JUDGMENT : SHAJI P. CHALY, J. 1. This is a public interest writ petition filed by the petitioners residing within the territorial limits of the Mattathur Grama, alleging that 1st respondent Panchayat is attempting to squander public money for constructing a market cum shopping complex, which cannot be done since the Panchayat is not vested with powers to do so as per the provisions of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994, hereinafter called act 1994 and Kerala Panchayat Raj Act (Acquisition and Disposal of Property) Rules, 2005, hereinafter called rules 2005. Brief material facts for the disposal of the writ petition are as follows. 2. The Mattathur Grama Panchayat as per Ext.P1 resolution in the ordinary meeting held on 3.5.2008, resolved to acquire an extent of less than 80 cents of property for making a taxi stand, construction of a shopping complex-cum-market, and a bye-pass road, to establish a better traffic system in Kodaly town. After the resolution so taken, Panchayat has approached the Deputy Director of Panchayat, Thrissur for securing a suitability certificate as provided under rule 3(3)(a) of Rules, 2005 and has secured Ext.P2 certificate dated 23.9.2008 whereby the Deputy Director of Panchayat, Thrissur has permitted the 1st respondent Panchayat for construction of a taxi stand in a property comprised in Sy. Nos. 592/2, 593/2 amd 592/1 admeasuing 80 cents belonging to various persons, after acquisition. Thereafter Panchayat has secured Ext.P4 order dated 22.12.2008 from the State Government to acquire the property specified above, subject to the condition that it shall be done in accordance with the procedure contemplated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. 3. From the documents produced by the petitioners it is evident that proceedings were initiated under the provisions of the Act, 1894 and at that point of time the owners of the property have approached this Court and filed W.P. (C) Nos. 34916/2009, 19412/2011 and 28364/2012 challenging the acquisition proceedings, however the writ petitions were dismissed as per Ext.P6 judgment dated 24.2.2015. Even though the judgment in W.P. (C) No. 19412/2011 and 28364/2012 was challenged by filing writ appeal Nos. 1247 and 1254 of 2015, they were also dismissed, which was affirmed by the Apex Court in SLP (C) Nos. 27775/2015 and 27924/2015, as per the order of dated 31.3.2017. 4. Even though the judgment in W.P. (C) No. 19412/2011 and 28364/2012 was challenged by filing writ appeal Nos. 1247 and 1254 of 2015, they were also dismissed, which was affirmed by the Apex Court in SLP (C) Nos. 27775/2015 and 27924/2015, as per the order of dated 31.3.2017. 4. The basic issue raised by the petitioners in this writ petition is that, evident from Ext.P8 proceedings of the Deputy Director of Panchayat, Thrissur dated 29.3.2017, the Panchayat is proceeding to construct a shopping complex and a bye- pass road in the properties in question without securing suitability certificate from the Deputy Director of Panchayat, Thrissur, which is violative of rule 3(3)(a) of the Rules, 2005, and accordingly, seeks to quash Ext.P8 communication of the Deputy Director of Panchayat, Thrissur issued to one Razak, Chembothparambil House, Kodaly, who is not a party in this writ petition. Evidently Razak is one of the owners of the property, which was acquired by the Panchayat, and Razak filed an application before the Deputy Director of Panchayat, Thrissur, seeking some sort of relief so as to rehabilitate the persons from whom the land was acquired, in which the Deputy Director of Panchayat has stated that the Panchayat would provide preference to the persons from whom the land was acquired once the shopping complex is constructed and the same is let out on rent. 5. The sum and substance of the contention put forth by the petitioners is that Ext.P8 communication so issued by the Deputy Director of Panchayat makes it clear that the Panchayat has the intention to construct the shopping complex overlooking Ext.P2 suitability certificate granted by the Deputy Director of Panchayat. Therefore, according to the petitioners, since there is no suitability certificate granted by the Deputy Director of Panchayat for construction of shopping complex and the bye-pass road, the Panchayat may be deprecated from proceeding with any construction other than what is permitted in Ext.P2 suitability certificate, after quashing Ext.P8. 6. The Panchayat and the Secretary have filed a joint counter affidavit refuting the allegations and claims and demands raised by the petitioners. 6. The Panchayat and the Secretary have filed a joint counter affidavit refuting the allegations and claims and demands raised by the petitioners. Inter-alia, it is submitted that the allegation of the petitioners that the land is not suitable for the construction of shopping complex or bye-pass cannot be sustained under law, especially in view of the fact that in Ext.P1 resolution it was specifically mentioned that the purpose of acquisition was to provide a taxi stand, to construct a bye-pass road parallel to Kodakara-Vellikulangara Road in Kodaly Town, which would reduce the heavy traffic at Kodaly Town, and also to utilise the land for constructing a market-cum-shopping complex for the Mattathur Grama Panchayat. That apart the Panchayat committee informed the proposal of acquisition to all the property owners before adopting the said resolution and none of them had any objection to the said proposal. That apart it is stated that the activities that were proposed to be undertaken by the Panchayat was for public purpose and the petitioners are not at liberty to contend that there is any squandering of money. It is also submitted that the land was acquired by following the procedures contemplated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the issue with respect to the acquisition was finally settled in the writ petitions filed by the landowners, and that the petitioners have no grievance at all. It is further submitted that the petitioners have not established any case of fraud or illegality as alleged in the writ petition, so as to secure any reliefs. 7. Third respondent Deputy Director of Panchayat, Thrissur, has also filed a detailed counter affidavit basically contending that Ext.P8 communication issued by the Deputy Director of Panchayat to Razak cannot be treated as a suitability certificate and Ext.P8 is only a reply given by the Deputy Director of Panchayat to Razak after securing necessary report from the Secretary of the Grama Panchayat and therefore, petitioners are not entitled to secure any relief of quashing Ext.P8 communication. 8. We have heard learned counsel for petitioners Sri. Philip J. Vettickattu, Smt. Dhanya P. Ashokan for Panchayat, learned Senior Government Pleader, Sri. Surin George Ipe appearing for respondents 3 to 5 and perused the pleadings and documents on record. 9. The paramount contention advanced by the learned counsel for petitioners is relying upon rule 3(3)(a) of the Rules, 2005. 8. We have heard learned counsel for petitioners Sri. Philip J. Vettickattu, Smt. Dhanya P. Ashokan for Panchayat, learned Senior Government Pleader, Sri. Surin George Ipe appearing for respondents 3 to 5 and perused the pleadings and documents on record. 9. The paramount contention advanced by the learned counsel for petitioners is relying upon rule 3(3)(a) of the Rules, 2005. Before appreciating the Rules, 2005, it is better that section 178 of Act, 1994 dealing with acquisition of immovable property required by the Panchayat, is considered which read thus: “178. Acquisition of immovable property required by the Panchayat - Any immovable property which is required by a Panchayat for a public purpose connected with the discharge of the functions imposed on it under this Act, or the rules or bye-laws made there under, or any other law, may be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act 1 of 1894) and on payment of compensation awarded under that Act in respect of such property and of any other charges incurred in acquiring it, the said property shall stand transferred to and vest in the Panchayat: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall be deemed to prevent any Panchayat from acquiring immovable property either through private purchase or any free surrender.” 10. On a reading of the said provision it is unambiguous that if the Panchayat takes a decision to acquire any immovable property, it shall be acquired only under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and on payment of compensation awarded under that Act. There is no dispute that the property was acquired by the Grama Panchayat following the procedures prescribed under Act, 1894 and that too by securing permission from the Government, evident from Ext.P4 Government Order. The Rules, 2005 is introduced on and w.e.f. 27.3.2006 in exercise of powers conferred under section 178 r/w. the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 254 of Act 1994, by the State Government. In our view, merely because in the suitability certificate the requirement of the Panchayat with respect to the construction of the bye-pass road and market-cum-shopping complex is not mentioned it will not dissuade the Panchayat to proceed with any developmental activities by virtue of the duty, obligation and responsibility imposed on the Panchayat under Article 243G of the Constitution of India. Moreover, the provisions of the Rules ,can only be subordinate to the provisions of the Act, 1994 and the provisions of the Constitution of India. That apart the procedure prescribed as per Act,1994 is complied with by the Panchayat, and merely because in the suitability certificate the entire requirements put forth by the Panchayat in its resolution is not mentioned, that will not dissuade the Panchayat from its decision to carry out its developmental activities. The following discussions would make the situation clearer. 11. Rule 3 of rules 2005 deals with power to acquire property, which read thus: “3. Power to acquire property - (1) A Panchayat may acquire any land or building within or outside its area either by purchase or otherwise-in order to introduce any public facility or for providing any service, and may with the prior approval of the Government dispose of any of its property either by sale or otherwise. (2) The acquisition of land under sub-rule (1) may either be in accordance with the Land Acquisition Act for the time being in force and the rules made thereunder or through private purchase or free surrender. (3) A Panchayat, before acquiring any land under sub-rule (1) shall comply with the following conditions, namely:- (a) Suitability certificate to the effect that the proposed land is suitable for the proposed purpose shall be obtained from the Deputy Director of Panchayats/Assistant Development Commissioner/District Collector in the case of Village/Block/District Panchayats respectively. (b) If the proposed property is for educational purpose, permission from the. Deputy Director of Education shall be obtained. (c) Permission from the District Medical Officer shall be obtained in the case of Hospitals, Dispensaries etc.” 12. Rule 4 thereto deals with acquisition of land under the Land Acquisition Act which stipulates that in case of acquisition of land by a Panchayat otherwise than by bilateral agreement or free surrender, the provisions in the Land Acquisition Act for the time being in force and the procedure in the rules made thereunder shall be complied with. 13. True, as per clause (a) of rule 3(3), a suitability certificate is to be secured from the Deputy Director of Panchayat, to the effect that the proposed land is suitable for the proposed purpose. No doubt, Ext.P2 is issued certifying that the land is suitable for the purpose of construction of a taxi stand. 13. True, as per clause (a) of rule 3(3), a suitability certificate is to be secured from the Deputy Director of Panchayat, to the effect that the proposed land is suitable for the proposed purpose. No doubt, Ext.P2 is issued certifying that the land is suitable for the purpose of construction of a taxi stand. However, on a reading of Ext.P2, it is evident that the Deputy Director of Panchayat has relied upon the resolution of the Grama Panchayat dated 3.5.2008, and it was on the basis of the application submitted by the Grama Panchayat that Ext.P2 was issued. Anyhow it is not mentioned in Ext.P2 that the land is suitable for construction of the bye-pass road and the shopping complex. However, it is not certified anywhere that the land is not suitable for the construction of byepass road and the market-cum-shopping complex also. On a reading of Ext.P1 resolution of Grama Panchayat as pointed out earlier, it is clear that the Panchayat has taken a decision for acquisition of 80 cents of land for the multi purpose development of construction of a taxi stand, bye-pass road and shopping complex-cum-market. It is clear from section 178 of the Panchayat Raj Act that the requirement of law is only that, if any immovable property is required by the Panchayat for a public purpose connected with the discharge of functions imposed on it under the Act or the Rules or bye-laws made thereunder or any other law, it shall be acquired under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and pay compensation in accordance with the award passed for the same. Rule 2005 is a subordinate legislation which only specifies that the suitability certificate shall be secured from the Deputy Director of Panchayat that the proposed land is suitable for the proposed purpose. 14. As we have pointed out earlier, the proposed public purpose of the Panchayat was not only for construction of a taxi stand but also for multifarious activities as specified above. Even though in Ext.P2 it is only mentioned that the suitability certificate is for the purpose of construction of a taxi stand, it was issued purely based on the resolution of the Grama Panchayat as well as its request. Even though in Ext.P2 it is only mentioned that the suitability certificate is for the purpose of construction of a taxi stand, it was issued purely based on the resolution of the Grama Panchayat as well as its request. Therefore, it can be seen that the Deputy Director of Panchayat has not declined the proposed purpose put forth by the Grama Panchayat in its application and the resolution specified above. That apart, Part IX was inserted in the Constitution of India as per the 73rd Amendment Act, 1992, to deal with Panchayat. Article 243G deals with powers, authority and responsibility of Panchayats which read thus: “243G. Powers, authority and responsibilities of Panchayats - Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the Legislature of a State may, by law, endow the Panchayats with such powers and authority and may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats, at the appropriate level, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect to: (a) the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice. (b) the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh Schedule.” 15. On a reading of Article 243G, what we could gather is that, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, a legislature of a State may by law, endow the Panchayat with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of a self government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and responsibilities upon Panchayats for the preparation of plan for economic development and social justice and for the implementation of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh schedule of the Constitution. Which thus means any law made by the State Government shall only be subservient to the provisions of the Constitution of India and therefore thinking so, the provisions of the rules 2005 cannot have any interference with the power enjoyed by the Panchayat under the provisions of act 1994 and the Constitution. Which thus means any law made by the State Government shall only be subservient to the provisions of the Constitution of India and therefore thinking so, the provisions of the rules 2005 cannot have any interference with the power enjoyed by the Panchayat under the provisions of act 1994 and the Constitution. The Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution delineated the operational jurisdiction of the Panchayats which reads thus: “ELEVENTH SCHEDULE (Article 243-G) 1. Agriculture, including agricultural extension. 2. Land improvement, implementation of land reforms, land consolidation and soil conservation. 3. Minor irrigation, water management and watershed development. 4. Animal husbandry, dairying and poultry. 6. Social forestry and farm forestry. 7. Minor forest produce and Small scale industries, including food processing industries. 9. Khadi, village and cottage industries. 10. Rural housing. 11. Drinking water. 12. Fuel and fodder. 13. Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways and other means of communication. 14. Rural electrification, including distribution of electricity. 15. Non-conventional energy sources. 16. Poverty alleviation programme. 17. Education, including primary and secondary schools. 18. Technical training and vocational education. 19. Adult and non-formal education. 20. Libraries. 21. Cultural activities. 22. Markets and fairs. 23. Health and sanitation, including hospitals, primary health centres and dispensaries. 24. Family welfare. 25. Women and child development. 26. Social welfare, including welfare of the handicapped and mentally retarded. 27. Welfare of the weaker sections, and in particular, of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes. 28. Public distribution system. 29. Maintenance of community assets.” 16. Therefore, on a conjoint reading of Article 243G and the Eleventh Schedule, it is explicit that the Panchayat is vested with ample powers under the Constitution itself for its economic and social development in public interest. Which also means by virtue of the powers granted under Article 243G, Panchayat is duty bound and obligated to undertake various developmental activities as is provided under the Eleventh Schedule of the Constitution of India for which it shall also generate its own funds. Above all, Article 40 of the constitution of India enshrined with one of the directive principles of State policy specifies that the State shall take steps to organise Village Panchayats and endow with them such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government. Above all, Article 40 of the constitution of India enshrined with one of the directive principles of State policy specifies that the State shall take steps to organise Village Panchayats and endow with them such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-government. Which means the framers of the constitution felt that there is a vital and imperative requirement to confer the Panchayats with sufficient strength and power enabling them to function independently and village centric. Moreover, the parliament thought it fit to confer more powers on a democratically elected body to serve the citizens by understanding the requirements at micro habitat level. Thinking so, a rule made by the state government cannot whittle down the powers enjoyed by a Panchayat in a different plain, hemisphere and dimensions. 17. Taking into account all these aspects, we are of the considered opinion that, the relevance, importance and mandatory requirement of section 178 of Act, 1994 r/w Rules, 2005 is the acquisition of land following mandatory procedures contemplated under Act, 1894, which no doubt has been scrupulously followed by the Panchayat. We are also of the view that rule 3(3)(a) of Rules, 2005 has to be construed harmoniously with section 178 of Act, 1994 and Article 243G of the Constitution of India so as to have a meaningful objective as envisioned by the father of our nation. 18. In that view of the mater, we are of the considered opinion that, once the property was acquired in accordance with the mandatory requirements of Act, 1994 and Rules, 2005, and having secured suitability certificate in respect to the proposed land, the Panchayat is at liberty to utilise the property acquired by it so as to have maximum advantage of the same to the people residing in the Panchayat area. There is no case for the petitioners that such requirements are not existing in the Panchayat area but the sole contention put forth is that in the suitability certificate the requirement of the Panchayat for construction of the bye-pass road and market-cum-shopping complex is not certified. However, as specified above, Panchayat is not prohibited or prevented from carrying out the objective of Panchayat as per Ext.P1 resolution adopted by it. 19. However, as specified above, Panchayat is not prohibited or prevented from carrying out the objective of Panchayat as per Ext.P1 resolution adopted by it. 19. That apart Ext.P8 is only a communication issued by the Deputy Director of Panchayat, Thrissur, to one Razak on some request made by him with respect to the rehabilitation of land owners from whom the land was acquired. The prime relief sought for by the petitioners is to quash Ext.P8, but we do not think, it can done since it is only a communication issued by the Deputy Director of Panchayat, Thrissur on account of a letter submitted by the previous land owner to the Deputy Director of Panchayat. Moreover, the recipient of the letter is conferred with some right, whether right or wrong, as per Ext.P8 and the question of quashing the same cannot at all be considered without the so called beneficiary of Ext.P8 in the party array. Therefore, the said relief sought for by the petitioners also cannot be granted by this Court. 20. We are also reminded of the fact that the writ petition is a Public Interest Litigation. So far as a Public Interest Litigation is concerned, the requirements are well settled by a plethora of decisions of the Apex Court as well as the High Courts. One of the most important requirements is that a public interest litigant must approach a writ court not only with clean hands and mind, but also with a clean heart, soul and objective. Coming to the case on hand, as we have pointed out earlier, the writ petition is founded on Ext.P8, a letter written by the Deputy Director of Panchayat, Thrissur to a third person, wherein it is mentioned that on the Panchayat constructing a market-cum-shopping complex and given on rent, the land owners from whom the land was acquired would be given preference. The writ petitioners on the basis of such a statement of the Deputy Director presumes that the Panchayat has decided to construct a market-cum-shopping complex in the property in question. Even the Panchayat, as per the Kerala Panchayat Building Rules 2011, has to submit a plan of the construction proposed to be carried out and the Secretary of the Panchayat has to approve the same by following a procedure prescribed thereunder. Moreover, funds are to be allocated for the purpose of construction. Even the Panchayat, as per the Kerala Panchayat Building Rules 2011, has to submit a plan of the construction proposed to be carried out and the Secretary of the Panchayat has to approve the same by following a procedure prescribed thereunder. Moreover, funds are to be allocated for the purpose of construction. However, in the writ petition, nowhere it is stated that the Panchayat has taken any such steps. Even though the petitioners have a case that Panchayat is attempting to squander public money, nowhere in the writ petition it is stated how the public money is proposed to be wasted by the Panchayat. In this regard, we feel that reference to a few judgments of the Apex Court would be fruitful to arrive at a logical conclusion. 21. In S.P. Aannad vs. H.D Deve Gowda, (1996) 6 SCC 734 , it was held that, it is of utmost importance that those who invoke the jurisdiction of a constitutional court seeking a waiver of the locus standi rule must exercise restraint in moving the court by not plunging in areas wherein they are not well versed. It was also observed that as such a litigant seeking to espouse a public cause, he owes it to the public as well as to the court that, he does not rush to the court without undertaking a research, even if he is qualified or competent to raise the issue. 22. In Narmada Bachao Andolan vs. Union of India and Others, (2000) 10 SCC 664 , the Apex Court has held that in exercise of its enormous power, the court should not be called upon to or undertake governmental duties or functions. The courts cannot run the government, nor can the administration indulge in abuse or non-use of power and get away with it. The Courts must, therefore, act within their judicially permissible limitations to uphold the rule of law and harness their power in public interest and it is precisely for the said reason that it has been consistently held that in matters of policy, the court will not interfere. 23. In Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao vs. K. Parasaran, (1996) 7 JT 265 , it was observed by the Apex Court that today people rush to courts to file cases in profusion under the attractive name of public interest. However, they must inspire confidence in courts and among the public. 24. 23. In Dr. Buddhi Kota Subbarao vs. K. Parasaran, (1996) 7 JT 265 , it was observed by the Apex Court that today people rush to courts to file cases in profusion under the attractive name of public interest. However, they must inspire confidence in courts and among the public. 24. In Villianur Iyarkkai Padukappu Maiyam vs. Union of India, (2009) 7 SCC 561 , it was held by the Apex Court that in a democracy, it is the prerogative of each elected Government to follow its own policy and often a change in Government may result in the shift in focus or change in economic policies. Any such change may result in adversely affecting some vested interest but, unless any illegality is committed in the execution of the policy or the same is contrary to law or mala-fide, a decision bringing about change cannot per se be interfered with by the court. 25. Therefore, analysing the law, facts, and circumstances involved in the case at hand, we are of the view that the petitioners have not made out any case so as to secure any relief in a Public Interest Litigation. We also seriously suspect that the Public Interest Litigation is the outcome of some vested interest so as to sabotage the policy of the Panchayat to carry out construction in Public Interest, and for economic development of the Panchayat. Upshot of the discussion is that, petitioners have not made out or established any case, much less any public interest, so as to grant the reliefs as are sought for. Needless to say, the writ petition fails, accordingly it is dismissed.