ORDER : 1. Heard learned counsel for petitioner and learned Government Pleader appearing for the respondents. 2. Petitioner is working as Hostel Welfare Officer Grade-II. In this writ petition he is challenging the order dated 29.09.2013 imposing the punishment of withholding of two annual increments with cumulative effect. 3. The facts on record would disclose that on 10/11.09.2003 the ACB officials conducted surprise check in the BC Boys Hostel, Karimnagar, where petitioner was working as Hostel Welfare Officer. By proceedings dated 27.11.2003, Charge Memo was drawn containing three charges and petitioner was also placed under suspension by the same proceedings. An Enquiry Officer was appointed to enquire into the charges leveled against the petitioner. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report vide letter dated 27.08.2004 holding the Charges as not proved. 4. The Enquiry record of the petitioner was placed before the Government. The Government examined the Disciplinary case of the petitioner and it was not satisfied with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer. Therefore, by Memo dated 25.08.2006, the Government directed the District Collector to exercise power under Rule 21 (2) of the Andhra Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (for short ‘the CCA Rules 1991’) indicated the reasons to be incorporated in the disagreement note, punishment that is required to be imposed and also directed to send the report on the action taken to the Government. Consequently, on 03.11.2006, show cause notice was issued incorporating the disagreement note and the punishment that was proposed to be imposed as suggested by the Government. On 20.11.2006, petitioner submitted his explanation. According to the petitioner, there is no further progress on the above aspect. 5. While so, on 14.02.2007, a fresh Charge Memo was drawn with reference to the very same incident. On 19.02.2007, petitioner submitted representation denying the charges leveled against him and also requested to supply the photocopies of item wise details and date/month wise details, wherein alleged irregularities were committed and alleged loss caused to the Government. He also submitted reminder on 24.02.2007 requesting to supply the documents. On 29.09.2013, the District Collector, passed orders imposing punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect. 6. On 30.09.2013, petitioner claims to have submitted appeal to the Government. A copy of the appeal is filed as Ex.P.12. He also submitted reminder on 24.02.2007 requesting to supply the documents. On 29.09.2013, the District Collector, passed orders imposing punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect. 6. On 30.09.2013, petitioner claims to have submitted appeal to the Government. A copy of the appeal is filed as Ex.P.12. In the first page of the appeal there is stamp of the Office of the Principal Secretary acknowledging the receipt of said appeal. Alleging inaction in disposing of the appeal and aggrieved by the punishment imposed, this writ petition is filed. 7. From the above narration of facts, the following crucial facts can be culled out. Consequent to the raid conducted by ACB on 10/11.09.2003, disciplinary action was initiated. In the Charge Memo dated 27.11.2003, Charge No. 2 deals with variation in the food provisions and Charge No. 3 deals with shortfall in actual strength of the boarders in the hostel. It is alleged that as against strength shown as 179, only 100 boarders were found present. For all the three charges, the basis is the report dated 11.09.2003 of the ACB. In the report of Enquiry Officer, the Enquiry Officer notices that the stock register and attendance register were verified by the District BC Welfare Officer and reported to the Director of BC Welfare on 13.01.2003 holding that no variations were found. He held all the charges as not proved. Particularly he found that there was no illegality in the stock of food provisions. With reference to shortfall of strength, he recorded that absence of 79 boarders was on account of festival of lord Ganesha and immersion on 09.09.2003 preceded by second Saturday and Sunday and held the Charge as not proved. 8. The CCA Rules clearly delineate the powers of hierarchy of authorities and their jurisdiction. It has created remedies in the form of appeal or revision. The powers of disciplinary authority in departmental proceedings is regulated by CCA Rules. Rule 20 prescribes procedure to conduct enquiry into the allegations and steps required to be taken after the report of enquiry. Rule 9 prescribes what punishments can be imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. In exercise of his discretion, based on the delinquency alleged and proved, he can impose any one of the punishments mentioned therein. 9. Rule 20 prescribes procedure to conduct enquiry into the allegations and steps required to be taken after the report of enquiry. Rule 9 prescribes what punishments can be imposed by the Disciplinary Authority. In exercise of his discretion, based on the delinquency alleged and proved, he can impose any one of the punishments mentioned therein. 9. As per Rules 20 and 21 of the CCA Rules, 1991, if the Disciplinary Authority is not in agreement with the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, he can defer with the findings, record his dissenting note, call for explanation of the delinquent employee and take further action. If the Disciplinary Authority notices discrepancies in the Enquiry, he can remit the matter to the Enquiry Officer for conducting further Enquiry/Denovo Enquiry as the case may be, but fundamentally, the Disciplinary Authority being a quasi-judicial authority, has to independently act in the matter to decide the delinquency of the employee concerned, working under him and take appropriate decision. 10. Once a decision is taken by the disciplinary authority on any matter concerning disciplinary action, if employee is not satisfied, he may go in appeal and/or revision. Rule 37 of the CCA Rules vests power in the appellate authority to enhance/reduce the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, if he is not satisfied with the said decision. Under Rule 38 power of review is available in the Government. Rule 40 vests overarching power of revision in the Government. Rule 41 vests power of review in the Government on a reference by the Head of Department. Residuary power is vested in the State Government and in certain circumstances, it can take up the disciplinary action on its own. 11. Within the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Authority, the quasi-judicial power is unrestricted and cannot be fettered by any means by the superior authority, however high he may be, including the Government. I am fortified in my view by the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Nagaraj Shivara Karjagi vs. Syndicate Bank, (1991) 3 SCC 219 and the opinion expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in D. Ramesh Sinha vs. Cadre Authority for Key Personnel (W.A. No. 562 of 2001 dated 19.06.2001). 12. That being the statutory scheme and the law, strangely, at the stage of consideration of report of the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority forwards the entire record to Government. 12. That being the statutory scheme and the law, strangely, at the stage of consideration of report of the Enquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority forwards the entire record to Government. The Government in turn, examines the record as if it is acting as Original Authority or Supervising Authority over the functioning of Disciplinary Authority, records what is to be disagreed upon, mandates Disciplinary Authority to notify the disagreement points and further mandates to impose appropriate punishment mentioned therein. It also intended to monitor what steps are taken by asking the Collector to send the report after finalizing the proceedings. In other words, the Government was directing the District Collector to act as per its command taking away the discretion vested in Competent Authority and subjugated the discretion of the Disciplinary Authority to its command. 13. The question of sending report to Government, seeking its direction and acting upon those directions is not permissible. It would be amounting to the Disciplinary Authority not applying his mind independently, but acting on the commands of the Superior Authority. This is per se illegal. 14. As there was a clear mandate from the Government, the Disciplinary Authority had no option but to issue show cause notice dated 03.11.2006 incorporating whatever is directed by the Government as dissenting note and indicating the punishment that was proposed to be imposed. Strangely, no further steps were taken. 15. Fresh Charge Memo was drawn on 14.02.2007 referring to the very same incident of ACB conducting raid on 10/11.09.2003. Though the first charge was framed in a different manner i.e. causing loss of Rs. 19,437.06, the alleged loss refers to the maintenance of stock and second charge is same as was formulated in the Charge Memo dated 27.11.2003 i.e. absence of 79 boarders. At this stage, it is appropriate to note that the Charge Memo dated 27.11.2003 as well as present Charge Memo is based on the report of ACB. Even the witnesses cited now are the two mediators, the Inspector of Police, who conducted surprise check and the Deputy Superintendent of Police who filed final report. Petitioner denied the charges in his explanation dated 19.02.2007 and he also sought for supply of documents to submit a detailed explanation. Even the witnesses cited now are the two mediators, the Inspector of Police, who conducted surprise check and the Deputy Superintendent of Police who filed final report. Petitioner denied the charges in his explanation dated 19.02.2007 and he also sought for supply of documents to submit a detailed explanation. The said representation as well as the reminder dated 24.02.2007 were acknowledged by the Office of the District BC Welfare Officer but strangely in the order imposing punishment, the Disciplinary Authority holds that no explanation was offered by the petitioner and holds the charges as proved and imposes the punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect, which was punishment suggested by the Government in the earlier round. 16. It gives an interesting reading. Firstly, it refers to the Government Memo dated 11.01.2007 directing to frame charges and initiate major penalty proceedings duly furnishing copy of the Draft Article of Charges provided by the ACB officials. It also refers to the Government Memo dated 25.08.2006. By this Memo, in the first round of disciplinary action, as noticed above, Government directed the District Collector to disagree with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, indicate the disagreement factors and impose punishment of withholding of two increments with cumulative effect. In other words, with reference to the very same incident, forming part of the earlier proceedings, by setting in motion fresh disciplinary action this punishment order is passed. 17. The order of punishment is challenged primarily on the following grounds: Firstly on the same issue, when the earlier disciplinary proceedings were initiated and no further steps were taken, it is not permissible to initiate another disciplinary proceeding; secondly, when major punishment is proposed to be imposed, it is mandatory to hold enquiry into the charges leveled against the delinquent employee by affording due opportunity of hearing and following the entire gamut of Rule 20 of the CCA Rules, 1991 but instead straight away punishment is imposed; thirdly though petitioner denied the charges and sought for supply of document, without looking into the explanation offered and without supplying the documents, major punishment cannot be imposed; and fourthly, even assuming that the punishment is validly imposed, it is not made in independent exercise of power by the Disciplinary Authority, but it is imposed based on the mandate issued by the Government and the same is ex-facie illegal. Further it is contended that having acknowledged the appeal by the Government it is illegal to keep the appeal pending for more than six years. Learned Counsel finally submitted that on account of the punishment imposed, grave prejudice is caused to the petitioner and has direct impact on the quantum of pension that can be paid to the petitioner and such drastic punishment cannot be imposed without following the due process. 18.1. Though learned Government Pleader is fair in submitting that the procedure required by law was not followed, he raised objection on maintainability of writ petition on the ground of delay and laches. According to learned Government Pleader, against the order of punishment dated 29.09.2013, writ petition is filed after six years. He would submit that the alleged appeal preferred by the petitioner is not traceable in the office of Principal Secretary to Government. He would submit that even assuming that the appeal was preferred, petitioner could not have waited for six long years to institute this writ petition. 18.2. Learned Government Pleader placed reliance on Shiv Das vs. Union of India and Others, (2007) 9 SCC 274 and State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. R.K. Zalpuri and Others, (2015) 15 SCC 602 . 19.1. In response to this submission of learned Government Pleader, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that petitioner was bonafidely waiting that his appeal would be disposed of by the Government and therefore he did not immediately institute the writ petition. He would submit that delay in filing the writ petition is not deliberate and willful. He would further submit that even assuming that there is delay, as the order is not sustainable on the face of it, merely on the ground that petitioner did not institute the writ petition immediately, cannot ensure to the benefit of the respondents and validate an ex-facie illegal order. 19.2. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Syed Qamar Ali, 1967 SLR 228, Badruka College of Commerce vs. State of A.P. and Others, 1997 (1) ALD 282 (FB) and P. Chandra Shekar Reddy vs. District Collector and Another, 2008 (4) ALD 797 . 20. Three glaring illegalities are noticed. 20. Three glaring illegalities are noticed. Firstly, Government is acting as Supervising Authority over the functioning of Disciplinary Authority and directing him to act in a particular manner imposing fetters on the independence of the Disciplinary Authority; secondly, higher authority cannot examine report of Enquiry Officer even before proceedings are finalized by the Disciplinary Authority and indicate reasons for dissent with the report of Enquiry Officer; thirdly even assuming that what was done by the Government is valid, even before dissenting note is communicated and explanation is offered, the question of coming to conclusion about imposing punishment, more particularly a particular punishment is not permissible. It would be amounting to prejudging the issue and acting with closed mind. At any rate, Government cannot mandate Disciplinary Authority to impose a particular punishment; Second charge memo on the very same issue without concluding the earlier disciplinary proceedings is not valid; when major punishment is to be imposed domestic enquiry has to be conducted; merely because employee has not submitted explanation, assuming it was not submitted, is not a ground to straight away impose punishment. In fact, petitioner requested to supply documents but they were not supplied. It is not a case where petitioner refused to file his explanation; inordinate delay in taking disciplinary action. On a 2003 incident punishment was imposed after ten years without following due procedure; and no justification to keep the appeal pending for more than six years. 21. As assessed above, the order of punishment is vitiated on several counts on the face of it, and is not sustainable for more than one reason. Therefore, the only defense available to the learned Government Pleader is the issue of delay of six years in filing the writ petition and therefore he vehemently opposed the writ petition on the ground of delay. 22. Thus, the only issue for consideration is whether delay of about 6½ years is fatal to deny the legitimate claim of petitioner and validate a decision which is ex-facie illegal? 23. Writ remedy is an extra-ordinary remedy, equitable and discretionary. Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not impose any restrictions to avail the remedy and does not impose limitation to avail the remedy. It is very wide and all encompassing. 23. Writ remedy is an extra-ordinary remedy, equitable and discretionary. Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not impose any restrictions to avail the remedy and does not impose limitation to avail the remedy. It is very wide and all encompassing. Whenever, an aggrieved person knocks the doors of the Writ Court, the Court looks into the allegation of infringement of the right of an individual, examines his claim and redresses the grievance wherever injustice is caused. However, Constitutional Courts have imposed self-restraint in exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 24. Ordinarily Writ Courts do not encourage stale claim even assuming party makes out a case of infringement of his right. Thus, in considering a grievance brought before the High Court in a writ petition, delay and laches also plays significant role and determines the course of the litigation. There is no hard and fast rule. Impact of delay and laches on the course of litigation depends on the facts of the case, nature of grievance and relief prayed. Writ Court may still entertain a writ petition, if it finds grave illegality in the decision affecting a person and no third party rights have accrued in the meantime. However, the Court may mould the relief, having regard to the delay in instituting the writ petition. 25. In service disputes, there are two aspects which require consideration whenever a grievance is made on infringement of right of an employee after lapse of reasonable time. 26. Firstly, in the combined State of Andhra Pradesh, in exercise of powers vested under Article 371-D his Excellency the President of India, has promulgated Presidential Order constituting Administrative Tribunal to adjudicate service disputes. It prescribed six months time to seek redressal of grievance. This was replaced by the Administrative Tribunal established under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short 'the Act, 1985'). This Act fixed one year to seek legal remedy. After formation of the State of Telangana, this Tribunal was also abolished w.e.f. 16.09.2016. This abolition restored status quo ante obtaining prior to 1975. Now, alleging infringement of right concerning service conditions in an employment, an aggrieved person can directly institute writ petition. As noted above, Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not impose limitation to avail the remedy. 27. This abolition restored status quo ante obtaining prior to 1975. Now, alleging infringement of right concerning service conditions in an employment, an aggrieved person can directly institute writ petition. As noted above, Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not impose limitation to avail the remedy. 27. Thus, when a writ petition is instituted where on the face of it, delay is apparent, party has to satisfy why the remedy under the Act, 1985 was not availed before it was abolished. While considering such cases, it has to be noted that even under the Presidential Order and the Act, 1985 the Tribunal was conferred discretion to entertain the O.A. filed after the period of limitation, by condoning the delay. 28. Secondly, even if cogent reasons are assigned for not instituting case before the Administrative Tribunal within the period of limitation or before the High Court within reasonable time, still Writ Court may refuse to grant the relief, if in the meantime third parties have acquired right and entertaining the writ petition and granting relief would upset settled issue particularly in matters of seniority and promotion. A writ petition filed a long time after cause of action arose may be entertained only if it is an individual grievance and has no impact on the rights of others and cogent reasons are assigned for delay in approaching the High Court. Even in such cases, though Court may entertain the writ petition it would mould the relief to balance the equities. 29. In S.S. Rathore vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582 , challenging order of dismissal from service dated 13.1.1966 suit was instituted on 30.9.1969. Suit was dismissed on the ground of delay as it was not filed within three years from 13.1.1966. Reliance was placed on Article 58 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. If date of order of appellate authority i.e. 31.8.1966 and Section 80 notice dated 17.6.1969 are taken into consideration the suit was within time. The Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed its opinion as under: “20. Reliance was placed on Article 58 of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963. If date of order of appellate authority i.e. 31.8.1966 and Section 80 notice dated 17.6.1969 are taken into consideration the suit was within time. The Hon'ble Supreme Court expressed its opinion as under: “20. We are of the view that the cause of action shall be taken to arise not from the date of the original adverse order but on the date when the order of the higher authority where a statutory remedy is provided entertaining the appeal or representation is made and where no such order is made, though the remedy has been availed of, a six months' period from the date of preferring of the appeal or making of the representation shall be taken to be the date when cause of action shall be taken to have first arisen. We, however, make it clear that this principle may not be applicable when the remedy availed of has not been provided by law. Repeated unsuccessful representations not provided by law are not governed by this principle. 21. It is appropriate to notice the provision regarding limitation under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. Sub-Section (1) has prescribed a period of one year for making of the application and power of condonation of delay of a total period of six months has been vested under sub-section (3). The civil court's jurisdiction has been taken away by the Act and, therefore, as far as government servants are concerned, Article 58 may not be invocable in view of the special limitation. Yet, suits outside the purview of the Administrative Tribunals Act shall continue to be governed by Article 58. 22. It is proper that the position in such cases should be uniform. Therefore, in every such case only when the appeal or representation provided by law is disposed of, cause of action shall first accrue and where such order is not made, on the expiry of six months from the date when the appeal was filed or representation was made, the right to sue shall first accrue. Submission of just a memorial or representation to the head of the establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing limitation.” (Emphasis supplied) 30. On 30.9.2013, petitioner claims to have preferred appeal. Submission of just a memorial or representation to the head of the establishment shall not be taken into consideration in the matter of fixing limitation.” (Emphasis supplied) 30. On 30.9.2013, petitioner claims to have preferred appeal. As per law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.S. Rathore, petitioner had to wait for six months, i.e. 30.3.2014 and as no decision was communicated on his appeal within six months, he had one year from 30.3.2014 to file Original Application before the Tribunal, i.e. 30.3.2015. By then Tribunal was in existence. Thus, delay operates against him from 30.3.2015. In paragraph No. 7 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, petitioner assigns reasons why he could not institute case earlier and also asserts that granting relief to him would not affect third party rights. 31. When writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction [Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. vs. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322]. The Constitutional Court has to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the Court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained [Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 ]. However, the real test to determine delay is that the petitioner should come to the Court before a parallel right is created but the test is not the physical running of time [Badruka College of Commerce vs. State of A.P. Education Department and Others]. 32. In Tukaram Kana Joshi vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: “12. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the rule of law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if the whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third-party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. (Emphasis supplied) 33. In Shiv Das vs. Union of India and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court approved the view taken by the Privy Council in Lindsay Petroleum Co. vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) 5 PC 221. It reads as under: “7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. vs. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, PC at P.239 was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. vs. M.R. Meher, AIR 1967 SC 1450 and Maharashtra SRTC vs. Balwant Regular Motor Service, AIR 1969 SC 329 , Sir Barnes had stated: “Now the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, if founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.” (Emphasis supplied) 34. Thus, though delay in seeking legal remedy is crucial aspect even while considering alleged infringement of right in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, writ petition need not be thrown out on that ground, when the decision of the administrative authority, under challenge, shocks the conscience of the Court. However, while setting aside such decision Court can mould the relief that can be granted to the petitioner. 35. As noticed in the earlier paragraphs the order of punishment is ex-facie illegal. Repeated disciplinary action on the same issue; prolonged disciplinary action; not following the CCA Rules, 1991 to impose major punishment; no independent application of mind by the Disciplinary Authority and acting as per the directions of superior authority; not considering the request to supply documents, thereby depriving opportunity of hearing, are all fatal and go to the root of the order and per se vitiates the order of punishment impugned in the writ petition. This order affects two annual increments of the petitioner for the rest of the service and affects quantum of pension payable on retirement. Thus, is a grave punishment. It is a wholly unjust decision and pricks the conscious of the Court. When the order is having grave civil consequences and on the face of it vitiated on several counts, the writ petition can not be thrown out only on the ground of delay. However, as petitioner kept quiet for more than five years, even after preferring appeal, he is not entitled to full array of reliefs, and reliefs have to be moulded. Learned counsel for petitioner fairly submitted that petitioner would not claim promotion if he is discharged from the disciplinary action. However, as petitioner kept quiet for more than five years, even after preferring appeal, he is not entitled to full array of reliefs, and reliefs have to be moulded. Learned counsel for petitioner fairly submitted that petitioner would not claim promotion if he is discharged from the disciplinary action. In addition to this submission, petitioner is also not entitled to claim arrears of amounts on release of increments. 36. In the above analysis of facts and law, the order of punishment is not sustainable and is set aside and the Writ Petition is allowed. However, petitioner is only entitled to notional fixation of annual increments, withheld consequent to the impugned punishment order and not entitled to arrears of amounts on restoration of annual increments. Prospectively, petitioner is entitled to full array of benefits flowing out of setting aside the punishment order. It is also made clear that petitioner is not entitled to claim retrospective promotion even if a junior to him was granted promotion. Pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.