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2020 DIGILAW 6 (KER)

Sannasi v. Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd.

2020-01-06

ANIL K.NARENDRAN

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JUDGMENT : ANIL K. NARENDRAN, J.:— The appellants are the claimants in O.P.(MV) No. 377 of 2017 on the file of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Pala, a claim petition filed under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, claiming compensation on account of the death of a minor child by name, Maneesh, son of appellants 1 and 2, and brother of the 3rd appellant, in a motor accident which occurred on 29.10.2016, while he was walking through a public road. At the place of accident, he was knocked down by a motorcycle bearing registration No. KL-37/C-8525, ridden by the 1st respondent, owned by the 2nd respondent and insured with the 3rd respondent. In the accident, he sustained fatal injuries, who succumbed to the injuries on 30.10.2016, while undergoing in-patient treatment. Alleging that the accident occurred due to rash and negligent riding of the motorcycle by the 1st respondent rider, claim petition was filed before the Tribunal, claiming a total compensation of Rs. 10,00,000/- under various heads. 2. Before the Tribunal, the 1st respondent rider and the 2nd respondent owner of the motorcycle remained absent and they were set ex parte. The 3rd respondent insurer filed written statement admitting the policy coverage of the motorcycle involved in the accident; however, denying negligence alleged against the rider of that vehicle. The insurer contended that the accident occurred due to the negligence on the part of the deceased in crossing the road. They also contended that the compensation claimed is highly excessive. 3. Before the Tribunal, Exts.A1 to A7 were marked on the side of the appellants/claimants. Both sides have not chosen to adduce any oral evidence. 4. After considering the pleadings and materials on record, the Tribunal arrived at a conclusion that the accident occurred due to the rash and negligent riding of the motorcycle by the 1st respondent rider. Since insurance coverage of the said vehicle was not in dispute, the insurer was held liable to indemnify the insured. Under various heads, the Tribunal awarded a total compensation of Rs. 2,70,000/- together with interest at the rate 9% per annum from the date of petition, i.e., from 27.04.2017, till realisation, with cost and directed the 3rd respondent insurer to satisfy the award. The amount of compensation was apportioned among the appellants in the ratio 30 : 50 : 20. 5. 2,70,000/- together with interest at the rate 9% per annum from the date of petition, i.e., from 27.04.2017, till realisation, with cost and directed the 3rd respondent insurer to satisfy the award. The amount of compensation was apportioned among the appellants in the ratio 30 : 50 : 20. 5. Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads, the appellants/claimants are before this Court in this appeal. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants/claimants and also the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent insurer. 7. The issue that arises for consideration in this appeal is as to whether the appellants/claimants are entitled for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads. 8. In Sarla Verma v. Delhi Transport Corporation [ (2009) 6 SCC 121 ] the Apex Court laid down the principles governing determination of quantum of compensation in the case of death in a motor accident. The Apex Court held that, the compensation awarded does not become ‘just compensation’ merely because the Tribunal considers it to be just. Just compensation is adequate compensation which is fair and equitable, on the facts and circumstances of the case, to make good the loss suffered as a result of the wrong, as far as money can do so, by applying the well settled principles relating to award of compensation. It is not intended to be a bonanza, largesse or source of profit. To have uniformity and consistency, Tribunals should determine compensation in cases of death, by following the well settled steps, namely, ascertaining the multiplicand (annual contribution to the family), the multiplier and calculation of loss of dependency by multiplying the multiplicand by such multiplier. 9. In National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [ (2017) 16 SCC 680 ], a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 deals with the concept of ‘just compensation’ and the same has to be determined on the foundation of fairness, reasonableness and equitability on acceptable legal standard because such determination can never be in arithmetical exactitude. It can never be perfect. The aim is to achieve an acceptable degree of proximity to arithmetical precision on the basis of materials brought on record in an individual case. It can never be perfect. The aim is to achieve an acceptable degree of proximity to arithmetical precision on the basis of materials brought on record in an individual case. The conception of ‘just compensation’ has to be viewed through the prism of fairness, reasonableness and non-violation of the principle of equitability. In a case of death, the legal heirs of the claimants cannot expect a windfall. Simultaneously, the compensation granted cannot be an apology for compensation. It cannot be a pittance. Though the discretion vested in the Tribunal is quite wide, yet it is obligatory on the part of the Tribunal to be guided by the expression, i.e., just compensation. 10. In the instant case, the compensation awarded by the Tribunal under various heads reads thus; Head of claim Amount awarded (in rupees) Loss of dependancy Rs. 2,40,000/- Funeral expenses Rs. 15,000/- Loss of estate Rs. 15,000/- Total Rs. 2,70,000/- 11. During the course of arguments, the learned counsel for the appellants would place reliance on the judgment of this Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Assainar [ (2019) 4 KLT 39 ]. 12. In Assainar's case (supra), the questions formulated for decision were as follows; (i) Can multiplier method be accepted as the appropriate mode of assessment of compensation for loss of dependency in all cases involving death of children and if not, what shall be the mode for assessment of compensation under that head? (ii) What shall be the multiplier to be applied for computing compensation for loss of dependency in cases involving death of children and what shall be the additions and deductions to be made for determining the multiplicand for the said purpose? 13. In the said decision, this Court held that except in exceptional cases where the children are earning during their minority itself and positive evidence is let in, in the proceedings to establish the prospective services and pecuniary benefit expected from them, compensation in respect of school going children died in motor accidents above the age of 6 upto the age of 15, shall be uniformly computed and granted applying multiplier method. Paragraph 12 of the said decision reads thus; “12. It is a fact that only in a very few cases coming up before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals, evidence is let in by the parties. Even among the said cases, cases involving death of children is a minuscule. Paragraph 12 of the said decision reads thus; “12. It is a fact that only in a very few cases coming up before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals, evidence is let in by the parties. Even among the said cases, cases involving death of children is a minuscule. The practice adopted in such cases is to compute compensation for loss of dependency applying multiplier method based on a notional income arrived at subjectively by the Tribunal. It is on account of this reason that there has been no uniformity in the compensation granted by the Tribunals in the State. Except in exceptional cases where the children are earning during their minority, according to me, the expectation of the parents about their children would only be that they would be a helping hand for them in future, financially and otherwise. The said expectation may or may not materialise. For instance, an intelligent bright child may not financially or otherwise support his parents at their old age, and at the same time, the possibility of a child who is not that much bright and intelligent supporting the parents financially and otherwise at their old age cannot be ruled out. Be that as it may, after the introduction of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, which confers on all children in the age group of 6 to 14, right to free and compulsory education till the completion of his or her elementary education, irrespective of their financial and other backgrounds, the parents of all school going children in that age group who are not earning need to be treated alike in the matter of considering their expectations about their children. It is all the more so since it has come to light, situations where children from very poor backgrounds have achieved greater heights in life and situations vice versa. If such a view is not taken, there would be situations where different compensation would be granted in respect of children studying together, but hailing from different backgrounds. Having regard to the advancement of medical sciences, the reason that mortality rate is high among the children below the age of 10 also cannot be accepted. If such a view is not taken, there would be situations where different compensation would be granted in respect of children studying together, but hailing from different backgrounds. Having regard to the advancement of medical sciences, the reason that mortality rate is high among the children below the age of 10 also cannot be accepted. In the circumstances, according to me, except in exceptional cases where the children are earning during their minority itself and positive evidence is let in, in the proceedings to establish the prospective services and pecuniary benefit expected from them, compensation in respect of school going children died in motor accidents above the age of 6 up to the age of 15, shall be uniformly computed and granted applying multiplier method.” 14. In the said decision, this Court held further that, in cases involving death of children in the age group of 6 to 15 years after 2018 amendment to Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 compensation can be fixed appropriately on the basis of the compensation prescribed under Section 163A, namely, Rs. 5,00,000/-, after offsetting the effect of inflation on the real value of money. The multiplier to be applied for arriving at the compensation for dependency payable in cases involving the death of children can be ‘15’, and the mode of assessment is as provided for in the Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, viz, that one third of the notional income shall be deducted while determining the multiplicand, subject, of course, to the condition that the compensation shall not go below the compensation prescribed under the Act. This Court held that, no amount can be added to the notional income towards future prospects while determining the multiplicand for computing compensation for loss of dependency in cases involving death of children. On the issue as regards the manner in which notional income has to be arrived at in cases involving death of children, in a proceedings under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court held that the notional income of children died after the financial year 1995-96 can be determined applying the table showing the cost inflation index notified by the Government of India from time to time, the corresponding money value for Rs. 24,000/-, applying the cost inflation index upto the year 2018-19 and the nearest thousand of the money value arrived at. 24,000/-, applying the cost inflation index upto the year 2018-19 and the nearest thousand of the money value arrived at. Paragraphs 17 to 19 of the said decision reads thus; “17. What remains to be considered is the issue as regards the manner in which notional income has to be arrived at in cases involving death of children in a proceedings under Section 166 the Act. The plethora of precedents in matters relating to computation of compensation in cases involving children do not provide consistency or uniform guidelines for the tribunals and courts to approach the matter with certainty or with absolute confidence. As noted, in the context of cases involving death of children below the age of 10, except in cases where the children are actually earning during their minority itself, determination of notional income has been a mere process of guess work. Having regard to the large number of motor accident claims coming up for adjudication before the tribunals and the summary nature of the proceedings contemplated under the Act for adjudication of such claims, according to me, there is need for a simplified procedure for the said purpose so as to maintain uniformity in the awards. Except in exceptional cases where the circumstances warranted a different yardstick to be followed for arriving at the notional income, according to me, the statutory prescription contained in the Second Schedule can be the basis for fixing the notional income. 18. Once it is accepted that the multiplier to be applied while computing compensation for dependency is ‘15’ and the mode of assessment is as provided for in the Second Schedule to the Act, viz, that one third shall only be deducted from the notional income to determine the multiplicand, as it is found that the compensation payable under the un-amended Section 163A is Rs. 2,40,000/-, it can be seen, though it is provided in the Second Schedule that the notional income of a non-earning person shall be reckoned at Rs. 15,000/-, the notional income in respect of children below the age of 15 is actually contemplated to be reckoned at Rs. 24,000/-. In other words, having regard to the fact that Section 163A is a provision introduced only with effect from 14.11.1994, and having regard to the compensation granted by various courts in cases involving death of children during the said period, I am of the view that Rs. 24,000/-. In other words, having regard to the fact that Section 163A is a provision introduced only with effect from 14.11.1994, and having regard to the compensation granted by various courts in cases involving death of children during the said period, I am of the view that Rs. 24,000/- can be fixed, except in exceptional cases where a different yardstick has to be followed, as the notional income of the children died in accidents till the end of the financial year 1995-96. But the said amount cannot be reckoned as the notional income in cases arising in the subsequent years, as it is common knowledge that rupee value has come down drastically thereafter and the effect of inflation in the subsequent years has therefore, to be offsetted. In Chetan Malhotra v. Lala Ram ((2016) 2 KLT 2511 (Del.) : CDJ 2016 DHC 865), the Delhi High Court has made an endeavour to bring in uniformity in the compensation granted in cases involving death of children. In the said case, it was found that having regard to the fluctuating trends in consumer price index, the cost inflation index determined and notified by the Ministry of Finance in Government of India under Section 48 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, for each financial year would be a better method to offset the effect of inflation on the real value of money. The view expressed in the said case appears to be sound and can be accepted. A table showing the cost inflation index notified by the Government of India from time to time, the corresponding money value for Rs. 24,000/- applying the cost inflation index up to the year 2018-19 and the nearest thousand of the money value arrived at, is furnished hereunder for ready reference: SCHEDULE 2 Sl. A table showing the cost inflation index notified by the Government of India from time to time, the corresponding money value for Rs. 24,000/- applying the cost inflation index up to the year 2018-19 and the nearest thousand of the money value arrived at, is furnished hereunder for ready reference: SCHEDULE 2 Sl. No. Financial Year Cost Inflation Index Cost Inflation New Index Value Value to Nearest Thousand 1 1995-96 281 24,000 24,000 2 1996-97 305 26,050 26,000 3 1997-98 331 28,270 28,000 4 1998-99 351 29,979 30,000 5 1999-00 389 33,224 33,000 6 2000-01 406 34,676 35,000 7 2001-02 426 100 36,384 36,000 8 2002-03 105 38,204 38,000 9 2003-04 109 36,659 40,000 10 2004-05 113 41,114 41,000 11 2005-06 117 42,570 43,000 12 2006-07 122 44,389 44,000 13 2007-08 129 46,936 47,000 14 2008-09 137 49,847 50,000 15 2009-10 148 53,849 54,000 16 2010-11 167 60,762 61,000 17 2011-12 184 66,947 67,000 18 2012-13 200 72,769 73,000 19 2013-14 220 80,046 80,000 20 2014-15 240 87,322 87,000 21 2015-16 254 92,416 92,000 22 2016-17 264 96,055 96,000 23 2017-18 272 98,965 99,000 24 2018-19 280 101,876 102,000 In other words, the notional income of children died after the financial year 1995-96 can be determined applying the above table and I have no doubt, the same would certainly provide uniformity in the awards. 19. The outcome of the aforesaid discussion as regards compensation payable for loss of dependency in cases involving death of children can be summarised as follows: (1) Compensation in respect of school going children died in motor accidents above the age of 6 and upto the age of 15 shall be computed applying the multiplier method, and the multiplier to be applied shall be ‘15’, subject to the condition that the compensation shall not go below the prescribed amount in terms of the Second Schedule. (2) Except in exceptional cases, where different yardsticks have to be followed for arriving at the notional income having regard to the cogent and irrefutable evidence let in by the parties, the notional income of the deceased children in the age group of 6 to 15 shall be determined as in the Second Schedule, viz, Rs. 24,000/-, after making appropriate correction for offsetting the inflation, as indicated in the table furnished in paragraph 18 above. 24,000/-, after making appropriate correction for offsetting the inflation, as indicated in the table furnished in paragraph 18 above. (3) No amount need be added to the notional income towards future prospects and one third of the notional income has to be deducted towards personal expenses while computing compensation. (4) Except in exceptional cases, where the Tribunal finds on cogent and irrefutable evidence let in by the parties that the quantum of compensation arrived at in cases involving death of children below the age of 6 in the manner indicated in this judgment will not satisfy the requirement of just compensation, consolidated amounts can be granted by way of compensation. The consolidated amounts for the said purpose shall be as provided for in Section 163A of the Act as applicable to death cases namely, Rs. 2,40,000/-, subject to a progressive addition to be made from year to year, at the rate of Rs. 12,000/- for every year after 1995, for cases involving death upto the year 2018. Thereafter, the compensation shall be computed as provided for in the amended Section 163A, viz, Rs. 5,00,000/-, after offsetting the effect of inflation on the real value of money, as indicated in Clause (2) above.” 15. In the instant case, the deceased was aged 5 years. Towards dependency compensation, the Tribunal awarded Rs. 2,40,000/- (5,600 × 12 × 15 × ½). The accident occurred on 29.10.2016, i.e., during the financial year 2016-17. Applying the principle laid down in Assainar's case (supra), the dependency compensation has to be calculated taking a notional annual income of Rs. 96,000/-; applying the multiplier of 15; and deducting 1/3 towards the personal and living expenses of the deceased. In the result, the compensation under the head loss of dependency is re-fixed as Rs. 9,60,000/- (96,000 × 15 × 2/3). After deducting a consolidated amount of Rs. 2,40,000/- awarded by the Tribunal towards loss of dependency, the additional compensation payable under this head comes to Rs. 7,20,000/- (9,60,000 - 2,40,000). 16. In the impugned award, the Tribunal awarded Rs. 15,000/- towards funeral expenses and Rs. 15,000/- towards loss of estate. 17. In Rajesh [ (2013) 9 SCC 54 ] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court granted Rs. 25,000/- towards funeral expenses, Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of consortium and Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. 18. In the impugned award, the Tribunal awarded Rs. 15,000/- towards funeral expenses and Rs. 15,000/- towards loss of estate. 17. In Rajesh [ (2013) 9 SCC 54 ] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court granted Rs. 25,000/- towards funeral expenses, Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of consortium and Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of care and guidance for minor children. 18. In Pranay Sethi [ (2017) 16 SCC 680 ] the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that the head relating to loss of care and guidance for minor children does not exist. Though Rajesh refers to Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limited [ (2012) 6 SCC 421 ], it does not seem to follow the same. The conventional and traditional heads cannot be determined on percentage basis because that would not be an acceptable criterion. Unlike determination of income, the said heads have to be quantified. Any quantification must have a reasonable foundation. There can be no dispute over the fact that price index, fall in bank interest, escalation of rates in many a field have to be noticed. The Court cannot remain oblivious to the same. There has been a thumb rule in this aspect. Otherwise, there will be extreme difficulty in determination of the same and unless the thumb rule is applied, there will be immense variation lacking any kind of consistency as a consequence of which, the orders passed by the Tribunals and Courts are likely to be unguided. Therefore, the reasonable figures on conventional heads, namely, loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/-, Rs. 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively. The principle of revisiting the said heads is an acceptable principle. But the revisit should not be fact-centric or quantum-centric. The Apex Court observed that, it would be condign that the amounts that have quantified as above should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years, which will bring in consistency in respect of those heads. 19. The Apex Court observed that, it would be condign that the amounts that have quantified as above should be enhanced on percentage basis in every three years and the enhancement should be at the rate of 10% in a span of three years, which will bring in consistency in respect of those heads. 19. In Santosh Devi v. Mahaveer Singh [ (2018) 9 SCC 146 ] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court granted compensation on conventional heads, in terms of the figures standardised by the Constitution Bench in the year 2017, in Pranay Sethi, to the wife and children of one Puran Chand, who died in a motor accident, which occurred on 30.12.1992. 20. In Sureshchandra Bagmal Doshi v. New India Assurance Company Limited [ (2018) 15 SCC 649 ] the Apex Court granted the figures on conventional heads standardised by the Constitution Bench in the year 2017, in Pranay Sethi, i.e., Rs. 15,000/- as loss of estate; Rs. 40,000/- towards loss of consortium; and Rs. 15,000/- as funeral expenses to the parents [appellants before the Apex Court], who lost their only daughter in a motor accident which occurred on 16.08.1998. In the said decision, Rs. 40,000/- granted in Pranay Sethi towards loss of consortium was granted to the appellants, who are the parents of the deceased, towards loss of love and affection. Paragraphs 1 and 14 of the said decision read thus; “1. Fate can be cruel. This is a tragic case where the only daughter of a lawyer husband and a doctor wife, who got married early and unfortunately became a widow also at a young age, died in a vehicular accident, which took place on 16.8.1998. The claim of the parents (appellants herein) in respect of this unfortunate demise forms the subject matter of the present appeal. xxx xxx xxx 14. Now coming to the last aspect, i.e., the conventional heads, in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi [ (2017) 16 SCC 680 ], it has been standardised at Rs. 15,000 for loss of estate; Rs. 40,000 towards loss of consortium (in the present case loss of love and affection) and Rs. 15,000 towards funeral expenses. The total amount, thus, would be Rs. 70,000, which as per the said judgment is capable of being enhanced @ 10 per cent in the span of every three years. 15,000 for loss of estate; Rs. 40,000 towards loss of consortium (in the present case loss of love and affection) and Rs. 15,000 towards funeral expenses. The total amount, thus, would be Rs. 70,000, which as per the said judgment is capable of being enhanced @ 10 per cent in the span of every three years. However, we are still within the window of three years.” “underline supplied” 21. In Magma General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nanu Ram @ Chuhru Ram [ (2018) 18 SCC 130 ], after referring to the decision in Pranay Sethi, the Apex Court held that in legal parlance, ‘consortium’ is a compendious term which encompasses ‘spousal consortium’, ‘parental consortium’ and ‘filial consortium’. The right to consortium would include the company, care, help, comfort, guidance, solace and affection of the deceased, which is a loss to his family. With respect to a spouse, it would include sexual relations with the deceased spouse. Spousal consortium is generally defined as rights pertaining to the relationship of a husband-wife which allows compensation to the surviving spouse for loss of ‘company, society, cooperation, affection, and aid of the other in every conjugal relation’. Parental consortium is granted to the child upon the premature death of a parent, for loss of ‘parental aid, protection, affection, society, discipline, guidance and training’. Filial consortium is the right of the parents to compensation in the case of an accidental death of a child. An accident leading to the death of a child causes great shock and agony to the parents and family of the deceased. The greatest agony for a parent is to lose their child during their lifetime. Children are valued for their love, affection, companionship and their role in the family unit. 22. In Magma General Insurance the Apex Court held that consortium is a special prism reflecting changing norms about the status and worth of actual relationships. Modern jurisdictions world-over have recognised that the value of a child's consortium far exceeds the economic value of the compensation awarded in the case of the death of a child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child. Most jurisdictions therefore permit parents to be awarded compensation under loss of consortium on the death of a child. The amount awarded to the parents is a compensation for loss of the love, affection, care and companionship of the deceased child. The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial legislation aimed at providing relief to the victims or their families, in cases of genuine claims. In a case where parents have lost their minor child, or unmarried son or daughter, the parents are entitled to be awarded loss of consortium under the head of filial consortium. Parental Consortium is awarded to children who lose their parents in motor vehicle accidents under the Motor Vehicles Act. The Apex Court held further that, the amount of compensation to be awarded as consortium will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under ‘loss of consortium’ as laid down in Pranay Sethi. 23. In Magma General Insurance, the deceased was aged 24 years, who was engaged in the business of manufacturing ‘namkeen products’, who died in a motor accident which occurred on 01.12.2013. The father, brother and sister of the deceased filed claim petition under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The Claims Tribunal did not award any compensation to the brother of the deceased, as he could not be considered to be a dependent. Compensation was awarded to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased, who were held to be dependents. The father and sister of the deceased filed appeal before the Punjab and Haryana High Court for enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Claims Tribunal. The High Court found that the Claims Tribunal used the wrong principle for application of multiplier. The multiplier ought to have been taken on the basis of the age of the deceased and not that of his father. The High Court, while re-assessing the compensation granted a sum of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rs. 50,000/- × 2) towards loss of love and affection to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased. The insurer filed S.L.P. before the Apex Court contending, inter alia, that the father and sister of the deceased could not be considered as dependants, and were not entitled to compensation. In case of death of bachelor, only the mother could be considered to be a dependant. The grant of Rs. 1,00,000/- on account of loss of love and affection, and Rs. In case of death of bachelor, only the mother could be considered to be a dependant. The grant of Rs. 1,00,000/- on account of loss of love and affection, and Rs. 25,000/- towards funeral expenses is erroneous. It was contended that only Rs. 30,000/- could have been awarded as per the judgment in Pranay Sethi. [i.e., loss of estate - Rs. 15,000/- and funeral expenses - Rs. 15,000/-] The Apex Court held that, considering that the deceased was living in a village, where he was residing with his aged father, who was about 65 years old, and an unmarried sister, the High Court correctly considered them to be dependants of the deceased, and made a deduction of 1/3rd towards personal expenses of the deceased. [Para.16 @ page 135 of SCC] The Apex Court found that the deceased was a bachelor, whose mother had pre-deceased him. The father of the deceased was about 65 years old and his sister was unmarried. The deceased was contributing a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival. Therefore, the Apex Court held that the father and unmarried sister of the deceased would be entitled to compensation under his dependants. [Para.18 @ page 136 of SCC] Dealing with the contention of the insurer that the High Court had wrongly awarded Rs. 1,00,000/- towards loss of love and affection, and Rs. 25,000/- towards funeral expenses, the Apex Court, after quoting Para.52 of the decision in Pranay Sethi, decreased the compensation under the head funeral expenses from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 15,000/-. However, the amount awarded under the head loss of love and affection was maintained. After explaining the concept of spousal consortium, parental consortium and filial consortium, the Apex Court deem it appropriate to award the father and unmarried sister of the deceased, an amount of Rs. 40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium. 24. In view of the law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi, which was followed in Santhosh Devi and Suresh Chandra Bagmaldoshi referred to supra, the compensation payable under the conventional heads of loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses should be Rs. 15,000/-, 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid figures quantified by the Apex Court should be enhanced on percentage basis, at the rate of 10%, in a span of every three years. 25. 15,000/-, 40,000/- and Rs. 15,000/- respectively. The aforesaid figures quantified by the Apex Court should be enhanced on percentage basis, at the rate of 10%, in a span of every three years. 25. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd., after referring to the decision in Pranay Sethi, the surviving spouse is entitled for spousal consortium; children of the deceased are entitled for parental consortium; and parents of a deceased child, who died in a motor accident, are entitled for filial consortium. The amount of compensation that has to be awarded will be governed by the principles of awarding compensation under the head loss of consortium, as laid down in Pranay Sethi. 26. In Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. [ (2006) 5 SCC 72 ] one of the contentions raised was that, any direction issued by the Apex Court in exercise of power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do proper justice and the reasons, if any, given for exercising such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by that Court under Article 141. It was also pointed out that, other Courts do not have the power similar to that conferred on the Apex Court under Article 142 and any attempt to follow the exercise of such power will lead to incongruous and disastrous results. The Apex Court left open that question, observing as follows; “Though there appears to be some merit in the first respondent's submission, we do not propose to examine that aspect.” Though the said question was left open, the Apex Court observed as follows in Para.26 of the judgment; “26. ……. Many a time, after declaring the law, this Court in the operative part of the judgment, gives some directions which may either relax the application of law or exempt the case on hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts or in view of the uncertainty of law till then, to do complete justice. While doing so, normally it is not stated that such direction/order is in exercise of power under Article 142. It is not uncommon to find that Courts have followed not the law declared, but the exemption/relaxation made while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142. While doing so, normally it is not stated that such direction/order is in exercise of power under Article 142. It is not uncommon to find that Courts have followed not the law declared, but the exemption/relaxation made while moulding the relief in exercise of power under Article 142. When the High Courts repeatedly follow a direction issued under Article 142, by treating it as the law declared by this Court, incongruously the exemption/relaxation granted under Article 142 becomes the law, though at variance with the law declared by this Court. The Courts should therefore be careful to ascertain and follow the ratio decidendi, and not the relief given on the special facts, exercising power under Article 142. ……” 27. In State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih [ (2014) 8 SCC 883 ] a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court affirmed the view taken in ABS Marine Products' case (supra) holding that, the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court held further that, the directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. Paras.11 to 13 of the judgment read thus; “11. Article 136 of the Constitution of India was legislatively intended to be exercised by the Highest Court of the Land, with scrupulous adherence to the settled judicial principle well established by precedents in our jurisprudence. Article 136 of the Constitution is a corrective jurisdiction that vests a discretion in the Supreme Court to settle the law clearly and make the law operational to make it a binding precedent for the future instead of keeping it vague. In short, it declares the law, as under Article 141 of the Constitution. 12. Article 142 of the Constitution is supplementary in nature and cannot supplant the substantive provisions, though they are not limited by the substantive provisions in the Statute. In short, it declares the law, as under Article 141 of the Constitution. 12. Article 142 of the Constitution is supplementary in nature and cannot supplant the substantive provisions, though they are not limited by the substantive provisions in the Statute. It is a power that gives preference to equity over law. It is a justice oriented approach as against the strict rigors of the law. The directions issued by the Court can normally be categorised into one, in the nature of moulding of relief and the other, as the declaration of law. ‘Declaration of Law’ as contemplated in Article 141 of the Constitution : is the speech express or necessarily implied by the Highest Court of the land. This Court in the case of Indian Bank v. ABS Marine Products (P) Ltd. [ (2006) 5 SCC 72 ], Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar [ (2006) 8 SCC 381 ] and in State of U.P. v. Neeraj Awasthi [ (2006) 1 SCC 667 ], has expounded the principle and extolled the power of Article 142 of the Constitution of India to new heights by laying down that the directions issued under Article 142 do not constitute a binding precedent unlike Article 141 of the Constitution of India. They are direction issued to do proper justice and exercise of such power, cannot be considered as law laid down by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The Court has compartmentalised and differentiated the relief in the operative portion of the judgment by exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution as against the law declared. The directions of the Court under Article 142 of the Constitution, while moulding the relief, that relax the application of law or exempt the case in hand from the rigour of the law in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances do not comprise the ratio decidendi and therefore lose its basic premise of making it a binding precedent. This Court on the qui vive has expanded the horizons of Article 142 of the Constitution by keeping it outside the purview of Article 141 of the Constitution and by declaring it a direction of the Court that changes its complexion with the peculiarity in the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. This Court on the qui vive has expanded the horizons of Article 142 of the Constitution by keeping it outside the purview of Article 141 of the Constitution and by declaring it a direction of the Court that changes its complexion with the peculiarity in the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. Therefore, in our opinion, the decisions of the Court based on different scales of Article 136 and Article 142 of the Constitution of India cannot be best weighed on the same grounds of reasoning and thus in view of the aforesaid discussion, there is no conflict in the views expressed in the first two judgments and the latter judgment.” 28. In Magma General Insurance Company Ltd., the Apex Court maintained the compensation awarded by the High Court at the rate of Rs. 50,000/- to the father and unmarried sister of the deceased towards loss of love and affection. However, the compensation under the head funeral expenses was decreased from Rs. 25,000/- to Rs. 15,000/-, after quoting para 52 of the decision in Pranay Sethi. After explaining the concept of spousal consortium, parental consortium and filial consortium, the Apex Court awarded the father and unmarried sister of the deceased an amount of Rs. 40,000/- each for loss of filial consortium. 29. As already noticed, the compensation that has to be awarded to the surviving spouse towards spousal consortium; to the children of the deceased towards parental consortium; or to the parents of the deceased child towards filial consortium, is for loss of love and affection and such other matters. In such circumstances, once the surviving spouse is awarded compensation towards spousal consortium; or the children of the deceased are awarded compensation towards parental consortium; or the parents of the deceased child are awarded compensation towards filial consortium, they are not entitled for award of further compensation under the head loss love and affection, as it would result in duplication or overlapping of compensation under the relevant heads. 30. The concept of spousal consortium to the surviving spouse; parental consortium to the children of the deceased; and filial consortium to the parents of the deceased child laid down by the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. does not speak anything as to the right of siblings to get compensated under the head loss of consortium. 30. The concept of spousal consortium to the surviving spouse; parental consortium to the children of the deceased; and filial consortium to the parents of the deceased child laid down by the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. does not speak anything as to the right of siblings to get compensated under the head loss of consortium. In Magma, after noticing the fact that the mother of the deceased had pre-deceased him, his father was aged 65 years old, his sister was unmarried, and the deceased was contributing a part of his meagre income to the family for their sustenance and survival, the Apex Court granted a sum of Rs. 40,000/- as compensation to unmarried sister of the deceased under the head filial consortium, after maintaining the compensation (Rs. 50,000/- × 2) awarded by the High Court towards loss of love and affection, which can only be treated as a direction issued by the Apex Court in exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to do proper justice and the exercise of such power cannot be considered as law laid down by the Apex Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. 31. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Pranay Sethi and Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. referred to supra, Rs. 15,000/-. awarded by the Tribunal under the head funeral expenses; and Rs. 15,000/- awarded under the head loss of estate cannot be said to be on the lower side, which require no enhancement in this appeal. 32. The Tribunal awarded no compensation under the head loss of consortium. In view of the decisions referred to supra, this Court deem it appropriate to grant a sum of Rs. 80,000/- (40,000 × 2) to appellants 1 and 2 under the head filial consortium. 33. As already noticed, the concept of spousal consortium to the surviving spouse; parental consortium to the children of the deceased; and filial consortium to the parents of the deceased child laid down by the Apex Court in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. does not speak anything as to the right of siblings to get compensated under the head loss of consortium. Therefore, the 3rd appellant, who is the sibling of the deceased, is not entitled for payment of any compensation under the head loss of consortium or loss of love and affection. 34. Therefore, the 3rd appellant, who is the sibling of the deceased, is not entitled for payment of any compensation under the head loss of consortium or loss of love and affection. 34. Towards pain and suffering, no amount has been awarded by the Tribunal. 35. In Jyni v. Raphel P.T. [ 2016 (2) KHC 870 ] a Division Bench of this Court held that, death in an accident is generally the result of violent impact on the body resulting in serious injuries causing severe pain. The magnitude of the ordeal may vary from case to case depending upon the nature of injuries sustained. In cases of instantaneous deaths also pain and suffering is invariably present, as in the case of survival for hours or days. In cases of instantaneous death as well as cases where the deceased was unconscious between the time of accident and the time of his death, some notional amount is payable under the head pain and suffering. A slightly higher amount can be awarded under this head, if the death is not instantaneous. Therefore, a conventional amount in the range of Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 15,000/- could be awarded under the head pain and suffering in such cases. 36. In the instant case, the deceased succumbed to the injuries on the next day of the accident. In such circumstances, this Court is of the view that the appellants are entitled for a compensation of Rs. 10,000/- towards the head pain and suffering. 37. In the result, the appellants are entitled for payment of an additional compensation of Rs. 8,10,000/-[Rupees Eight lakh and ten thousand only] (7,20,000 + 80,000 + 10,000), in this appeal, which will carry interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of petition till realisation. The additional compensation granted in this appeal, excluding that granted to appellants 1 and 2 under the head filial consortium, shall be apportioned among the appellants in the ratio 40 : 50 : 10. The respondent insurer shall satisfy the additional compensation granted in this appeal, together with interest, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, after deducting the liability, if any, of the appellants/claimants towards Balance Court Fee and Legal Benefit Fund. The respondent insurer shall satisfy the additional compensation granted in this appeal, together with interest, within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment, after deducting the liability, if any, of the appellants/claimants towards Balance Court Fee and Legal Benefit Fund. The insurer shall also deduct the liability of the appellants/claimants towards additional Court Fee in this appeal, in view of the amendment made to sub-rule (3) of Rule 397 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 with effect from 16.01.2015, and the same shall be deposited before this Court. Registry shall calculate the additional Court Fee payable in this appeal and a statement to that effect shall also be enclosed along with the certified copy of the judgment. The disbursement of the amount to the appellants/claimants shall be in terms of the directives issued by this Court in Circular No. 3 of 2019 dated 06.09.2019 and clarified further in Official Memorandum No. D1-62475/2016 dated 07.11.2019. The additional compensation payable to the 3rd appellant/3rd claimant, who is minor, shall be deposited in fixed deposit in a Nationalised Bank, till she attain majority. The appellants to provide their Bank account details before the Tribunal, with copy to the learned Standing Counsel for the insurer, within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. 38. This appeal is disposed of as above. No order as to costs.