JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Deepak Kumar Prasad, the learned counsel appearing for the Petitioner and Mr. Dhananjay Kr. Pathak, the learned G.A-III appearing for the respondent-State. 2. This writ petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard. 3. The petitioner has preferred this writ petition for quashing the order dated 28.03.2019 whereby the departmental appeal preferred by the petitioner was rejected on the ground of limitation. His further prayer is made for quashing the order dated 10.03.2012 whereby two punishments have been imposed upon the petitioner. The further prayer made is that after quashing the order dated 10.03.2012, to grant benefit of promotion to the petitioner in the rank in which juniors have been granted promotion by the Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha, Govt. of Jharkhand. 4. Mr. Deepak Kumar Prasad, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner was appointed as Assistant, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha, Govt. of Bihar and after transfer to Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Government of Bihar, he joined on 10.12.1982. The petitioner was posted as Assistant in the Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Government of Bihar between the Year 1991 to 1994 as Assistant in Accounts Section. Mr. Prasad, the learned counsel submitted that one Vigilance Case No.11/97 was lodged on 09.06.1997 by the Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Government of Bihar in which ten persons have been made as accused including the petitioner for financial embezzlement and the cognizance was taken on 04.10.2004. It is submitted that after bifurcation of cadre, the petitioner has been allocated Jharkhand Cadre in the Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha, Govt. of Jharkhand. It is stated that the petitioner was dismissed from service vide Order dated 22.06.2002 by the Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha, Govt. of Jharkhand. The petitioner has preferred a departmental appeal before the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand. In the departmental appeal, the dismissal of the petitioner was set aside by the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand vide Order dated 13.08.2008 and it was directed to start a fresh departmental proceeding against the petitioner. of Jharkhand. The petitioner has preferred a departmental appeal before the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand. In the departmental appeal, the dismissal of the petitioner was set aside by the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand vide Order dated 13.08.2008 and it was directed to start a fresh departmental proceeding against the petitioner. By Order dated 18.08.2008, the petitioner was directed to join in the Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Government of Jharkhand as suspended employee. By Order dated 10.11.2008 charge was framed against the petitioner for the same charge which was the subject matter in a criminal case. The inquiry officer submitted his report on 15.07.2009. The second show cause was issued to the petitioner on 11.09.2009 for the proposed punishment. The petitioner replied to the second show cause and denied the allegation. Mr. Deepak Kumar Prasad, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that in view of judgment rendered in the case of “Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. & Anr” reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 , the departmental proceeding was not correct and as the criminal case was pending, the same was need to be stayed. He submitted that the disciplinary authority has passed major punishment upon the petitioner vide order dated 10.03.2012 whereby the punishment of reversion on the basis of scale and no salary during the suspension period except subsistence allowance have been imposed upon the petitioner. The petitioner retired on 31.12.2015. Mr. Prasad, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the punishment is major. He further submitted that other persons have been provided lessor punishment and on the ground of parity the case of the petitioner is fit to be allowed. He further submitted that against the Order dated 10.03.2012 the petitioner has filed revision application before the Principle Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms and Rajbhasha, Govt. of Jharkhand, but no decision was taken on the revision application. When no revision order was communicated to the petitioner, the petitioner preferred the departmental appeal before the Chief Secretary, Government of Jharkhand. He further submitted that the petitioner earlier moved before this Court in W.P.(S) No.1038 of 2019 for quashing the order dated 10.03.2012 which was directed to be withdrawn to pursue the case before appellate authority. Pursuant to that order, he again filed a petition before the appellate authority. He further submitted that the petitioner earlier moved before this Court in W.P.(S) No.1038 of 2019 for quashing the order dated 10.03.2012 which was directed to be withdrawn to pursue the case before appellate authority. Pursuant to that order, he again filed a petition before the appellate authority. He submitted that the said departmental appeal was rejected on 28.05.2019 on the point of limitation. He further submitted that the action of the respondents are arbitrary and illegal. He further submitted that there is no financial embezzlement done by the petitioner. Mr. Prasad, the learned counsel further submitted that the enquiry officer has not given specific finding with regard to the petitioner in the enquiry report. On this submission, he submitted that the case of the petitioner is fit to be allowed and the impugned order needs to be interfered with by this Court. 5. Per contra, Mr. Dhananjay Kumar Pathak, the learned G.A.-II appearing on behalf of the respondent-State submitted that vide departmental order dated 22.06.2002 the petitioner was dismissed. The said order of dismissal was modified by order dated 13.08.2008 putting the petitioner under suspension and directing the disciplinary authority to initiate a fresh regular departmental proceeding against the petitioner. Accordingly the petitioner was proceeded afresh in a full-fledged departmental proceeding. The charge against the petitioner was of involvement/commission of financial embezzlement of Rs.54.29 lakhs during the financial year 1990-91, 1991-92, 1992-93, 1993-94 and 1994-95 was labelled against the petitioner. The enquiry officer was appointed for conducting the enquiry. The petitioner was show caused by order dated 26.12.2008. The petitioner has participated in the departmental enquiry conducted against him and availed every opportunity to defend his case. The enquiry officer submitted the report on 15.07.2009. He submitted that the enquiry officer in the conclusive paragraphs of his report has emphatically mentioned that the petitioner cannot be exonerated in this case in view of the fact that he was equally responsible for the alleged and subsequently admitted embezzlement. The second show notice was issued to the petitioner vide letter dated 11.09.2009. The petitioner filed his reply to the second show cause which was considered by the disciplinary authority and after such consideration the impugned order has been issued awarding the punishment of reversion on the basic scale of Assistant and admissibility of only subsistence allowances for the period of suspension. The petitioner filed his reply to the second show cause which was considered by the disciplinary authority and after such consideration the impugned order has been issued awarding the punishment of reversion on the basic scale of Assistant and admissibility of only subsistence allowances for the period of suspension. He further submitted that the disciplinary authority has taken a lenient view in the matter. In the financial embezzlement the petitioner has been provided with lessor punishment. He further submitted that the punishment was awarded in the year 2012 itself. Only after his retirement, the petitioner has challenged the order i.e. after six years of the order of punishment. As the departmental appeal was barred, the appellate authority has rightly rejected the petition. 6. This Court has considered the rival submission of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as the respondent State. It transpires that the appellate authority by order dated 13.08.2008 has already modified the order of dismissal. Pursuant thereto a fresh enquiry was conducted. The petitioner fully participated in the second enquiry. On perusal of the enquiry report annexed as Annexure-1 it transpires that the principle of natural justice has been followed in the enquiry proceeding and the enquiry officer has come to the definite finding that in view of the material on record the petitioner cannot be absolved. The departmental proceeding pending a criminal proceeding does not warrant an automatic stay. It is well settled proposition of law that the superior courts before exercising its discretionary jurisdiction in this regard must take into consideration the fact as to whether the charges as also the evidence in both the proceedings are common and as to whether any complicated question of law is involved in the matter. The criminal proceeding is still pending. There can be no straight jacked formula as to in which case the departmental proceedings are to be stayed or quashed. There may be cases where the trial of the case gets prolonged by the dilatory method adopted by the delinquent officer. He cannot be permitted to, on one hand, prolong the criminal case and at the same time contend that the departmental proceedings should be stayed on the ground that the criminal case is pending. There may be cases where the trial of the case gets prolonged by the dilatory method adopted by the delinquent officer. He cannot be permitted to, on one hand, prolong the criminal case and at the same time contend that the departmental proceedings should be stayed on the ground that the criminal case is pending. The standard of proof required in a departmental proceeding is not the same as required to prove a criminal charge and even if there is an acquittal in the criminal proceeding the same does not bar departmental proceeding. In that view of the matter the State Government has rightly proceeded with the departmental proceeding. A reference may be made to paragraph nos.6 and 6.1 to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “State of Bihar & Ors. v. Phulpari Kumari” reported in (2020) 2 SCC 130 : (2020) 1 SCC (L&S) 161: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1563, which is quoted below: “6. The criminal trial against the respondent is still pending consideration by a competent criminal court. The order of dismissal from service of the respondent was pursuant to a departmental inquiry held against her. The inquiry officer examined the evidence and concluded that the charge of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the respondent was proved. The learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court committed an error in appreciating the evidence and coming to a conclusion that the evidence on record was not sufficient to point to the guilt of the respondent: 6.1 It is settled law that interference with the orders passed pursuant to a departmental inquiry can be only in case of “no evidence”. Sufficiency of evidence is not within the realm of judicial review. The standard of proof as required in a criminal trial is not the same in a departmental inquiry. Strict rules of evidence are to be followed by the criminal court where the guilt of the accused has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, preponderance of probabilities is the test adopted in finding the delinquent guilty of the charge.” 7. The scope of judicial review of the punishment imposed by disciplinary authority, unless shocking to the conscience of the Court, is not subject to judicial review. On the other hand, preponderance of probabilities is the test adopted in finding the delinquent guilty of the charge.” 7. The scope of judicial review of the punishment imposed by disciplinary authority, unless shocking to the conscience of the Court, is not subject to judicial review. If the Court finds the punishment to be shockingly disproportionate, it has to record the reasons for coming to such a conclusion. The Court may in exceptional or rare cases impose appropriate punishment by recording cogent reasons in support thereof. The disciplinary authority has already substituted lessor punishment after dismissal of the petitioner and imposed the punishment which is under challenge. The delinquent employee has already superannuated. In that view of the matter on the quantum of punishment, no case of interference is made out in the present case. In a disciplinary proceeding the High Court should not and cannot act as a Second Court to a first appeal. In a departmental enquiry the scope of judicial review is very limited and the Court cannot interfere with the findings of the facts based on evidences and substitute its own independent findings. The review is of decision making process where the findings of the disciplinary authority/ appellate authority are based on some evidence and the Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and substitute its own findings. The statute prescribing limitation does not confer a right of action nor speaking generally does it confer on a person a right to relief which has been barred by efflux of time prescribed by the law. The necessity for enacting periods of limitation is to ensure that actions are commenced within a particular period, firstly to assure the availability of evidence documentary as well as oral to enable the defendant to contest the claim against him; secondly to give effect to the principle that the law does not assist a person who is inactive and sleeps over his rights by allowing them when challenged or disputed to remain dormant without assenting them in a court of law. Thus, the reason of the statute of limitation is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims. The petitioner has preferred the appeal after six years of the impugned order. Thus, the appellate authority has rightly passed the order. Thus, the reason of the statute of limitation is to compel a person to exercise his right of action within a reasonable time as also to discourage and suppress stale, fake or fraudulent claims. The petitioner has preferred the appeal after six years of the impugned order. Thus, the appellate authority has rightly passed the order. A reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered in the case of “M/s Bharat Barrel And Drum Mfg. Co. Ltd. And Anr. v. The Employees State Insurance Corporation” reported in 1971(2) SCC 860 [para-7]. 8. In the light of the above discussion, this Court finds that no case of interference is made out. 9. Accordingly, the instant writ petition [W.P.(S) No.3886 of 2019] stands dismissed. 10. I.A., if any, also stands disposed of.