JUDGMENT : Vivek Rusia, J. The aforesaid appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 24.9.2009 passed by Additional Sessions Judge, Sonkatchh, District Dewas in S.T. No.46/2009, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as under : Section & Act. Imprisonment Fine Amount Imprisonment in lieu of default of payment of the fine. U/s. 302 of IPC R.I. for life 5,000/- Six months R.I. 2. As per prosecution story, on 20.12.2008, the complainant Ramsingh (PW-1) complained the Police Station Bhaunrasa, District Dewas alleging that on 20.12.2008 at about 8.00 a.m., his son Gulab i.e. deceased was fencing the med on the western side of the field and he was on the other side (i.e. eastern side) of the field. At that time present appellant Parvat Singh S/O Siddu Singh came armed with an axe and said to Gulab that why he is not allowing him to lay the pipe from his field then said I would see you and all of a sudden he inflicted a blow by Axe on the backside of the head of Gulab, as a result of which Gulab fell on the ground thereafter he inflicted one more blow, then Ram Singh (PW-1) and one other person Shriram ran towards the spot and Parvat Singh swinging the Axe ran towards the village. Thereafter Shriram tried to make Gulab drink some water, however, he died on the spot itself and Ramsingh went to lodge FIR. It was further narrated that Parbat sing appellant wanted to lay the pipe through the field of Shriram and as he was not allowing, hence, he has killed Gulab by inflicting axe blows. Based on above information a Merg was registered as No. 21/08 u/s 147 of Cr.P.C. (Exhibit-P/3) and FIR was also registered at Crime No.254/08 against the appellant for the offence punishable u/s 302 of I.P.C (Exhibit- D/3). 3. After lodging the FIR, the investigation was conducted by Vinod Singh Kushwaha ASI (PW-9). He recorded the crime investigation details in Naksha Panchayatnama at 8.00 am on 20/12/2008 vide (Exhibit-P/2). Photographs of the Gulab were also taken as (Exhibit-P/16 to Exhibit-P/20). He recovered the dead body and sent to post-mortem. He also collected the soil, bunch of hair & blood etc from the spot. The police prepared the spot map on 20.12.2008 (Exhibit-D/2) That vide letter dated 20.12.2008 dead body of Gulab was sent for post-mortem (Exhibit-P/10). Photographs of the Gulab were also taken as (Exhibit-P/16 to Exhibit-P/20). He recovered the dead body and sent to post-mortem. He also collected the soil, bunch of hair & blood etc from the spot. The police prepared the spot map on 20.12.2008 (Exhibit-D/2) That vide letter dated 20.12.2008 dead body of Gulab was sent for post-mortem (Exhibit-P/10). Post-mortem of Gulab was done on was done by Dr Atul Pawnikar (PW-11) but no such post-mortem report is available in the Final Report. Vide letter dated 30.12.2008 a query report was sought from the doctor as to whether injuries on the head were homicidal? and whether these injuries were possible by the Axe?. The Appellant was arrested on 24/12/2008 (Exhibit P/11). Dr Atul Pawnikar (PW-11) has opined that (i) injury to a dead person was grievous & danger to life and (ii) injury caused by a sharp object in my opinion (Exhibit-P/21). 4. The appellant was arrested on 24.12.2008 and his memorandum under section 27 of Evidence Act was recorded on the same day in which he said to have admitted the commission of a crime on Saturday (Exhibit-P/3). On his disclosure axe was recovered from the open place outside of the village and seized vide Seizure Memo dated 24.12.2008 (Exhibit-P/4). The size of the Axe is 9x7 cm and dry blood was found on it. All the seized articles sent to FSL for chemical analyses vide (Exhibit-P/12) dated 27.12.2008. As per report dated 24.1.2009 (Exhibit-P/15), bloodstains were found but all were disintegrated. After completion of the investigation police filed the Final Report on 30.12.2008 and trial was committed to Session court. That vide order dated 5.3.2009 charge under section 302 of the Penal Code was framed against the appellant by additional Session Judge, Sonkachh District Dewas. The appellant abjured the guilt and pleaded for the trial. 5. The prosecution in support of its case examined 11 witnesses including informant and sole eye witness Ram Singh (PW-1) (father of the deceased Gulab). In defence, the appellant examined one witness. After appreciating the evidence came on record the learned additional Session Judge has convicted the appellant under section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo the life imprisonment, hence this appeal before this High Court. 6. In defence, the appellant examined one witness. After appreciating the evidence came on record the learned additional Session Judge has convicted the appellant under section 302 of Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo the life imprisonment, hence this appeal before this High Court. 6. Ms Mini Ravinderan learned counsel appearing for the appellant contended that the police examined 11 witnesses out of whom, the seizure witnesses (PW-4 and PW-5) have turned hostile, PW-6 Shriram who was named as an eye witness in the FIR also turned hostile, PW-9 also turned hostile. The prosecution also got exhibited documentary evidence as (Exhibit-P/1 to P/23). The appellant exhibited 4 documents and examined one witness (DW-1 Vikram Singh) who has wrongly been disbelieved. She has further contended that learned trial court has convicted the appellant only on the sole testimony of the Ram Singh (PW-1) i.e. father of the deceased Gulab and it is settled position of law that when the case of the prosecution is based on the evidence of the sole witness then the court should proceed with caution and the court is duty-bound to see whether the sole witness is wholly reliable or not and the evidence of such witness should inspire full confidence in support of this contention. She has placed reliance over the following judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court enumerating the principles of law regarding dealing with the evidence of solitary or sole witness:- (a) Birappa and other V/s State of Karnataka (2010) 12 SCC 182 (para 9) (b) Jagdish and others V/s State of Haryana (2019) 7 SCC 711 (para 8 & 10) (c) Hasan Murtaja V/s State of Haryana (2002) 3 SCC 1 (para 8 & 10) (d) State of Uttar Pradesh V/S Satveer and others (2015) 9 SCC 44 ( para 12) (e) Lallu Manjhi and another V/S State of Jharkhand (2003) 2 SCC 401 (para 13) 7. By placing reliance on above judgments learned counsel tried to explain that the evidence of Ram Singh PW.-1 is wholly unreliable, who was not even present at the spot because in the FIR (Ex. D-3) he has categorically stated that the appellant Parvat Singh had inflicted two Axe blows to Gulab (deceased) and thereafter went running towards the village. Meaning thereby this FIR could only have been lodged after seeing Parvat Singh inflicting fatal blows to Gulab and also after seeing the injuries on Gulab. D-3) he has categorically stated that the appellant Parvat Singh had inflicted two Axe blows to Gulab (deceased) and thereafter went running towards the village. Meaning thereby this FIR could only have been lodged after seeing Parvat Singh inflicting fatal blows to Gulab and also after seeing the injuries on Gulab. Whereas in the dock evidence in para 8 P.W.-1 Ram Singh says that on the date of incident he went to the field to give tea to his son, he was not able to give tea as on the western med he was eating Tobacco and at that time on hearing altercation, he ran towards his son but as the appellant came running towards him pointing the Axe, therefore he ran in the opposite direction towards the village and after informing the watchmen and one Baje Singh he went to the police station. This shows that he was not at the spot or see the deceased or the incident. IO (PW-8) in his evidence has admitted that he did not find any utensils used for tea. In para 10 he says that he only reached the spot along with police after lodging the FIR. In paragraph no. 15 he says that after hearing his son he had only covered the half of the way towards his son when the appellant came running towards him, fearing for his life Ram Singh ran towards the village at that time he was not able to see his son, he further said that he only went to the spot along with police then only he had seen his son and also saw the injury for the very first time. 8. Learned counsel further contended that the FIR was lodged only after the police reached the spot at 11.20 AM and the FIR so purported/shown to be lodged at 10:40 AM is concocted because as per the own evidence of PW-1 Ram Singh he did not see the injuries and even did not see that the appellant inflicting axe blows on deceased Furthermore it is to be seen that the incident as alleged is at 8 AM and Ram Singh P.W.-1 says he straight away ran to the police station which is 14 Km away and thereafter he says that he was made to sit for 1 hour and then report was lodged at 10:40 AM. This delay is unsuccessfully tried to be explained by the statement but the inference which can be drawn is that the delay in lodging F.I.R. shows that it was only lodged after the police and Ram Singh went to the spot at 11:20 AM this also explains the contents of the F.I.R. wherein Ram Singh explicitly mentions the injuries which could only have been done once he saw the injuries as per evidence it is proved beyond any iota of doubt that Ram Singh only see the injury after reaching the spot along with police at 11:20 AM. This leads to being only inference that PW-1 did not see the incident and this factum has also been admitted by him before the trial court and even the trial court has also found the same. 9. Learned counsel further contended that the evidence of PW-1 suffers from major contradictions, omissions, alteration and improvement making it wholly unreliable. In the FIR, he has said that he along with his son at 8.00 AM was working in the field on different med ¼esM½ he was on the western med ¼esM½ and his son on the eastern med ¼esM½ Further in the FIR and in the 161 statement, he has said that Shriram was there on the spot and he offered water to his son, however, he died succumbing to his injuries. Whereas in the dock evidence PW-1 has said that the incident occurred at about 7-8 AM. In paragraph no. 6 he states that Shriram was not present and he was only present. In paragraph no. 8 he has said that he had gone to his son for giving tea and in paragraph no. 13 he has denied that on the date of the incident his son was fencing the med and he did not disclose this in the FIR. In paragraph no. 12 he has said that his son at the time of the incident was grazing the Goat. In paragraph no. 18 he has said that the appellant did not come after him while he was running towards the village and he did not look back and see the appellant coming after him wielding an axe. In the FIR and statement of 161 Cr.P.C. he has categorically stated that he saw Parvat Singh inflicting Axe blows on Gulab however in his evidence in paragraph no. In the FIR and statement of 161 Cr.P.C. he has categorically stated that he saw Parvat Singh inflicting Axe blows on Gulab however in his evidence in paragraph no. 8 he categorically said that on hearing his son, he ran towards his son on the opposite side of the field and before he could reach his son Parvat Singh came running towards him with Kulhadi, so frightened he ran towards the village, however, he did not see Parvat Singh coming behind. 10. Learned counsel further emphasised that the PW-1 is wholly unreliable and clearly shows that he is not deposing the truth as in paragraph no. 6 he says that Shriram (PW-6) did not call him to the spot, but Shriram was not present. Whereas in the FIR it is said that Shriram was the eyewitness and was present at the time of the incident. In the statement under 161 Cr.P.C., he has further said that Shriram was present, but in his deposition in the court in paragraph no. 6 where he says Shriram was not present in the spot, clearly shows that PW-1 is not telling the truth but is hiding the truth as Shriram (PW-6) in his statement has categorically said that when he went to the field he saw Gulab lying dead with blood dripping and in paragraph no. 5 Shriram says that Ram Singh was not on the spot but he went to the house of Ranaji where Ram Singh was chatting and there he informed that Gulab was dead. Furthermore, the evidence of the Watchmen (Chowkidar) PW-2 also corroborates that Shriram was the first one to arrive at the spot and the version of Shriram is more reliable and supported by independent witness PW-2 as compared to the version of PW-1. Learned submits that it is nothing but unnatural conduct of sole eye witness Ram Singh (PW-1). Learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment passed by the Supreme Court of India in case of Bhimappa Jinnappa Naganur V/S State of Karnataka (1993) Supp (3) SCC 449 and State of Orissa Versus Babaji Charan Mohanty, (2003) 10 SCC 57 11. Learned counsel further contended that PW-1 has completely disowned the FIR thereby demolishing the entire case of the prosecution he has categorically said that various things which have been written in the FIR were not narrated by him in the FIR (Ex. D-3). Learned counsel further contended that PW-1 has completely disowned the FIR thereby demolishing the entire case of the prosecution he has categorically said that various things which have been written in the FIR were not narrated by him in the FIR (Ex. D-3). His statement of PW-1 shows that he was not present on the spot at the time of the incident as is clear from the evidence of PW-6 Shriram and also his evidence. Wherein PW-1 in paragraph no. 8 and 11 says that he was eating Tobacco on one side of the med and the other side he heard altercation from the other side of the field and thereafter he ran towards his son. In paragraph no. 5 he says that in between the western and the eastern med the field admeasuring 1 Bigha and 6 Biswa is situated and further goes on to say that to reach on either side of the field, one has to walk from 250 to 300 Ft. From the map (Ex. D-2), it is quite clear that Ram Singh was standing on one side and Gulab was lying dead on the other side of the field near the Mango trees. The map clearly shows that there is a huge distance and the morning timing (8’O clock) also establishes and points to the possibility that Ram Singh could not have heard the altercation from such a distance. 12. That, the evidence of PW-1 Ram Singh is wholly unreliable and his presence is doubtful because in paragraph no. 8 he has said that he had gone to the field to give tea to his son and on hearing the altercation, whereas the investigation officer (PW8) in paragraph no. 24 has categorically said that he did not find any utensil which is used for tea. 13. Learned counsel has further emphasised that the learned trial court in paragraph no. 31, 32, 33 despite having found that the PW-1 Ram Singh was the opposite side of the med at a distance of 200 Ft. 24 has categorically said that he did not find any utensil which is used for tea. 13. Learned counsel has further emphasised that the learned trial court in paragraph no. 31, 32, 33 despite having found that the PW-1 Ram Singh was the opposite side of the med at a distance of 200 Ft. and further was not able to see the appellant inflicting as axe blow but only based on his evidence regarding hearing the cries of his son the trial court held that he saw the incident from a distance, such a finding is perverse as this factum is not even disclosed by the PW-1 Ram Singh, in his Evidence hence the trial court has arrived at this finding on surmises and conjectures not born out of the record. Therefore being perverse deserves to be set aside. 14. FSL report about so far it relates to the fact about Bloodstains found disintegrated is concerned learned submitted that the law on this issue is quite settled that the evidence about the blood group is the only conclusive evidence to connect and bring whom the guilt of the accused. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has enunciated the principles of law while dealing with the evidence of bloodstains and their evidentiary value in case of Kansa Behera V/S State of Orissa (1987) 3 SCC 480 (para 12), Narayan V/S State of M.P. 2003(II) MPWN Note 56, Raghunath VS State of Haryana and another (2003) 1 SCC 398 and Mustkeem Alias Sirajudeen VS State of Rajasthan (2011) 11 SCC 724 . 15. Learned counsel further submitted that on disclosure of appellant after his arrest the Axe was seized as per Ex. P-4 property seizure memo on 24.12.2008 from the Nala (open space) in the description of the property it was stated that the dried blood was found to be there on the blade. However, no test was done to ascertain that it was human blood. This seizure is not supported by the seizure witness (PW-4) and PW-5), who have categorically stated that no seizure was affected in their presence. The aforesaid Article was sent on 27.12.2008 (Ex.P/12) to the FSL Laboratory in Gwalior and column no. 5 states as under:- ^^Qy dh vf/kdre yEckbZ 9 ls-eh- pkSM+kbZ 7 ls-eh- Qy ij [kwu tSlk yxk gSA^^ and this article was marked as Ex.-E & Ex-A was the blood-stained soil. The aforesaid Article was sent on 27.12.2008 (Ex.P/12) to the FSL Laboratory in Gwalior and column no. 5 states as under:- ^^Qy dh vf/kdre yEckbZ 9 ls-eh- pkSM+kbZ 7 ls-eh- Qy ij [kwu tSlk yxk gSA^^ and this article was marked as Ex.-E & Ex-A was the blood-stained soil. A bare perusal of this FSL report goes to show that in column no. 1 it is stated that on Ex. A, C, D-1, D-2, D-3, D-4 and E blood was found and the test for determining the type of blood and the group of blood was conducted. In point no. 2 the result was shown and it was stated that C, D-1, D-2, D-3 and D-4 contained ‘human blood’, whereas the spots in Ex.-A and E were disintegrated and in Ex.-B human blood was not found. It is worth mentioning here that Ex.-A and B is the soil taken from the place of crime. Ex.-A is the soil taken from the spot where the deceased was found lying dead whereas Ex.-E is the Axe alleged to be used in the offence. As per the FSL report in both Ex.-A and E the spots were disintegrated and no test could be done, meaning thereby the soil from the spot and the Axe so alleged to be used in the offence could not test for the presence of any blood much less, human blood of the group of the deceased. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that all the seizure witnesses have turned hostile The prosecution has produced two witnesses PW-4 Kripal and Kaluram (PW-5) as seizure witness. Both these witnesses have turned hostile and not supported the case of the prosecution. Further, these witnesses cannot be said to be independent as the incident is of Gram Jalodiya whereas PW-4 is of Gram Londiya PS Sonkattch and PW-5 is of Gram Bhanwrasa where the police station is situated. The inability of the prosecution to undertake seizure of the weapon in front of the independent witness of Gram Jalodiya from where the seizure was affected leads to the only inference that the recovery is a false recovery and no credibility can be attached to such a recovery. The inability of the prosecution to undertake seizure of the weapon in front of the independent witness of Gram Jalodiya from where the seizure was affected leads to the only inference that the recovery is a false recovery and no credibility can be attached to such a recovery. The said seizure proceedings of the prosecution are further demolished by the evidence of PW5 Kaluram and on this point learned counsel has placed reliance over following judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in case of Mousam Singh Roy and others Vs State of W.B. (2003) 12 SCC 377 (para 26), Mustkeem Alias Sirajudeen VS. State of Rajasthan (2011) 11 SCC 724 (para 20) and Varun Chaudhary Vs. State of Rajasthan (2011) 12 SCC 545 (para 11) 16. Learned counsel has emphasised that the witnesses are pocket witness and were not present on the spot at the time of seizure. Thus making the entire seizure process susceptible and in the process breaking the chain hence in such circumstances the judgment of conviction suffers from perversity. Furthermore, the said recovery if at all believed then in the absence of there being any bloodstain found on the axe can only be said to be very weak evidence to connect the appellant with the crime as it is settled position that the prosecution is to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. 17. Ms Ravindran learned counsel appearing for the appellant further argued that the trial court in para no. 51 has said that it can be said that the appellant was last seen with the deceased. The trial court has applied this theory based on evidence of P.W.1 Ramsing however Ramsingh himself has said that he only saw the voice of his son from a distance and thereafter saw the appellant Parvat Singh running towards him wielding an axe. Whereas RamSingh himself is an unreliable witness and his presence is doubtful. Furthermore, no independent witness has stated that the deceased was seen in the company of appellant Parvat Singh. The evidence of P.W.-6 Shriram and P.W.-2 Mohan (Chowkidar) only state that they saw the dead body of Gulab. The theory of last seen is not the case of the prosecution but this theory is expounded by the trial court which is bearing no material proof and is beyond the record. The evidence of P.W.-6 Shriram and P.W.-2 Mohan (Chowkidar) only state that they saw the dead body of Gulab. The theory of last seen is not the case of the prosecution but this theory is expounded by the trial court which is bearing no material proof and is beyond the record. In support of above submissions, she has placed reliance over the judgments passed by the Supreme Court of India in case of State of Uttar Pradesh V/s Satveer and others (2015) 9 SCC 44 (para 11) 18. Ms Ravindran has also addressed us on the issue of the motive so alleged is that as the deceased was not allowing the appellant to lay the pipe through this field and due to this only the appellant was holding a grudge the prosecution has produced two document Ex.P/22-C and Ex.P/22-D and has tried to establish that there was a dispute amongst the parties as these two complaints were lodged before the police However a bare perusal of these documents goes to show that it is not even an inquest report ¼bLrxklk½ because the same has been written on a form about missing report. Furthermore, the other complaint is on a paper which is upside down. This goes to show that these documents were written hastily with purposes of building evidence against the appellant whereas P.W.-1 Ram Singh himself in para no. 2 has admitted that there was partition matter pending amongst the appellant and Ram Singh. Furthermore, Ram Singh being the father of the deceased is an interested witness and his evidence remains uncorroborated by other evidence-making his story wholly unreliable. This point to the fact that there was a dispute amongst the parties and in the given set of facts and circumstance of the case the false implication of the present applicant cannot be ruled out. 19. According to her, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the certain principles to be followed while considering the motive behind the murder in case of Kanakarajan Alias Kanakan Versus State of Kerala (2017) 13 SCC 597 (Para No. 22), Jagdish and others V/s State of Haryana (2019) 7 SCC (Page 711) 20. Learned counsel has concluded the arguments by submitting that the prosecution has not been able to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Learned counsel has concluded the arguments by submitting that the prosecution has not been able to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, it is a settled position of law that the prosecution cannot rest its case and bring home guilt based on surmises and conjectures but has to prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, in this case, the trial court has convicted the appellant only based on surmises and conjectures without there being any cogent and reliable evidence to support such findings. The prosecution has badly failed to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt and the chain is not complete to convict the appellant. Hence in such circumstances, the appellant deserves to be acquitted of all charges. 21. Shri Lokesh Bhargav learned Govt. Advocate argued in support of the impugned judgment by submitting that learned additional Session Judge did commit any error while convicting the appellant, hence there is no scope of interference by this Hon'ble Court under section 302 of the Penal Code. Minor omission and contradictions in the evidence are liable to be ignored. Appellant has been convicted after due appreciation of evidence of Ram Singh (PW-1) which needs no corroboration. He was an eye witness and there was the motive for the appellant to kill Gulab, hence appeal be dismissed. 22. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 23. As per the prosecution story, Ramsingh (PW/1) being an agriculturist and resident of village Javdia lodged an FIR in the Police Station Bhorasa that on the alleged date of an incident near about 8 A.M he along with his son Gulab Singh was on the agriculture field. Gulab was fencing on one side of the field near the Med and he was on the other side of the Med, the accused/appellant Parvat Singh came with an axe and had a verbal altercation with his son Gulab regarding laying a pipeline through his agricultural filed and gave a blow by an axe on his head due to which Gulab Singh fell. He along with Shriram (PW/6), who was also on the field, rushed towards Gulab Singh, the accused/appellant ran towards the village by whirling the axe. He tried to give water to his son but he had already succumbed to his head injuries. He along with Shriram (PW/6), who was also on the field, rushed towards Gulab Singh, the accused/appellant ran towards the village by whirling the axe. He tried to give water to his son but he had already succumbed to his head injuries. According to him, the accused Parvat Singh wanted to lay a pipeline through his agricultural field and since he refused, therefore, he has killed his son Gulab using the axe. After registration of FIR against Parvat Singh near about 10.40 A.M at Crime No.254/2008, Police reached the spot and prepared a Naksha Pachayatnama (Ex.P/2) and thereafter sent the dead body for postmortem. The Police seized the blood-stained soil and clothes of the deceased and kept in a sealed cover. 24. So far the issue as to whether the death of Gulab was culpable homicidal, the learned trial has duly considered in para 7 to 22 of the impugned judgment and held that the death of Gulab was amounting to murder. As per post-mortem report and evidence of Dr Atul Pavnikar (PW-11) the deceased sustained two deep incised wounds on the left side of the head (occipital region) which is a vital part of the body, were sufficient to cause death. This evidence has properly been appreciated by the ld. Trial Judge and findings are not contrary to the evidence came on record. The appellant has not disputed the said findings during arguments hence need not be considered this issue again in this appeal accordingly these findings are hereby affirmed. 25. The Police arrested the accused/appellant Parvat Singh and recorded his memorandum statement under section 27 of the Evidence Act. In his confessional statement, he admitted that he killed Gulab Singh using the axe and threw it near a Nallah. On his disclosure, the axe was recovered containing bloodstains. The Investigating Officer sent all the three seized articles to the F.S.L Gwalior vide letter dated 24.01.2009 for chemical analysis. Meanwhile, the Police recorded the statement of RamSingh, Shriram, Prahlad, Devi Singh and prepared the spot map. 26. To set up the charge of section 302 of I.P.C. Against the appellant, the prosecution examined father of deceased i.e. Ram Singh (PW/1). Meanwhile, the Police recorded the statement of RamSingh, Shriram, Prahlad, Devi Singh and prepared the spot map. 26. To set up the charge of section 302 of I.P.C. Against the appellant, the prosecution examined father of deceased i.e. Ram Singh (PW/1). In his statement before the Court, he stated that four months back he was working in his agricultural field along with his son Gulab Singh who was doing the fencing work near the Med and he was on the other side of the field. The accused/appellant came with an axe and threatened Gulab Singh with dire consequences as he was not permitting him to lay the pipeline through his field. Thereafter after a verbal altercation, he gave two axe blows on the backside of his head due to which Gulab Singh died due to head injuries on the spot. When Ram Singh (PW/1) along with Shriram (PW/6), who was also present on the spot, rushed to his son Gulab, he had already died. So far this part of the deposition of Ramsingh (PW/1) is concerned, there is no omission and contradiction in respect of his earlier version recorded in the FIR as well as in the statement recorded under section 161 Cr.P.C. However, Shriram who examined as PW/6 denied his presence in the agricultural field at the time of the alleged occurrence. He has only stated that near about 8 A.M when he went to the field he saw that Gulab Singh was lying in the field and was bleeding from his head and he went to his house and gave information to Ram Singh (PW/1). Thereafter he along with Ram Singh reached to the spot along with other villagers. He has supported the prosecution case to the extent that Police reached the spot, found the dead body and collected the bloodstained soil. Thereafter he was declared hostile by the prosecution. 27. Ramsingh (PW/1) further deposed that he went to the house of Mohan (Chowkidar) (PW/2), thereafter both went to the Police Station Bhorasa for lodging the report. The Police came to the spot and prepared the Panchnama. 28. Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the cross-examination part of Ram Singh (PW/1) in which he admitted that the distance between the two Meds was 250-300 ft. and crop up to the height of 3-4 ft. was in the field. The Police came to the spot and prepared the Panchnama. 28. Learned counsel for the appellant has drawn our attention to the cross-examination part of Ram Singh (PW/1) in which he admitted that the distance between the two Meds was 250-300 ft. and crop up to the height of 3-4 ft. was in the field. He has further admitted that upon hearing the cry of his son when he rushed towards his son and when he reached half the way the accused ran towards him with the axe and on seeking him without turning back he fled towards the village. Learned counsel submitted that Ramsingh (PW/1) gave an exaggerated version of the incident. He was not present on the spot. He had neither seen the incident nor the appellant causing the injury and for the first time, along with the Police, he saw his son Gulab lying in injured condition in the agricultural field. Other witnesses have also not supported him and they were all were declared hostile, hence is no evidence on record to corroborate the version of Ramsingh PW/1. Learned counsel emphasised that the appellant has been convicted on the sole testimony of P.W.-1. We are unable to agree with the learned counsel appearing for the appellant for the simple reason that the conviction can be based on the sole testimony of the ocular witness if he inspires the confidence of the court and no corroboration is required from other witnesses. The (PW-1) is not only the father of the deceased but a rustic villager and at the time of the incident, he was aged about 60 years. His presence in the agriculture field with his son was natural and cannot be debatable. The appellant is the owner of adjoining agriculture field and he was willing to lay pipe from the land of Ram Singh for which he was not agreeing at that point of time. The prosecution has established that such a dispute was going on between them since last few months and report in the police station was also lodged (Exhibit-P/23). A civil dispute was also going on between them. There was no reason for the Ram Singh to falsely implicate the appellant because he was not going to gain anything from the appellant. The appellant was interested to lay pipe-line from his filed for which he was threatening Ram sing and deceased. A civil dispute was also going on between them. There was no reason for the Ram Singh to falsely implicate the appellant because he was not going to gain anything from the appellant. The appellant was interested to lay pipe-line from his filed for which he was threatening Ram sing and deceased. There was no title or boundary dispute between them. 29. The alleged incident took place in the remote area during the early morning hours hence Ram Singh had heard the sound of quarrel and saw the appellant on the spot with Axe. The dead body was also found in the same place as described by him in his police statement and examination -in-chief. Hence we are of the firm opinion that Ram Singh is a wholly reliable witness. He was cross-examined after 4-5 months from the date of his examination-in-chief., hence some minor omission and contradictions are obvious and same are liable to be ignored. In the case of State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj, (2000) 1 SCC 247 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that 7. In support of the impugned judgment the learned counsel appearing for the respondents vainly attempted to point out some discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix and other witnesses for discrediting the prosecution version. Discrepancy has to be distinguished from contradiction. Whereas contradiction in the statement of the witness is fatal for the case, minor discrepancy or variance in evidence will not make the prosecution’s case doubtful. The normal course of the human conduct would be that while narrating a particular incident there may occur minor discrepancies, such discrepancies in law may render credential to the depositions. Parrot-like statements are disfavoured by the courts. In order to ascertain as to whether the discrepancy pointed out was minor or not or the same amounted to contradiction, regard is required to be had to the circumstances of the case by keeping in view the social status of the witnesses and environment in which such witness was making the statement. This Court in Ousu Varghese v. State of Kerala (1974) 3 SCC 767 held that minor variations in the accounts of the witnesses are often the hallmark of the truth of their testimony. This Court in Ousu Varghese v. State of Kerala (1974) 3 SCC 767 held that minor variations in the accounts of the witnesses are often the hallmark of the truth of their testimony. In Jagdish v. State of M.P.1981 Supp SCC 40 this Court held that when the discrepancies were comparatively of a minor character and did not go to the root of the prosecution story, they need not be given undue importance. Mere congruity or consistency is not the sole test of truth in the depositions. This Court again in State of Rajasthan v. Kalki (1981) 2 SCC 752 held that in the depositions of witnesses there are always normal discrepancies, however, honest and truthful they may be. Such discrepancies are due to normal errors of observation, normal errors of memory due to lapse of time, due to mental disposition such as shock and horror at the time of occurrence, and the like. Material discrepancies are those which are not normal and not expected of a normal person 8. Referring to and relying upon the earlier judgments of this Court in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony (1985) SCC 505, Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P., AIR 1959 SC 1012 , Appabhai v. State of Gujarat 1988 Supp SCC 241 and Rammi v. State of M.P. (1999) 8 SCC 649 , this Court in a recent case Leela Ram v. State of Haryana (1999) 9 SCC 525 held: “There are bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimension, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason therefore should not render the evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence…. The court shall have to bear in mind that different witnesses react differently under different situations: whereas some become speechless, some start wailing while some others run away from the scene and yet there are some who may come forward with courage, conviction and belief that the wrong should be remedied. As a matter of fact it depends upon individuals and individuals. As a matter of fact it depends upon individuals and individuals. There cannot be any set pattern or uniform rule of human reaction and to discard a piece of evidence on the ground of his reaction not falling within a set pattern is unproductive and a pedantic exercise.” Mohan (PW-2) in his statement recorded under section 164 Cr.P.C has only stated that 8 months ago Ram Singh came to his house to inform him that the appellant has killed his son and thereafter he went to the spot, however, he did not see the accused on the spot. However, he admitted that immediately after the incident Ram Singh came to his house and informed about the aforesaid incident and it was a natural act on the part of Ram Singh (PW/1) and to that extent, there is corroboration by Mohan (PW-2). The Apex Court in the case of Lallu Manjhi v. the State of Jharkhand, reported in (2003) 2 SCC 401 has held that the law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories, there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon the testimony of a single witness. In the case of State of U.P. v. Satveer, reported in (2015) 9 SCC 44 , Hon,ble Apex Court after considering the facts of the case has held that The evidence of the sole witness thus needs to be considered with caution and after testing it against other material and further, such evidence must inspire confidence and ought to be beyond suspicion. 11. It is the case of the prosecution that the victim was last seen in the company of the respondents. 11. It is the case of the prosecution that the victim was last seen in the company of the respondents. The “last seen” theory in the present case has two facets, (i) in terms of proximity of time; and (ii) as regards the place itself, as the dead body of Akash was found from the very same place where the victim was seen to have been taken by the respondents. The law on the point is summed up by this Court in State of U.P. v. Satish as under: (SCC p. 123, para 22) “22. The last seen theory comes into play where the time gap between the point of time when the accused and the deceased were seen last alive and when the deceased is found dead is so small that possibility of any person other than the accused being the author of the crime becomes impossible.” 12. The last seen theory in the present case having dimensions in terms of time as well as place, would certainly clinch the matter if the testimony of PW 2 Mewa Ram is accepted. Everything hinges on his testimony. He is the sole witness. It was stated by this Court in Joseph v. State of Kerala that where there is a sole witness his evidence has to be accepted with an amount of caution and after testing it on the touchstone of other material on record. Further, in State of Haryana v. Inder Singh it was laid down that the testimony of a sole witness must be confidence-inspiring and beyond suspicion, thus, leaving no doubt in the mind of the Court. Noticing these two judgments this Court in Ramnaresh v. State of Chhattisgarh summed up the principles as under: (SCC pp. 270-71, para 27) “27. The principles stated in these judgments are indisputable. None of these judgments says that the testimony of the sole eyewitness cannot be relied upon or conviction of an accused cannot be based upon the statement of the sole eyewitness to the crime. 270-71, para 27) “27. The principles stated in these judgments are indisputable. None of these judgments says that the testimony of the sole eyewitness cannot be relied upon or conviction of an accused cannot be based upon the statement of the sole eyewitness to the crime. All that is needed is that the statement of the sole eyewitness should be reliable, should not leave any doubt in the mind of the court and has to be corroborated by other evidence produced by the prosecution in relation to the commission of the crime and involvement of the accused in committing such a crime.” In the case of Jugendra Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 6 SCC 297 Hon,ble Supreme court has held as under, 40. At this juncture, we may remind ourselves that it is the duty of the court to sift the chaff from the grain and find out the truth from the testimony of the witnesses. A testimony of the witness is required to inspire confidence. It must be creditworthy. 41. In State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony this Court has observed (SCC p. 331, para 15) that in case of “[m]inor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hypertechnical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole”. 42. In Rammi v. State of M.P. this Court has held as follows: (SCC p. 656, para 24) “24. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness can possibly escape from making some discrepant details. Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully make his testimony totally non-discrepant. But courts should bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.” 43. But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.” 43. In Appabhai v. State of Gujarat this Court has ruled thus: (SCC pp. 246-47, para 13) “13. … The court while appreciating the evidence must not attach undue importance to minor discrepancies. The discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case may be discarded. The discrepancies which are due to normal errors of perception or observation should not be given importance. The errors due to lapse of memory may be given due allowance. The court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in different cases must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness. When a doubt arises in respect of certain facts alleged by such witness, the proper course is to ignore that fact only unless it goes into the root of the matter so as to demolish the entire prosecution story. The witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to their version perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the court. The courts, however, should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy.” In the case Pundappa Yankappa Pujari v. State of Karnataka, (2014) 12 SCC 372 Hon'ble Supreme court after ignoring certain discrepancies in the evidence of eye witness and held as under, 24. Coming to the evidence of Sangappa (PW 8) and Chandrasekhar (PW 9), we find that both of them have deposed that they heard the shouting when they came near the place of incident, they saw Accused 1 and Accused 2 assaulting Mahantappa with an axe and with a stick. Even though the witnesses were cross-examined at depth, not much evidence was elicited to discredit the testimony of Sangappa (PW 8) and Chandrasekhar (PW 9). Even though the witnesses were cross-examined at depth, not much evidence was elicited to discredit the testimony of Sangappa (PW 8) and Chandrasekhar (PW 9). It is apparent in the evidence of Bhimappa (PW 10) and Ranganagouda (PW 11) that they came to the land of one Rangappa Gouli for ploughing at about 7 or 7.30 a.m. then they heard the screaming and rushed to the spot wherein they noticed the presence of Laxmavva (PW 7) who proceeded to the village side to inform the same to the complainant Giriyavva (PW 1). 25. It is true that there are certain discrepancies in mentioning the time of the incident. Laxmavva (PW 7) stated that the incident took place at about 11 a.m. whereas, Sangappa (PW 8) and Chandrasekhar (PW 9) stated that the incident of assault took place at 9 or 9.30 a.m. Such discrepancies cannot be a ground to disbelieve the statements of the witnesses if the difference is about one hour, as the villagers generally suggest the approximate time. 30. The prosecution examined Kripal (PW/4) who has been completely declared hostile by the prosecution. In cross-examination, he admitted that the Police recorded the statement of accused in respect of the recovery of the axe before him. On a query put by the Court he has also admitted that the accused has disclosed that he did hide the axe near the Nallah, therefore, Kripal (PW/) has also supported the disclosure of the axe by the accused/appellant and thereafter its seizure. Another seizure witness Kaluram (PW/5) has only admitted his signature in (Exhibit-P/1) and admitted that the Police have recovered the axe from the accused in his presence. Thereafter he was declared hostile, therefore, (PW/5) is also supporting the prosecution regarding recovery of the axe from the accused. 31. Kailash (PW/9), who is one of the relatives of the deceased as well as the complainant, has not supported the case of the prosecution and turned hostile, which has no significance in the matter because after laps of so much time from the date of the incident instead of supporting (PW-1) he has chosen to support the accused who is also his close relative. His conduct of becoming hostile witness is quite natural and would not help the appellant. 32. Indisputably, accused/appellant, the complainant, deceased, Shriram (PW/6), and Kailash (PW/7) are closely related to each other. His conduct of becoming hostile witness is quite natural and would not help the appellant. 32. Indisputably, accused/appellant, the complainant, deceased, Shriram (PW/6), and Kailash (PW/7) are closely related to each other. The agriculture fields of Ram Singh and accused/appellant are neighbouring to each other. As per Ram Singh, the appellant wanted to lay a pipeline through his agricultural field, however, he permitted the accused to do so after cutting the standing crop. Devi Singh (PW/3), who is a relative, has admitted that eight days before the alleged incident, Gulab intercepted Parvat Singh and asked him as to why he is not permitting him to lay a pipeline through the agricultural field. The prosecution also examined Devi Singh (PW/3) who has supported the case of prosecution regarding the previous enmity/dispute between the appellant and complainant. Therefore, so far as the testimony of (PW-1) is concerned, he is a truthful witness. He is a wholly reliable witness and there is no reason to disbelieve him. His testimony cannot be disbelieved on the grounds i.e. solitary witness, bloodstain disintegrated, the related witness turned hostile and minor contradictions etc... To impeach his testimony technical questions were asked to him but it would not be the correct approach for discarding his testimony. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the learned trial Court has committed an error in believing the testimony of (PW-1) for convicting the appellant. In the case of State of Orissa v. Dibakar Naik, (2002) 5 SCC 323 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 1128, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that : 1. Much has been made out by the High Court for the alleged failure of PW 1 to disclose the name of the accused persons to PWs 10 and 13. Non-mentioning of the names of the accused is factually not borne out and even if accepted would not render his testimony unacceptable. Post-event conduct of a witness cannot be predicted on specified lines. It varies from person to person as different people react differently under different situations. PW 1 had lost his wife in a most ghastly crime committed by the culprits. He apprehended danger to his life and was under shock. PWs 10 and 13 did not ask him about the names of the persons involved in the crime nor did he think it proper to disclose such names. PW 1 had lost his wife in a most ghastly crime committed by the culprits. He apprehended danger to his life and was under shock. PWs 10 and 13 did not ask him about the names of the persons involved in the crime nor did he think it proper to disclose such names. Under such circumstances, no adverse inference could be drawn against PW 1 making his testimony doubtful or unbelievable. In Rammi v. State of M.P. (1999) 8 SCC 649 this Court held: (SCC p. 654, para 8) “This Court has said time and again that the post-event conduct of a witness varies from person to person. It cannot be a cast-iron reaction to be followed as a model by everyone witnessing such event. Different persons would react differently on seeing any violence and their behaviour and conduct would, therefore, be different.” Under the facts and circumstances, the conduct of PW 1 cannot be held to be abnormal. 33. As per the opinion of the doctor (PW-11), the cause of death was two incised cut wounds on the backside of the near head and neck (occipital region) which lead to excess bleeding and heart failure. The appellant gave two repeated blows with full force on the vital part of the body intending to kill the deceased Gulab, therefore he has committed murder. He came to the spot with intention to kill, he did no cause injuries due to quarrel and sudden provocation by the deceased. In the case of Rampal Singh v. State of U.P., (2012) 8 SCC 289 the Apex Court has explained deference between “culpable homicide” and “murder”, 11. Sections 299 and 300 of the Code deal with the definition of “culpable homicide” and “murder”, respectively. In terms of Section 299, “culpable homicide” is described as an act of causing death: (i) with the intention of causing death, or (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or (iii) with the knowledge that such an act is likely to cause death. As is clear from a reading of this provision, the former part of it, emphasises on the expression “intention” while the latter upon “knowledge”. Both these are positive mental attitudes, however, of different degrees. The mental element in “culpable homicide”, that is, the mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. As is clear from a reading of this provision, the former part of it, emphasises on the expression “intention” while the latter upon “knowledge”. Both these are positive mental attitudes, however, of different degrees. The mental element in “culpable homicide”, that is, the mental attitude towards the consequences of conduct is one of intention and knowledge. Once an offence is caused in any of the three stated manners noted above, it would be “culpable homicide”. Section 300, however, deals with “murder” although there is no clear definition of “murder” in Section 300 of the Code. As has been repeatedly held by this Court, “culpable homicide” is the genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides” but all “culpable homicides” are not “murders”. 17. Section 300 of the Code states what kind of acts, when done with the intention of causing death or bodily injury as the offender knows to be likely to cause death or causing bodily injury to any person, which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or the person causing injury knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, would amount to “murder”. It is also “murder” when such an act is committed, without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such bodily injury. The section also prescribes the Exceptions to “culpable homicide amounting to murder”. The Explanations spell out the elements which need to be satisfied for application of such Exceptions, like an act done in the heat of passion and without premeditation. Where the offender whilst being deprived of the power of self-control by grave and sudden provocation causes the death of the person who has caused the provocation or causes the death of any other person by mistake or accident, provided such provocation was not at the behest of the offender himself, “culpable homicide would not amount to murder”. This Exception itself has three limitations. All these are questions of facts and would have to be determined in the facts and circumstances of a given case. 34. That learned counsel for the appellant has further raised the ground that the trial court has give perverse finding contrary to the medical evidence as the doctor has never opined that injury could be caused from an Axe. All these are questions of facts and would have to be determined in the facts and circumstances of a given case. 34. That learned counsel for the appellant has further raised the ground that the trial court has give perverse finding contrary to the medical evidence as the doctor has never opined that injury could be caused from an Axe. This submission too is unacceptable because as per post-mortem report and evince of doctor the injuries were caused by the sharp edged weapon and definitely the axe is an sharp edged weapon. In the case of Jaswant Singh v. State of Haryana, (2000) 4 SCC 484 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that 41. As far as Gurnam Singh and Iqbal Singh are concerned they were carrying naizas. A naiza is a spear or pike-like weapon causing incisable wounds. The High Court misread the evidence of the doctors when it said that “the doctors did not find any injury caused by naiza”. The post-mortems showed several deep incised wounds on both the deceased. The doctors did not say that the injuries could not be caused by naizas. What they had said was that the incisions could have been caused by a sharp weapon “including a gandasi or a kirpan”. The word “including” indicates that it could have been some other sharp weapon. 42. The trial court in fact found: “Injury 3 which was incised wound 2 cm × 0.2 cm on the person of Kulwant Singh, Injury 4 which was ½? × ¼? elliptical wound, Injury 7 which was incised elliptical wound 2 cm and bone-deep on the person of Bidhi Shankar. Keeping in view the size of the injuries (they) could possibly be the result of naiza-blow.” 43. In fact the narrowness and depth of the incised wounds as indicated in the postmortem reports supports the trial court’s finding. The naizas recovered consequent upon the disclosure statements made from the places indicated by Gurnam Singh and Iqbal Singh were found by the Forensic Science Laboratory to be covered with human blood. No explanation was given by either of these accused as to this telling circumstance which indicated their participation in the crime. The naizas recovered consequent upon the disclosure statements made from the places indicated by Gurnam Singh and Iqbal Singh were found by the Forensic Science Laboratory to be covered with human blood. No explanation was given by either of these accused as to this telling circumstance which indicated their participation in the crime. Because of the above discussion, we are of the firm opinion that the appellant had the previous enmity with the deceased and his father Ram Singh as they were not permitted to use their land to lay a pipe-line, hence on the date of incident he came with Axe intending to kill the Gulab and gave two repeated blow on the occipital region which caused the death on the spot, nothing but an act to cause death i.e. “culpable homicide”, hence he has rightly been convicted under section 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo life imprisonment. Resultantly the appeal is hereby dismissed.