JUDGMENT : These two Civil Revision Applications are filed by some of the original defendants against common order dated 01/07/2019, passed by the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Bhandara, whereby two applications filed by them under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Exhs.83 and 101), were rejected. 2. The respondent No.1 in both the Revision Applications (original plaintiff) filed a suit for specific performance of contract and permanent injunction bearing Special Civil Suit No.3/2019, before the Court below against the revision applicants in these two Revision Applications and other defendants totaling 29 defendants. The suit properties are agricultural lands in respect of which the respondent No.1 claims to have entered into an agreement for sale and purchase. It is the case of respondent No.1 that an agreement dated 30/06/2016, was executed by original defendant Nos. 3,10, 11 and 19 in favour of respondent No.1, agreeing to sell the property for valuable consideration. It was claimed by respondent No.1 that earnest money of Rs.11,00,000/- by way of four cheques was paid by him to the said original defendant Nos. 3, 10, 11 and 19 and that the agreement was specifically signed only by the said four defendants only. It was the case of respondent No.1 that in stead of complying with the requirements of the said agreement, original defendant Nos. 3, 10, 11 and 19 sold the property to a third person, thereby cheating the respondent No.1, despite the fact that the respondent No.1 was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. On this basis, the respondent No.1 has filed the aforesaid suit for specific performance and permanent injunction. 3. In the aforesaid suit, the revision applicants filed Applications at Exhs.83 and 101, seeking rejection of the plaint as against them, primarily on the ground that even as per the pleadings of the respondent No.1 and agreement dated 30/06/2016, revision applicants were not even parties to the agreement and, therefore, there was no question of the suit for specific performance proceeding against them. These Applications were opposed on behalf of respondent No.1. 4. On 01/07/2019, the Court below passed the impugned order, wherein it found that when the suit property was ancestral property and defendant Nos. These Applications were opposed on behalf of respondent No.1. 4. On 01/07/2019, the Court below passed the impugned order, wherein it found that when the suit property was ancestral property and defendant Nos. 3, 10, 11 and 19 had executed the said agreement dated 30/06/2019, without consent of the revision applicants and when they were not even signatories to the agreement, it was clearly not enforceable against the revision applicants. The Court below found that it was a practice of fraud by defendant Nos. 3, 10, 11 and 19, as there was no consent given by the revision applicants for entering into the said agreement and it was also found that respondent No.1 could not be said to have any cause of action against the revision applicants herein. 5. Yet, in the impugned order, the Court below found that the applications for rejection of plaint filed by the revision applicants could not be allowed because rejection of the plaint in piecemeal could not be permitted and since the plaint could be rejected only as a whole, the applications filed by the revision applicants could not be granted. 6. Mr. N.B. Kalwaghe, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners has referred to various judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and High Courts to contend that the approach adopted by the Court below while passing the impugned order is not sustainable. The learned counsel appearing for the revision applicants has fairly placed before this Court judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that appear to approve the approach of the Court below in holding that the plaint could not be rejected in piecemeal, but, it is contended that such judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court have been passed without referring to or explaining an earlier judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust and Educational Charitable Society represented by its Chairman Vs. Ponniamman Educational Trust represented by its Chairperson / Managing Trustee (2012) 8 SCC 706 , wherein the contentions sought to be raised on behalf of the revision applicants have been accepted. It is contended that the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is closer on facts and directly applicable to the question that arises in the present case and that, therefore, the Revision Applications deserve to be allowed. It is contended that the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court is closer on facts and directly applicable to the question that arises in the present case and that, therefore, the Revision Applications deserve to be allowed. Reliance was placed a a full bench judgment of five judges of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Jabalpur Bus Operators Association and others Vs. State of M.P. and another AIR 2003 MP 81 , on the question of precedents and their applicability, to contend that an earlier judgment is binding unless it is explained by subsequent judgments rendered by Benches of equal strength. It is contended that although in the case of Sejal Glass Limited Vs. Navilan Merchants Private Limited (2018) 11 SCC 780 and Madhav Prasad Aggarawal and another Vs. Axis Bank Limited and another (2019) 7 SCC 158 , it has been held that the plaint can be rejected as a whole or not at all, the said judgments do not refer to or explain the aforesaid earlier judgment in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust (supra), wherein it was held that plaint could be rejected as against some of the defendants. It was contended on behalf of the revision applicants that when they were seeking rejection of plaint as against them, it amounted to rejection of the plaint as a whole as against them and it could not be said that the plaint was being rejected in a piecemeal manner. On this basis, it was contended that the impugned order deserved to be set aside and the Applications at Exhs.83 and 101 deserved to be allowed. 7. Mr. S. D. Deoras, learned counsel appearing for the contesting respondent No.1 submitted that the impugned order was justified as it was in accordance with the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sejal Glass Ltd. (supra) and Madhav Prasad Aggarwal (supra). Apart from this, it was submitted that if prayer for rejection of plaint made in Applications at Exhs.83 and 101, was to be accepted, it would obviously lead to piecemeal rejection of the plaint, which could not be permitted under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 8. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material on record. 8. Heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the material on record. The main crux of the controversy in the present revision applications is, as to whether acceptance of contentions raised on behalf of the revision applicants would lead to rejection of plaint in part or rejection of the plaint as a whole only against the revision applicants before this Court. This assumes significance in the backdrop of the rival contentions raised on behalf of the parties wherein reliance is placed on judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein there appears to be an apparent conflict with regard to the question as to whether a plaint can be rejected only against some of the defendants while it can continue against the remaining defendants. Before considering the facts of the present case, it would be appropriate to consider the position of law that would be applicable to the facts of the present case. 9. The learned counsel appearing for the revision applicants has placed reliance on judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra), wherein while considering a similar situation pertaining to a suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff, the Hon’ble Supreme Court came to a conclusion that when a plain reading of the plaint demonstrated that there was no agreement between the plaintiff and the first defendant, there was no cause of action as against the said defendant for seeking a decree of specific performance and that therefore, the plaint deserved to be rejected as against the first defendant, while it could continue to proceed against the second defendant. It was held in such a situation that it could not be said that defendant No.1 was seeking rejection of the plaint in part, but the said defendant was seeking rejection of the plaint as a whole against itself, because it did not disclose cause of action and it did not satisfy the requirement of statutory provisions. 10. It was held in such a situation that it could not be said that defendant No.1 was seeking rejection of the plaint in part, but the said defendant was seeking rejection of the plaint as a whole against itself, because it did not disclose cause of action and it did not satisfy the requirement of statutory provisions. 10. On the other hand, the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sejal Glass Limited v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd. (supra) and Madhav Prasad Aggarwal v. Axis Bank Ltd. (supra), lay down that a plaint could be rejected as a whole and it was not permissible to reject the plaint qua any particular portion of a plaint, including against some of the defendants and continue against others. The said judgments are subsequent, having been rendered in the years 2017 and 2019, but admittedly there is no reference in these subsequent judgments to the aforesaid earlier judgment in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra), which was rendered in the year 2012. The said subsequent judgments do not explain the said earlier judgment of the year 2012. There is no dispute about the fact that the earlier judgment in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra) and the subsequent judgments in the cases of Sejal Glass Limited v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd. (supra) and Madhav Prasad Aggarwal v. Axis Bank Ltd. (supra), are all judgments rendered by Benches of two Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court of India. Thus, co-equal benches have taken different views on a particular issue. In such a situation, it needs to be examined as to which of the views is to be followed by this Court. 11. In the Full Bench judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, a bench of Five Judges of the High Court in the case of Jabalpur Bus Operators Association v. State of M. P. (FB) (supra), has held as follows: “In case of conflict between two decisions of the Apex Court, Benches comprising of equal number of Judges, decision of earlier Bench is binding unless explained by the latter Bench of equal strength, in which case the later decision is binding. Decision of a Larger Bench is binding on smaller Benches. Decision of a Larger Bench is binding on smaller Benches. Therefore, the decision of earlier Division Bench, unless distinguished by latter Division Bench, is binding on the High Courts and the Subordinate Courts. Similarly, in presence of Division Bench decisions and Larger Bench decisions, the decisions of Larger Bench are binding on the High Courts and the Subordinate Courts. No decision of Apex Court has been brought to our notice which holds that in case of conflict between the two decisions by equal number of Judges, the later decision in binding in all circumstances, or the High Courts and Subordinate Courts can follow any decision which is found correct and accurate to the case under consideration. High Courts and Subordinate Courts should lack competence to interpret decisions of Apex Court since that would not only defeat what is envisaged under Article 141 of the Constitution of India but also militate hierarchical supremacy of Courts. The common thread which runs through various decisions of Apex Court seems to be that great value has to be attached to precedent which has taken the shape of rule being followed by it for the purpose of consistency and exactness in decisions of Court, unless the Court can clearly distinguish the decision put up as a precedent or is per incuriam, having been rendered without noticing some earlier precedents with which the Court agrees. Full Bench decision in Balbir Singh's case (supra) which holds that if there is conflict of views between the two co-equal Benches of the Apex Court, the High Court has to follow the judgment which appears to it to state the law more elaborately and more accurately and in conformity with the scheme of the Act, in our considered opinion, for reasons recorded in the preceding paragraph of this judgment, does not lay down the correct law as to application of precedent and is, therefore, over-ruled on this point.” 12. On the basis of the said view taken by the Full Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, it was submitted on behalf of the revision applicants that since the subsequent two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the years 2017 and 2019, on which the learned counsel for the contesting respondent placed reliance, neither referred to nor explained the earlier judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra) rendered in 2012, this Court could follow the view taken by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra). In the case of Rattiram v. State of M.P., reported in (2012) 4 SCC 516 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the aspect of a binding precedent and held as follows: “24. It is apposite to note that in Kuttappan case, the assail was different and the Bench was not considering the effect of non-committal under Section 193 of the Code after conviction was recorded. Though it referred to the authority in Vidyadharan, yet that was to a limited extent. Hence, the said pronouncement cannot be regarded or treated to be one in line with Vidyadharan and is, therefore, kept out of the purview of conflict of opinion that has emerged in the two streams of authorities. 25. Before we advert whether Bhooraji was correctly decided or Moly and Vidyadharan laid down the law appositely, it is appropriate to dwell upon whether Bhooraji was a binding precedent and, what would be the consequent effect of the later decisions which have been rendered without noticing it. 26. In Union of India and Another v. Raghubir Singh the Constitution Bench, speaking through R. S. Pathak, C.J., has held thus: (SCC p. 778, para 28) "28. We are of opinion that a pronouncement of law by a Division Bench of this Court is binding on a Division Bench of the same or a smaller number of Judges, and in order that such decision be binding, it is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered by the Full Court or a Constitution Bench of the Court" 27. In Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. In Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. the Division Bench of the High Court had come to the conclusion that Municipal Corpn., Indore v. Ratnaprabha was not a binding precedent in view of the later decisions of the co-equal Bench of this Court in Dewan Daulat Rai Kapoor v. New Delhi Municipal Committee and Balbir Singh v. MCD. It is worth noting that the Division Bench of the High Court proceeded that the decision in Ratnaprabha was no longer good law and binding on it. The matter was referred to the Full Bench which overruled the decision passed by the Division Bench. When the matter travelled to this Court, it observed thus: (Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. case, SCC p. 100, para 8) "8. …..The Division Bench of the High Court in Municipal Corpn., Indore v. Ratnaprabha Dhanda was clearly in error in taking the view that the decision of this Court in Ratnaprabha was not binding on it. In doing so, the Division Bench of the High Court did something which even a later coequal Bench of this Court did not and could not do." 23. In Chandra Prakash v. State of U. P. a subsequent Constitution Bench reiterated the view that had already been stated in Raghubir Singh. 24. Thus viewed, Bhooraji was a binding precedent, and when in ignorance of it subsequent decisions have been rendered, the concept of per incuriam would come into play.” 13. As noted above a reading of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Benches of co-equal strength in the cases of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra), Sejal Glass Limited v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd. (supra) and Madhav Prasad Aggarwal v. Axis Bank Ltd. (supra) would show that there is neither any reference to nor any explanation in the subsequent two judgments regarding the judgment rendered earlier in point of time. Thus, there is substance in the contention raised on behalf of the revision applicants that this Court could follow the view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra). A close look at the said judgment would show that even on facts, it is applicable to the present case. A close look at the said judgment would show that even on facts, it is applicable to the present case. In the said case also the question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was, as to whether a suit could be permitted to continue against a defendant with which the plaintiff had never entered into an agreement and there was total lack of pleading in the plaint as expected under the relevant provisions of law. It was found that the prayer for grant of a decree of specific performance could not be entertained at all as against the defendant No.1 since there was no agreement between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 in the first place. This was discernible from mere reading of the plaint. On this basis, the Hon’ble Supreme Court found that the plaint deserved to be rejected as against defendant No.1 although the suit could continue as against the other defendant. It was noted that the first defendant in the said case had prayed for rejection of the plaint as a whole against it as there was no disclosure of cause of action against the said defendant. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case set aside the judgment of the Division Bench and restored that of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, whereby it had been held that the suit could continue only against the other defendant while the plaint stood rejected as against the first defendant. 14. The said judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra), wherein it was held that the plaint could be rejected as against one of the defendants and the suit could continue against other, was not brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Supreme Court when judgments were rendered by Benches of co-equal strength in the case of Sejal Glass Limited v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd. (supra) and Madhav Prasad Aggrawal Vs. Axis Bank Ltd. (supra). Consequently, the earlier judgment in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra) was not explained or dealt with in the aforesaid subsequent judgments rendered by Benches of co-equal strength of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. On facts, the subsequent judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court were not dealing with a case for grant of decree of specific performance. On facts, the subsequent judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court were not dealing with a case for grant of decree of specific performance. In the case of Sejal Glass Limited v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd. (supra), it was claimed that the plaint was to be bifurcated as it did not disclose cause of action against the Directors i.e. defendant Nos.2 to 4 while the suit could continue against the company i.e. defendant No.1. The suit was for recovery of specific amount against the defendants and for a direction to the defendants to furnish TDS Certificate. In the backdrop of such facts, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the plaint could not be rejected against defendant Nos.2 to 4 only. 15. In the case of Madhav Prasad Aggarwal v. Axis Bank Ltd. (supra) a Bench of co-equal strength held that the aforesaid judgment in the case of Sejal Glass Limited v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd. (supra) was directly on the point. By following the said judgment, it was held that if the plaint survives against certain defendants, Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC will have no application and that the suit as a whole must proceed to trial. In the said case, defendant No.1-Bank had claimed that the suit was barred as against it under section 34 of the Act of 2002. It was also claimed that the averments in the plaint did not spell out a case of fraud against the Bank. In such circumstances, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the plaint could not have been rejected only as against the defendant-Bank. 16. This Court finds that the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra) can be followed as per of the position of law indicating that it is a binding precedent on this Court, in view of absence of any reference to or explanation of the said judgment in the subsequent judgments of Benches of co-equal strength of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Sejal Glass Limited v. Navilan Merchants (P) Ltd. (supra) and Madhav Prasad Aggarwal v. Axis Bank Ltd. (supra). Additionally, in the facts of the present case, the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra) is directly applicable. 17. Therefore, the facts of the present case need to be appreciated to examine whether the Court below was justified in rejecting the applications for rejection of plaint filed by the revision applicants at Exhibits-83 and 101. The only reason given by the Court below for rejecting the said applications is that the plaint could not be rejected in piecemeal and the rejection of the plaint must be as a whole and it could not be split for rejection. 18. A perusal of the plaint in the present case and the agreement filed along with the plaint clearly shows that even as per the pleadings in the plaint and the clauses of the agreement in question, the parties to the agreement were only the plaintiff and the defendants, other than the revision applicants who had filed the applications for rejection of plaint as against them. There is no dispute about the fact that respondent No.1 i.e. the original plaintiff entered into the said agreement only with the original defendant Nos.3, 10, 11 and 19. It is an admitted position that other than the aforesaid defendants, none of the defendants were party to the said agreement dated 30/06/2016. The agreement could therefore be specifically enforceable only against those defendants who were party to the said agreement. There can be no doubt about the same. The rule of pleadings incorporated in Forms 47 and 48 in Appendix A to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, specifies the pleadings necessary in a suit seeking specific performance of an agreement. This rule requires specific pleadings with regard to the date on which the plaintiff and the defendant entered into the agreement in question with the original document being annexed to the plaint, and with description of the immovable property in question. Respondent No.1 i.e. the original plaintiff in the present case, needed to specify in the pleadings in the plaint as regards the details when he entered into agreement for sale of immovable property with the revision applicants herein and how he was seeking a decree of specific performance against the revision applicants. Respondent No.1 i.e. the original plaintiff in the present case, needed to specify in the pleadings in the plaint as regards the details when he entered into agreement for sale of immovable property with the revision applicants herein and how he was seeking a decree of specific performance against the revision applicants. In the present case, the sole respondent has obviously not made any such statements in respect of the revision applicants because even as per the agreement on which he relies, it is evident that the said agreement was executed between him and only original defendant Nos.3, 10, 11 and 19. Thus, there is absolute lack of pleadings and in fact no material to show that any agreement in the present case could be specifically enforced as against the revision applicants. 19. In the impugned order the Court below has accepted this position and at one place it has found that the revision applicants were not signatories to the agreement and, therefore, the agreement could not be enforceable against them and it would be inequitable to enforce specific performance of such contract. The Court below went to the extent of observing that it was almost a practice of fraud on the revision applicants in the present case, that the agreement was null and void as against the revision applicants and the suit could therefore not be decreed against them. It was also observed that it could be safely held that there was no cause of action as against the revision applicants. This was found on the basis that the property was ancestral and the revision applicants were co-owners and since they were not party to the agreement in question, there was no question of granting a decree of specific performance as against the revision applicants. Even after holding so in favour of the revision applicants, the Court below held that the application for rejection of plaint filed by the revision applicants could not be granted, because the rejection of the plaint had to be as a whole and the plaint could not be split, only to be rejected as against the revision applicants. 20. Even after holding so in favour of the revision applicants, the Court below held that the application for rejection of plaint filed by the revision applicants could not be granted, because the rejection of the plaint had to be as a whole and the plaint could not be split, only to be rejected as against the revision applicants. 20. In a similar situation, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra) held as follows : “29) Finally, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent submitted that in view of a decision of this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhatar Singh Gill, rejection of the plaint in respect of one of the defendants is not sustainable. We have gone through the facts in that decision and the materials placed for rejection of plaint in the case on hand. We are satisfied that the principles of the said decision does not apply to the facts of the present case where the appellant-first defendant is not seeking rejection of the plaint in part. On the other hand, the first defendant has prayed for rejection of the plaint as a whole for the reason that it does not disclose a cause of action and not fulfilling the statutory provisions. In addition to the same, it is brought to our notice that this contention was not raised before the High Court and particularly in view of the factual details, the said decision is not applicable to the case on hand. (30) In the light of the above discussion, in view of the shortfall in the plaint averments and statutory provisions, namely, Order 7 Rule 11, Rule 14(1) and Rule 14(2), Form Nos.47 and 48 in Appendix A of the Code which are statutory in nature, we hold that the learned single Judge of the High Court has correctly concluded that in the absence of any cause of action shown as against the first defendant, the suit cannot be proceeded either for specific performance or for the recovery of money advanced which according to the plaintiff was given to the second defendant in the suit and rightly rejected the plaint as against the first defendant. Unfortunately, the Division Bench failed to consider all those relevant aspects and erroneously reversed the decision of the learned single Judge. Unfortunately, the Division Bench failed to consider all those relevant aspects and erroneously reversed the decision of the learned single Judge. We are unable to agree with the reasoning of the Division Bench of the High Court.” 21. The aforesaid position laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court applies to the facts of the present case and the relief sought by the revision applicants for rejection of plaint as against them deserves to be granted. It is significant that the revision applicants are not seeking rejection of plaint qua a particular portion of the plaint or qua any relief sought in the plaint, but they are seeking rejection of the plaint as a whole, as against them. It is significant that in the plaint, the sole respondent has sought relief of direction to the defendants to accept the balance consideration in terms of the aforesaid agreement and to execute sale deed, further seeking a direction that if the defendants fail to do so, the same be directed to be executed through the Court and a permanent injunction is sought against the defendants to the effect that they should not sell the land to any other person. Such reliefs can be granted, even if the entire case of the respondent/plaintiff is to be accepted, only against the signatories to the agreement i.e. defendant Nos.3, 10, 11 and 19, while such reliefs can certainly not be granted against the other defendants i.e. the revision applicants at all. Therefore, the Court below could not have rejected the applications filed by the revision applicants at Exhibits-83 and 101, after having accepted the contentions of the revision applicants, only on the ground that acceptance of their prayers would amount to splitting of the plaint and rejecting the same partially, which could not be permitted. 22. As noted above, applying the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust (supra) to the facts of the present case, accepting the contentions raised on behalf of the revision applicants amounts to rejection of the plaint as a whole against the revision applicants and it cannot be said that the plaint was being split or that only a part of the plaint was being rejected, which could not be permitted. 23. 23. In view of the above, the revision applications are allowed and the impugned order passed by the Court below is quashed and set aside. Consequently, the plaint is rejected as against the defendants, who filed the applications at Exhibits-83 and 101 before the Court below. No order as to costs.