction or a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents no.1 and 2 to refund the amount which the petitioner has deposited in terms of and in compliance of the Interim Order dated 02.03.2005 of the Learned Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal in Appeal ATA 192(4)/2005 (Annexure-21 of the writ petition) and iii. Issue an order, direction or a writ in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents no.1 and 2 to refund the amount which the petitioner has deposited in terms of and in compliance of the Interim Order dated 02.03.2005 of the Learned Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal in Appeal ATA 192(4)/2005 (Annexure-21 of the writ petition) and iii. Issue any other order or direction as the nature of the case may warrant and the Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper in the circumstances of the case, and iv. Issue an ad-interim order in favour of the petitioner." 3. At the inception of the proceedings and the arguments, of this present writ petition, a very short controversy which the learned Senior Counsel, for the petitioner has raised this controversy, is from the prospective, as to once, the proceedings held thereto, it is an imposition of a liability payable by an employer and has financial implications, as contemplated under Section 7A of the Act of 1952; what ought to have been an effective opportunity which was required to be provided to the petitioner or any other organization as such, in order to effectively, defend themselves, as against the proposed financial liability, which the respondents intended to impose on the employer, for any dereliction of non-compliance of provisions contained under the Act of 1952. 4. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner in the beginning of his arguments, has referred to the provisions, as it is contained, under Sub Section (4) of Section 7A of the Act of 1952, which is quoted hereunder:- “[(4) Where an order under sub-section (1) is passed against an employer ex parte, he may, within three months from the date of communication of such order, apply to the officer for setting aside such order and if he satisfies the officer that the show-cause notice was not duly served or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the inquiry was held, the officer shall make an order setting aside his earlier order and shall appoint a date for proceeding with the inquiry: Provided that no such order shall be set aside merely on the ground that there has been irregularity in the service of the show-cause notice if the officer is satisfied that the employer had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear before the officer. Explanation.-Where an appeal has been preferred under this Act against an order passed ex-parte and such appeal has been disposed of otherwise than on the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this sub-section for setting aside the ex parte order." 5. The purpose for drawing the attention and attraction to the provisions of Sub Section (4) of Section 7A of the Act of 1952, by the petitioner's counsel was from the prospective, as to satisfy whether an opportunity to defend himself to have a sufficient show cause, for projecting his defence, on an issuance of a notice under Section 7A of the Act of 1952, was mandatory or not? For the said purpose in his arguments, he has submitted that if the language of Sub Section (4) of Section 7A, itself is taken into consideration, which grants the latitude to the employer to file an application to set aside an ex-parte order passed under Section 7A of the Act, which has been passed under Sub Section (1), it contemplates one of the basic ingredients, which is required to be satisfied, prior to passing of the order under Sub Section (1) of Section 7A of the Act of 1952, which would necessitate for a recall under Sub Section (4) is that its only when the employer is able to satisfy the authority, who has passed the order sought to be recalled that there was no show cause notice issued, or when it was issued to him, it was not duly served on the employer. In fact, Mr. R.K. Raizada, Senior Advocate, intended to convey by his arguments that a reference of a term show cause, under Sub Section (4) for the purposes of maintaining a recall of an ex-parte order itself, would stipulate that prior to initiation of any proceedings under Section 7A(1) of the Act of 1952, there has had to be a satisfaction, of a pre-condition of issuance of an effective show cause notice to be served on the employer calling for reply. As far as the said argument is concerned, and quite logically also, I am of the view that under an Act, where, under which the authorities are created under it, are in the process of determining or imposing a financial liability, irrespective of the fact that whether the principal Section speaks about the issuance of a prior show cause notice or not but yet under a normal adherence of principles of nature justice and in common legal parlance, if it is to be read with Sub Section (4) of Section 7A of the Act of 1952, I am of the view that issuance of an effective show cause notice, is bound to be a condition precedent for the purposes of initiation of the proceeding under Section 7A(1) of the Act of 1952, against the petitioner. 6. In order to further elucidate his argument pertaining to the modalities, which were adopted by the respondents for the purposes of initiation of the proceedings under Section 7A of the Act of 1952. The counsel for the petitioner had drawn the attention of this Court to the show cause notice dated 16.03.2004, which was the genesis of the entire dispute of the assessment being made against the petitioner under Section 7A of the Act of 1952 and particularly the counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to the notice dated 16.03.2004 (Annexure 11 to the writ petition). If the said notice is taken into consideration and the purpose for which it has been issued, it refers therein to the following effect:- ¼^^lafonk deZpkfj;ksa ds lEcU/k esa**½ 7. The decipher of this preposition and the intention of the notice itself on 16.03.2004; does not reflect as to whether this assessment which is intended to be conducted by the respondents, under Section 7A(i) of the Act of 1952 pertained to which financial years; for which the action, was intended to be taken by the respondents, since being vague. The decipher of this preposition and the intention of the notice itself on 16.03.2004; does not reflect as to whether this assessment which is intended to be conducted by the respondents, under Section 7A(i) of the Act of 1952 pertained to which financial years; for which the action, was intended to be taken by the respondents, since being vague. By referring the aforesaid terminology of the assessment to be made of the “contractual employees", may not be elaborative and specific, enough to project and convey the intention of respondent no.2, to resort to an action under Section 7A of the Act of 1952 and there are two consequences, which would be flowing from it, viz:- (i) The notice itself would be determined to be vague and having been issued by the respondent no.2, without a proper application of mind on account of its failure in expressing his intention of the probable action to be taken against the petitioner and for which assessment years and under which head. (ii) The second impact of the same would be that in the absence of there being any particulars for the period for which the impugned action was intended to be taken by respondent no.2, would render the employer in capacitated may have his effective defence against the action proposed to be taken against him as that would render him to give an effective reply, that itself would deceive the very fabric of an effective opportunity of hearing. (iii) Reference of the period for which the action was intended to be taken by the respondents under Section 7A(I), would be a mandatory requirement, because in the absence of it, the employer would be in capacitated to know as to for which period he has been called upon to reply. That itself would render the entire process to be vitiated in the eyes of law, being derogatory to the basic principles of natural justice. 8. That itself would render the entire process to be vitiated in the eyes of law, being derogatory to the basic principles of natural justice. 8. Hence, the argument extended by the learned Senior Counsel, for the petitioner, in the light of the provision contained under Sub Section (4) of Section 7A of the Act of 1952, that issuance of a show cause notice is a condition precedent for initiation of the proceedings under Section 7A of the Act of 1952, herein, as per my opinion, under law, the show cause means an affective show cause was required, to be issued by the respondents containing and satisfying the element of a judicious application of mind, which should be reflected and conveyed from the contents of the notice itself, which expresses the clear and specific intention of an action proposed to be taken by the respondents, and which simultaneously, enables the employer to avail an effective defence, as to for which period he was expected to extend his reply in his defence to be taken before the respondents. In the absence of the same it would vitiate the proceedings, where the circumstances lead to a situation, where the person called to file reply, himself has not made sure by the contents of show cause notice as to what he has to reply. 9. In order to further elucidate his argument, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court to the reply which the petitioner has submitted at the first instance of the receipt of the notice as extended by him on 20.03.2004; wherein he has specifically taken a ground and a specific plea to the effect that as a consequence the inspection which was held on 07.01.2004, and subsequent issuance of notices on 16.03.2004, thereof is vague and is not containing the full particulars for which the petitioner has been called upon to give a reply to it. The relevant excerpt of the said reply given by the petitioner on 20.03.2004 is referred to hereunder:- “Copy of your inspection report dated 17.01.2004 and our reply dated 07.02.2004 regarding your suggestions/observations in the inspection report is enclosed herewith for your ready reference. Further, the contents of the notice issued by you are irrelevant, vague and unwarranted without any base." 10. Further, the contents of the notice issued by you are irrelevant, vague and unwarranted without any base." 10. The counsel for the petitioner has further submitted that it is not that the petitioner has taken the said defence of non supplying of an effective notice with full particulars, to the petitioner, which has incapacitated him to give an effective reply. He has further reiterated his defence with regards to non supplying of an affective notice containing with full particulars for which the petitioner was called upon to give his reply, the said fact was also reiterated by him, while submitting his reply to the Assistant Provident Fund Commissioner, in continuation to his earlier correspondence dated 26.03.2004; wherein in the concluding part of the said correspondence petitioner has yet again taken a defence that there was an absolute vagueness in the notice issued to him on 16.03.2004, and that has rendered him to be incapacitated to give his effective reply in defence plea, to the notice issued by the respondents on 16.03.2004. 11. In response to it, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents Mr. D.S. Patni, had submitted and had also very candidly, accepted the fact that the notice issued on 16.03.2004, did not express or decipher the particulars of the period for which the proceedings under Section 7A of the Act of 1952; was expected or intended to be taken against the petitioner. But in order to overcome the said procedural anomaly, the learned Senior Counsel, for the respondents had submitted that the said mistake of not providing the details of the assessment year for which the action was proposed to be taken against the petitioner, subsequently stood rectified by other communications, which were made by the respondents after issuance of show cause notice on 16.03.2004, calling upon the petitioner to give the details of Form 26(C), providing them the details of the engagement of the contractual employees, and the other particulars, which according to the respondents, were supplied to them by the petitioner's correspondence on 17.05.2004, which was in relation to the years of 2001-2002 and 2002-2003. 12. 12. This argument of learned Senior Counsel, for the respondents that after the issuance of show cause notice of 16.03.2004, since in pursuance to the other later correspondences, which were issued subsequent to the show cause notices dated 16.03.2004, since assessment of the period for which the action was contemplated to be taken against him was referred therein, in the later correspondences, as per the opinion of this Court that itself would not be a sufficient an effective compliance for issuance of an effective show cause notice to the petitioner because calling for a documentation at a later stage after issuance of the principle of show cause, means depriving the petitioner of his first step of availing of an effective defence as against the action proposed to be taken under Section 7A(1) of the Act of 1952. 13. On this limited count itself, this Court is of the view that the respondent no.2, when he was intending to take an action under Section 7A(1) of the Act having financial bearing as against the petitioner, he ought to have complied with the condition of- 1. Undertaking a prior exercise of drawing a logical conclusion based on material to be considered, as to whether the action at all was required to be taken under Section 7A(1) of the Act of 1952, for irrespective of the period for which the action was intended to be taken. 2. It is only after the effective and analytical determination which was to be made by respondent no.2, as to whether the action if at all, was required it ought to have been reflected in the show cause, at the first instance itself, when the show cause is issued to an employer, calling upon him for his defence, as against an action intended to be taken and as expressed to be taken in the show cause notice. 3. 3. This Court is of the view that if an employer gives a vague notice, as it happens to be in the present case, as would be apparently reflected from the notice of 16.03.2004, this would amount to that an affective opportunity of defence, has not been provided to the employer, because in the absence of the details and particulars for which the reply was solicited, if that itself is not expressed in the show cause notice, it would be a deprivation of an effective opportunity, at the first instance to extend the defence. Subsequent rectifications or calling for more particulars by respondents from employer petitioner, would be only patching up the defects, which has chanced in the show cause notice. 14. The argument of learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Mr. D.S. Patni, from the prospective that the details of the action proposed to be taken for the periods, since was asked from the petitioner at later stage would suffice the purpose of an effective show cause, I am of the view that this calling upon of details of an action to be taken for a particular specified period of time may not be amounting to be an affective opportunity, once it relates to an action to be taken under Section 7A(1) of the Act of 1952; which entails a fiscal implications on an employer. In that view of the matter since the proceedings itself suffers from the vices of initiation of a defective proceedings under Section 7A(1) of the Act of 1952 and failed to satisfy the conditions which according to the petitioner would be applicable, in accordance with the provisions contained under Section (4) of Section 7A of the Act of 1952. 15. However at this stage, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, had submitted that as a consequence of the impugned judgment, the petitioner had already deposited a certain amount before the respondents themselves and later on when the writ petition was admitted on 29.12.2010, the petitioner was further directed by an interim order to deposit the balance 50% of the amount due to be paid by the petitioner, as a consequence of the impugned judgments under challenge, which the petitioner has complied with. Since I have held that the action taken due to issuance of an defective show cause notice, was vitiated the amount thus deposited by the petitioner would be remitted back to the petitioner forthwith. However, the issue of an interest accruing to him on the amount thus deposited by the petitioner, would be a subject matter, to be decided by respondent no.2 on the revival of the proceedings after issuance of a proper show cause notice by him. 16. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed. The entire proceedings and consequential impugned orders are quashed, being violative of principles of natural justice and adherence of an effective opportunity of hearing, being provided to the petitioner. Quashing of the impugned orders, would be without prejudice to the rights of the respondents, to initiate a de novo proceedings, but only after giving due and effective show cause notice to the petitioner which is to be decided exclusively on its own merits. 17. Subject to the above, the writ petition stands allowed.