Mahendra Dhisalal Agarwal v. Gujarat Revenue Tribunal
2020-07-02
A.Y.KOGJE
body2020
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. RULE. Learned Advocates appearing for the respective respondents waives service of Rule. 2. This group of petitions is filed in connection with an immovable property belonging to a Public Charitable Trust, viz. 'Dhor Charvanu Trust' bearing registration No.E/552/Surat. Essentially the immovable property consists of land bearing block /survey No.6 of village Pasodara, Kamrej, Surat, admeasuring 71469 sq. mtrs. The root of the dispute is grant of permission to sale under Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act (“the Act”, for short). The petitioners have jointly objected to the application under Section 36 of the Act filed with the Joint Charity Commissioner, Surat for the purpose of sale of aforementioned land. However, such objections by the objectors /petitioners were rejected and permission to sale was granted. Each of the petitioners had challenged the permission thus granted by filing appeal before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by the impugned order has upheld such permission. The petitioners therefore have respectively filed separate petitions challenging such orders both by the Charity Commissioner and the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal.
Each of the petitioners had challenged the permission thus granted by filing appeal before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal by the impugned order has upheld such permission. The petitioners therefore have respectively filed separate petitions challenging such orders both by the Charity Commissioner and the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal. The prayer clause in each of the petitions is as under : - SCA No.16954 of 2019 “(A) That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction calling for the records of Appeal No.AS/04/2018 from the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and be pleased to quash and set aside final judgment and order dated 6.9.2019 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Appeal No.AS/04/2018 and produced at Annexure A;” (B) That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside order dated 3.5.2018 passed by the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat and produced at Annexure P;” SCA No.16957 of 2019 “(A) That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction calling for the records of Appeal No.AA/11/2018 from the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and be pleased to quash and set aside final judgment and order dated 6.9.2019 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Appeal No.AA/11/2018 and produced at Annexure A;” (B) That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside order dated 3.5.2018 passed by the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat and produced at Annexure B-1;” SCA No.2715 of 2020 “(A) That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction calling for the records of Appeal No.AA/33/2018 from the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and be pleased to quash and set aside final judgment and order dated 06/09/2019 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Appeal No.AA/33/2018 and produced at Annexure A;” (B) That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside order dated 21/05/2018 passed by the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat;” SCA No.18224 of 2019 (A) Your Lordships may be pleased to issue a writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside the judgment and order dated 06/09/2019 passed by the Resp.
No.1 in Appeal No.AS/05/2018 and the order dated 21/05/2018 passed of Resp.
No.1 in Appeal No.AS/05/2018 and the order dated 21/05/2018 passed of Resp. No.2;” SCA No.22047 of 2019 “(A) That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction calling for the records of Appeal No.AS/04/2018 from the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and be pleased to quash and set aside final judgment and order dated 6.9.2019 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Appeal No.AS/04/2018 and produced at Annexure A;” (B) That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside order dated 3.5.2018 passed by the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat and produced at Annexure B;” SCA No.18250 of 2019 “(A) to admit and allow this petition with costs; (B) to call for the records and proceedings of the Appeal No.AS/6/2018 from the office of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and also of the Permission Application No.36/45/2018 from the office of the learned Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad; (C) to quash and wet aside the order dated 6/9/2019 passed in Appeal No.AS/6/2018 by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and also be pleased to quash and set aside both the orders dated 21/5/2018 (Annexure-J Colly.) passed by the learned Charity Commissioner, Ahmedabad, in Permission Application No.36/45/2018;” SCA No.17940 of 2017 “(A) That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside order dated 30.8.2017 passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner, Surat in Permission Application No.36/26/2015 and all actions taken pursuant thereto including actions pertaining to holding auction of the trust property; (B) That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside order dated 26.9.2017 at Annexure B passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner, Surat in petitioner's application dated 26.9.2017 at Annexure J filed in Permission Application No.36/26/2015 and be pleased to direct Respondent No.1 to decide the objections lodged by the petitioner before taking any further steps in Permission Application No.36/26/2015;” SCA No.336 of 2020 “(A) That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction calling for the records of Appeal No.AS/03/2018 from the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and be pleased to quash and set aside final judgment and order dated 06/09/2019 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Appeal No.AS/03/2018 and produced at Annexure A;” (B) That the Hon'ble Court be pleased to issue a writ of or in the nature of certiorari or any other writ, order or direction quashing and setting aside order dated 21/05/2018 passed by the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat;” 3.
With consent of learned Advocates for the parties, the matters are taken up for joint hearing and disposal. The facts are taken from SCA No.16954 of 2019. 4. On behalf of the petitioners, the main contentions to oppose grant of permission are the illegalities committed at various stages, beginning from inducting now successful bidder as a tenant without following procedure till exercise of jurisdiction by the Charity Commissioner beyond his scope. In this connection, learned Advocates for the petitioners took this Court to various documents which consist of the application for permission, evaluation of the land, interim orders passed by the Joint Charity Commissioner, etc. It is contended that the entire exercise of selling of the land in question was stage-managed from the beginning and under no circumstances, can it be said that the sale of this land is serving the interest of the Trust in any manner. It is also contended that the price that the Trust is to receive is peanuts as compared to the market price of the land in question. 4.1 It is submitted that the application under Section 36 is filed on completely falls facts to create a ground for the Trust to dispose of the land in question in favour of respondent No.3. It is submitted that first of all, respondent No.24 (hereinafter referred to as “Mr.Lalwani”) was inducted into the said land as a tenant. However, nothing is coming on record as to in what manner said Mr.Lalwani was to utilize the said land, more particularly when the object of the Trust for maintaining this huge parcel of land was to cater to the cattle of the village. Mr.Lalwani was neither having any cattle nor was involved in activity of any dairy farming. Therefore, it was pre-decided that Mr.Lalwani will be inducted as a tenant first and thereafter gradually the land will be transferred by way of sale to said Mr.Lalwani and therefore, merely a show was created as if the respondent-Trust is complying with the requirements of law by making application under Section 36. However, the contents of the application under Section 36 were all false and concocted. 4.2 Learned Advocates for the petitioners pointed out certain instances by which it is submitted that the application under Section 36 is not a genuine application. In the application, it is claimed that the land is infertile land whereas supporting documents, viz.
However, the contents of the application under Section 36 were all false and concocted. 4.2 Learned Advocates for the petitioners pointed out certain instances by which it is submitted that the application under Section 36 is not a genuine application. In the application, it is claimed that the land is infertile land whereas supporting documents, viz. valuation report annexed with the application indicates the land to be a fertile land and should fetch price mentioned in the valuation report. 4.3 The next ground is that a show of public advertisement was made by showing land to be in possession of a tenant. The tenanted property, obviously, will fetch value far lower than its market value and this was the gimmick played by the respondent-Trust acting hand-in-glove with Mr.Lalwani. 4.4 It is contended that the rent agreement is executed for a period of 7 years and total land in the agreement is 120000 sq. mtrs. and the rent at which Mr.Lalwani is to take possession of the land as tenant is at Rs.24,000/- per annum, which is unimaginably low amount which does not match with the measurement of the land and the prevailing rates. It is submitted that in the application ground for alienating the land is apprehension of encroachment over the property. It is submitted that when the Trust itself has already given land on rent to Mr.Lalwani and has source of income, the ground of apprehended encroachment is a concocted ground. 4.5 It is submitted that the lease deed is also unreliable document as it is not a registered document. It is submitted that the chronology of dates with regard to documents, that is to say the purported date of execution of such document, carrying out notary on such document and filing application on the basis of such document under Section 36 would suggest that the lease deed is a document which is fabricated. 4.6 It is submitted that the trustees have relied on resolution dated 10.5.2015 (E-160) which has only 43 purported signatures (and of only 1 trustee). 2 years after filing the Section 36 application, they have produced a resolution dated 23.7.2017 (H-174) which has only 227 purported signatures of villagers out of a village of 8700 (F-165). None of the resolutions is preceded by a public notice (by which people would come to know that a meeting is going to be held).
2 years after filing the Section 36 application, they have produced a resolution dated 23.7.2017 (H-174) which has only 227 purported signatures of villagers out of a village of 8700 (F-165). None of the resolutions is preceded by a public notice (by which people would come to know that a meeting is going to be held). The Sarpanch Anitaben Rajendrabhai has denied that any meeting took place under her supervision (p. 596, 618). The Talati has also stated that no meeting took place (p. 562). Hence, the claim on p. 174 (top) that the meeting of 23.7.2017 took place under Sarpanch Anitaben Rajendrabhai’s supervision is false. At p. 619, there is a detailed expert report which states that many signatures are by the same individuals. 4.7 It is submitted that the best price has not been fetched as is clear from the following: (i) The advertisement is issued with the words “with tenants”, (ii) no details of size of land or sale deed no. of sale instances are mentioned on p. 154. Also, the sale instances are of 2014-15 and auction took place at the end of 2017. The sale instances are of Village Jokha (30 km from Surat) and Vav (25 km from Surat) whereas Pasodara is only 17 km from Surat. Therefore, the price of Pasodara is bound to be much higher. Also, it is a known fact that sale deeds are always at 30% or 40% of the actual market value. Hence, even going by the sale instances of Jokha and Vav of three years ago (Rs. 4625/-per sq.mtr.), the sale price would be much above the sale price of Rs. 4939 per sq.mtr. offered by Mr. Lalwani. The reduction made on p. 154 (bottom) on the ground that it is given on rent and it is infertile land (banjar) is baseless. The rent agreement is a bogus document and there is no tenancy in reality. The valuation report itself states that the land is fertile. (iii) The jantri rate of 2011 is Rs. 2500/-. The market value is always 2.5 to 3 times the jantri rate. Hence, the market value even as far back as in 2011 was Rs. 6500/- to Rs. 7500/-per sq.mtr. and is bound to be much higher now. From these facts, it is evident that value of land is above Rs. 100 crore.
2500/-. The market value is always 2.5 to 3 times the jantri rate. Hence, the market value even as far back as in 2011 was Rs. 6500/- to Rs. 7500/-per sq.mtr. and is bound to be much higher now. From these facts, it is evident that value of land is above Rs. 100 crore. 4.8 It is submitted that the proceeding is a collusive proceeding between the trustees and Mr. Lalwani and suffers from fraud. Mr. Lalwani has been favoured by the trustees by first creating a bogus rent agreement few days before filing the Section 36 application and then by specifically praying (p. 124) that permission is sought to sell the land “with tenants”. 4.9 The matter had been transferred from Joint Charity Commissioner, Surat to Charity Commissioner only few days back and 21.5.2018 was only the second time it was listed. Normally, when a matter is transferred from one district to another and especially when there are so many parties, the authority would grant accommodation to enable the parties to make arrangements. On this ground itself, the Charity Commissioner ought to have granted adjournment on 21.5.2018 and it is strange that the Charity Commissioner was in a great hurry to finish the matter. The Charity Commissioner did not merely reserve the matter for orders but even passed two orders on 21.05.2018 and finished the matter though the petitions challenging the transfer order were listed on 22.05.2018. The Charity Commissioner has acted with undue haste and in an extremely arbitrary fashion. The claim that objectors were delaying the matter is baseless. From 2015, the matter was pending. It is in September, 2017 that an advertisement was issued inviting objections and several persons objected. Hence, the objectors cannot be blamed for the period from 2015 till September, 2017. From September, 2017, there have been only about 10 adjournments due to various reasons and the same cannot be said to be excessive. The same has resulted in the objectors not being heard on merits and a violation of natural justice. The action of the CC is a case of serious impropriety on his part. At this stage, it may also be noted that before the GRT, the CC has filed an affidavit adopting the submissions of the trust’s lawyer (p. 356, para 2).
The action of the CC is a case of serious impropriety on his part. At this stage, it may also be noted that before the GRT, the CC has filed an affidavit adopting the submissions of the trust’s lawyer (p. 356, para 2). 4.10 It is very obvious that after this proceeding is over, another application will be filed by the trustees to sell the second parcel of land. 4.11 It is submitted that Ranchhod Bharwad (petitioner of SCA No. 16957 of 2019) resides in Pasodara. This is admitted by the trustees as is clear from the submissions of the trustees in the GRT order (p. 88, 9th line from the top and 3rd line from the bottom). Another objector Bhadresh Vasani (petitioner in SCA No. 2715 of 2020) also resides in Pasodara. Consequently, they are beneficiaries. Without prejudice to the submission that Ranchhod Bharwad owns cattle, even assuming that he did not own cattle, the mere fact that he resides in Pasodara makes him a beneficiary. It may be noted that according to the trustees, there are only 30 cattle in Pasodara. The trustees rely on resolutions of meetings bearing of 47 signatures (10.5.2015 resolution) and 227 signatures (23.7.2017 resolution). This means that even if what the trustees say is to be believed, at least 17 persons (in the 2015 meeting) and 197 persons (in the 2017 meeting) are villagers who do not own cattle and yet the trustees are relying on resolutions claimed to have been passed by villagers who according to the trustees are not cattle owners. Therefore, ownership of cattle cannot be the criteria for being a beneficiary. The contention that a villager can be a beneficiary and “person having interest” under S. 2(10) of the Act only if he owns cattle is misconceived. So far as Mahendra Agarwal (petitioner in SCA No. 16954 of 2019) is concerned, he is also a beneficiary for the reasons mentioned in para 13 (p. 533) and para 28 (p. 537) and Ann. BB (p. 559). There is only one village named Kamrej in District Surat and it is in Taluka Kamrej. It is only 5 kms from Village Pasodara (which is also in Taluka Kamrej). The subject land is on the outskirts of Pasodara village and about 3.5 km from Mahendra Agarwal’s village i.e. Kamrej. Moreover, so far as Mr.
BB (p. 559). There is only one village named Kamrej in District Surat and it is in Taluka Kamrej. It is only 5 kms from Village Pasodara (which is also in Taluka Kamrej). The subject land is on the outskirts of Pasodara village and about 3.5 km from Mahendra Agarwal’s village i.e. Kamrej. Moreover, so far as Mr. Agarwal is concerned, vide order dated 3.10.2017 (p. 225), this Hon’ble Court has directed that his objections be heard. The said order has not been challenged. It is important to note that the villagers are supporting the petitioner. Reference be made to the document at Ann. ZZ, p. 547 which contains signatures of several villagers supporting the petitioners and the contentions raised by the petitioners. 4.12 The term “person having interest” appearing in S. 2(10) is not used in S. 36 at all and hence, is not applicable to a S. 36 proceeding. Consequently, it is necessary to look at judicial pronouncements on who can object to a S. 36 proceeding. As held in 1986 (3) SCC 391 (para 1) (delivered under the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, 1966) and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 9936 of 2018 (Shri Amba Devi Sanstha) (para 10) (delivered under S. 36 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act), “public minded citizens have to show exemplary vigilance and property of religious and charitable institutions….. must be jealously protected.” Consequently, the narrow concept of locus applicable to private litigation can never apply. In fact, in 1977 (0) GLHEL-HC 204570, it was held that the inquiry is an inquisitorial inquiry (p. 6) and the principles of public oriented litigation apply (p. 7). Keeping this principle in mind, Charity Commissioners issue advertisement (p. 203) inviting objections from persons without restricting it to beneficiaries only. 4.13 It is submitted that Section 36(3) uses the word “person aggrieved” and hence, the term used in S. 2(10) (‘person having interest’) cannot be applied. If a person is an objector/party in the S. 36 proceeding, he automatically gets a right to challenge the order passed in the said proceeding especially when his grievance is that he is not heard. Reliance is placed on paras 25 to 28 of 2008 (3) GLR 2529 (Five Navtanpuri Dham Khijda Mandir Trust).
If a person is an objector/party in the S. 36 proceeding, he automatically gets a right to challenge the order passed in the said proceeding especially when his grievance is that he is not heard. Reliance is placed on paras 25 to 28 of 2008 (3) GLR 2529 (Five Navtanpuri Dham Khijda Mandir Trust). 4.14 It is submitted that Charity Commissioner's powers under Section 3 are “subject to such general or special orders as the State Government may pass”. Under Rule 36(3), the State Government has restricted his power of transfer to transferring proceedings pending before Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioners. Hence, he has no power to transfer a proceeding pending before a Joint Charity Commissioner. Secondly, all his powers so far as the District of Surat are concerned are transferred to Joint Charity Commissioner, Surat by a notification. Consequently, even territorially Charity Commissioner does not have the power. 4.15 Learned Advocates for the petitioners relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in case of Chenchu Rami Reddy Anr. Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh & Ors., reported in (1986) 3 SCC, 391. Attention is drawn to para-10 and it is submitted that the properties of the Public Charitable Trust are required to be protected and if such properties are to be sold then the same has to be done in a transparent manner. 4.16 Reliance is also placed on judgment of the Apex Court in case of Shri Ambadevi Sanstha & Ors. Vs. Joint Charity Commissioner & Ors., in Civil Appeal No.9936 of 2018 dated 25.09.2018, wherein relying upon series of decisions including Chenchu Rami Reddy (supra), the Court has emphasized on the importance of protecting the Trust property and disposal of the same in a transparent manner. 4.17 Learned Advocate for the petitioners relied upon judgment of this Court in case of 5 Navtanpuri Dham-Khijda Mandir Trust trough Acharyashri & Ors. Vs. Anilbhai Bhagwanji Jobanputra & Ors., reported in 2008 (2) GLH, 450. Attention is drawn to para-13 to substantiate the argument that generating of more income by disposal of the Trust property is not the relevant consideration for an application under Section 36. 4.18 Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of M.B.Gopala Krishna & Ors. Vs.
Attention is drawn to para-13 to substantiate the argument that generating of more income by disposal of the Trust property is not the relevant consideration for an application under Section 36. 4.18 Reliance is also placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of M.B.Gopala Krishna & Ors. Vs. Special Deputy Collector, Land Acquisition, reported in (1996) 3 SCC, 594, to contend that encumbered or burdened land will attract fewer buyers as in the present case, the land is advertised as a tenanted premises. 4.19 Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in case of Hamumiya Bachumiya Vs. Mehdihusen Gulamhusen, reported in 1978 GLR 661 , to submit that in case of charities, the Courts are constitutional protectors and guardians of the paramount interest of the charities. 4.20 Reliance is also placed on the judgment of this Court in case of Lallubhai Girdharlal Parikh Vs. Acharya Shri Vrijbhushanlalji Balkrishnalalji, reported in 1967 GLR 42 . 4.21 Learned Advocate for the petitioners next relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in case of Committee of Management of Pachaiyappa's Trust Vs. Official Trustee of Madras & Ors., reported in (1994) 1 SCC, 475. Attention is drawn to para-20 to emphasis the role of a Trustee to do all acts which are reasonable and in the interest and benefit of the Trust. 4.22 Learned Advocates for the petitioners next relied upon judgment of this Court in case of Ramdev Developers thr. Partner-Kishor G. Vavia Vs. Jt. Charity Commissioner, reported in 2009 (1) GLR, 337, to submit that on facts, the Court had concluded the Charity Commissioner had not exercised powers properly on the basis of the material produced before it and therefore, permission granted by the Charity Commissioner was held to be without making proper examination of necessity to sale the land of the Trust. 4.23 Learned Advocates for the petitioners also relied upon judgment of the Madras High Court in case of Imayam Trust & Ors. Vs. Balakumar & Ors., reported in 2015 (3) 654. Attention is drawn to para-18 of the judgment. 5. Learned Senior Advocate for the respondent-Trust submitted that Shri Mahendra Agarwal the petitioner of Special Civil Application no. 16954 of 2019 who is trader in Surat and who is resident of Pandesara is the lead person in making objections. Pandesara is within Surat City-Municipal Corporation.
Attention is drawn to para-18 of the judgment. 5. Learned Senior Advocate for the respondent-Trust submitted that Shri Mahendra Agarwal the petitioner of Special Civil Application no. 16954 of 2019 who is trader in Surat and who is resident of Pandesara is the lead person in making objections. Pandesara is within Surat City-Municipal Corporation. Petitioner's place of residence is 35 kms from village Pasodara wherein the trust property is situated. The petitioner is having shop of textile material in 'Rohit Air-Condition Market' which is on Ring Road Surat. The petitioner is essentially a trader in textile materials. 5.1 It is submitted that the objections filed by Shri Mahendra Agarwal do not point out as how he is person interested into affairs of a Trust situated in village of Surat District as he is not residing in that village and he is trader in Surat as per address shown by him. 5.2 It is submitted that above will go to show that the petitioners are busy bodies and they are not beneficiaries or "person interested" and therefore they have no locus standi to file the present writ petitions. 5.3 Learned Senior Advocate relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., reported in (2013) 4 SCC 465 . He invited attention of the Court to para 23 for the proposition that petitioners cannot maintain the writ petition as they have no locus to file the writ petitions. 5.4 It is submitted that the 17 objectors, including petitioners have filed proceeding after proceeding before the authorities only to cause hindrance into the smooth functioning of the trust and to cause obstruction in the decision making process of the Charity Commissioner. 5.5 It is submitted that in the Application seeking to alienate the trust property the Charity Commissioner is required to take into consideration Rule 24 of Gujarat Trust Rules,1961 and his inquiry is required to be focused only on those points as referred in Rule 24 of the Gujarat Trust Rules 1961. 5.6 It is submitted that the legislature have given power to Charity Commissioner under section 3 of Gujarat Public Trust Act, 1950. The power conferred to the Charity Commissioner is conferred by Legislature and this power is for entire State of Gujarat. The power of Jt.
5.6 It is submitted that the legislature have given power to Charity Commissioner under section 3 of Gujarat Public Trust Act, 1950. The power conferred to the Charity Commissioner is conferred by Legislature and this power is for entire State of Gujarat. The power of Jt. Charity Commissioner is conferred by State Government and is by way of issuing notification and same is exercised by the State Government as a Delegated Power. The power of Joint Charity Commissioner conferred by virtue of notification would not take away the power of Charity Commissioner which is conferred by the Legislature. The Charity Commissioner would continue to retain the power under section 3 of the Act. 5.7 It is submitted that initially the section 3 was not under the Trust Act, 1950, but having regard to the work section 3A came to inserted in 1960. That it is submitted that only when State Government appointed the Jt. Charity Commissioner for Surat notification under section 3A came to be issued, however power of Jt. Charity Commissioner are subject to control of Charity Commissioner. That it is submitted that power given by legislature to Charity Commissioner under sections 3 would not get diluted or taken away by subordinate legislature. 5.8 It is vehemently submitted on behalf of the respondent-Trust and Mr.Lalwani that the objectors who are the petitioners herein are having history of objecting in any sale proceedings of the a Trust property and have made it their business of raising such objections without there being any of their stake involved and tried to earn by using such objections in the proceedings as a tool for blackmailing the Trust or participant bidders. Today, Mr.Lalwani has already invested a huge amount for purchase of the trust property and has deposited an amount of Rs.8.82 crores in the ongoing proceedings whereas none of the objectors have even come forward to participate in the auction after the public advertisement. Therefore, the purpose of the objectors, who have joined hands, is very clear. It is also submitted that the practice adopted by the petitioners, who are objectors, in strategizing the litigation, where the objectors have individually objected to the proceedings before various forums and at various stages, is giving cumulative effect of stalling the ongoing sale process when an oblique motive to make some financial gains.
It is also submitted that the practice adopted by the petitioners, who are objectors, in strategizing the litigation, where the objectors have individually objected to the proceedings before various forums and at various stages, is giving cumulative effect of stalling the ongoing sale process when an oblique motive to make some financial gains. None of the objectors have any interest in the working and administration of the Trust or the objectives of the Trust. None of them in the petitions or during the course of entire litigation have produced anything on record to indicate if any of them have done any activity in the interest of cattle or village. Therefore, the only interest is commercial in nature and such practice is required to be strongly deprecated. 5.9 Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Apex Court in case of State of Bihar Vs. J.A.C. Saldanna, reported in AIR 1980 SC 326 , to support the argument of limited exercise of powers under Articles 226 and 227. the word, 'superintendence' is given meaning to in paras-15, 16 and 17. 5.10 Learned Senior Advocate for the respondent-Trust relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Official Trustee of West Bengal Vs. Stephen Court Ltd., reported in (2006) 13 SCC, 401, wherein the Apex Court has given definition of a beneficiary under the Trust Act and person beneficially interested in any Trust property. Attention is drawn to paras-33 and 35 of the judgment. 5.11 Reliance is also placed on decision of the Apex Court in case of Ghulam Qadir Vs. Special Tribunal, reported in 2002 (1) SCC, 33, in support of the argument that the petitioners did not have any locus to raise objections and therefore, does not have locus. Attention is drawn to para-38 of the judgment. 5.12 Learned Senior Advocate for the respondent-Trust next relied upon judgment of this Court in case of Kachhiya Patidar Samaj Vs. Joint Charity Commissioner & Anr., reported in 2008 (1) GLR, 232, in support of the contention of exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 in cases related to trust. Attention is drawn to para-9 of the judgment. 5.13 Reliance is also placed on an unreported decision of this Court in case of Ajay Dhanvantray Swadiya Vs.
Joint Charity Commissioner & Anr., reported in 2008 (1) GLR, 232, in support of the contention of exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 in cases related to trust. Attention is drawn to para-9 of the judgment. 5.13 Reliance is also placed on an unreported decision of this Court in case of Ajay Dhanvantray Swadiya Vs. Charity Commissioner & Ors., in SCA No.14302 of 2013 dated 08.12.2017, in support of the contention that a person who is not an aggrieved cannot file an appeal against the order of the Charity Commissioner granting permission under Section 36. 5.14 Reliance is placed on an unreported judgment of this Court in case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation thru General Secretary Kamini Jaiswal Vs. Union of India thru Secretary in WP (PIL) No.49 of 2019 dated 23.01.2020, with regard to contention of valuation of land and it is submitted that valuation cannot be in an exactitude manner. Attention is particularly drawn to para-7.22 of the judgment. 5.15 Learned Senior Advocate for the respondent-Trust next relied upon judgment of this Court in case of Upendrabhai Shantilal Maniar Vs. Sheth Shri Morarjibhai Dhanjibhai Padiya & Anr., reported in (2008) 3 GLH, 308 and submitted that while examining sale of the Trust property, “compelling necessity” is not the principle to be followed. 5.16 Reliance is placed on the judgment of this Court in case of Manubhai B. Desai Vs. Charity Commissioner, reported in 2001 (2) GLR, 1208, where, in the facts of that case, the Court had not exercised discretion at the instance of a meddlesome interlocutor or busybody. 6. On behalf of respondent No.2-Charity Commissioner, an affidavit in reply is filed, wherein the Charity Commissioner has explained the manner in which the matter was transferred from the Joint Charity Commissioner, Surat to the Charity Commissioner and how the matter has been conducted. Paras-9, 10, 11, 12, 14 and 15 of the said affidavit in reply read as under :- “9. It is most humbly and respectfully submitted that pursuant to abovementioned directions issued by this Hon’ble Court, the matter was listed on daily basis before the Jt. Charity Commissioner, Surat, but no effective hearing were taken place. And thereafter on 02.05.2018 the Jt.
It is most humbly and respectfully submitted that pursuant to abovementioned directions issued by this Hon’ble Court, the matter was listed on daily basis before the Jt. Charity Commissioner, Surat, but no effective hearing were taken place. And thereafter on 02.05.2018 the Jt. Charity Commissioner, Surat had sent a communication to the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State for showing his inability to take up the matter and the said communication was send through fax to the office of the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State and upon receipt of the same, on 03.05.2018 the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State had issue transfer order for transferring the proceedings from the Jt. Charity Commissioner, Surat to himself. 10. It is further submitted that on the above issue, the petitioner had made several averments regarding that the Charity Commissioner has not powers to transfer the matter pending before the Jt. Charity Commissioner vis-a-vise submissions of facts (sic) on the aspect of receipt of the letter dated 02.05.2018. I say and submit that so far as the letter dated 02.05.2018 was received by the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State initially through fax machinery and therefore on 03.05.2018 the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State had acted upon the request of the Jt. Charity Commissioner and the said letter dated 02.05.2018 was also received other mode of service i.e. by post on 14.05.2018 and therefore the petitioner had made averment in that regards by having incomplete information. For kind perusal of this Hon’ble Court, I crave leave to annex herewith the copy of fax communication dated 02.05.2018 received by the office of the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State as AnnexureR1 to this affidavit in reply. 11. That upon receipt of the same, the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State in exercise of his powers call for the record and proceedings and after transferring the matter, initiate necessary further procedure in accordance with law. 12. At this stage the answering respondent also clarify the aspect on the jurisdiction of transferring such matter from Jt. Charity Commissioner to Charity Commissioner. I say and submit that the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State while issuing transfer order on 03.05.2018 had very well considered the aspect about the nearby district from Surat i.e. the pendency of cases in District: Vadodara. And such transfers are generally made since decades in the State of Gujarat upon the request of the Jt. Charity Commissioner as looking to the definition of the Jt.
And such transfers are generally made since decades in the State of Gujarat upon the request of the Jt. Charity Commissioner as looking to the definition of the Jt. Charity Commissioner provided under the provisions of law wherein under Section 3A of the Act it provides that “The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, appoint one or more officers to be called Joint Charity Commissioners who shall, subject to control of Charity Commissioner to such general or special order as the State Government may pass, exercise all or any of the powers and perform all or any of the duties and functions of the Charity Commissioner.” And therefore also looking to the above provisions of law, it is clearly provided that the Jt. Charity Commissioner exercise powers and duties as if of the Charity Commissioner and to substantiate the said submissions, I say and submit that as a part of general practice, once upon request by Jt. Charity Commissioner for showing difficulty or request to transfer the matter, the Charity Commissioner also take in to note the situation of pendency of the matter before the Jt. Charity Commissioner of the nearby district and also has powers to take up the matter under him for further proper adjudication of the matter as having superior and administrative powers within the State of Gujarat to perform the duties and functions of the Act. And by transferring the matter, there is no right of the petitioner will be infringe as whether one officer will hear the matter or the other officer. And therefore there is no substance in the averments to that regards made by the petitioner in the memo of the petition.” 13. xxxx 14. It is further submitted that against the transfer order, one of the objector namely one Mr. Dineshbhai Dhirubhai Rudani had filed Special Civil Application no. 8105 of 2018 before this Hon’ble Court, wherein initially vide order dated 16.05.2018 the Hon’ble Court while issuing notice had observed that “it would be open for the petitioner to apply for adjournment before the authority below till 22.05.2018. 15. It most humbly and respectfully submitted that thereafter on the date of hearing on all the objections application on 21.05.2018, the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State has looking the objections raised by the objectors, rejected the adjournments applications of all the objectors.
15. It most humbly and respectfully submitted that thereafter on the date of hearing on all the objections application on 21.05.2018, the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State has looking the objections raised by the objectors, rejected the adjournments applications of all the objectors. At this stage the answering respondent respectfully submit that there is no disrespect to the order passed by this Hon’ble Court dated 16.05.2018 in which the Hon’ble Court while issuing the notice allow the concerned petitioner to apply for the adjournment but at the time when the Charity Commissioner had passed an order on 21.05.2018, the Charity Commissioner had considered the factual aspect that the bid was opened on 03.10.2017 but on hand or other hand the proceedings was prolonged because of the conduct of the objectors who keep filing objections on one or other ground even one objector Mr. Dinesh Rudani had filed Revision Application on 06.10.2017 i.e. after the order passed by the Ld. Single Judge dated 03.10.2017 in the SCA preferred by the present petitioner. In the said application the concerned objector had raised contention that the land in question is not belonging to the Trust property and such objection was raised after 65 years of the Registration of Trust which rejected by the Charity Commissioner vide order dated 14.05.2018 and being aggrieved by the said order the concerned objector had preferred appeal before the Ld. District Court, Surat. Apart from the said delaying strategies the objectors also sought time before the Charity Commissioner on one or other grounds, the instances on which the adjournment was sought by the objectors pursuant to the order dated 03.10.2017 on one or other grounds are as under: On 12.10.2017: Application for adjournment was sought by applicant as well as the objector Mr. Harkesh Patel, On 23.10.2017: Reply filed by the objectors, On 19.12.2017: Adjournment applications made by the objectors Mr. Harkesh Patel, Rambhai Dhandhal and Dilipbhai Hirpara, On 18.01.2018: Adjournment applications made by the objectors Mr. Rajesh Dungarsinhbhai Bodariya, Mr. Harkesh Patel, Mahendra Agrawal, Mr. Bhadresh Dhirubhai Vasani and ors. On 15.02.2018: Adjournment application by objector Mr. Bhadresh Vasani as other objectors were remain absent, On 27.02.2018: Adjournment application by objector Mr.
Harkesh Patel, Rambhai Dhandhal and Dilipbhai Hirpara, On 18.01.2018: Adjournment applications made by the objectors Mr. Rajesh Dungarsinhbhai Bodariya, Mr. Harkesh Patel, Mahendra Agrawal, Mr. Bhadresh Dhirubhai Vasani and ors. On 15.02.2018: Adjournment application by objector Mr. Bhadresh Vasani as other objectors were remain absent, On 27.02.2018: Adjournment application by objector Mr. Bhadresh Vasani, On 05.04.2018: Adjournment application by objector Rajnikant Ratilal Thakkar, On 03.05.2018: Order passed for transfer of proceedings and administrative order to that effect was passed on 04.05.2018: On 04.05.2018: Simultaneously adjournment application by objector Rajnikant Ratilal Thakkar at Surat before Jt. Charity Commissioner, On 07.05.2018: After transfer of proceedings before the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State, the notice was issued to the concerned parties: On 14.05.2018: Around eight adjournment applications from objectors were received. By granting adjournment the Charity Commissioner had by passing order on 14.05.2018 adjourned the matter on 21.05.2018. On 21.05.2018: Rejected the objections application by considering the objections in depth of all the objector by also considering the facts that numbers of Special Civil Application being Special Civil Application no. 8105 of 2018 preferred by one Mr. Dinesh Rudani, Special Civil Application no. 18915 of 2017 preferred Harkesh Navinbhai Patel against the issuance of public notice which after issuance of notice by this Hon’ble Court as per the status report lastly listed on 16.12.2017 and Special Civil Application no. 17940 of 2017 preferred by the present petitioner i.e. Mahendra Agarwal and therefore keeping in mind the order dated 03.10.2017 passed by this Hon’ble Court in Special Civil Application no. 17940 of 2017 in which the Hon’ble Court observed to hear the objection and not to proceed further with the bid and therefore while deciding the objections of all the objectors in details, the Charity Commissioner has also considered the factual position such as, the certificate of the concerned Mamlatdar dated 05.08.2017 showing only 30 animals which as per the census of 2012 are only 19 animals and there are no any animals using the land in question for cattle feed and after scrutinizing the objections of all the objectors found that non of the objectors have any right, title or interest on the issue in question and also are beneficiary of the Trust. Infact most of the objectors are not even residing at Village: Pasodara.
Infact most of the objectors are not even residing at Village: Pasodara. And therefore after considering the evidence on record and proper examination of the objections, the Charity Commissioner, Gujarat State in the interest of the Trust passed an order rejecting the objection applications filed by the objector. It is further submitted that while passing the order dated 21.05.2018 in the para 13, the Charity Commissioner observed that “It is modus operandi and I have no any hesitation to observe my experience that a systematic class of the parsons, they are interested to rise the various objections in an Application under Section 36 of the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 and after filing the objections, they are pressurizing the parties to do something, then and they, they will be in position to withdraw the objections. This is the practice prevailing in the judicial proceedings under Section 36 and the objectors are making a “RING” and thereafter the persons, who is very much desirous to purchase the property. Unnecessarily, a pressurizing practice is being adopted for their personal gain. The objectors simply invest in the money and compete ting in the bid process and if the real person who is desirous to purchase the property, may not get it but as soon as the oblique motive of the false objector may satisfy, they will remain either absent, or they will not rise more amount in the auction proceedings. This is the practice prevailing in the Charity litigation particularly Section 36. I am of the view that, such conduct on the part of the objectors and/or so called false bidders are required to be criticized highly and their conduct is required to be condemned.” 6.1 Learned AGP, in support of her contention that exercise of power by the Charity Commissioner was within jurisdiction, relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in case of Godavari S.Parulekar Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in AIR 1966 SC, 1404. She invited attention of the Court to para-6. 6.2 Learned AGP next relied upon judgment of the Apex Court in case of Ishwar Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in 2005 (2) SCC, 334. She invited attention of the Court to paras8 to 10 of the judgment. 7. Having heard learned Advocates for the parties and having perused documents on record, it is trite that the assets of the trust are required to be protected.
State of Rajasthan, reported in 2005 (2) SCC, 334. She invited attention of the Court to paras8 to 10 of the judgment. 7. Having heard learned Advocates for the parties and having perused documents on record, it is trite that the assets of the trust are required to be protected. In several judgments, the Supreme Court has taken this view. In case of Chenchu Rami Reddy (supra), the Apex Court has held that the property of the public trusts or endowment must be jealously protected as large number of segment of the community has beneficial interest in it and therefore, the Charity Commissioner, exercising powers under the Act must not only be alert and vigilant in such matters but also show awareness of the ways of the present day world as also ugly realities of the world of the day. It is further observed that the authorities cannot afford to take things at their face value or make less than closest and best attention approach to guard against all pitfalls. The authorities had to be aware that in such matters, trustees could be involved in secret or invisible underhand dealing or understanding with the purchasers at the cost of the institution. In case of R.Venugopala Naidu & Ors. Vs. Venkatarayulu Naidu Charities & Ors., reported in 1989 Supp. (2) SACC 356, the Apex Court has reiterated that the sale of public trust properties should be free from suspicion. In case of Bhaskar Laxman Jadhav & Ors. Vs. Karamveer Kakasaheb Wagh Education Society & Ors., reported in (2013) 11 SCC, 531, the Apex Court has taken note of the flip-flop indulged into by the trustees and the purchasers and when it was found that the sale transaction was not for the benefit and in the interest of the trust, uphold the decision of the Charity Commissioner in rejecting the application. The exercise, therefore, is required to be undertaken at the hands of the Charity Commissioner to conclude that the permission was granted in the best interest of the trust. 8. The Charity Commissioner has passed two orders on the same day, i.e. 21.05.2018, one being on the application of the objectors, by which the objections were rejected and another below Application No.36/45/2018 for permission to sale under Section 36.
8. The Charity Commissioner has passed two orders on the same day, i.e. 21.05.2018, one being on the application of the objectors, by which the objections were rejected and another below Application No.36/45/2018 for permission to sale under Section 36. Close scrutiny of both these orders fails to indicate any exercise undertaken by the Charity Commissioner or anything coming on record that the sale of land is in the best interest of the trust. In the order rejecting objections, reference is made accordingly to the objections of the objectors and concluding that the objectors have no semblance of interest in the property except for a commercial interest to prolong the process of alienation that their objections do not deserve consideration. The order also goes on to narrate how various objectors have successfully prolonged the process of grant of permission by using technical objections. The order also refers to the population of the cattle in the village for which the land was to be made available for grazing. 8.1 In the order below application by the trust for permission to sale, there does not appear to be any independent exercise to ascertain as to what is the interest of the trust. There is no discussion with regard to the objects of the trust. No discussion as to the change in the object of the trust with the change in time. But, merely on the ground that the land is lying idle and is to fetch high value which may be used by the trust for better purposes, appears to be the reasoning. In para9, the Charity Commissioner has held as under: “(9) The present application when read along with the evidences produced, the said trust is registered in 1952. The land of said trust was utilized especially for oxen grazing. At present, the land is not used for grazing of oxen. Further, as per the certificated issued by the Mamlatdar, Kamrej, the stated land is not used for cattle grazing due to existence of residential and commercial constructions in the surroundings. Considering these facts, the stated land of trust, which is not used for oxen or cattle grazing at present, there exist no circumstances that it can be used for cattle grazing in the future as well, because residential and commercial constructions have taken place in the surroundings of the stated land.
Considering these facts, the stated land of trust, which is not used for oxen or cattle grazing at present, there exist no circumstances that it can be used for cattle grazing in the future as well, because residential and commercial constructions have taken place in the surroundings of the stated land. Considering these facts, the trustees of trust have leased the land on rent for tenure of seven years so that the land is not occupied by someone illegally. The annual such rental amounts to Rs.24,000/-. As per the bidding process taken place before the Joint Charity Commissioner, Surat, if approval for selling the property is granted, the trust may receive an amount equivalent to Rs.35,30,00,000/-. If such an amount is invested, there are circumstances that the trust may have much larger interest income than current rental income. There exist circumstances that such proceed of interest income can be utilized for protecting other immovable properties as well as the interests of the trust in a better manner. Therefore, granting the permission for sell as per the application is found appropriate, judicious and in the larger interests of the trust. Hence, following order is passed hereby;” 9. At this stage, it would be pertinent to refer to the chronology which is referred to in the preceding paras, where successful bidder-Mr. Lalwani is first inducted into the land in question as a tenant for a period of 7 years; thereafter, public notice is issued labeling the property to be a tenanted property for the purpose of sale and thereafter, order permitting sale and setting aside of objections. This chronology leads this Court to believe that the land would go to Mr.Lalwani was a foregone conclusion and only necessary formalities were thereafter to be followed. Such a methodology, in the opinion of the Court will not protect the interest of the trust and in the facts of the present case, certainly is not protecting the interest of the trust. 10. The Court is of the view that burden lies heavy on the shoulder of the Charity Commissioner to protect the interest of the trust. In the present case, as narrated in the preceding paras, the decision of the Charity Commissioner to transfer the proceedings from Joint Charity Commissioner to himself was the subject matter of challenge before this Court in separate petitions.
In the present case, as narrated in the preceding paras, the decision of the Charity Commissioner to transfer the proceedings from Joint Charity Commissioner to himself was the subject matter of challenge before this Court in separate petitions. In one such petitions, being SCA No.8105 of 2018 by order dated 16.05.2018, notice was issued making it returnable on 22.05.2018 and it was further observed that it would be open for the petitioner to apply for adjournment before the authority till 22.05.2018, i.e. next date of hearing. So when a petition questioning the jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner to deal with the proceedings was still under scrutiny, even before the returnable date in the writ petition, impugned order dated 21.05.2018 came to be passed as if the issues raised before the High Court with regard to transfer of proceedings and jurisdiction of the Charity Commissioner to decide the proceeding are not required to be dealt with by the High Court and effectively making such petition infractuous. The hot haste in which the Charity Commissioner has acted is sought to be explained by the Charity Commissioner himself by filing a detailed affidavit, wherein the Charity Commissioner has proceeded to justify by giving explanation to the issue that the order of transferring the proceedings from the Joint Charity, Surat upon request of the Joint Charity Commissioner, Surat expressing his inability to deal with the proceedings had reached the office of the Charity Commissioner only on 14.05.2018 whereas on 03.05.2018 itself, the Charity Commissioner had ordered transfer of proceedings to himself on the ground that he had accepted communication of the Joint Charity Commissioner, Surat on 02.05.2018 by fax. This appears to the Court an effort to tie-up lose ends.
This appears to the Court an effort to tie-up lose ends. Therefore, the order of transferring the proceedings on 03.05.2018 on the letter of the Joint Charity Commissioner, Surat dated 02.05.2018 received in due course by post on 14.05.2018 and the Charity Commissioner ordering taking over of the proceedings on 03.05.2018, when viewed with the fact that the action of the Charity Commissioner was subject matter of challenge in the petitions before this Court, wherein returnable date was fixed on 22.05.2018, the impugned decision on 21.05.2018, i.e. one day prior to the returnable date creates doubt with regard to manner and method adopted to decide the application for permission to sale under Section 36 of the Act and certainly not above the suspicion as is required in the judgment of R.Venugopala Naidu (supra). In any event, when this Court had passed an order on 16.05.2018 observing that it is open to apply for adjournment before the authority till 22.5.2018, the Charity Commissioner ought not to have proceeded with the matter on 21.5.2018 and ought to have granted the adjournment applications. 11. In the entire proceedings, at various stages, the Court has found that there has been stage managing. The application under Section 36 claimed that on 10.05.2015, the villagers purportedly passed resolution permitting sale of land. However, the village consisting out of population of village of 8700, only 43 had signed. Moreover, the resolution did not bear signatures of the trustees. The resolution therefore would not represent wishes of the villagers who are beneficiaries of the trust. The resolution refers to the rent agreement in favour of Mr.Lalwani, which was apparently dated 01.11.2012, but was notarized on 30.07.2015. In the application under Section 36, it is claimed that the land was being given to Mr.Lalwani as the said land is not cultivable and does not yield any crop whereas the valuation report produced indicates that the land is given on rent agreement to Mr.Lalwani for agricultural activities. Coincidently, the application under Section 36 was filed immediately after notarizing the agreement on 30.07.2015.
Coincidently, the application under Section 36 was filed immediately after notarizing the agreement on 30.07.2015. It appears that again to overcome these lacuna, another stage managing took place when another resolution was passed on 23.07.2017 much after filing of application under Section 36, which was purportedly resolution of the villagers bearing 225 signatures and thereafter on 30.08.2017, the Joint Charity Commissioner, Surat went on to fix upset price at Rs.30 crores and directing issuance of public advertisement. It is on record of the case by way of affidavit of respondent No.3,wherein at page No.562 is a communication of TalticumMantri and in the affidavit of respondent No.9, page No.596 is communication of the Sarpanch of Pasodara Gram Panchayat, which indicates that there was no meeting on 23.07.2017 under the Chairmanship of Sarpanch Anitaben Rajendrabhai Vasani and therefore, the resolution supporting application under Section 36 itself put under serious doubt. 11.1 The object of the trust has not been referred to by the Charity Commissioner in the impugned order. The constitution of the trust refers to the object to be that of functioning in the interest of the villagers of Pasodara village. When the beneficiaries have purportedly not participated in the process and the resolution, on which reliance is placed appears to be doubtful, the Charity Commissioner ought not to have proceeded further with the application under Section 36 without necessary scrutiny and recording of findings in that regard. 12. From the record, the Court has found serious discrepancies in facts in the form of details mentioned in support of the application under Section 36 and documents supplied in support of the resolution of the village, which is the basis, is not a clear cut reflection of the villagers who are beneficiaries. Handful of villagers were part to resolution. The second resolution of 2017 almost after two years of 1st resolution also does not inspire confidence as the Sarpanch and the Talati-cum-Mantri in separate communications have stated that no such meeting has taken place. This aspect has been overlooked by the Charity Commissioner. The Charity Commissioner in due course of his exercise of power under Section 36 ought to have closely scrutinized this. 12.1 Similarly, discrepancy in the information supplied along with the application about the nature and status of land in question is also relevant.
This aspect has been overlooked by the Charity Commissioner. The Charity Commissioner in due course of his exercise of power under Section 36 ought to have closely scrutinized this. 12.1 Similarly, discrepancy in the information supplied along with the application about the nature and status of land in question is also relevant. On one hand, application mentions land to be barren land, not fit for agriculture whereas the expert report mentions this land cultivable and productive. This discrepancy indicates about flipflop by the trustees and the proposed purchaser, who under any circumstances, want the deal through. One more aspect is the interpolation in the application to change the description of land which is the subject matter of application under Section 36. All these aspect are relevant to the proceedings and there is no reason for the Charity Commissioner for not adjudicating and dealing with them. 13. There are no reasons by the Charity Commissioner why it should overlook such discrepancies in the facts relating to the land in question. Such discrepancies in isolation may not carry any weightage, but when many discrepancies coincide, it was duty of the Charity Commissioner to take a close look to ensure protection of interests of trust. Here it appears that contradictory is done. 14. The Court would thereafter scrutinize the impugned order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in the appeal proceedings. A close reading of the order of the Tribunal passed at the stage of interim application and the final impugned order would reveal that the Tribunal, on the same issues, had agreed with the petitioners and granted stay on the order of the Charity Commissioner granting permission under Section 36. Thereafter, without there being any change of record, in the final hearing, the Tribunal, on the very same issue, has given finding otherwise and rejected the appeal. At an interim stage, in a detailed order, the Tribunal had, on the issue of use of consideration received upon such sale, the trust was to deposit such consideration with the Bank and the Tribunal said that for such reasons, permission for sale ought not to be granted.
At an interim stage, in a detailed order, the Tribunal had, on the issue of use of consideration received upon such sale, the trust was to deposit such consideration with the Bank and the Tribunal said that for such reasons, permission for sale ought not to be granted. The clear cut finding was given that when the trust is not coming out with any explanation as to in which manner the proceeds are to be used to achieve the object of the trust and nothing is mentioned in the application also, such permission ought not to be granted. As against this, the very Tribunal has not examined the object of the trust or any change in the object with the passage of time nor any roadmap has been produced by the trustees for achieving object of the trust by sale of properties of the trust. The Tribunal has proceeded on the ground that as the land of the trust is lying unutilized and the trust is also under apprehension that the land would be encroached upon and when the land in question was already given on rent and was fetching rent and was occupied by the tenant, such reasonings would not stand to any logic except for to overcome the proper reasonings already assigned by the Tribunal in its interim order. The order of the Tribunal therefore requires to be interfered. 15. In case of Hamumiya Bachumiya (supra), in para-4, the Court has observed as under :- “4. ….. Therefore, in charities court, as constitutional protector of all charities, is the sole guardian of the paramount interest of the charities and its jurisdiction is analogous to one as a protector of the infant. Under the scheme of the Act Section 80 has taken away the jurisdiction of the Court in matters where the authorities are prescribed in the Act for dealing with those questions. Therefore, the Charity Commissioner having been conferred with this jurisdiction of sanction of sale of immovable properties of a public trust and this jurisdiction having been conferred, notwithstanding anything contained in the instrument of the trust, the Charity Commissioner would have to exercise its jurisdiction by making an inquisitorial enquiry so that public interests of such public trust are properly served......” 16. Though the trust and the private respondent-Mr.
Though the trust and the private respondent-Mr. Lalwani have raised issue of locus of the petitioners, however when the Court has found that the Charity Commissioner having failed in discharge of his authority while exercising powers under Section 36, the Court is duty bound to examine such failure. The malafides of the trustees and Mr. Lalwani are evident from the fact that originally the S. 36 application was filed not only for Survey No. 6 (71,469 sq. mtrs.) but also for Survey No. 128 (51,610 sq. mtrs.). Later, by scratching out some portions from the S. 36 application, the application was restricted to Survey No. 6 (71,469 sq. mtrs.). It is pertinent to note that the bogus rent agreement is for both lands. The 2017 resolution (p. 174, typed portion at p. 184 @ 185, para 2) states that “hal purati”, only Survey No. 6 (71,469 sq. mtrs.) is to be sold. 17. On behalf of the respondents, an important issue of locus is raised. It is strongly contended that the petitioners are the 'busy body'. they have no interest in the trust property nor have they put any stake on the trust property. Each of them are neither resident of the village nor connected with the trust land through any activity or cattle grazing or otherwise. The sole purpose is to create an obstacle and use such obstacle as arm-twisting tool to gain some monetary benefit. 17.1 On behalf of the petitioners, a feeble attempt is made to show the manner in which they are interested. In case of SCA No.26954 of 2019, claim is made that petitioner Mahendra Agrawal was resident of an adjacent village which shares common cattle grazing land with village Pasodara. Such a distant claim of this petitioner will not brig the petitioners in definition of 'affected party or interested party'. However, petitioner of SCA No.16957 of 2019 - Ranchod Bharwad is resident of village Pasodara. Similarly, petitioner of SCA No.2715 of 2020 - Bhadreshbhai Vasani also is resident of Pasodara. The name of the trust as it suggests that atleast villagers of Pasodara can be held to be 'affected party' when it comes to dealing with the trust land. Therefore, the Court holds that in present set of petitions, only those persons who are resident of village Pasodara can be termed to be beneficiaries of the trust and thus affected parties. 18.
Therefore, the Court holds that in present set of petitions, only those persons who are resident of village Pasodara can be termed to be beneficiaries of the trust and thus affected parties. 18. This leads to an important question as to whether the Court can entertain these petitions which are filed by the persons who are not beneficiaries. There is no dispute on the fact that the trust was constituted for the benefit of the villagers of village Pasodara. Therefore, the villagers being beneficiaries, will have a say in the affairs of the Trust. Therefore, atleast, the petitioners, as mentioned in preceding paras by the villagers can be held to be maintainable. 18.1 However, the issue faced with by this Court is exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226/227. In the facts of this case, where Court in preceding paras has referred to the manner and method in which the proceedings were conducted by the Charity Commissioner and then the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, the Court finds it apt to refer to and rely upon the judgment of the Apex Court in case of Estralla Rubber Vs. Dass Estate (Private) Limited, reported in (2001) 8 SCC, 97. In para-6, it is held as under: "6. The scope and ambit of exercise of power and jurisdiction by a High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is examined and explained in number of decisions of this Court. The exercise of power under this Article involves a duty on the High Court to keep inferior courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority and to see that they do duty expected or required by them in a legal manner. The High Court is not vested with any unlimited prerogative to correct all kinds of hardship or wrong decisions made within the limits of the jurisdiction of the courts subordinate or tribunals. Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected.
Exercise of this power and interfering with the orders of the courts or tribunal is restricted to cases of serious dereliction of duty and flagrant violation of fundamental principles of law or justice, where if High Court does not interfere, a grave injustice remains uncorrected. It is also well settled that the High Court while acting under this Article cannot exercise its power as an appellate court or substitute its own judgment in place of that of the subordinate court to correct an error, which is not apparent on the face of the record. The High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of facts of inferior court or tribunal, if there is no evidence at all to justify or the finding is so perverse, that no reasonable person can possibly come to such a conclusion, which the court or Tribunal has come to." 19. The Apex Court in the case of Sugarbai M. Siddiq v/s. Ramesh S. Hankare, reported in 2001 (8) SCC 477 in para-6 has held as under: "6. There can be little doubt that in a application under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court has to see whether the lower courts/tribunal has jurisdiction to deal with the matter and if so, whether the impugned order is vitiated by procedural irregularity; in other words, the court is concerned not with the decision but with the decision making process. On this ground alone, the order of the High Court is liable to set aside." 20. Therefore, when the Court as discussed in preceding paras about the procedure adopted, the Court cannot disregard to address such illegality on the grounds of technicality 21. In the facts of the present case, it appears to the Court that the Charity Commissioner has failed to consider the relevant aspects to decide application under Section 36 when such transaction had failed test of being done in the interest of the trust. Consequential order of the Tribunal, upholding decision of the Charity Commissioner is also required to be interfered. 22. In view of the aforesaid reasonings, the Court is inclined to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the impugned order of the Charity Commissioner dated 03.05.2018 in Registration Application No.E/552/Surat and order dated 06.09.2019 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Appeal No.AS/04/2018 and allied appeals. Rule is made absolute in aforesaid manner.
22. In view of the aforesaid reasonings, the Court is inclined to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India to set aside the impugned order of the Charity Commissioner dated 03.05.2018 in Registration Application No.E/552/Surat and order dated 06.09.2019 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal in Appeal No.AS/04/2018 and allied appeals. Rule is made absolute in aforesaid manner. No order as to costs. Petition allowed.