JUDGMENT : Prakash Padia, J. 1. The petitioner has preferred the present writ petition with the prayer to issue a writ in the nature of quo-warranto against the Respondent No. 6 to vacate the post of Gram Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Gohra Alamgirpur, Block Simbhawi, Tehsil and District Hapur Forthwith with the further prayer to issue a mandamus directing the concerned respondent to restrain the Respondent No. 6 from functioning as Gram Pradhan of the village in question. 2. Facts in brief as contained in the writ petition are that in the Panchayat General Elections of 2015 the respondent No. 6 namely Sanchit son of Ramkishan had filed his nomination papers on 23.11.2015 for the post of Gram Pradhan of village Panchayat Gohra Alamgirpur, Block Simbhawi, Tehsil and District Hapur. General Election of Gram Panchayat in question was held on 1.12.2015 in which respondent No. 6 was elected as Gram Pradhan. The petitioner came to know regarding the fact that respondent No. 6 was elected as Gram Pradhan for the first time in the month of April, 2017 and immediately thereafter he moved an application asking certain information's under Right to Information Act, 2005 from the office of District Inspector of Schools, Hapur. It is contended that the petitioner came to know that the respondent No. 6 was working on the post of Assistant Clerk in an institution namely Sri Gandhi Smarak Inter College, Hapur (hereinafter called as 'Institution'). 3. It is stated in the writ petition that the respondent No. 6 has not resigned from the post of clerk prior to election of Gram Pradhan nor after he was elected on the post of Gram Pradhan. It is further stated in the writ petition that the institution in question is a Government aided Institution and all its teachers and employees are getting their salary from State Exchequer in terms of Uttar Pradesh High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salaries of Teachers and Other Employees) Act, 1971. It is further stated in the writ petition that the post on which the respondent No. 6 is working comes within the purview of the office of profit and attracts disqualification under Section 5-A (c) of U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. 4. It is further stated in the writ petition that Part-IX of the Constitution of India was inserted by the Seventy Third Amendment Act, 1992 w.e.f. 24.4.1993. 4. It is further stated in the writ petition that Part-IX of the Constitution of India was inserted by the Seventy Third Amendment Act, 1992 w.e.f. 24.4.1993. By the aforesaid amendment Article 243-F was also inserted in the constitution. Article 243-F is reproduced below: "243F Disqualification for membership- (1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being, a member of a Panchayat- (a) if he is so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of elections to the Legislature of the State concerned: Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than twenty-five years of age, if he has attained the age of twenty-one years; (b) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by the Legislature of the State. (2) If any question arises as to whether a member of a Panchayat has become subject to any of the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1) the question shall be referred for the decision of such authority and in such manner as the Legislature of State may, by law, provide." 5. It is further stated in the writ petition that the sub clause (a) of Article 191 of the Constitution of India deals with the disqualifications for membership of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State. Relevant portion of Article 191 is reproduced below: "Article 191 Disqualification for membership- (1) A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of the Legislative Assembly or Legislative Council of a State- (a) if he holds any office of profit under the Government of India or the Government of any State specified in the First Schedule, other than an office declared by the Legislature of the State by law not to disqualify its holder;" 6. In this view of the matter it is argued that in terms of the provisions contained under Section 5-A (c) of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 as well as under Article 191 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India since the respondent No. 6 holds the office of clerk in the institution in question which comes within the purview of office of profit as such the respondent No. 6 was not qualified to contest the election of Gram Pradhan. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Sarita Devi v. State of U.P. and others, 2010 (10) ADJ 484 (DB). 7. It is further argued that the respondent No. 6 being disqualified has no authority to hold the office of Gram Pradhan and writ of quo-warranto be issued. It is further argued that the petitioner not being a candidate in the election could not have filed an election petition and the only remedy left to the petitioner is to challenge the election by means of filing the present writ petition. In this view of the matter it is argued that the writ of quo-warranto be issued against the respondent No. 6. 8. Learned Standing Counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 1, 2 and 4 as well as Sri Ashish Kumar Singh learned counsel for respondent No. 6 argued that the present writ petition filed on behalf of petitioner is not at all maintainable. It is further argued that the present writ petition is barred by the provisions of Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of India. It is further argued that the election could only be challenged by filing election petition and not by filing a writ petition before this Court in the nature of quo warranto. 9. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the present writ petition is decided finally in terms of the Rules of the Court. 10. We have heard the submissions of the counsel for the parties and have perused the record. The petitioner has preferred the present writ petition challenging the election of respondent No. 6 as Gram Pradhan of Gram Panchayat Gohra Alamgirpur, Block Simbhawi, Tehsil and District Hapur. It is relevant to mention hear that the petitioner in paragraph-2 of the present writ petition mentioned that the petitioner is the elector/voter of Gram Panchayat in question from which the respondent No. 6 has been elected as Gram Pradhan. 11. From the pleadings of the petitioner as stated above, it is clear that the challenge in the present writ petition is essentially to the election of the respondent No. 6. The election of the Gram Pradhan was held in accordance with the provisions contained of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. 11. From the pleadings of the petitioner as stated above, it is clear that the challenge in the present writ petition is essentially to the election of the respondent No. 6. The election of the Gram Pradhan was held in accordance with the provisions contained of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. The aforesaid election could only be challenged by filing an election petition as provided under the relevant rules. Whether election to an office of Gram Panchayat has to be challenged under the Statutory rules and whether a writ of quo-warranto should be entertained by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, are the questions to be answered. 12. Under Section 5-A of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act 1947 (here-in-after called as Act 1947') deals with the disqualification of the membership. The relevant portion of Section 5-A of the Act of 1947 is reproduced below: "[5-A. Disqualification of membership-A person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being [the Pradhan or] a member of a Gram Panchayat, if he- (a) is so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purpose of elections of the State Legislature. Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than twenty-five years of age, if he has attained the age of twenty-one-years. Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than twenty-five years of age, if he has attained the age of twenty-one-years. (b) is a salaried servant of the Gram Panchayat or a Nayaya Panchayat; (c) holds any office of profit under a State Government or the Central Government or a [local authority other than a Gram Panchayat or Nyay Panchayat; or a Board, Body or Corporation owned or controlled by a State Government or the Central Government; (d) has been dismissed from the service of State Government, the Central Government or a local authority or a Nyaya Panchayat for misconduct; (e) is in arrears of any tax, fee, rate or any other dues payable by him to the Gram Panchayat, Kshettra Panchayat or Zila Panchayat for such period as may be prescribed, or has, in spite of being required to do so by the Gram Panchayat, Kshettra Panchayat or Zila Panchayat failed to deliver to it any record or property belonging to it which had come into his possession by virtue of his holding any office under it; (f) is an undischarged involvement; (g) has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude; (h) has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding three months for contravention for any order made under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955; (I) has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding six months or to transportation for contravention of any order made under the Essential Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1946 or the U.P. Control of Supplies (Temporary Powers) Act, 1947; (j) has been sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding three months under the U.P. Excise Act, 1910; (k) has been convicted of an offence under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; (l) has been convicted of an election offence; (m) has been convicted of an offence under the U.P. Removal of Social Disabilities Act, 1947 or the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955; or (n) has been removed from office under sub-clauses (iii) or (iv) of Clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 95 unless such period, as has been provided in that behalf in the said section or such lesser period as the State Government may have ordered in any particular case, has elapsed; Provided that the period of disqualification under Clauses (d), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l) or (m) shall be five years from such date as may be prescribed. Provided further that the disqualification under Clause (e) shall cease upon payment of arrears or delivery of the record of property, as the case may be; Provided also that a disqualification under any of the clauses referred to in the first proviso may in the manner prescribed, be removed by the State Government." 13. Under Section 6-A of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, it is provided that if any question arises as to whether a person has become subject to any disqualification mentioned in Section 5-A or in sub-section (1) of Section 6, the question shall be referred to the prescribed authority for his decision and his decision shall, subject to the result of any appeal as may be prescribed, be final. Section 5 and 6-A of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 is reproduced below: "6-A. Decision on question as to disqualifications.-If any question arises as to whether a person has become subject to any disqualification mentioned in Section 5-A or in sub-section (1) of Section 6, the question shall be referred to the prescribed authority for his decision and his decision shall,' subject to the result of any appeal as may be prescribed, be final." 14. Rules were also framed by the State Government for settlement of dispute of disqualification in the year 1994 namely U.P. Panchayat Raj (Computation of period of Five years for removal of Disqualification, Fixation of period of Dues etc and Settlement of Dispute of Disqualification) Rules, 1994. Under Rule 4 of the Rules of 1994 it is provided that an application for removal of the disqualification under clauses (d), (f), (g), (i), (j), (k), (l) or (m), of Section 5-A of the Act of 1947, shall be in the form given in the Appendix and shall show the grounds upon which the applicant claims removal of the disqualification. It is further stated under Sub Rule (2) of the Rule 4 that the application shall be presented to Sub-Divisional Officer of Sub-Division concerned. It is further provided under Sub-rule (3) of Rule 4 that the Sub-Divisional Officer may, after such inquiry as he may deem fit either accept the application and remove the disqualification or reject the application. Under Rule 5 of the Rules of 1994 it is clearly stated that the question regarding disqualification shall be referred to the Tehsildar as referred under Section 6-A of the Act of 1947. Under Rule 5 of the Rules of 1994 it is clearly stated that the question regarding disqualification shall be referred to the Tehsildar as referred under Section 6-A of the Act of 1947. Relevant Rules namely Rule 4, 5, 6 as well as Appendix contained under the Rules of 1994 are reproduced below: "4. Removal of disqualification under Section 5-A.-(1) An application for removal of the disqualification under clauses (d), (f), (g), (I), (j), (k), (l) or (m), of Section 5-A of the Act, shall be in the form given in the Appendix and shall show the grounds upon which the applicant claims removal of the disqualification. (2) The application shall be presented to Sub-Divisional Officer of Sub-Division concerned. (3) The Sub-Divisional Officer may, after such enquiry as he deems fit, either accept the application and remove the disqualification or reject the application. (4) A copy of the order passed under sub-rule (3), removing the disqualification shall be sent to the secretary of the concerned Gram Panchayat and to the Assistant Development Officer (Panchayat) and to the concerned Kshettra Panchayat. 5. Reference under Section 6-A pertaining to disqualification.-(a) Where any question as is referred to in Section 6-A of the Act is raised otherwise than in a claim or objection, it shall be referred to the Tehsildar by the officer or authority before whom such question arises for consideration. (2) On the receipt of a reference under sub-rule (1) the Tehsildar shall fix the date, time and place for its hearing and shall give notice to the parties concerned. (3) The Tehsildar shall, after hearing the parties and after such other enquires as he deems fit, give his decision of the question referred to him. (4) Any person aggrieved by the order of the Tehsildar may, within fifteen days of the date of such order, prefer an appeal to the Sub-Divisional Officer. (5) The Sub-Divisional Officer shall, after notice to the parties and after hearing such of them as desire to be heard, dispose of the appeal. (6) A copy of the final order passed on the question referred to the Tehsildar as modified in appeal, if any, shall be forwarded to the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat and to the Assistant Development Officer (Panchayat) of the concerned Kshettra Panchayat. 6. (6) A copy of the final order passed on the question referred to the Tehsildar as modified in appeal, if any, shall be forwarded to the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat and to the Assistant Development Officer (Panchayat) of the concerned Kshettra Panchayat. 6. Disqualification on account of nonpayment of tax, etc.-(1) A person shall be disqualified under clause (c) of Section 5-A of the Act for being chosen as, and for being a member of the Gram Panchayat, if he is in arrears of any tax, fee, rate or any other dues payable by him to the Gram Panchayat, Kshettra Panchayat or Zila Panchayat for a period exceeding one year or if he fails to produce certificate from the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat, Khand Vikas Adhikari or Mukhya Adhikari, as the case may be, regarding delivery of the record of property belonging to Gram Panchayat, Kshettra Panchayat or Zila Panchayat which had come into his possession by virtue of his holding any office under it: Provided that in the case of a person who is a candidate for being elected or is being nominated or appointed to any office in the Gram Panchayat the said disqualification shall cease as soon as the arrears paid on before his nomination paper for election is rejected or he is nominated or appointed, as the case may be. (2) The secretary of the Gram Panchayat shall, in Form II given in the Appendix, prepare a list of all such persons, who, according to the record of the Gram Panchayat, are in arrears of any tax, fee, rate or any other dues as aforesaid. (3) the list prepared under sub-rule (2) shall be published by affixing it on Notice Board of the office of the Gram Panchayat and an announcement to this effect shall also be made by beat of drum in the Panchayat area. (4) The name of the person who has paid, whether under protest or otherwise, all the arrears shown against his name in the list shall be struck off the list. (4) The name of the person who has paid, whether under protest or otherwise, all the arrears shown against his name in the list shall be struck off the list. A receipt issued by the Secretary of the Gram Panchayat, Khand Vikas Adhikari or Mukhya Adhikari, as the case may be, in payment of any such amount shall be conclusive proof of the fact that the person is not in arrears of tax, fee or rate, as the case may be." Appendix From [Rule 4 (1)] Application for removal of disqualifications in clause (d),(f),(g),(h),(I),(J),(K),(l) or (m) of Section 5-A of the United Provinces Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. 1. Name of applicant……………….. 2. Father’s/Husband’s name…………… 3. Village/Gram Panchayat…………… 4. House Number…………………… 5. Details of Disqualification……………… 6. Date/Dates from which disqualification incurred……… 7. Grounds for removal of disqualification…………… 8. Remarks…………………………. Place……………… Signature…………… Date……………… Name………………. Note-Except of the electoral roll of the concerned territorial constituency of the Gram Panchayat shall be enclosed herewith. 15. Article 243-ZG of the Constitution of India provides for Bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters which is quoted below: "Art. 243ZG. Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution,- (a) the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under article 243ZA shall not be called in question in any Court; (b) no election to any Municipality shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the Legislature of a State." 16. It would be better to consider as to whether bar provided under Article 243-ZG (b) is an absolute bar or not. At least from the language of clause (b), it is clear that the bar is absolute Normally, where such a bar is expressed in a negative language as is the case here, it has to be held that the tone of clause (b) is mandatory and the bar created therein is absolute. 17. Supreme Court in the case of Jaspal Singh Arora v. State of M.P., (1998) 9 SCC 594 , has already held the bar to be absolute. 17. Supreme Court in the case of Jaspal Singh Arora v. State of M.P., (1998) 9 SCC 594 , has already held the bar to be absolute. In this case election of the petitioner as the President of the Municipal Council was challenged by a writ petition under Article 226, which was allowed setting aside the election of the petitioner. In paragraph 3 of the aforesaid judgment the Supreme Court observed as follows: "3. ... it is clear that the election could not be called in question except by an election petition as provided under that Act. The bar to interference by Courts in electoral matters contained in Article 243-ZG of the Constitution was apparently overlooked by the High Court in allowing the writ petition. Apart from the bar under Article 243-ZG, on settled principles interference under Article 226 of the Constitution for the purpose of setting aside election to a municipality was not called for because of the statutory provision for election petition...." 18. Again the Supreme Court in the case of Gurdeep Singh Dhillon v. Satpal, (2006) 10 SCC 616 , after quoting Article 243-ZG(b) was pleased to observed that the shortcut of filing the writ petition and invoking constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226/227 was not permissible and the only remedy available to challenge the election was by raising the election dispute under the local statute. 19. Apart from the same the Supreme Court in the case of Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal, AIR 1982 SC 983 , has laid down following: "A right to elect, fundamental though it is to democracy, is, anomalously enough, neither a fundamental right nor a common law right. It is pure and simple, a statutory right. So is the right to be elected. So is the right to dispute an election. Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to be elected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creations they are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. An election petition is not an action at common law, nor in equity. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which the statute makes and applies. It is a special jurisdiction, and a special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance with the statute creating it. It is a statutory proceeding to which neither the common law nor the principles of equity apply but only those rules which the statute makes and applies. It is a special jurisdiction, and a special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordance with the statute creating it. Concepts familiar to common law and equity must remain strangers to election law unless statutorily embodied. A Court has no right to resort to them on considerations of alleged policy because policy in such matters as those, relating to the trial of election disputes, is what the statute lays down. In the trial of election disputes, Court is put in a strait-jacket. Thus the entire election process commencing from the issuance of the notification calling upon a constituency to elect a member or members right up to the final resolution of the dispute, if any, concerning the election is regulated by the Representation of the People Act, 1951, different stages of the process being dealt with by different provisions of the Act. There can be no election to Parliament or the State Legislature except as provided by the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and again, no such election may be questioned except in the manner provided by the Representation of the People Act. So the Representation of the People Act has been held to be a complete and self-contained code within which must be found any rights claimed in relation to an election or an election dispute.........." 20. The Supreme Court in the case of K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan and another, (1999) 4 SCC 526 , held that in such a situation writ of quo-warranto is not maintainable. Relevant paragraphs of the aforesaid judgment namely paragraph, 27, 29, 31 and 34 are quoted below: "27. We are afraid, we are not in position to agree with the contention that K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan and another, (1999) 4 SCC 526 , is applicable to the present situation. Here the appellant had very specifically asserted in his counter-affidavit that he did not belong to the Christian religion and that he further asserted that he was a person belonging to the Scheduled Caste. Therefore, the Caste status of the appellant was a disputed question of fact depending upon the evidence. Such was not the case in K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan and another, (1999) 4 SCC 526 . Therefore, the Caste status of the appellant was a disputed question of fact depending upon the evidence. Such was not the case in K. Venkatachalam v. A Swamickan and another, (1999) 4 SCC 526 . Every case is an authority for what is actually decided in that. We do not find any general proposition that even where there is a specific remedy of filing an Election Petition and even when there is a disputed question of fact regarding the caste of a person who has been elected from the reserved constituency still remedy of writ petition under Article 226 would be available. 29. Shri Gupta, however, further argued that in the present case what was prayed for was a writ of quo warranto and in fact the election of the appellant was not called in question. It was argued that since the writ petitioners came to know about the appellant not belonging to the Scheduled Caste and since the post of the Chairperson was reserved only for the Scheduled Caste, therefore, the High Court was justified in entering into that question as to whether he really belongs to Scheduled Caste. 31. It is an admitted position that Ward No. 8 was reserved for Scheduled Cast and so also the Post of Chairperson. Therefore, though indirectly worded, what was in challenge in reality was the validity of the election of the appellant. According to the writ petitioners, firstly the appellant could not have been elected as a Ward member nor could he be elected as the Chairperson as he did not belong to the Scheduled Caste. We can understand the eventuality where a person who is elected as a Scheduled Caste candidate, renounces his caste after the elections by conversion to some other religion. Then a valid writ petition for quo warranto could certainly lie because then it is not the election of such person which would be in challenge but his subsequently continuing in his capacity as a person belonging to a particular caste. 34. Once it is held that the aforementioned case was of no help to the respondents, the only other necessary inference which emerges is that the bar under Article 243-ZG would spring in action." 21. 34. Once it is held that the aforementioned case was of no help to the respondents, the only other necessary inference which emerges is that the bar under Article 243-ZG would spring in action." 21. The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has also noticed the submission as to whether the writ of quo warranto can be issued when an incumbent is holding an elected office by virtue of election. The answer was given in negative. It was held that challenge essentially is to the election of an elected candidate and hence the bar under Article 243-ZG is attracted. 22. In so far as the judgment delivered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Sarita Devi (Supra) relied upon by the counsel for the petitioner is concerned, the said judgment does not help the petitioner. The said judgment is an authority that Anganbari Workers are disqualified from contesting the election of Panchayat and they are not eligible to contest the Panchayat election, but the said case was not a case challenging any election, but the question which was considered in the said case was whether the State Election Officer has any right to debar the Siksha Mitra/Anganbari Worker from contesting the Panchayat Election and, whether the honorarium received by Shiksha Mitra and/or Anganbari workers for rendering their respective services falls within the purview of "office of profit." There cannot be any dispute to the propositions as laid down in the said case. However, the said judgment does not help the petitioner in the present case, and it is not an authority for the proposition to hold that election of an elected member of Gram Panchayat can be challenged by filing a writ of quo-warranto. 23. From the facts and circumstances as stated above, it is clear that in view of the provisions contained under sub-clause (b) of Article 243-ZG, Section 6-A of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947 read with Rules 4, 5 and 6 of the Rules of 1994, the present writ petition filed by the petitioner is not at all maintainable before this Court. The only remedy available to the petitioner to file an election petition as provided under Section 6-A of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. Writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. 24. The only remedy available to the petitioner to file an election petition as provided under Section 6-A of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act, 1947. Writ petition is liable to be dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy. 24. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed on the ground of availability of alternative remedy to the petitioner.