ORDER : 1. The present writ petition has been taken up today through Video conferencing. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the memo no. JAC/Call-Estt.0024/ 09/Secy.277/2018 dated 24.04.2018 (Annexure-9 to the writ petition) issued by the respondent no. 3-the Secretary, Jharkhand Academic Council in the light of the resolution of the Jharkhand Academic Council taken in the meeting held on 27.02.2018, whereby a recommendation has been made for cancellation of permanent recognition/affiliation granted to the petitioner-College for conducting the courses of Intermediate in Science, Commerce and Arts disciplines. 2. The factual background of the case as stated in the writ petition is that the petitioner-College was established in the year 1999 for imparting education at intermediate level and was granted permission for the session 1999-2001, 2000-2002 and 2001-2003 by the Bihar Intermediate Education Council. On 24.07.2003, the Jharkhand Intermediate Education Council granted further permission for the session 2003 to 2006. In the meantime, Jharkhand Academic Council was created and on following due process of law including inspection and verification, the respondent no. 3 made recommendation for grant of permanent affiliation to the petitioner-College and on the basis of such recommendation, the respondent no. 1 granted permanent affiliation to the petitioner-College which was communicated by the respondent no. 2-the Director, Secondary Education, Ranchi to the respondent no. 3 vide letter dated 27.11.2008 issued for the said purpose. Subsequently, vide letter no. 1211 dated 16.08.2017 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa, the petitioner-College was stopped from taking fresh admission in the college. Aggrieved by the said letter, the petitioner preferred writ petition before this Court being W.P. (C) No. 4973 of 2017. In the meantime, the respondent no. 3 conducted enquiry in the petitioner- College in the light of direction as contained in letter no. 420 dated 12.02.2018 issued by the respondent no. 2 and based upon the report of such enquiry, the Jharkhand Academic Council in its meeting dated 27.02.2018 resolved and recommended for cancellation of permanent affiliation/recognition granted to the petitioner-College in terms with the provisions of Section 7.5(2) of the Jharkhand Academic Council Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 2002”). The said recommendation was informed to the petitioner vide impugned memo dated 24.04.2018. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. The said recommendation was informed to the petitioner vide impugned memo dated 24.04.2018. Hence, the present writ petition. 3. During the pendency of the writ petition, due to subsequent development, the petitioner by way of interlocutory application being I.A. No. 414 of 2019 has also put challenge to the order dated 31.08.2018 passed by the respondent no. 2 as well as the decision of the Four Members Committee headed by the respondent no. 2 dated 07.09.2018 to the extent of cancelling of the permanent affiliation granted to the petitioner-College. 4. Mr. Vimal Kirti Singh, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the impugned memo dated 24.04.2018 is completely cryptic, non-speaking and unreasonable. The penal action of cancellation of permanent affiliation/recognition of the petitioner-College in terms with the provisions as contained in Section 7.5(2) of the Act, 2002 has been initiated and recommended by the respondent no. 3 on the basis of the enquiry report, however, the resolution and/or the letter recommending cancellation of recognition/affiliation, nowhere deals with any violation made by the petitioner-College. No opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner-College for explaining the adverse circumstances available against it which formed the basis of impugned action. The high ranking officers of the State Government and the respondent no. 3 had instructed/reported about the eligibility of the petitioner-College for grant of permanent recognition and/or grant of financial assistance and based upon such report submitted in favour of the petitioner-College, the respondents themselves had decided, resolved and approved the grant of permanent recognition and financial aid to the petitioner-College in order to ensure that the female students of Garhwa district should not be deprived of education in Science, Commerce and Arts disciplines. The entire action of the respondents leading to issuance of impugned memo dated 24.04.2018 suffers from complete non-application of mind which is also vitiated due to non-compliance of basic requirement of following the principles of natural justice. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the impugned memo indicates that the action has been taken by the respondents in exercise of power conferred under Section 7.5(2) of the Act, 2002, however, the prerequisite condition for exercise of such power has neither been discussed nor even indicated in the impugned memo. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the impugned memo indicates that the action has been taken by the respondents in exercise of power conferred under Section 7.5(2) of the Act, 2002, however, the prerequisite condition for exercise of such power has neither been discussed nor even indicated in the impugned memo. If any administrative order is put to challenge before the court of law, it is to be sustained on the basis of reasons assigned in the said order itself and the same cannot be supplemented by way of affidavits or otherwise. The impugned order does not discuss any laches or deficiency which necessitated initiation of such penal action against the petitioner-College except mentioning the said provision of law. Such action of the respondents is detrimental to the interest of the female students of Garhwa district. The petitioner being a legal entity is also vested with the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution of India and any action affecting such right of the petitioner cannot be sustained in law unless the same is supported by observance of due procedure established under law. The impugned memo also involves adverse consequence against the petitioner and as such the principles of natural justice require that the petitioner and its management should have been heard by the respondent authorities before taking such a harsh decision of cancellation of its permanent affiliation. Unfortunately, no opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner before issuing the impugned memo. It is further submitted that the petitioner was informed under Right to Information Act, 2005 that as on date, there are several institutions including the constituent colleges where both Intermediate and Degree level courses are being conducted in the same land and building in different districts of Jharkhand. It is, however, submitted that the petitioner-College has got separate management Committee for the Inter College and Degree College and are being run in their separate and independent buildings. The petitioner, vide letters dated 23.05.2019 and 10.06.2019 communicated the respondent no. 2 that the petitioner-College was running in building situated in Mouza-Sonpurwa, District Garhwa, Thana No. 242 under Khata No. 158, measuring an area of 1 acre and further requested for reviewing the order dated 24.04.2018. The petitioner, vide letters dated 23.05.2019 and 10.06.2019 communicated the respondent no. 2 that the petitioner-College was running in building situated in Mouza-Sonpurwa, District Garhwa, Thana No. 242 under Khata No. 158, measuring an area of 1 acre and further requested for reviewing the order dated 24.04.2018. It is further submitted that the complainant-Sonu Singh has been found to be a non-entity/fictitious person as would be reflected from the information provided by the Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa to the Chief Information Commissioner, Jharkhand mentioning inter-alia that no such person of said name and identity resides on the given address and on such information, the Chief Information Commissioner vide order dated 18.05.2018 passed in Appeal No. 758 of 2011 has directed to keep 125 Second Appeals in abeyance instituted in the name of Sonu Singh, the same being imposter/fictitious. 5. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-State submits that several complaints including those made in “Mukhyamantri Jan Samwad Portal” were received against the petitioner-College on the issue that two colleges namely, Gopinath Singh Women’s Inter College and Gopinath Singh Degree College were being run in the same building. A Three Members Committee was constituted vide memo no. 1760 dated 08.09.2017 to make an enquiry in the matter and to submit a report to the respondent no. 2. The said Three Members Committee submitted its report vide memo no. 539 dated 06.12.2017 mentioning inter-alia that Gopinath Singh Women’s Inter College was running in the same building in which Gopinath Singh Degree College was being run. The said building belongs to Gopinath Singh Degree College. On the basis of the said enquiry report, the impugned memo dated 24.04.2018 has been issued. The petitioner was given an opportunity of hearing vide letter no. 2349 dated 23.08.2018 before taking any further action on the recommendation of Jharkhand Academic Council regarding cancellation of recognition of the Inter College. 6. The learned counsel for the respondent-Jharkhand Academic Council submits that on complaint of Sri. Sonu Singh, the Jharkhand Academic Council vide letter dated 17.06.2017 constituted a two Members Inspection Team consisting of Regional Deputy Director of Education, Palamau and Principal SSJSN College, Garhwa to enquire into the matter. Thereafter, one application of Sri. Sonu Singh dated 14.07.2017 was received through “Mukhyamantri Jan Samwad” in which a request was made for cancellation of affiliation of the petitioner-College and for stoppage of grant. The respondent no. Thereafter, one application of Sri. Sonu Singh dated 14.07.2017 was received through “Mukhyamantri Jan Samwad” in which a request was made for cancellation of affiliation of the petitioner-College and for stoppage of grant. The respondent no. 3 vide letter dated 28.07.2017 then requested the Regional Deputy Director of Education, Palamau to enquire into the matter, who on making such enquiry submitted his report. Subsequently, the District Education Officer, Garhwa vide letter no. 1211 dated 16.08.2017 directed the Principal of the petitioner-College to stop the Inter Level Admission in the said College, however, this Court vide order dated 06.09.2017 passed in W.P. (C) No. 4973 of 2017 was pleased to stay the operation of letter dated 16.08.2017. Thereafter, the respondent no. 2 vide letter no. 846 dated 06.09.2017 directed the respondent no. 3 to provide a report after taking appropriate action according to the rules and regulations in terms with the order dated 06.09.2017 passed by this Court in W.P. (C) No. 4973 of 2017. The respondent no. 3 requested the Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa to submit report in the matter and on receipt of the said report, the same was sent to the respondent no. 2 vide letter dated 18.10.2017. The respondent no. 2 directed the respondent no. 3 vide letter dated 12.02.2018 for making specific recommendation by taking action in accordance with law against petitioner-College in the light of Mukhyamantri Jan Samwad No. 9100/2017 and letter no. JAC/6335/17 dated 18.10.2017 issued by the respondent no. 3, annexing the enquiry report submitted by the Three Tier Enquiry Committee constituted by the Directorate of Secondary Education, Government of Jharkhand. Thereafter, respondent no. 3 sent recommendation to the respondent no. 2 vide letter no. JAC/Call-Estt.0024/09/ Secy.277/2018 dated 24.04.2018 for cancellation of permanent affiliation of the petitioner-College in terms with the decision taken in the meeting dated 27.02.2018. The respondent no. 3 (the answering respondent) is only the recommending authority in the matter of grant of cancellation of affiliation of Inter College in terms with the prevailing rules and regulations and as per the instruction of the Department, the competent authority for taking such decision in the matter is the Directorate of Secondary Education, Jharkhand. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 8. 7. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 8. Admittedly, the petitioner-College was granted permanent affiliation vide letter dated 27.11.2008 for imparting education at the level of Intermediate in Science, Commerce and Arts. The allegation against the petitioner is that its Inter and Degree College are running in the same building which is in violation of the terms and conditions of Jharkhand Intermediate College Establishment Permission and Recommendation (terms and conditions) Rules, 2005. 9. The thrust of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that while passing the impugned memo dated 24.04.2018, the respondent no. 3 did not provide any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and as such, the same vitiates in law being in gross violation of the principles of natural justice. 10. The respondents in the respective counter affidavits have though not controverted the aforesaid facts, yet it has been stated that the petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity of hearing by the respondent no. 2 before passing the order dated 31.08.2018 on the recommendation of the respondent no. 3. 11. To appreciate the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, I have gone through the record of the case. It is evident that during the pendency of the writ petition, the respondent no. 2 vide letter dated 23.08.2018 directed the petitioner to be present for hearing on 30.08.2018 with regard to the present matter and to explain its case, failing which its permanent affiliation would be cancelled ex-parte. Thereafter, the petitioner appeared before the respondent no. 2 and filed its explanation on 30.08.2018 stating inter-alia that there are several other colleges in the State of Jharkhand which are imparting Intermediate as well as Graduation courses in common campus, but with different Board of Management and as such on the said ground, the permanent affiliation of the petitioner- College should not be cancelled. It was also stated inter-alia that the complainant-Sonu Singh was actually an imposter as evident from the enquiry conducted by the Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa. It was also mentioned that the building of both Gopi Nath Singh Women’s Inter College and Gopinath Singh Degree College were separate, however, the same were joined for the purpose of security of the girl students and due to the said reason, both the buildings appeared to be one. 12. The respondent no. It was also mentioned that the building of both Gopi Nath Singh Women’s Inter College and Gopinath Singh Degree College were separate, however, the same were joined for the purpose of security of the girl students and due to the said reason, both the buildings appeared to be one. 12. The respondent no. 2 has cancelled the permanent affiliation of the petitioner-College vide order dated 31.08.2018 (a copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-G to the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the respondent No. 2). The said order appears to have been passed on the sole ground that the petitioner-College has no separate building and the Inter College as well as the Degree College are running in the same building which is in violation of the terms and conditions of Rules, 2005. The respondent no. 2, however, while taking the impugned decision dated 31.08.2018 has not appreciated the fact placed by the petitioner that the building of the petitioner-College is separate from the building of Gopinath Singh Degree College. Moreover, in the meeting of the Committee dated 07.09.2018 headed by the respondent no. 2, a final decision was taken for cancellation of permanent affiliation of the petitioner-College ignoring the said fact. The respondent no. 2 cancelled the permanent affiliation of the petitioner-College while putting heavy reliance on the enquiry report submitted by Three Members Committee dated 06.12.2017 and the enquiry report submitted by the Deputy Commissioner, Garhwa. The petitioner by filing the supplementary affidavit in the present case has specifically stated that at present, the Inter College is being run in a separate building and in support of the same, the photographs of the buildings have also been brought on record. The specific claim of the petitioner is that neither the enquiry committee nor the respondent no. 3 has provided any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The respondent no. 2 should have applied independent mind after going through the explanation submitted by the petitioner as well as the enquiry reports submitted by the committees. 13. In the case of Joshi Technologies International Inc. vs. Union of India and Others, (2015) 7 SCC 728 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “70. Further, the legal position which emerges from various judgments of this Court dealing with different situations/aspects relating to contracts entered into by the State/public authority with private parties, can be summarised as under: 70.1. vs. Union of India and Others, (2015) 7 SCC 728 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “70. Further, the legal position which emerges from various judgments of this Court dealing with different situations/aspects relating to contracts entered into by the State/public authority with private parties, can be summarised as under: 70.1. At the stage of entering into a contract, the State acts purely in its executive capacity and is bound by the obligations of fairness. 70.2. State in its executive capacity, even in the contractual field, is under obligation to act fairly and cannot practice some discrimination. 70.3. Even in cases where question is of choice or consideration of competing claims before entering into the field of contract, facts have to be investigated and found before the question of a violation of Article 14 of the Constitution could arise. If those facts are disputed and require assessment of evidence the correctness of which can only be tested satisfactorily by taking detailed evidence, involving examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the case could not be conveniently or satisfactorily decided in proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. In such cases the Court can direct the aggrieved party to resort to alternate remedy of civil suit, etc. 70.4. Writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution was not intended to facilitate avoidance of obligation voluntarily incurred. 70.5. Writ petition was not maintainable to avoid contractual obligation. Occurrence of commercial difficulty, inconvenience or hardship in performance of the conditions agreed to in the contract can provide no justification in not complying with the terms of contract which the parties had accepted with open eyes. It cannot ever be that a licensee can work out the licence if he finds it profitable to do so: and he can challenge the conditions under which he agreed to take the licence, if he finds it commercially inexpedient to conduct his business. 70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages. 70.7. 70.6. Ordinarily, where a breach of contract is complained of, the party complaining of such breach may sue for specific performance of the contract, if contract is capable of being specifically performed. Otherwise, the party may sue for damages. 70.7. Writ can be issued where there is executive action unsupported by law or even in respect of a corporation there is denial of equality before law or equal protection of law or if it can be shown that action of the public authorities was without giving any hearing and violation of principles of natural justice after holding that action could not have been taken without observing principles of natural justice. 70.8. If the contract between private party and the State/instrumentality and/or agency of the State is under the realm of a private law and there is no element of public law, the normal course for the aggrieved party, is to invoke the remedies provided under ordinary civil law rather than approaching the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. 70.9. The distinction between public law and private law element in the contract with the State is getting blurred. However, it has not been totally obliterated and where the matter falls purely in private field of contract, this Court has maintained the position that writ petition is not maintainable. The dichotomy between public law and private law rights and remedies would depend on the factual matrix of each case and the distinction between the public law remedies and private law field, cannot be demarcated with precision. In fact, each case has to be examined, on its facts whether the contractual relations between the parties bear insignia of public element. Once on the facts of a particular case it is found that nature of the activity or controversy involves public law element, then the matter can be examined by the High Court in writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to see whether action of the State and/or instrumentality or agency of the State is fair, just and equitable or that relevant factors are taken into consideration and irrelevant factors have not gone into the decision-making process or that the decision is not arbitrary. 70.10. 70.10. Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may render the decision arbitrary, and this is how the requirements of due consideration of a legitimate expectation forms part of the principle of non-arbitrariness. 70.11. The scope of judicial review in respect of disputes falling within the domain of contractual obligations may be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to remedies provided for adjudication of purely contractual disputes.” 14. In the case of S.N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India, (1990) 4 SCC 594 , a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “36. Reasons, when recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it while exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate the exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory authority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which have also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative authority must record reasons for its decision, are of no less significance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons by an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it excludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The said purpose would apply equally to all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions which are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our opinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should govern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the decision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. It may, however, be added that it is not required that the reasons should be as elaborate as in the decision of a court of law. The extent and nature of the reasons would depend on particular facts and circumstances. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. What is necessary is that the reasons are clear and explicit so as to indicate that the authority has given due consideration to the points in controversy. The need for recording of reasons is greater in a case where the order is passed at the original stage. The appellate or revisional authority, if it affirms such an order, need not give separate reasons if the appellate or revisional authority agrees with the reasons contained in the order under challenge. 37. Having considered the rationale for the requirement to record the reasons for the decision of an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions we may now examine the legal basis for imposing this obligation. While considering this aspect the Donoughmore Committee observed that it may well be argued that there is a third principle of natural justice, namely, that a party is entitled to know the reason for the decision, be it judicial or quasi-judicial. The Committee expressed the opinion that “there are some cases where the refusal to give grounds for a decision may be plainly unfair and this may be so, even when the decision is final and no further proceedings are open to the disappointed party by way of appeal or otherwise” and that “where further proceedings are open to a disappointed party, it is contrary to natural justice that the silence of the Minister or the Ministerial Tribunal should deprive them of the opportunity.” (P. 80) Prof. H.W.R. Wade has also expressed the view that “natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice.” (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th Edn. P. 548) In Siemens Engineering Co. H.W.R. Wade has also expressed the view that “natural justice may provide the best rubric for it, since the giving of reasons is required by the ordinary man's sense of justice.” (See Wade, Administrative Law, 6th Edn. P. 548) In Siemens Engineering Co. Case (1976) 2 SCC 981 this Court has taken the same view when it observed that “the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principles of audi alteram partem, a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi-judicial process.” This decision proceeds on the basis that the two well known principles of natural justice, namely (i) that no man should be a judge in his own cause and (ii) that no person should be judged without a hearing, are not exhaustive and that in addition to these two principles there may be rules which seek to ensure fairness in the process of decision-making and can be regarded as part of the principles of natural justice. This view is in consonance with the law laid down by this Court in A.K. Kraipak vs. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 , wherein it has been held: (SCR pp. 468-469: SCC p. 272, para-20) “The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely: (i) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (ii) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must he held in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to be added to the rules of natural justice.” 39. The object underlying the rules of natural justice “is to prevent miscarriage of justice” and secure “fair play in action.” As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. The object underlying the rules of natural justice “is to prevent miscarriage of justice” and secure “fair play in action.” As pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for its decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial functions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness and ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making. Keeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which govern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their application depends upon the particular statutory framework whereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative authority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an administrative authority including exercise of judicial or quasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said power, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest that the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority be recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party and it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making an express provision to that effect as those contained in the Administrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U.S.A. and the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders passed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit of the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary implication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the provisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a provision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the requirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot, therefore, be insisted upon in such a case.” 15. Further, in the case of Krishna Mohan Medical College and Hospital vs. Union of India, (2017) 15 SCC 719 as cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it has been held as under: “20. In the predominant factual setting, noted hereinabove, the approach of the respondents is markedly incompatible with the essence and import of the proviso to Section 10-A(4) mandating against disapproval by the Central Government of any scheme for establishment of a college except after giving the person or the college concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. In the predominant factual setting, noted hereinabove, the approach of the respondents is markedly incompatible with the essence and import of the proviso to Section 10-A(4) mandating against disapproval by the Central Government of any scheme for establishment of a college except after giving the person or the college concerned a reasonable opportunity of being heard. Reasonable opportunity of hearing which is synonymous to “fair hearing” it is no longer res integra, is an important ingredient of audi alteram partem rule and embraces almost every facet of fair procedure. The rule of “fair hearing” requires that the affected party should be given an opportunity to meet the case against him effectively and the right to fair hearing takes within its fold a just decision supplemented by reasons and rationale. Reasonable opportunity of hearing or right to “fair hearing” casts a steadfast and sacrosanct obligation on the adjudicator to ensure fairness in procedure and action, so much so that any remiss or dereliction in connection therewith would be at the pain of invalidation of the decision eventually taken. Every executive authority empowered to take an administrative action having the potential of visiting any person with civil consequences must take care to ensure that justice is not only done but also manifestly appears to have been done. 21. No endeavour whatsoever, in our comprehension, has been made by the respondents and that too in the face of an unequivocal direction by this Court, to fairly and consummately examine the materials on record in details before recording a final decision on the issue of confirmation or otherwise of the LoP granted to the petitioner College/Institution as on 12-9-2016. True it is that the Regulations do provide for certain norms of infrastructure to be complied with by the applicant College/Institution for being qualified for the LoP depending on the stages involved. This however does not obviate the inalienable necessity of affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the person or the College/Institution concerned vis-à-vis the scheme for establishment of a college before disapproving the same. The manner in which the respondents, in the individual facts of the instant case, have approached the issue, leads to the inevitable conclusion that the materials on record do not support determinatively the allegation of deficiency in course of the process undertaken, as alleged. The manner in which the respondents, in the individual facts of the instant case, have approached the issue, leads to the inevitable conclusion that the materials on record do not support determinatively the allegation of deficiency in course of the process undertaken, as alleged. We are thus of the considered opinion that in view of the persistent defaults and shortcomings in the decision-making process of the respondents, the petitioner College/Institution ought not to be penalised. Having regard to the progression of events, the assertions made by the petitioners in the representations countering the deficiencies alleged, the observations/views expressed by the Oversight Committee in its communication dated 14-5-2017 and the DGHS in the hearing held on 17-1-2017, we negate the findings with regard to the deficiencies as recorded by the assessors of MCI in the inspections held. Consequently, on an overall view of the materials available on record and balancing all relevant aspects, we are of the considered opinion that the conditional LoP granted to the petitioner College/Institution on 12-9-2016 for the academic year 2016-2017 deserves to be confirmed. We order accordingly. However, as the Act and Regulations framed thereunder have been envisioned to attain the highest standards of medical education, we direct the Central Government/MCI to cause a fresh inspection of the petitioner College/Institution to be made in accordance therewith for the academic year 2018-2019 and lay the report in respect thereof before this Court within a period of eight weeks herefrom. A copy of the report, needless to state, would be furnished to the petitioner College/Institution at the earliest so as to enable it to avail its remedies, if so advised, under the Act and the Regulations. The Central Government/MCI would not encash the bank guarantee furnished by the petitioner College/Institution. For the present, the impugned order dated 10-8-2017 stands modified to this extent only. The direction for a writ, order or direction to the respondents to permit the petitioner College/Institution to admit students for the academic year 2017-2018, in the facts of the case, is declined. The Registry would list the writ petition and I.A. No. 73716 of 2017 immediately after the expiry of period of eight weeks, as abovementioned.” 16. The direction for a writ, order or direction to the respondents to permit the petitioner College/Institution to admit students for the academic year 2017-2018, in the facts of the case, is declined. The Registry would list the writ petition and I.A. No. 73716 of 2017 immediately after the expiry of period of eight weeks, as abovementioned.” 16. It may thus be construed that if the executive action is found suffering from violation of the principles of natural justice, the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be invoked. It is always expected from an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial function to record appropriate reasons in support of its decision. Recording of reason in an order prevents miscarriage of justice and secures fair play in decision making process. Keeping in view the expanded horizon of the principles of natural justice, recording of reasons by the administrative/quasi-judicial authorities can be regarded as one of the pivotal requirements of the principles of natural justice. The order passed by the administrative/quasi-judicial authority must be without any biasness and mala-fide. 17. In the present case, the respondent no. 3 before issuing the impugned memo dated 24.04.2018 did not provide any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The respondent no. 2 though provided opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, yet he did not consider the petitioner’s explanation as discussed hereinabove, rather proceeded to decide the issue influenced by the enquiry report as well as the recommendation of the respondent no. 3 without applying independent mind. Thus, in my considered view, the opportunity of hearing claimed to be provided to the petitioner is merely an eyewash and the same does not pass the test of neutrality and fairness. In the case of Shekhar Ghosh vs. Union of India and Another, (2007) 1 SCC 331 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a post decisional hearing has no meaning as the disciplinary authority had already made up its mind before providing such opportunity of hearing to the delinquent. Opportunity of hearing with a pre-occupied mind is an eyewash which indicates the biasness involved in the decision making process. 18. Under the aforesaid circumstance, the memo no. JAC/Call-Estt.0024/09/Secy.277/ 2018 dated 24.04.2018 passed by the respondent no. 3-the Secretary, Jharkhand Academic Council, the order dated 31.08.2018 passed by the respondent no. Opportunity of hearing with a pre-occupied mind is an eyewash which indicates the biasness involved in the decision making process. 18. Under the aforesaid circumstance, the memo no. JAC/Call-Estt.0024/09/Secy.277/ 2018 dated 24.04.2018 passed by the respondent no. 3-the Secretary, Jharkhand Academic Council, the order dated 31.08.2018 passed by the respondent no. 2-the Director, Secondary Education, Jharkhand, Ranchi as well as the decision taken by the Four Members Committee headed by the respondent no. 2 dated 07.09.2018 are hereby quashed and set aside. The respondent no. 2 is directed to constitute a fresh committee for inspection of the petitioner-College to verify as to whether the petitioner-College is being run in a separate building constructed over the land allotted for the said purpose as has been claimed by the petitioner. Accordingly, it is also directed that the petitioner shall be informed about the date of inspection and the same will be carried out in presence of its representative. 19. The writ petition is allowed with aforesaid observation and direction. 20. I.A. No. 414 of 2019 and I.A. No. 9068 of 2018 also stand disposed of.