JUDGMENT : B. VIJAYSEN REDDY, J. 1. The detention order vide Proceeding No. 06/PD-CELL/CYB/2020 dated 15.2.2020 passed against Kelavath Shankar S/o K. Damla by the 2nd respondent, Commissioner of Police, Cyberabad Commissionerate, in exercise of powers conferred under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertilizer Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (Amendment Act No. 13 of 2018) (for short ‘the Act’) and confirmation order vide G.O. Rt. No. 814, General Administration (Spl. L&O) Department, dated 22.4.2020 passed by the 1st respondent, are challenged in this writ of habeas corpus as being illegal and arbitrary. 2. Heard Smt. B. Mohana Reddy, learned Counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S. Sharat Kumar, learned Special Government Pleader for the respondents. 3. Learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the crimes allegedly committed by the detenu are pertaining to law and order affecting specific individuals and not public at large, thus not affecting public order. The detenu was granted bail in all the six ground cases and was released from jail on 26.8.2019 and after a lapse of six months of his release, on 15.2.2020, the detention order is passed illegally without assigning any cogent reasons. The crimes can be dealt with under ordinary criminal law and invoking draconian law and passing detention order is illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional. 4. Per contra, the learned Special Government Pleader submitted that the detenu has been engaging in unlawful acts and indulging in house burglary in nights in an organized way in the limits of Cyberabad Commissionerate and other areas creating large scale fear and panic and a feeling of insecurity among the general public and thereby adversely affecting the public order and leaving large section of people under the grip of fear and trauma. The detention order was passed based on nature of activities indulged in by the detenu after arriving at subjective satisfaction since the activities of the detenu were disturbing public order and ordinary law would not be deterrent on the activities of the detenu. Thus, the detention order needs to be sustained. 5. The detention order was passed based on nature of activities indulged in by the detenu after arriving at subjective satisfaction since the activities of the detenu were disturbing public order and ordinary law would not be deterrent on the activities of the detenu. Thus, the detention order needs to be sustained. 5. The detention order indicates that during the years 2018-2019 detenu was involved in six cases stated to be grave and dangerous offences in the limits of Cyberabad Police Commissionerate, Sangareddy and Vikarabad Districts, during the year 2019, in quick succession in a span of one month i.e. from 17th May, 2019 to 15th June, 2019. 6. As seen from the detention order, the detaining authority has referred to six cases and the same, are considered as grounds for detention. The six ground cases with relevant details are shown as under: S. No. Crime No. and Date Police Station Offence Date of arrest Particulars of Bail 1. Cr. No. 332 of 2019 dated 27.8.2019 Chandanagar u/s 457 and 380 IPC 20.6.2019 Detenu moved bail petition before the X Additional Metropolitan Magistrate at Kukatpally vide Crl. M.P. No. 5837 of 2019 and he was granted bail on 5.7.2019. 2. Cr. No. 154 of 2019 dated 27.8.2019 Ameenpur u/s 457 and 380 IPC 20.6.2019 Detenu moved bail petition vide Crl. M.P. No. 2012 of 2019 and he was granted bail on 16.8.2019. 3. Cr. No. 171 of 2019 Ameenpur u/s 457 and 380 IPC 20.6.2019 The detenu moved bail application vide Crl. M.P. No 2016 and he was granted bail on 16.8.2019. 4. Cr. No. 175 of 2019 Ameenpur u/s 457 and 380 IPC 20.6.2019 The detenu moved second bail application vide Crl. M.P. No. 2017 of 2019 and he was granted bail on 16.8.2019. 5. Cr. No. 176 of 2019 Ameenpur u/s 457 and 380 IPC 20.6.2019 The detenu moved second bail application vide Crl. M.P. No. 2013 of 2019 and he was granted bail on 16.8.2019. 6. Cr. No. 177 of 2019 Ameenpur u/s 457 and 380 IPC 20.6.2019 The detenu moved second bail application vide Crl. M.P. No 2015 of 2019 and he was granted bail on 16.8.2019. 7. M.P. No. 2013 of 2019 and he was granted bail on 16.8.2019. 6. Cr. No. 177 of 2019 Ameenpur u/s 457 and 380 IPC 20.6.2019 The detenu moved second bail application vide Crl. M.P. No 2015 of 2019 and he was granted bail on 16.8.2019. 7. As seen above, in all six cases the detenu was granted bail with certain conditions and the detenu was released from jail on 26.8.2019 Surprisingly, after a gap of 5½ months impugned detention order came to be passed From the time when the detenu was released on bail i.e. on 26.8.2019 till 15.2.2020 there is no instance of detenu being involved in similar activities or acting in any manner prejudicial to public order When a bail is granted with certain conditions the detenu/accused would be under surveillance of the Court When the detention order is passed after a gap of 5½ months upon the detenu being released on bail, it is unwarranted and unjustified to invoke provisions of preventive detention laws Having not found any urgency to pass detention order before detenu was released from jail or immediately after detenu was released from jail there are no extraordinary circumstances pointed out by the detaining authority for passing the detention order after a gap of 5½ months The powers conferred under the preventive detention Act have to be executed by the executive authority as a last resort and only when the activities of the detenu are of such nature which would endanger to peace and tranquility of general public or a community, affecting public order Merely availability of the power cannot permit the authority to invoke preventive detention law unless there is a real necessity. 8. 8. There is a long delay of more than six months between the alleged prejudicial activities under the above referred six ground cases and the order of detention Even, from the date of release of detenu from jail i.e. 26.8.2019, there is a delay of about 5½ months in passing the detention order i.e. 15.2.2020 There is no explanation for such delay Not only there is undue delay but the same remained unexplained On the sole ground the impugned order is vitiated and liable to be set aside In T.A. Abdul Rahman vs. State of Kerala, (1989) 4 SCC 741 , it was held as under: “The question whether the prejudicial activities of a person necessitating to pass an order of detention is proximate to the time when the order is made or the live-link between the prejudicial activities and the purpose of detention is snapped depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be precisely formulated that would be applicable under all circumstances and no exhaustive guidelines can be laid down in that behalf. It follows that the test of proximity is not a rigid or mechanical test by merely counting number of months between the offending acts and the order of detention. However, when there is undue and long delay between the prejudicial activities and the passing of detention order, the Court has to scrutinise whether the detaining authority has satisfactorily examined such a delay and afforded a tenable and reasonable explanation as to why such a delay has occasioned, when called upon to answer and further the Court has to investigate whether the causal connection has been broken in the circumstances of each case. Similarly when there is unsatisfactory and unexplained delay between the date of order of detention and the date of securing the arrest of the detenu, such a delay would throw considerable doubt on the genuineness of the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority leading to a legitimate inference that the detaining authority was not really and genuinely satisfied as regards the necessity for detaining the detenu with a view to preventing him from acting in a prejudicial manner. In Hemalata Kantilal Shah vs. State of Maharashtra, (1981) 4 SCC 647 , it was held as under: Delay ipso facto in passing an order of detention after an incident is not fatal to the detention of a person, for, in certain cases delay may be unavoidable and reasonable. What is required by law is that the delay must be satisfactorily examined by the detaining authority. In Pradeep Nilkanth Paturkar vs. S. Rama Murthy and Others, 1999 (Supp) 2 SCC 61, it was held as under: 13. Coming to the case on hand, the detention order was passed after 5 months and 8 days from the date of the registration of the last case and more than 4 months from submission of the proposal. What disturbs our mind is that the statements from the witnesses A to # were obtained only after the detenu became successful in getting bail in all the prohibition cases registered against him, that too in the later part of March, 1991. These statements are very much referred to in the grounds of detention and relied upon by the detaining authority alongwith the registration of the cases under the Act. 14. Under the above circumstances, taking into consideration of the un-explained delay whether short or long especially when the appellant has taken a specific plea of delay, we are constrained to quash the detention order. Accordingly we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court and quash the impugned detention order. The detenu is directed to be set at liberty forthwith.” 9. The detenu is involved in house burglary cases. The offences allegedly committed by the detenu are specific individuals. These offences relate to maintenance of law and order. Going by the nature of offences, which are committed against specific individuals, it cannot be said that the activities of the detenu are prejudicial to maintenance of public order. By mere verbatim usage of phrases like “prejudicial and detrimental to the maintenance of public order” and repetition of such phrases, it cannot be said that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was on valid grounds. There is no material on record to substantiate that the activities of the detenu have the potential to cause disturbance to the peace and tranquility of public at large or at community and thereby affecting public order. There is no material on record to substantiate that the activities of the detenu have the potential to cause disturbance to the peace and tranquility of public at large or at community and thereby affecting public order. It is not the gravity, nature and number of cases wherein the detenu is involved but it is the effect and reach the activities of the detenu on public at large, that would determine whether such activities would affect public order or not. The concepts of “Law and Order” and “Public Order” are distinguished in several authoritative pronouncements of the Apex Court. It would be apt to refer to few of the oft repeated celebrated judgments. In Pushkar Mukherjee vs. State of West Bengal, (1969) 1 SCC 10 , the Supreme Court held as under: “The question to be considered in the present case is whether grounds (a), (b) and (e) served on Subhas Chandra Bose are grounds which are relevant to “the maintenance of public order.” All these grounds relate to cases of assault on solitary individuals either by knife or by using crackers and it is difficult to accept the contention of the respondent that these grounds have any relevance or proximate connection with the maintenance of public order. In the present case we are concerned with detention under Section 3(1) of the Preventive Detention Act which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Does the expression “public order” take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof. It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act.” “The difference between the concepts of “public order” and “law and order” is similar to the distinction between “public” and “private” crimes in the realm of jurisprudence. In considering the material elements of crime, the historic tests which each community applies are intrinsic wrongfulness and social expediency which are the two most important factors which have led to the designation of certain conduct as criminal. Dr. Allen has distinguished “public” and “private” crimes in the sense that some offences primarily injure specific persons and only secondarily the public interest, while others directly injure the public interest and affect individuals only remotely. (See Dr. Allen's Legal Duties P. 249). There is a broad distinction along these lines, but differences naturally arise in the application of any such test. The learned author has pointed out that out of 331 indictable English offences 203 are public wrongs and 128 private wrongs.” In Arun Ghosh vs. State of West Bengal, (1970) 1 SCC 98 , the Supreme Court held as under: “...It means therefore that the question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society. The French distinguish law and order and public order by designating the latter as order publique. The latter expression has been recognized as meaning something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order.” 10. In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that the impugned order is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 11. The writ petition is allowed. The latter expression has been recognized as meaning something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order.” 10. In view of the above discussion, this Court holds that the impugned order is unsustainable and liable to be set aside. 11. The writ petition is allowed. The impugned detention order dated 15.2.2020 passed by the respondent No. 2 and the consequential confirmation order dated 22.4.2020 are, hereby, set aside. The respondents are directed to set the detenu, namely Kelavath Shankar S/o K. Damla, at liberty forthwith, in case he is no longer detained in the criminal cases, which have been registered so far against him. 12. As a sequel, the miscellaneous petitions, pending if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.