Research › Search › Judgment

Jharkhand High Court · body

2020 DIGILAW 597 (JHR)

Suresh Prasad v. State of Jharkhand

2020-06-15

RAJESH SHANKAR

body2020
ORDER : The present writ petition has been taken up today through Video conferencing. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the corrigendum notice issued by the respondent no. 2 – the Jharkhand State Food and Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. vide letter no. 863 dated 19.05.2020 signed on 20.05.2020 by the respondent no. 4 – the Managing Director, Jharkhand State Food and Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd., Ranchi with regard to “Invitation of Tenders for providing transportation and handling services to the Jharkhand State Food and Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as “Corporation”) (2020-22) under Revenue Auction Platform of NCDEX e-Markets Limited” contending that by reasons of the said corrigendum, the basic and fundamental criteria incorporated in the original Notice Inviting Tender No. 1/2020 dated 17.04.2020 has apparently been changed to accommodate certain persons/companies. Further prayer has been made for issuance of appropriate writ commanding upon the respondents to restrain them from changing the terms and conditions of the eligibility criteria of the bidders and to continue with the tender process in the light of the terms and conditions of the eligibility criteria of the bidders incorporated in the original tender circulated in the official website of the Corporation vide Tender Reference No. 01/2020 dated 17.04.2020. 2. The factual matrix of the case is that a Reverse Auction Notice was published in the newspaper namely, ‘Hindustan’ dated 17.04.2020 under the signature of the respondent no. 4 for appointment of transportation and handling contractors in 24 districts in the State of Jharkhand by the Corporation for transportation and handling of food grains/paddy/sugar/pulses/oilseeds/edible oil/empty jute bags etc. for the period of 2020-22. The last date of submission of tender documents was advertised as 11.05.2020 (05:00 P.M.). The entire tender document was uploaded in the website of the Corporation as well as in the website of the NCDEX e-Market Limited which is a private company entrusted with the assignment of inviting tender on behalf of the Corporation as well as for conducting electronic auction system for providing transportation and handling services. Pre-bid meeting of the said tender was convened on 04.05.2020 via video conferencing. Thereafter, by way of Corrigendum Notice dated 19.05.2020 uploaded in the website of NeML as well as in the website of the Corporation, the last date of submission of the tender document was extended to 13.06.2020 and various conditions of the original tender document were amended. Pre-bid meeting of the said tender was convened on 04.05.2020 via video conferencing. Thereafter, by way of Corrigendum Notice dated 19.05.2020 uploaded in the website of NeML as well as in the website of the Corporation, the last date of submission of the tender document was extended to 13.06.2020 and various conditions of the original tender document were amended. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the Corrigendum Notice dated 19.05.2020 by reasons of which the eligibility criteria of the bidders and other conditions have substantially been changed indicates that the same has been done with a malafide intention to allow certain companies/persons to participate in the tender process. It is further submitted that in view of Jharkhand Financial Rules and PWD Code as well as the guidelines of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), the basic terms and conditions of the original tender document were finalized after due deliberation and discussion with the competent authorities, as such any subsequent change in the eligibility criteria of the bidders raises serious doubts on the intention of the authorities as well as regarding their vested interest. Change in the eligibility criteria of the bidders clearly indicates favoritism and nepotism in the action of the authorities of the Corporation. Due to the said amendment in the tender condition, other entities having no expertise in the field of transportation and handling of food grains and other edible items would also participate which would be against the public interest and hence, the same is illegal. In view of Clause 15.1 of the tender document, no amendment can be made in the terms and conditions of the same after eight days of pre-bid meeting. However, in the present case, the respondents have issued the corrigendum dated 19.05.2020 after the said stipulated period making major amendments in the eligibility conditions and, therefore, on the said score alone, the impugned corrigendum is liable to be set aside. 4. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent- Corporation submits that the amendment has been carried out in the original terms and conditions of the tender with a view to enhance the area of competition. It is further submitted that Clause 15.1 of the tender document is not an essential term of contract and as such, the respondents are free to make any suitable amendment to enhance the competition in the tender. It is further submitted that Clause 15.1 of the tender document is not an essential term of contract and as such, the respondents are free to make any suitable amendment to enhance the competition in the tender. It is also submitted that the tender document is yet to be submitted and as such, the petitioner is free to submit his bid on the terms and conditions mentioned in the tender as he has not been prejudiced by the amendment made in the original terms and conditions regarding the eligibility criteria. The petitioner has also failed to prove any malafide on the part of the authorities of the Corporation in issuing the impugned corrigendum notice which otherwise is uniformly applicable to all the bidders. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. 6. The petitioner has challenged the amendment carried out in the original NIT by way of corrigendum notice dated 19.05.2020 which has been issued after pre-bid meeting and before the date of submission of the tender document. 7. The main submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the amendment as incorporated in the terms and conditions of the original NIT has substantially changed the eligibility criteria of the intending bidders without following the due procedure which has been done with vested interest to put undue favour to certain bidders and thus suffers from the vice of arbitrariness, unreasonableness and malafide. 8. Before coming into the merits of the case, it would be relevant to go through some judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court with regard to the scope of interference by the writ court in the matter where challenge has been made with respect to the terms and conditions of the tender document. 9. In the case of “Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India” reported in (1994) 6 SCC 651 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “94. The principle deducible from the above are: (1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The Court does not sit as a Court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (2) The Court does not sit as a Court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fair play in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure.” 10. In the case of “Air India Limited Vs. Cochin International Airport Limited & Ors.” reported in (2000) 2 SCC 617 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 7. The law relating to award of a contract by the State, its corporations and bodies acting as instrumentalities and agencies of the Government has been settled by the decision of this Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India [ (1979) 3 SCC 489 ], Fertilizer Corpn. Kamgar Union (Regd.) v. Union of India [ (1981) 1 SCC 568 ], CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd. [ (1985) 1 SCC 260 , Tata Cellular v. Union of India [ (1994) 6 SCC 651 ], Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra [ (1997) 1 SCC 134 ] and Raunaq International Ltd. v. I.V.R. Construction Ltd. [ (1999) 1 SCC 492 ] The award of a contract, whether it is by a private party or by a public body or the State, is essentially a commercial transaction. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. In arriving at a commercial decision considerations which are paramount are commercial considerations. The State can choose its own method to arrive at a decision. It can fix its own terms of invitation to tender and that is not open to judicial scrutiny. It can enter into negotiations before finally deciding to accept one of the offers made to it. Price need not always be the sole criterion for awarding a contract. It is free to grant any relaxation, for bona fide reasons, if the tender conditions permit such a relaxation. It may not accept the offer even though it happens to be the highest or the lowest. But the State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies are bound to adhere to the norms, standards and procedures laid down by them and cannot depart from them arbitrarily. Though that decision is not amenable to judicial review, the court can examine the decision-making process and interfere if it is found vitiated by mala fides, unreasonableness and arbitrariness. The State, its corporations, instrumentalities and agencies have the public duty to be fair to all concerned. Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process the court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should intervene. 11. In the case of “Global Energy Limited Vs. Adani Exports Limited” reported in (2005) 4 SCC 435 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 9. In Tata Cellular v. Union of India [(1994) 6 SCC 65] a three-Judge Bench has explained what is a tender and what are the requisites of a valid tender. It has been held that the tender must be unconditional and must conform to the terms of the obligation and further the person by whom the tender is made must be able and willing to perform his obligations. It has been further held that the terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. It has been further held that the terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. In Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. [ (2000) 2 SCC 617 ] the same view was reiterated that the State can fix its own terms of invitation of tender and that it is not open to judicial scrutiny. Whether and in what conditions the terms of a notice inviting tenders can be a subject-matter of judicial scrutiny, has been examined in considerable detail in Directorate of Education v. Educomp Datamatics Ltd. [ (2004) 4 SCC 19 ] The Directorate of Education, Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi had taken a decision to establish computer laboratories in all government schools in NCT area and tenders were invited to provide hardware for this purpose. For the final phase of 2002-2003, tenders were called for 748 schools and the cost of the project was approximately Rs 100 crores. In view of the difficulty faced in the earlier years where the lowest tenderers were not able to implement the entire project, a decision was taken to invite tenders from firms having a turnover of Rs 20 crores or more for the last three financial years ending with 31-3-2002, as it was felt that it would be easier for the department to deal with one company which is well managed and not with several companies. Some of the firms filed writ petitions in the Delhi High Court challenging the clause of NIT whereby a condition was put that only such firms which had a turnover of Rs 20 crores or more for the last three financial years would be eligible. It was contended before the High Court that the aforesaid condition had been incorporated solely with an intent to deprive a large number of companies imparting computer education from bidding and monopolise the same for big companies. The writ petition was allowed and the clause was struck down as being arbitrary and irrational. In appeal, this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court basically on the ground that the terms of the invitation to tender are not open to judicial scrutiny, the same being in the realm of contract and the Government must have a free hand in settling the terms of the tender. In appeal, this Court reversed the judgment of the High Court basically on the ground that the terms of the invitation to tender are not open to judicial scrutiny, the same being in the realm of contract and the Government must have a free hand in settling the terms of the tender. The courts would not interfere with the terms of the tender notice unless it was shown to be either arbitrary or discriminatory or actuated by malice. It was further held that while exercising the power of judicial review of the terms of the tender notice, the court cannot order change in them. 10. The principle is, therefore, well settled that the terms of the invitation to tender are not open to judicial scrutiny and the courts cannot whittle down the terms of the tender as they are in the realm of contract unless they are wholly arbitrary, discriminatory or actuated by malice. This being the position of law, settled by a catena of decisions of this Court, it is rather surprising that the learned Single Judge passed an interim direction on the very first day of admission hearing of the writ petition and allowed the appellants to deposit the earnest money by furnishing a bank guarantee or a bankers' cheque till three days after the actual date of opening of the tender. The order of the learned Single Judge being wholly illegal, was, therefore, rightly set aside by the Division Bench. 12. In the case of “S.S. & Company Vs. Orissa Mining Corporation Limited” reported in (2008) 5 SCC 772 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: 22. The first two circumstances are woefully inadequate to bring home the grave charge of mala fide and the High Court was quite right in holding that the appellant completely failed to establish its case in that regard. It is axiomatic that the Corporation is the best judge of its interests and needs and it is always open to it to suitably modify or change the eligibility criteria so as to best serve its purposes. Whenever a change is introduced in the eligibility criteria either by introducing some new conditions or restricting or altogether doing away with certain previous concessions it might hurt the interests of someone or the other but for that reason the changes made in the eligibility criteria cannot be labelled as mala fide. Whenever a change is introduced in the eligibility criteria either by introducing some new conditions or restricting or altogether doing away with certain previous concessions it might hurt the interests of someone or the other but for that reason the changes made in the eligibility criteria cannot be labelled as mala fide. The first two arguments advanced on behalf of the appellant thus completely fail to show any mala fide and we now proceed to examine the third argument advanced on its behalf. 13. It would thus be construed that the terms of the invitation to tender are not open to judicial scrutiny as the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. The Government/its agency must have the freedom of contract on the terms it deems appropriate. However, the said decision is required to be considered by the writ court to see as to whether the same complies the Wednesbury principles of reasonableness and that it is free from the vice of arbitrariness, biasness and malafide. Any tendering authority is the best judge of its interest and needs and it is open to it to suitably modify or change the eligibility criteria so as to best serve its purposes. Though any change in the eligibility criteria may hurt the interest of someone or the other, yet on that score, changes/amendments made in the eligibility criteria cannot be labelled as bias or suffering from malafide, if it conforms to the aforesaid principles. 14. Now, let us examine the facts of the present case in view of the aforesaid ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has though assailed the entire corrigendum, yet he has put much emphasis on the argument that the amendment made in the eligibility criteria mentioned in the original bid document suffers from malafide, favouritism and arbitrariness. The learned counsel for the petitioner has though assailed the entire corrigendum, yet he has put much emphasis on the argument that the amendment made in the eligibility criteria mentioned in the original bid document suffers from malafide, favouritism and arbitrariness. It would thus be appropriate to make a comparison of Clause 17.3 and 17.7 of the original terms and conditions of the tender document with the respective amended clauses, which are detailed as under: As stood prior to amendment After amendment Clause 17.3 The average annual turnover of the Tenderer for the last three financial years namely 2016-17, 2017-18 and 2018-19 shall be Rs.2 crore due to transportation of Food Grains of any State Food Corporation/Food Corporation of India (FCI) in case the Tenderer is exclusively carrying on the business of transportation of goods. Or In case transportation of goods is one of the businesses of the Tenderer, at least Rs.2 Crore of the turnover shall be due to transportation of Food Grains of State Food Corporation/Food Corporation of India (FCI) The average annual turnover of the Tenderer for the last three financial years namely 2016-17, 2017-18 and 2018-19 shall be Rs.1.5 crore due to transportation of Food Grains of any Central or State Government agency/Public Sector Undertaking/State Food Corporation/Food Corporation of India (FCI) or any private entity in case the Tenderer is exclusively carrying on the business of transportation of Food Grains. Or In case transportation of Food Grains is one of the businesses of the Tenderer, at least Rs. 1.5 Crore of the turnover shall be due to transportation of Food Grains of any Central or State Government agency/Public Sector Undertaking/State Food Corporation/Food Corporation of India (FCI) or any private entity. Clause 17.7 For each district, the applicant should have atleast 10 owned trucks in his/her name of the company on the date of publishing of the Tender. The carriage capacity of each Truck should be 9 MT or above. For each district, the applicant should have atleast 10 owned trucks in his/her name/name of the company till the Last date of Document submission/upload (whichever date is finalized by the Corporation). The carriage capacity of each Truck should be 9 MT or above. 15. The carriage capacity of each Truck should be 9 MT or above. For each district, the applicant should have atleast 10 owned trucks in his/her name/name of the company till the Last date of Document submission/upload (whichever date is finalized by the Corporation). The carriage capacity of each Truck should be 9 MT or above. 15. The case of the petitioner is that prior to the amendment made in Clause 17.7, a tenderer was required to have 10 trucks on the date of publishing the tender, however, the same has been amended by stipulating that a tenderer should have 10 owned trucks on the last date of submission or uploading of the document. Moreover, by reasons of amendment made in Clause 17.3 of the tender documents, the annual turnover of Rs. 2 crores for the financial year 2016-17, 2017-18 and 2018-19 due to transportation of food grains of any State Food Corporation/FCI has further been relaxed by reducing the annual turnover as Rs. 1.5 crores due to transportation of food grains of any Central or State Government agency/public sector undertaking/State Food Corporation/Food Corporation of India (FCI) or any private agency. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the persons who are carrying on their businesses of transportation with any private entity and have the annual turnover of Rs. 1.5 crores have also become eligible to participate in the tender which would lead to submission of fabricated experience certificate issued from the private entities. On appreciation of the said submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner, it can be construed that the petitioner by way of impugned corrigendum has not been deprived of participating in the tender, rather by reasons of the said amendment, some bidders may also participate in the tender document by furnishing forged documents. 16. I find no force in the said argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The court cannot act on presumption or assumption. Even it is assumed that there is a possibility of producing forged/manufactured documents by some bidders, it is for the tendering authority to deal with such a situation in terms with the prescribed procedure and as such, a future event cannot reasonably be a ground for assailing the impugned corrigendum. 17. The court cannot act on presumption or assumption. Even it is assumed that there is a possibility of producing forged/manufactured documents by some bidders, it is for the tendering authority to deal with such a situation in terms with the prescribed procedure and as such, a future event cannot reasonably be a ground for assailing the impugned corrigendum. 17. The next limb of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent-Corporation has issued the impugned corrigendum after the period stipulated for issuing the same and, therefore, the same is violative of the terms and conditions set out in the NIT itself. On the contrary, the learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation has submitted that the time stipulated for making any amendment in the NIT is not an essential term of contract and, therefore, the tendering authority is well empowered to modify/amend the original terms and conditions of the NIT in the given facts and circumstances of the case and keeping in view the interest of public at large. 18. To appreciate the rival contentions of the learned counsel for the parties, it would be relevant to refer Clause 15.1 under the heading of “Amendments to tender documents”, which reads as under: 15.1 At any time prior to the deadline for submission of tenders, Corporation, may, for any reason, whether at its own initiative or in response to a clarification requested by a Tenderer or as a result of the outcome of the pre-bid meeting, modify this tender document through an amendment/corrigendum. Provided that no such amendment shall be made to tender document eight days after the pre-bid meeting. 19. On perusal of the aforesaid clause, it would be evident that prior to the deadline of submission of tender, the Corporation either on its own or in response to the clarification requested by the tenderers or as a result of the outcome of the pre-bid meeting, is empowered to modify the tender document through an amendment/corrigendum. 20. Thus, in view of the specific clause in the tender document itself, a prospective bidder cannot claim that the Corporation has no right to amend the tender document. On the contrary, the said clause itself indicates that pursuant to the pre-bid meeting, certain amendments can be made depending on the request of the tenderers or at the own initiation of the Corporation for smooth execution of the work in question. On the contrary, the said clause itself indicates that pursuant to the pre-bid meeting, certain amendments can be made depending on the request of the tenderers or at the own initiation of the Corporation for smooth execution of the work in question. A pre-bid meeting is generally conducted to clarify any confusion prevailing among the intending tenderers with regard to the project details, scope of work and solicitation of the documents and during pre-bid meeting, the contractors can decide as to whether it may go ahead with the tender work keeping in view its interest. Clause 16.2 of the tender document also provides that in the pre-bid meeting, the tenderers may seek clarification of the tender document and suggest the amendment, however, the Corporation will have the absolute discretion of accepting or rejecting the suggestions so made. Thus, the amendment after the pre-bid meeting is a natural conduct of the tendering authority and, therefore, intending bidder cannot be allowed to challenge the said amendment if the same does not suffers from the vice of arbitrariness, malafide and favoritism. Though the petitioner has alleged favoritism against the respondent-Corporation, yet the same by itself is not sufficient to set aside any such amendment unless there is a strong evidence in support of the said allegation. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioner has tried to persuade this Court that due to such amendment, an entity who does not have any experience in the business of handling and transportation of food grains and other related items would also be entitled to participate in the same. It may be construed from the said argument that an entity who has not dealt with the State Food Corporation/Food Corporation of India should not be allowed to participate in the tender. This Court is not impressed with such argument. The amended clause itself manifests that a tenderer should have experience of transportation of food grains with annual turnover of Rs. 1.5 crores. Otherwise also, the work of transportation of food grains does not require any exclusive expertise, on the contrary the amendment as made out in the tender document will enhance the competition arena which can obviously be said to be in the interest of Corporation as well as the public at large. Moreover, the same would also discourage the monopoly. Otherwise also, the work of transportation of food grains does not require any exclusive expertise, on the contrary the amendment as made out in the tender document will enhance the competition arena which can obviously be said to be in the interest of Corporation as well as the public at large. Moreover, the same would also discourage the monopoly. It is a settled position of law that the tendering authority is the best judge of its interest and needs and it is open to it to suitably modify or change the eligibility criteria so as to best serve its purposes. 22. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also contended that the respondent-Corporation while issuing the impugned corrigendum has not followed the provisions of Jharkhand Financial Rules. In exercise of discretionary power enshrined under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ court is to be more cautious and should exercise such power only in furtherance of public interest and not merely making out a legal point. The said procedural defect in issuing the corrigendum as raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not worth consideration by this Court in the given facts and circumstances of the case as he has not been able to show that introduction of such amendments has jeopardized the interest of public. 23. So far as the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned amendment has been carried out after the stipulated time i.e., eight days from the date of pre-bid meeting is concerned, the learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation has submitted that the time stipulated for making amendment in the tender document is not an essential term of the contract and, therefore, any deviation in the same cannot vitiate the entire tender process. 24. In the case of “Central Coalfields Limited & Anr.” Vs. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium) & Ors.” reported in (2016) 8 SCC 622 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: 47. The result of this discussion is that the issue of the acceptance or rejection of a bid or a bidder should be looked at not only from the point of view of the unsuccessful party but also from the point of view of the employer. The result of this discussion is that the issue of the acceptance or rejection of a bid or a bidder should be looked at not only from the point of view of the unsuccessful party but also from the point of view of the employer. As held in [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 ] the terms of NIT cannot be ignored as being redundant or superfluous. They must be given a meaning and the necessary significance. As pointed out in [Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 651 ] there must be judicial restraint in interfering with administrative action. Ordinarily, the soundness of the decision taken by the employer ought not to be questioned but the decision-making process can certainly be subject to judicial review. The soundness of the decision may be questioned if it is irrational or mala fide or intended to favour someone or a decision “that no responsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance with relevant law could have reached” as held in [Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa, (2007) 14 SCC 517 ] followed in [Michigan Rubber (India) Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2012) 8 SCC 216 ]. 48. Therefore, whether a term of NIT is essential or not is a decision taken by the employer which should be respected. Even if the term is essential, the employer has the inherent authority to deviate from it provided the deviation is made applicable to all bidders and potential bidders as held in [Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489 ]. However, if the term is held by the employer to be ancillary or subsidiary, even that decision should be respected. The lawfulness of that decision can be questioned on very limited grounds, as mentioned in the various decisions discussed above, but the soundness of the decision cannot be questioned, otherwise this Court would be taking over the function of the tender issuing authority, which it cannot. 25. Thus, it is the tendering authority who has to see as to whether any condition given in the tender is essential or not and only question that is to be seen by the writ court is that the decision of the authority has been universally applied with respect to all the tenderers and whether the decision making process suffers from arbitrariness, unreasonableness or malafide. Since the provision for amendment in the tender document was already stipulated in the NIT, I find force in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent-Corporation that the time stipulated for amendment is not an essential term of the contract. I am also of the view that the said amendment has been carried out to enhance the area of competition before submission of the tender which serves the public interest and, therefore, I do not find any arbitrariness in such action of the respondent-Corporation. 26. The learned counsel for the petitioner has cited a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of “Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. Vs. Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation & Ors.” reported in (2000) 5 SCC 287 . I have gone through the said judgment, paragraph-12 of which is quoted as under: 12. If we bear these principles in mind, the High Court is justified in setting aside the award of contract in favour of Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. because it had not fulfilled the conditions relating to clause 6(a) of the Tender Notice but the same was deleted subsequent to the last date of acceptance of the tenders. If that is so, the arguments advanced on behalf of Konark Infrastructure (P) Ltd. in regard to the allegation of mala fides of the Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation in showing special favour to Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. or the other contentions raised in the High Court and reiterated before us are insignificant because the High Court had set aside the award made in favour of Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. The only question therefore remaining is whether any contract should have been awarded in favour of Konark Infrastructure (P) Ltd. The High Court had taken the view that if a term of the tender having been deleted after the players entered into the arena it is like changing the rules of the game after it had begun and, therefore, if the Government or the Municipal Corporation was free to alter the conditions fresh process of tender was the only alternative permissible. Therefore, we find that the course adopted by the High Court in the circumstances is justified because by reason of deletion of a particular condition a wider net will be permissible and a larger participation or more attractive bids could be offered. 27. Therefore, we find that the course adopted by the High Court in the circumstances is justified because by reason of deletion of a particular condition a wider net will be permissible and a larger participation or more attractive bids could be offered. 27. In the aforesaid case, the tender was awarded to a tenderer who was not fulfilling Clause 6(a) of the NIT and the said clause was deleted subsequent to the last date of submission of the tender. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while affirming order of the High Court, whereby the tendering authority was directed to issue fresh tender, has held that if a term of the tender having been deleted after the players entered into the arena, the same amounts to changing the rules of the games after it had begun. So far as the present case is concerned, the tender was yet to be submitted by the bidders, rather the amendment was carried out after the pre-bid meeting and before the date of submission of the tender. Moreover, in the case of “Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd.” (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not set aside the deletion of Clause 6(a) of the NIT, rather has appreciated the deletion which was offering a larger participation in the tender. 28. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstance, I am of the view that the petitioner has failed to establish any case of arbitrariness, unreasonableness, illegality and malafide on the part of the respondent-Corporation while issuing the corrigendum notice dated 19.05.2020. Thus, I do not find any reason to interfere with the same. 29. The writ petition being devoid of merit is accordingly dismissed.