ORDER : J.B. PARDIWALA, J. 1. Since the issues raised in both the captioned writ applications are the same, those were heard analogously and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. For the sake of convenience, the Special Civil Application No.3937 of 2020 is treated as the lead matter. 3. By this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ applicant, a registered cooperative society through its Chairman, has prayed for the following reliefs : “(A) THIS HONOURABLE COURT WOULD BE PLEASED TO admit present petition. (B) THIS HONOURABLE COURT WOULD BE PLEASED TO allow present petition by quashing and setting aside the impugned communication dated 12/7/2019 by which the work orders given to the petitioner is cancelled and thereby the petitioner Society may be permitted to continue to complete the work orders till December, 2020, as stated in the Tender Notice and also the communication accepting the Tender, in the interest of justice. (C) THIS HONOURABLE COURT WOULD BE PLEASED TO allow present petition by directing the respondent to withdraw the recent Tender Notice dated 1/2/2020 published by it. (D) THIS HONOURABLE COURT WOULD BE PLEASED TO allow present petition by issuing a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus to grant prayer ‘B’ and ‘C’ above, in the interest of justice. (E) THIS HONOURABLE COURT WOULD BE PLEASED TO grant interim relief by staying the execution, implementation and operation of the impugned communication dated 12/7/2019 (Annexure ‘C’) pending admission hearing and till final disposal of present petition and thereby the petitioner may be allowed to complete the work order till December, 2020, in the interest of justice. (F) THIS HONOURABLE COURT WOULD BE PLEASED TO grant interim relief by staying further process qua the Tender Notice issued by the respondent on 1/2/2020 (Annexure ‘F’) pending admission and till final disposal of present petition, in the interest of justice. (G) THIS HONOURABLE COURT WOULD BE PLEASED TO award the costs of present petition.” 4. The facts giving rise to this writ application may be summarized as under : 4.1 The respondent herein invited tenders for carrying out various civil works within the forest area of different ranges falling within his jurisdiction. In this regard a tender notice came to be uploaded on the website of n-procure. The facts giving rise to this writ application may be summarized as under : 4.1 The respondent herein invited tenders for carrying out various civil works within the forest area of different ranges falling within his jurisdiction. In this regard a tender notice came to be uploaded on the website of n-procure. The last date for filling up the tender was 12.12.2018. The tender was for the purpose of SMC (Soil and Moisture Conservation) and building. Ultimately, the writ applicant’s society was allotted the tender for the civil works for the Danta (East), Danta (West), Ambaji (North) and Ambaji (South) range vide the communication dated 14.12.2018. 4.2 To the aforesaid extent, there is no dispute. 4.3 It is not in dispute that the contract period as stipulated in the agreement is up to 31.12.2020. During the subsistence of the contract, all of a sudden, a unilateral decision was taken to rescind the contract by declaring the entire tender process as not being transparent. Thus, it appears that all of a sudden the concluded contract came to be terminated. 4.4 The impugned communication dated 12.07.2019 issued by the respondent herein terminating the contract Annexure-C to this writ application reads as under: “Hence, with regard to the captioned subject, all the Range Forest Officers are informed that oral and written submissions have been received from the local MLA Shri Kantibhai Kharadi and other persons vide above referred letter at serial No.2 pursuant to sanctioning of the tender of rates for different goods and activities referred to in above letter at serial No.1. Because of that, new issues have arisen. Considering all these issues and for resolution of the said issues as well as considering the administrative convenience and transparency, this tender is rejected with immediate effect (date : 12.07.2019).” 4.5 It appears that after the contract allotted in favour of the writ applicant came to be terminated, a fresh tender notice was issued for the very same work. The fresh tender contract has been finalized and the contract has now been awarded in favour of one party. 4.6 Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid action, the writ applicant is here before this Court with the present writ application. 5. Mr. The fresh tender contract has been finalized and the contract has now been awarded in favour of one party. 4.6 Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid action, the writ applicant is here before this Court with the present writ application. 5. Mr. Kharadi, the learned counsel appearing for the writ applicant vehemently submitted that the action on the part of the respondent in terminating the contract, all of a sudden and that too without giving any opportunity of hearing to his clients could be termed as arbitrary, unreasonable and non est. 5.1 Mr. Kharadi, the learned counsel appearing for the writ applicant, has alleged that the entire arbitrary action is at the instance of a local MLA. Mr. Kharadi would submit that his clients were abiding by all the terms and conditions of the contract and were doing the work satisfactorily. According to him, there was no good reason to terminate a concluded contract on a totally baseless assumption. 5.2 Mr. Kharadi would submit that for any good reason if the respondent intended to terminate the contract, then at least an opportunity of hearing should have been given to his clients. 5.3 In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Kharadi, prays that there being merit in this writ application, the same be allowed and the necessary relief as prayed for may be granted. 6. On the other hand, this writ application has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Dharmesh M. Devnani, the learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for the respondents. Mr. Devnani would submit that none of the allegations levelled by the writ applicant merits any consideration. He would submit that the decision to terminate the contract was on account of the various communications received from the local MLA and other people of the area. He would submit that as the entire tender process was not found to be satisfactory and transparent, the decision to terminate the contract had to be taken. 6.1 Mr.Devnani would submit that this writ application is not maintainable as the dispute arises on account of breach of contract. According to Mr. Devnani, the writ applicant could not have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the writ applicant has the remedy of seeking specific performance of the contract or to claim appropriate damages in terms of money for the alleged breach of contract. According to Mr. Devnani, the writ applicant could not have invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as the writ applicant has the remedy of seeking specific performance of the contract or to claim appropriate damages in terms of money for the alleged breach of contract. He would submit that ordinarily this Court would be loath in exercise of its writ jurisdiction to interfere with contractual matters and more particularly when it is a case of a non-statutory contract. Mr.Devnani would submit that although no notice prior to terminating the contract was issued to the writ applicant yet the action on the part of the respondent cannot be said to be arbitrary or illegal on such ground. Mr.Devnani submitted that having regard to the Condition No.17 as stipulated in the agreement it was within the power of the respondent to terminate the contract by declaring the tender process to be illegal or non-transparent. 6.2 Mr. Devnani invited the attention of this Court to the following averments made in the affidavit in reply filed on behalf of the respondents. The same reads thus : “7. It is humbly submitted that as far as the conditions of tender of the concerned, one of the condition more particularly condition no.17 (Page No.12) contemplates that the authority is empowered to allot or cancel the tender. 8. It is humbly submitted that the petitioner was allotted the tender for civil works for Danta (East), Danta (West), Ambaji (North), and Ambaji (South) Range vide communication dated 14.12.2018. A copy of the communication dated 14.12.2018 is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-R1. The said tender was till 31.12.2020. 9. It is humbly submitted that a tender came to be floated on the website on n-procure and the last date for filing up of the tender was 12.12.2018. The said tender was for the purpose of SMC (Soil and Moisture Conservation) and Building. This tender was floated range wise. The petitioner society herein applied for the said tender and in all nine tenders were received by the authorities. The lowest three tenders were allotted the work and the petitioner herein was one of the lowest bidder who was allotted the work. 10. This tender was floated range wise. The petitioner society herein applied for the said tender and in all nine tenders were received by the authorities. The lowest three tenders were allotted the work and the petitioner herein was one of the lowest bidder who was allotted the work. 10. It is humbly submitted that the office of the Deputy Conservator of Forest, Palanpur received a communication dated 02.12.2018 wherein it was intimated that the rates were called for carrying out civil works of different talukas of district Banaskantha and it was specifically intimated that for societies of Danta (East), Danta (West), Ambaji (North), and Ambaji (South) range there was an element of recommendation towards certain societies and that though rates were called from labour societies tender was allotted to forest societies. This letter was issued by the representative also directed the authority to clarify such allegations for inviting rates from different societies of different talukas of the very same district. A copy of the communication dated 02.12.2018 is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-R2. 11. It is humbly submitted that there is a meeting held at the level of the Collector which is District Coordination Meeting and in one such meeting there was a representation in the nature of letter dated 10.06.2019 whereby a grievance was raised that the forest authorities are not giving necessary information to the letters issued by the representative. A copy of the communication dated 10.06.2019 is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-R3. 12. It is humbly submitted that on account of these communications received, the Deputy Conservator of Forest taking into consideration the communications with a view to provide transparency and to provide a solution cancelled the tender w.e.f. 12.07.2019. 13. It is humbly submitted that one of the grounds raised in the petition is that the authority In charge had become “functus officio” and therefore could not have passed such order, it would be appropriate to submit that the notification of the State Government is dated 12.07.2019 while in the normal course these orders are communicated within three days of passing of such orders and there is nothing on record to indicate that such order was communicated or the authority had left charge on the very same day. 14. 14. It is humbly submitted that thereafter another tender is floated on 02.02.2020 for the entire division and in all 23 participants applied for the tender and the lowest participant of range is allotted the work. Further, it is to state that this Hon’ble Court while issuing notice vide order dated 13.02.2020 ordered that action regards new tender shall be subject to final outcome of this writ petition. 15. It is further submitted that for the range of Danta (East), Danta (West), Ambaji (North), and Ambaji (South) tenders are allotted to three participants with lowest rates. The said tender is allotted subject to final orders of this Hon’ble Court and the orders of allotment specifically refer to the said condition. Copies of such allotment is annexed hereto and marked as Annexure-R4 (Colly.). 16. It is humbly submitted that the cancellation of the tenders of the petitioners was on account of the communications received by the representative and only with a view to provide complete transparency the decision was taken by the officer to cancel the tender. It is humbly prayed that in the subsequent tender process, the petitioners have not participated and therefore, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court be pleased to dismiss the petition.” 6.3. In the last, Mr. Devnani submits that a fresh tender notice was issued and the contract has now been awarded in favour of one party and the said party is doing the contract work as on the date. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Devnani, learned Assistant Government Pleader prays that there being no merit in this writ application, the same be rejected. 7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the writ applicant is entitled to the relief’s prayed for in this writ application. 8. The following facts are not in dispute. 7. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the writ applicant is entitled to the relief’s prayed for in this writ application. 8. The following facts are not in dispute. (a) the writ applicant was the successful bidder in the tender proceedings, (b) the bid offered by the writ applicant was duly accepted by the respondent, (c) the contract was to remain in force upto 31.12.2020, (d) the writ applicant was abiding by all the terms and conditions of the agreement, (e) the action on the part of the respondent in terminating a concluded contract was on account of the representation made by a local MLA namely Kantibhai Kharadi and few other persons of the concerned area, (f) except the communication dated 12.07.2019, Annexure-C to this writ application, no other reason has been assigned by the respondent for the impugned action and (g) no opportunity of hearing was given to the writ applicant before terminating the contract. 9. In view of the above referred undisputed facts, we have no doubt in our mind that the impugned action could be termed as arbitrary and unreasonable. 10. We are not impressed by the submission of Mr.Devnani as regards the Condition No.17 of the agreement. 11. It is settled proposition of law that even if an Authority has the discretion to pass an order, the discretion cannot be exercised in an arbitrary manner. In Brosen v. Amalgamated Engineering Unit, (1971) 2 QB 175, Lord Denning has observed as under :-- "The discretion of a statutory body is never underrated. It is the discretion which is to be exercised according to law, that means, at least this :-- the statutory body must be guided by relevant consideration and not by irrelevant. If the decision is influenced by extraneous consideration, which is ought not to have taken into account, then the decision cannot stand. No matter that the statutory body may have acted in good faith ;-- nevertheless the decision will be set aside.." 12. Thus, the issue remains to be examined as to whether the respondent has exercised the power fairly, reasonably and bona fide as there is no scarcity of judicial pronouncement to support the proposition that official arbitrariness may be worst than the statutory arbitrariness. Thus, the issue remains to be examined as to whether the respondent has exercised the power fairly, reasonably and bona fide as there is no scarcity of judicial pronouncement to support the proposition that official arbitrariness may be worst than the statutory arbitrariness. In the State of Andhra Pradesh v, Nalla Raja Reddy, AIR 1967 SC 1458 , the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has observed as under :-- "Official arbitrariness is more subversive of doctrine of equality than the statutory discrimination. In spite of statutory discrimination, one knows where he stands but the wand of the official arbitrariness can be waved in all directions indiscriminately." 13. Similarly, in S.G.Jaisinghani v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 1427 , the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court has observed as under (para 14):-- "In this context it is important to emphasise that absence of arbitrary power is the first essence of the rule of law, upon which our whole Constitutional System is based. In a system governed by rule of law, discretion, when conferred upon Executive Authorities, must be confined within the clearly defined limits. Rule of law, from this point of view, means that the decision should be made by the application of known principle and rules and in general, such decision should be predictable and the citizen should know where he is. If a decision is taken without any principle or without any rule, it is unpredictable and such a decision is antithesis to the decision taken in accordance with the rule of law." 14. In the aforesaid judgment, the Apex Court has referred to the judgment in United States v. Winderlich, (1951) 342 US 98, wherein it has been observed as under :-- "Law has reached its finest moment, when it has freed men from the unlimited discretion of some ruler.............where discretion is absolute, man has always suffered." 15. Therefore, the rule of Law may be said to be the sworn enemy of caprice. The Apex Court has, also, referred and quoted with approval Lord Mansfild in case of John Wilkes, (1770) 4 Burr 2528, wherein it has been observed as under :- "Discretion means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour : it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful." 16. The Apex Court has, also, referred and quoted with approval Lord Mansfild in case of John Wilkes, (1770) 4 Burr 2528, wherein it has been observed as under :- "Discretion means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour : it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful." 16. In a case where a result of a decision taken by the authority, the other party is likely to be adversely affected, the Government has to exercise its powers bona fide and not arbitrarily. The discretion of the Government cannot be absolute and injusticiable. Legal maxim "discretio est discrenere per legem guid sit justum", explains that discretion means discerning what is just in law. 17. There is no manner of doubt that the public authorities and the Government are bound to act reasonably and fairly and each action of such authorities must pass the test of reasonableness and whenever action taken is found to be lacking in bona fide and made in colourable exercise of the power, the Court should not hesitate to strike down unfair and unjust proceedings. 18. In fact the order of the State or State Instrumentality would stand vitiated if it lacks bona fides as it would only be a case of colourable exercise of power. In State of Punjav v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1980 SC 319 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has dealt with the issue of legal malice which is just different from the concept of personal vice. The Court observed as under :-- "When the custodian of power is influenced in its exercise by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested, the Court calls it a colourable exercise and is undeceived by illusion. In a broad, blurred sense, Benjamin Disraeli was not off the mark even in law when he stated: 'Irepeat...........that all power is a trust that we are accountable for its exercise that, from the people, and for the people, all springs, and all must exist.' Fraud on power voids the order if it is not exercised bona fide for the end designed. Fraud in this context is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all cases in which the action impugned is to affect some object which is beyond the purpose and intent to the power, whether this be malice laden or even benign. Fraud in this context is not equal to moral turpitude and embraces all cases in which the action impugned is to affect some object which is beyond the purpose and intent to the power, whether this be malice laden or even benign. If the purpose is corrupt the resultant act is bad. If considerations, foreign to the scope of the power or extraneous to the statute, enter the verdict or impels the action mala fides or fraud on power vitiates the..............official act." 19. It is, thus, settled that the minimum and bare requirement of Rule of Law is that every action of the State should be free from arbitrariness as denial of the administrative fairness is constitutional anathema. Article 14 of the Constitution of India strikes in arbitrariness in such action and ensures reasonableness and fairness. 20. In A.K.Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150 , the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has considered this aspect and held that the proceedings should be so held or an order should be passed in such a manner that there may be no room for doubt of a party being biased. Legal maxims, e.g. "Aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa, quia non potest esse judex et pars"; nemo sibi esse judex vel suis jus dicere debet"; and "nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa" mean that no man can be at once judge and suitor; a person cannot be a judge in a cause wherein he is interested; and no one can be a judge in his own cause, respectively. The said maxims have been applied by the Courts from time and again as is evident from the judgments in Gurdeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (1997) 10 SCC 641 , U.D.Lama v. State of Sikkim, (1997) 1 SCC 111 ; Dr. B. P. Yadav v. Dr. Rule P. Singh, (1996) 8 SCC 494 : ( AIR 1996 SC 3202 ) and State of West Bengal v. Shivananda Pathak, (1998) 5 SCC 513 : ( AIR 1998 SC 2050 ). 21. There is another aspect of the matter. It is also settled proposition of law that even in administrative matters, the reasons should be recorded as it is incumbent upon the authorities to pass a speaking and reasoned order. 21. There is another aspect of the matter. It is also settled proposition of law that even in administrative matters, the reasons should be recorded as it is incumbent upon the authorities to pass a speaking and reasoned order. In Shrilekha Vidyarthi ( AIR 1991 SC 537 ) (supra), the Apex Court has observed as under :-- "Every such action may be informed by reason and if follows that an act uninformed by reason is arbitrary, the rule of law contemplates governance by law and not by humour, whim or caprice of the men to whom the governance is entrusted for the time being. It is the trite law that "be you ever so high, the laws are above you." This is what a man in power must remember always." 22. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, (1995) 2 SCC 482: ( AIR 1995 SC 1811 ), the Apex Court observed that the State or its instrumentality must not take any irrelevant or irrational factor into consideration or appear arbitrary in its decision. "Duty to act fairly" is part of fair procedure envisaged under Articles 14 and 21. Every activity of the public authority or those under public duty must be received and guided by the public interest. 23. The same view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P. Financial Corporation, (1992) 2 JT (SC) 326 :( AIR 1993 SC 935 ) and Union of India v. M.L.Capoor, AIR 1974 SC 87 . 24. In State of West Bengal v. Atual Krishna Shaw, 1991 Suppl (1) SCC 414: ( AIR 1990 SC 2205 ), the Supreme Court observed that "giving of reasons is an essential element of administration of justice. A right to reason is, therefore, an indispensable part of sound system of judicial review." 25. In S.N. Mukherji v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 , it has been held that the object underlying the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and secure fair play in action. A right to reason is, therefore, an indispensable part of sound system of judicial review." 25. In S.N. Mukherji v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 , it has been held that the object underlying the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of justice and secure fair play in action. The expanding horizon of the principles of natural justice provides for requirement to record reasons as it is now regarded as one of the principles of natural justice, and it was held in the above case that except in cases where the requirement to record reasons is expressly or by necessary implication dispensed with, the authority must record reasons for its decision. 26. In Krishna Swami v. Union of India, AIR 1993 SC 1407 , the Apex Court observed that the rule of law requires that any action or decision of a statutory or public authority must be founded on the reason stated in the order or borne-out from the record. The Court further observed that "reasons are the links between the material, the foundation for these erection and the actual conclusions. They would also administer how the mind of the maker was activated and actuated and there rational nexus and syntheses with the facts considered and the conclusion reached. Lest it may not be arbitrary, unfair and unjust, violate Article 14 or unfair procedure offending Article 21.” 27. Similar view has been taken by the Supreme Court in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L.K.Ratna, (1986) 4 SCC 537 : ( AIR 1987 SC 71 ), Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar Raghvendranath Nadkarni, AIR 1983 SC 109 . Similar view has been taken by this Court in Rameshwari Devi v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1999 Raj 47 . In Vasant D. Bhavsar v. Bar Council of India, (1999) 1 SCC 45 , the Apex Court held that an authority must pass a speaking and reasoned order indicating the material on which its conclusions are based. Thus, the impugned order, being non-reasoned, is also liable to be quashed. 28. We are also not impressed by the preliminary objection raised by Mr.Devnani, the learned AGP as regards the maintainability of this writ application. It is true that ordinarily the High Court should be loath in interfering with disputes relating to contract. Thus, the impugned order, being non-reasoned, is also liable to be quashed. 28. We are also not impressed by the preliminary objection raised by Mr.Devnani, the learned AGP as regards the maintainability of this writ application. It is true that ordinarily the High Court should be loath in interfering with disputes relating to contract. However, it would all depend on the nature of the action complained before the Court. The termination Clause No.17 in the contract does not give an unbridled power to the respondent acting on behalf of the State to terminate the contract on the say of the local MLA and other persons interested in the matter. The manner in which the respondent proceeded to pass the order terminating a concluded contract and has tried to justify his illegal action in the name of transparency and public interest has really disturbed us a lot. The respondent having entered into a contract must, in all fairness, be held bound by its terms. Only on compelling, lawful and just reason, can it be allowed to wriggle out of the terms of an agreement. The “State”, while entering into contracts and in the field of business, is expected to be consistent and fair in its relationship with the citizens or association of citizens. That is the difference between the dealings between the State and ordinary self interested businessman. Any action of the State, which is not informed by fairness and reason, is constitutionally invalid on the touchstone of Article 14 of the Constitution and merely because the right sought to be enforced by a citizen is based on a contract, is no reason to refuse him the constitutional remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 29. We may remind ourselves of the observations made by Justice A.P. Misra (as His Lordship then was) in the case of M/s Shyam Gas Company V/s State reported in AIR 1991 Allahabad 129 which are very much apt in the facts of the present case. We quote the observations: "37. The State must act fairly and reasonably does not only flow from Art.14 of the Constitution. A State is always expected to act fairly to its subjects for which no law is necessary. Art.14 merely enshrines this principle. Even in the matter of entering into contract under Art.229, right flowing from Art. 298 for carrying on trade etc. The State must act fairly and reasonably does not only flow from Art.14 of the Constitution. A State is always expected to act fairly to its subjects for which no law is necessary. Art.14 merely enshrines this principle. Even in the matter of entering into contract under Art.229, right flowing from Art. 298 for carrying on trade etc. the State is always expected to act fairly and reasonably. The act of fairness by the State is always expected right from the stage of initiating of the contract, entering into the contract, performance of the terms of the contract of enforcement of the contract." "39. In fact, a social structure of a society is always strong with sound economy fairness in every conduct, behaviour, motive of action is inherent in every citizen and the State. It is this lack of fairness in the citizen brings forth the police power of the State to enforce law through obligations of the State to restrict such individuals from bringing disarray to the social order. Laws are laid down to keep check on such violations. In the modern time what was unthinkable in the ancient time that a king or Ruler would do any wrong to its subjects, the State its substitute cannot be equated on the same pedastal. It is when State not acting fairly, transgressing its power and obligations affecting citizens right they are controlled by courts through the constitutional provisions. This again is only for checking unfairness, unreasonableness of the State. Thus, State even performing contractual obligations under terms of contract, without obliterating it even while literally following terms of contract cannot be expected to act unfairly or unreasonably. The terms of the contract is for an object to be achieved and if in performing the contract the State acts unfairly, unreasonably, though it enforces the contract in literal words, then the Court can always examine each act of the State Government to test whether it is exercising that power for enforcement of that contract or for some ulterior purpose or unfairly against public policy unreasonably. If the Court comes to the conclusion on the facts of each case by removing the veil of State purporting to exercise powers under the contract but acting unfairly or arbitrarily, the Courts should always strike down such an action." 30. If the Court comes to the conclusion on the facts of each case by removing the veil of State purporting to exercise powers under the contract but acting unfairly or arbitrarily, the Courts should always strike down such an action." 30. We are conscious of the fact that after the contract came to be terminated, the respondent floated a fresh tender notice and pursuant to the same, the contract has been awarded in favour of a particular party. However, that should not come in our way in granting appropriate relief to the writ applicant. We say so because our order dated 13.02.2020 is very clear. The same reads thus : “Let Notice be issued to the respondent returnable on 18.02.2020. Any further action as regards the new tenders said to have been floated, shall be subject to the final outcome of this writ application. Direct service is permitted.” 31. Thus, we permitted the respondent to proceed further with the fresh tender proceedings subject to the final outcome of the present litigation. Mr. Devnani, the learned Assistant Government Pleader very fairly pointed out that in the fresh tender notice, there is a reference of the order passed by this Court dated 13.02.2020 referred to above. 32. In over all view of the matter, we are convinced that the writ applicant is entitled to the relief prayed for in the writ application. 33. In the result, this writ application succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned communication dated 12.07.2019, Annexure-C, is hereby quashed and set aside. All consequences to follow. Any action taken in the meantime will also stand nullified. In other words, the respondent is directed to permit the writ applicant to undertake the work of the contract till 31.12.2020. 34. In view of the aforesaid, the connected writ application being the Special Civil Application No.3940 of 2020 also succeeds and is hereby allowed in the aforesaid terms.