By the Court:- 1. Heard the parties through video conferencing. 2. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 against the Judgment dated 08.02.2017 passed by the learned Civil Judge, (Sr. Division)- 1st, Dhanbad in Misc. (Arbitration) Case no. 14 of 2014 whereby and whereunder, learned court below has dismissed the Misc. Appeal filed under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 preferred before it, challenging the award by the sole arbitrator. 3. The brief facts of this case is that there was a dispute between the parties in respect of the work done in terms of an agreement between them and as per the terms of the agreement between the parties, the matter was placed before the sole arbitrator being the Chief Engineer, the departmental head of the department concerned. During pendency of the arbitration, the parties to the arbitration proceeding entered into a settlement and requested the arbitrator to record the settlement in the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms between the parties to the arbitration and the same was not objected to by the arbitral tribunal rather the arbitral tribunal has consented for the same and accordingly passed the award in the arbitration. In the court below, it was agitated by the appellant herein-who was also the appellant before the court below, that the provisions of section 73 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which reads as under: 73. Settlement agreement.—(1) When it appears to the conciliator that there exist elements of a settlement which may be acceptable to the parties, he shall formulate the terms of a possible settlement and submit them to the parties for their observations. After receiving the observations of the parties, the conciliator may reformulate the terms of a possible settlement in the light of such observations. (2) If the parties reach agreement on a settlement of the dispute, they may draw up and sign a written settlement agreement. If requested by the parties, the conciliator may draw up, or assist the parties in drawing up, the settlement agreement. (3) When the parties sign the settlement agreement, it shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively. If requested by the parties, the conciliator may draw up, or assist the parties in drawing up, the settlement agreement. (3) When the parties sign the settlement agreement, it shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively. (4) The conciliator shall authenticate the settlement agreement and furnish a copy thereof to each of the parties has not been complied with by the sole arbitrator before passing the award, hence, it was submitted before the court below that the award impugned before the court below was bad in law and the same be set aside. The court below in the impugned judgment observed that the settlement between the parties, was in terms of section 30 (2) of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and hence, the provisions of section 73 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was not attracted, hence, it dismissed the appeal. 4. It is submitted by Mr. P.K. Bhattacharya, learned counsel for the appellant that as no any settlement agreement in writing was arrived at during the arbitral proceeding between the parties to the arbitration, hence, learned court below failed to apply the ratio of the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Mysore Cements Ltd vs. Svedala Barmac Ltd. reported in AIR 2003 SC 3493 , in paragraph 16 of which, Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held as under: “16. If the Settlement Agreement comes into existence under Section 73 satisfying the requirements stated therein, it gets the status and effect of an arbitral award on agreed terms on the substance of the dispute rendered by an arbitral tribunal under Section 30 of the Act. The submission that when there was substantial compliance with the requirements of Section 73, as in the present case, when the parties have arrived at a Settlement Agreement like the parties before any Civil Court filing a compromise petition, there should be no impediment to take up execution based on such a compromise or agreement, cannot be accepted. Even a compromise petition signed by both the parties and filed in the Court per se cannot be enforced resorting to execution proceedings unless such a compromise petition is accepted by the Court and the Court puts seal of approval for drawing a decree on the basis of compromise petition. Even a compromise petition signed by both the parties and filed in the Court per se cannot be enforced resorting to execution proceedings unless such a compromise petition is accepted by the Court and the Court puts seal of approval for drawing a decree on the basis of compromise petition. In the present case, looking to the Memorandum of Conciliation Proceedings and Letter of Comfort, it is true that parties have agreed to certain terms, but they cannot be straightway enforced by taking up execution proceedings. As rightly held by the High Court for the reasons stated in the impugned order on the basis of the Letter of Comfort execution proceedings could not be taken up under Section 36 of the Act. When the facts are disputed as to the satisfaction of the modification work and as to the breach of obligations even in relation to the modification work by either party, the High Court was right in passing the impugned order. It may be again stated here that at the end of Memorandum of Conciliation Proceedings, it is stated that the terms of Conciliation Settlement are agreed to and accepted by both the parties. Conciliators and both the parties also have signed the same but the procedure as indicated and various steps contemplated in Section 73 of the Act were not adhered to. This apart, as already stated above, in this Memorandum neither consequences for not completing the modification work are stated nor any amount of compensation is fixed. In this case virtually Letter of Comfort is sought to be enforced. This Letter of Comfort, in our view, could not be accorded the status of Settlement Agreement to bring it within the meaning of Section 74 of the Act to treat it as an arbitral award under Section 30 of the Act so as to enforce it under Section 36 of the Act. In the present case, the Conciliation proceedings were not terminated but they were only adjourned. Under Section 76 of the Act, the proceedings shall be terminated as per clauses (a) to (d) of the said Section. If there was Settlement Agreement under Section 73, Conciliation Proceedings would have been terminated under Section 76(a) of the Act. This is yet another pointer against the appellant's case. Under Section 76 of the Act, the proceedings shall be terminated as per clauses (a) to (d) of the said Section. If there was Settlement Agreement under Section 73, Conciliation Proceedings would have been terminated under Section 76(a) of the Act. This is yet another pointer against the appellant's case. It is also not possible to agree with the submission that this Memorandum of Conciliation and the Letter of Comfort could be treated as interim award in the absence of any Settlement Agreement as already discussed above. It is not every agreement or arrangement between parties to the disputes, arrived at in whatever manner or form, during the pendency of conciliation proceedings that automatically acquires the status of a settlement agreement within the meaning of Section 73 of the Act so as to have the same status and effect as if it is an arbitral award, for being enforced as if it were a decree of the Court. It is only that agreement which has been arrived at in conformity with the manner stipulated and form envisaged and got duly authenticated in accordance with Section 73 of the Act, alone can be assigned the status of a settlement agreement, within the meaning of and for effective purposes of the Act, and not otherwise. We find in spite of our careful scrutiny, serious deliberations and analysis of the materials on record, particularly the Memorandum of Conciliation Proceedings and the Letter of Comfort, that either taken individually or even together - they or any one of them can legitimately claim to be entitled to or assigned the status of a settlement agreement within the meaning of Section 73, for purposes of the Act. In our view, they fall short of the essential legal pre-requisites to be satisfied for being assigned any such status, despite our endeavour to view them with a liberal approach in the background of the objects and purposes underlying conciliation, arbitration and alternative mode of settlement of disputes.” (Emphasis Supplied) It is next submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that hence, the impugned judgment as well as the award passed by the arbitral tribunal be set aside and the matter be referred to the sole arbitrator to pass an award afresh on the merit. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. Shresth Gautam, learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand, defended the impugned judgment and submitted that submissions of the learned counsel for the appellant is misconceived. It is then submitted by Mr. Gautam that in Mysore Cements Ltd vs. Svedala Barmac Ltd. (supra) the question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was: “ Whether a letter of comfort furnished on the same day of a settlement arrived at during conciliation signed by both the parties and authenticated by the Conciliators is enforceable in the same manner as an arbitration award under Section 74 read with sections 30 and 35 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ?” (Emphasis Supplied) Mr. Gautam, drawing attention of the court to section 61 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which is first section of part III of the said Act, under the heading ‘Conciliation’ submits that section 73 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is applicable to a “conciliation proceeding” and not an “arbitration proceeding”; as section 61 categorically says that part III of the said Act, which includes section 73 of the said Act, shall apply to conciliation of disputes arising out of legal relationship whether contractual or not and to all proceedings relating thereto. Drawing attention of the court to section 62 of the said Act, Mr. Gautam further submits that for a conciliation proceeding, the essential ingredients and the procedure has been prescribed in section 62 of the said Act and as none of the said procedure was followed in this case, the award which is challenged in this case was passed not in any conciliation proceeding rather this case is out and out, a case of the arbitration simpliciter, hence, section 73 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not applicable and for the alleged non-compliance of section 73 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the said award cannot be interfered with. It is further submitted by Mr. Gautam that the scope of interference of an appellate court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is very limited and in this respect, Mr. Gautam relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Navodaya Mass Entertainment Ltd. v. J.M. Combines, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 698 , paragraph 8 of which read as under: “8. Gautam relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Navodaya Mass Entertainment Ltd. v. J.M. Combines, reported in (2015) 5 SCC 698 , paragraph 8 of which read as under: “8. In our opinion, the scope of interference of the court is very limited. The court would not be justified in reappraising the material on record and substituting its own view in place of the arbitrator’s view. Where there is an error apparent on the face of the record or the arbitrator has not followed the statutory legal position, then and then only it would be justified in interfering with the award published by the arbitrator. Once the arbitrator has applied his mind to the matter before him, the court cannot reappraise the matter as if it were an appeal and even if two views are possible, the view taken by the arbitrator would prevail.” (Emphasis Supplied) In this respect, Mr. Gautam also relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ssangyong Engg. & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI (2019) 15 SCC 131 , paragraphs 37 to 41 of which reads as under:- “37. Insofar as domestic awards made in India are concerned, an additional ground is now available under sub-section (2-A), added by the Amendment Act, 2015, to Section 34. Here, there must be patent illegality appearing on the face of the award, which refers to such illegality as goes to the root of the matter but which does not amount to mere erroneous application of the law. In short, what is not subsumed within “the fundamental policy of Indian law”, namely, the contravention of a statute not linked to public policy or public interest, cannot be brought in by the backdoor when it comes to setting aside an award on the ground of patent illegality. 38. Secondly, it is also made clear that re-appreciation of evidence, which is what an appellate court is permitted to do, cannot be permitted under the ground of patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. 39. To elucidate, para 42.1 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , namely, a mere contravention of the substantive law of India, by itself, is no longer a ground available to set aside an arbitral award. 39. To elucidate, para 42.1 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , namely, a mere contravention of the substantive law of India, by itself, is no longer a ground available to set aside an arbitral award. Para 42.2 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , however, would remain, for if an arbitrator gives no reasons for an award and contravenes Section 31(3) of the 1996 Act, that would certainly amount to a patent illegality on the face of the award. 40. The change made in Section 28(3) by the Amendment Act really follows what is stated in paras 42.3 to 45 in Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , namely, that the construction of the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator to decide, unless the arbitrator construes the contract in a manner that no fair-minded or reasonable person would; in short, that the arbitrator's view is not even a possible view to take. Also, if the arbitrator wanders outside the contract and deals with matters not allotted to him, he commits an error of jurisdiction. This ground of challenge will now fall within the new ground added under Section 34(2-A). 41. What is important to note is that a decision which is perverse, as understood in paras 31 and 32 of Associate Builders [Associate Builders v. DDA, (2015) 3 SCC 49 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 204] , while no longer being a ground for challenge under “public policy of India”, would certainly amount to a patent illegality appearing on the face of the award. Thus, a finding based on no evidence at all or an award which ignores vital evidence in arriving at its decision would be perverse and liable to be set aside on the ground of patent illegality. Additionally, a finding based on documents taken behind the back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also have to be characterised as perverse.” It is further submitted by Mr. Additionally, a finding based on documents taken behind the back of the parties by the arbitrator would also qualify as a decision based on no evidence inasmuch as such decision is not based on evidence led by the parties, and therefore, would also have to be characterised as perverse.” It is further submitted by Mr. Gautam, the learned counsel for the respondent, that keeping in view the fact that the arbitrator in this case is none other than the departmental head of the department concerned and he is not even an independent arbitrator and out of total claim of Rs. 1,16,51,198/- as only Rs. 12,75,041/- with interest thereon which in total, amounts to Rs. 24,33,288/- has been awarded and in absence of any allegation of any malafide or malice or patent illegality on the part of the sole arbitrator, the impugned award or the impugned judgment passed by learned court below ought not be interfered with in exercise of its appellant power under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and this appeal be dismissed. 6. In view of the rival submissions made at the bar, the sole point for determination is- “ Whether section 73 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is to be complied with; if a settlement is arrived at between the parties to an arbitration, in an arbitration proceeding and the award which is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal is bad for non-compliance of section 73 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 ?” 7. Before adverting to the facts of the case, it will be profitable to refer to Section 30 of the of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which reads as under : 30. Settlement.- (1) It is not incompatible with an arbitration agreement for an arbitral tribunal to encourage settlement of the dispute and, with the agreement, of the parties, the arbitral tribunal may use mediation, conciliation or other procedures at any time during the arbitral proceedings to encourage settlement. (2) If, during arbitral proceedings, the parties settle the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the proceedings and if, requested by the parties and not objected to by the arbitral tribunal, record the settlement in the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms. (3) An arbitral award on agreed terms shall be made in accordance with section 31 and shall state that it is an arbitral award. (3) An arbitral award on agreed terms shall be made in accordance with section 31 and shall state that it is an arbitral award. (4) An arbitral award on agreed terms shall have the same status and effect as any other arbitral award on the substance of the dispute. It is crystal clear from plain reading of section 30 (2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 that it envisages two situations:- First is that, if, during arbitral proceedings, the parties settle the dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall terminate the arbitration proceedings. The second situation is that when the parties settle dispute and request the arbitral tribunal to record the settlement in form of arbitral award on agreed terms. In such a situation, again two possibilities arise (i) if the arbitral tribunal does not object to the settlement, it will record the settlement in the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms and (ii) if the arbitral tribunal objects to the settlement, it will not record the settlement in the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms. Obviously section 30 (2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, does not cast any duty upon the arbitrator that upon not objecting to the settlement, when it records the settlement in the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms, it has to follow the procedure for settlement made in a conciliation proceeding as envisaged under section 73 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Hence in the absence of the same the award passed by the sole arbitrator is not liable to be set aside for non-compliance of section 73 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 8. So far as section 73 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is concerned, the same is in part III of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the said section 73 is applicable only to conciliation proceedings as has been categorically mentioned in section 61 of the said act which reads as under 61. Application and scope.—(1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force and unless the parties have otherwise agreed, this Part shall apply to conciliation of disputes arising out of legal relationship, whether contractual or not, and to all proceedings relating thereto. Application and scope.—(1) Save as otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force and unless the parties have otherwise agreed, this Part shall apply to conciliation of disputes arising out of legal relationship, whether contractual or not, and to all proceedings relating thereto. (2) This Part shall not apply where by virtue of any law for the time being in force certain disputes may not be submitted to conciliation. (Emphasis Supplied) 9. Section 74 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 envisages that if a settlement agreement is made in a conciliation proceeding, the same shall have the status as if it is an arbitral award on agreed terms on the substance of the dispute rendered by arbitral tribunal under section 30. 10. Thus, in view of the discussions made above, this court is of the considered view that the settlement as envisaged under section 30 (2) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, cannot be found fault with merely because a written settlement signed by the parties has not been part of the arbitral award. Thus it is crystal clear that section 73 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not required to be complied with, if a settlement is arrived at between the parties to an agreement in an arbitration proceeding and the award which is the subject matter of challenge in this appeal is not bad for non-compliance of section 73 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The point of determination is answered accordingly. Thus considering the limited scope of interference in exercise of appellate power under section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, as already been mentioned above, this court is of the considered view that there is no illegality in the impugned judgment passed by learned court below, in exercise of its power under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, hence, this appeal being without any merit is dismissed but under the circumstances, without any costs. 11. Let the lower court records be sent back to the court below along with a copy of the judgment forthwith.