JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 02.01.2016 whereby the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No.5, West Tripura, Agartala has convicted and sentenced the accused-appellant to suffer R.I. for 5(five) years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees five thousand)for committing offence under Section 306 of IPC and to suffer further S.I. of 6(six) months for committing offence under Section 498A of IPC with default stipulation. 2. In a brief outline of the material aspects, it may be noticed that in the present case, the appellant was charged with the imputations that he inflicted physical and mental torture upon his wife and set her ablaze on fire leading to death of his wife on 13.01.2011. In the written ejahar which was formally registered as Amtali PS Case No. 15/2011, under Section 304B and 498A of IPC dated 07.02.2011, the elder brother of the victim has stated that-".... Failing to tolerate the extreme level of assault inflicted upon her by all the aforementioned torturous accused persons, my sister on 13.01.2011 A.D. last at night about 12.00 to 12.30 A.M., she set (herself) on fire by pouring kerosene on her body. All the accused persons were present (there) at that time. In such a situation, next day after getting the news we came and found (my) sister was admitted in G.B.P. Hospital. On being asked, my sister kept telling us till the moment before her death that she was compelled to commit suicide due to their torture (inflicted upon her). " Then thereafter the informant has stated that- "They used to beat her whenever she failed to bring money from her parental house. We provided huge amount (to them) to maintain peace (in the life) of my sister. My sister's husband and his relatives were not satisfied even after getting money. So, they compelled her to select the way of suicide." 3. After registration of the case, the investigating officer has taken over the charge of investigation and inquest over the dead body of the deceased was made. It is found that at the time of preparation of inquest he examined some of the available witnesses who are the close relatives and friends of the informant as well as the deceased wife of the appellant. Inquest report has been marked as Exbt.2. It is found that at the time of preparation of inquest he examined some of the available witnesses who are the close relatives and friends of the informant as well as the deceased wife of the appellant. Inquest report has been marked as Exbt.2. The investigating officer had arranged postmortem examination over the dead body of the deceased and after examination collected the report. Thereafter on completion of investigation, he submitted charge-sheet against four accused persons including the appellant under Sections 498A/304B of IPC. 3.1 Being committed, the learned Additional Sessions Judge had framed charge against all the four accused persons namely (1) Biplab Das, (2) Sujit Das, (3) Chatanyana Das alias Chaitan and (4) Smt. Renu Bala Das under Sections 498A/304B/302 of IPC read with Section 34 of IPC. 4. The prosecution had examined 11 witnesses to substantiate the charges and the appellant side also adduced one defence witness namely, Smt. Bulti Das as DW-1. 5. Having regard to the subject matter of this appeal and the questions involved, it would be advantageous to take note of the relevant aspects emerging from the statement of material witnesses in requisite details, even at the cost of little inflation. 6. PW-1, Sri Pradip Das is the brother-in-law (husband of elder sister of the deceased). He deposed that marriage between the appellant and the deceased Soma was solemnized in the year 2009. They started a happy life but it was only prevailed for two months. Biplab had a small grocery shop, located in the house of the accused Chaitanya Das, his brother-in-law. Chaitanya intended to develop extra-marital relationship with the wife of Biplab. Soma informed the matter to the appellant. Chaitanya asked Biplab to take his grocery shop somewhere else. Due to that, Biplab had suffered financial loss and in consequence thereof, the relationship between the appellant and Soma became bitter. However, Biplab has set up his grocery shop again at his own house. This witness deposed that once Biplab assaulted his wife. He further stated that since Biplab and his wife were at dispute between them, they tried to settle up their disagreement and they succeeded. They took both Biplab and Soma to the 'Kirtan' and came back to their respective home at 10.30/11 pm. After about half-an-hour, PW-1 had received a telephonic call from Biplab wherein he was requested to go to GB Hospital immediately. They took both Biplab and Soma to the 'Kirtan' and came back to their respective home at 10.30/11 pm. After about half-an-hour, PW-1 had received a telephonic call from Biplab wherein he was requested to go to GB Hospital immediately. He went to GB Hospital and found Soma with burn injuries. Soma died at GB Hospital after about 20/25 days. He further deposed that Darogababu had obtained his signature on the inquest report which was marked as Exbt. 1/1 on identification. 6.1 Being confronted with cross-examination, this witness stated that the deceased used to insist Biplab i.e. the appellant herein, to take back the key of grocery shop from Chaitanya and on that issue, a disagreement had cropped up between Biplab and Chaitanya and after that incident, Biplab would not go to the house of Chaitanya. He further stated that the disagreement between the deceased and Biplab had cropped after about 3/4 months from the date of their marriage. Thereafter this witness has stated that he went to GB Hospital prior to the arrival of Biplab, the appellant herein and his wife. He further stated that Biplab, Sujit, Badal, Bulti and Soma also went to the GB Hospital by an auto-rickshaw. This witness has categorically stated that during the period Soma was in hospital, he visited Soma almost every day and he also used to talk with Soma about her health. 6.2 In his cross-examination this witness has specifically stated that- "While putting my signatures in the inquest report, I stated Darogababu whatever I knew about the incident." 7. PW-2, Smt. Sima Das is the elder sister of the deceased. She deposed that after marriage both the appellant and deceased were happy for two months. Thereafter some disputes were cropped up between them due to taking over the key of the lock of the grocery shop which was situated in the house of Chaitanya. The deceased wanted to bring back the key to the possession of the appellant. Thereafter the shop was closed for about a year. She further deposed that the issue of financial stringency of the appellant had given rise to a dispute between the appellant and the deceased. She further stated that once the deceased was assaulted by the appellant. They went to the house to settle up the dispute. Thereafter the shop was closed for about a year. She further deposed that the issue of financial stringency of the appellant had given rise to a dispute between the appellant and the deceased. She further stated that once the deceased was assaulted by the appellant. They went to the house to settle up the dispute. After going to the house of the appellant they found that the household goods of their house was in scattered condition. The incident took place about 2/21/2 months before the death of Soma. However, on their initiatives the dispute was managed. She further deposed that Soma used to call her over phone. Often she used to tell her about her sufferings. Thereafter this witness stated that more than two years ago, she along with her husband i.e. PW-1 went to the house of Soma in the evening and at that time they came to know about their dispute. However, they succeeded to resolve their dispute. Thereafter they went to 'kirtan'. At about 11 pm they came back to their respective houses. After about half-an-hour her husband received a telephonic call from Biplab to go to GB Hospital. They met Soma at GB Hospital. This witness stated that "On my asking, Soma told me that immediately after returning home, Biplab damaged the household goods with the help of his motorbike. At this, Soma and Biplab disputed between themselves. Thereafter, Soma poured Kerosene Oil on her person. Biplab then gave Soma a "Safety Match" (i.e., Fire-Box) and told her that if she wants to die she may fire on her. Saying this, Biplab went away. Soma then came out of her room in burning condition. Her senior brother-in-law tried to rescue her. Soma's mother-in-law was rebuking Soma at that time. Soma died at GB Hospital after about 26 days from the date of the incident." 7.1 In cross-examination PW-2 stated that "Darogababu examined me in connection with this case. I stated to Darogababu that once Soma was assaulted by her husband. We went there to settle up the dispute. We found household goods in scattered condition. This incident took place about 2/21/2 months before the death of Soma. We, somehow, managed their dispute/disagreement. Attention of the witness is drawn to her previous statements but the witness admits that no such statement is there. We went there to settle up the dispute. We found household goods in scattered condition. This incident took place about 2/21/2 months before the death of Soma. We, somehow, managed their dispute/disagreement. Attention of the witness is drawn to her previous statements but the witness admits that no such statement is there. " 7.2 This witness further stated in her cross-examination that "One day ahead the said 'Kirtan', Biplab booked for 'Prasad'. We were served with 'Prasad' on the following day in the Soma 's house. The Motorcycle of Biplab was usually kept in the room where the incident took place. " 7.3 However, the witness had denied the suggestion that the showcase was not broken into pieces by accidental fall of the said Motor bike. 8. PW-3, Sri Raju Das is another brother-in-law of the deceased. This witness re-iterated the statements of PWs 1 and 2 which they have deposed in regard to the appellant's grocery shop at the house of Chaitanya and about the circumstances of closure of grocery shop of the appellant. 8.1 PW-3 stated in his cross-examination that after the stoppage of grocery shop business, the appellant had been suffering financial constraints for the time being and he therefore engaged Biplab i.e. the appellant with his masonry work. He further deposed that the appellant was also assisted with financial assistance by the members of his father-in-law's house. 8.2 In his cross-examination, PW-3 stated that the marriage of Soma was negotiated at his house when Chaitanya was there and proposed her marriage with the appellant. He further stated that the appellant and his family members were of his previous acquaintance and Soma's parents died prior to her marriage. This witness also stated in the cross-examination that "After the incident of appellant, I visited Soma on many occasions at GB Hospital and also talked to her " 9. PW-4, Badal Das stated that after hearing the news of burn injury of the deceased on 13.01.2011, at about 11:45/12:00 pm, he had rushed to GB Hospital. After about 10 minutes or so, the appellant went there with his wife with burn injuries. Soma was admitted into the Hospital. PW-4, Badal Das stated that after hearing the news of burn injury of the deceased on 13.01.2011, at about 11:45/12:00 pm, he had rushed to GB Hospital. After about 10 minutes or so, the appellant went there with his wife with burn injuries. Soma was admitted into the Hospital. Thereafter he stated that "On the asking of Shilpi (i.e., the wife of Pradip), Soma told that Biplab damaged the glasses of the Showcase of her room with his Motorbike; and that on this issue Soma and Biplab were at dispute; and that Biplab planted a slap on her: and that Soma then poured kerosene oil on her person; and that Biplab gave a 'Safety -Match' to Soma and asked her to fire the match and to die. Biplab found Soma in burning condition but he did not come forward to her rescue. " 9.1 In cross-examination, this witness stated that Pradip, he himself and Apu belonged to Nagerjala Auto Syndicate. This witness stated that "Soma made her dying declaration". He further stated that he was examined in connection with a case after about 15 days from the date of death of Soma. 10. PWs 5 and 6 are not material witnesses and their evidences are not discussed. 11. After perusal of the evidence of PW-7, in my opinion, it has no relevance in the instant case as she brought out a story that her father-in-law Chaitanya wanted to sexually assault her and tried to sexually assault the deceased Soma. 12. PW-8, Sri Arunoday Das who was attached to GB TOP as S.I. of Police on 07.02.2011. On that date in connection with GB TOP Case GDE No. 167, dated 07.02.2011, he prepared inquest report over the dead body of the deceased. The inquest report was prepared by him on his own hand writing. He identified his hand writing on the inquest report. 12.1 When confronted with cross-examination, PW-8 stated that he made a requisition for deputing an Executive Magistrate for the purpose of preparing inquest report. Having prepared the inquest report he returned to GB TOP at about 1:15 pm. This witness further stated that- "I enquired about the incident from the witnesses to the inquest report. One Bhulu Deb, Pradip Das and Sujit Das were present at the time of preparation of the inquest report. I recorded in the inquest report what the marginally witnesses stated. This witness further stated that- "I enquired about the incident from the witnesses to the inquest report. One Bhulu Deb, Pradip Das and Sujit Das were present at the time of preparation of the inquest report. I recorded in the inquest report what the marginally witnesses stated. They did not state me anything more. " 13. PW-9, Dr. Jayanta Sankar Chakraborty who was posted in the Department of Forensic Medicine and Toxicology at AGMC & GBP Hospital on 07.02.2011 as Tutor. He conducted postmortem examination on the body of deceased Soma Das and submitted report (Exbt.3) as a whole. He opined that "Burn injury was ante mortem in nature and about 47% of body surface area was affected by that burn injury. That burn injury was caused by flame burn and age of injury was more than 3 weeks at the time of death. On post mortem examination we opined that cause of death was septicaemic shock as a result of burn injury." 14. PW-10, Bhulu Deb is the elder brother of the deceased. In his examination-in-chief he stated that after about a month of marriage, the deceased was subjected to cruelty on account of her failure to meet their further demand for dowry. Occasionally, they tried to fulfill the demand of the appellant. He further deposed that her sister succumbed to burn injuries on 07.02.2011 at GBP Hospital. Thereafter, he lodged the complaint. Further, he had no idea about the scribe who had written the complaint. He further stated that Darogababu prepared the inquest report over the dead body of his sister Soma and he signed on the inquest report. 14.1 In his cross-examination, he stated that "I met Soma at GB Hospital and she talked to me. " 15. PW-11 is the Assistant Commandant, Ratan Majumder who deposed that he was posted as SDPO of Bishalgarh Sub-Division on 07.02.2011. He investigated the case, visited the place of occurrence, prepared the hand sketch map and identified his signature on the said documents. He examined the available witnesses and recorded their statements under Section 161, CrPC and finally submitted charge-sheet. 15.1 When confronted with the cross-examination, this witness as investigating officer stated that "I examined Sima Das. He investigated the case, visited the place of occurrence, prepared the hand sketch map and identified his signature on the said documents. He examined the available witnesses and recorded their statements under Section 161, CrPC and finally submitted charge-sheet. 15.1 When confronted with the cross-examination, this witness as investigating officer stated that "I examined Sima Das. She did not state to me that about two or two and half months before the death of Soma, she was assaulted by her husband; or that they went to settle up the dispute; or that they found household goods in scattered condition. During investigation, I came to know that a dying declaration of the deceased was recorded by one Smt. Sanchita Roy, DCM, SDM's Office, Sadar, Agartala. I did not collect the said report. It is not a fact that the dying declaration of the deceased was in favour of the accused persons; or that I did not, therefore, seize the said report. I examined Smt. Bulti Das, W/o Sri Badal Das of Kathaltali, Bankumari, PS. Amtali, Sri Ranjit mandal, S/o. Sri Samir Mandal of East Champamura, PS. East Agartala, Sri Amal Ch. Das, S/o Late Sachindra Ch. Das of Bishalgarhy North Brajapur, PS. Bishalgarh. " 16. After conclusion of the recording of prosecution evidence, learned trial Judge had examined the accused-appellant under Section 313, CrPC where he pleaded his innocence and replied to a question as follows:- "Q. Do you want to say anything else ? Ans. On the fateful night when I was parking my motor bike in our room, the glass of the show case in the room craked by hitting of my motor cycle. My wife about the saying that I intentionally broke the glass. When I go out to throw the broken glass she set fire on her body. Myself and my brother tried to save her. At that time Bulti Das also came there and tried to save her. " Thereafter, he stated that he wanted to adduce evidence. 17. Bulti Das had appeared as DW-1, who deposed that the accused persons namely, Biplab Das, Sujit Das and Chaitan Das were known to her and deceased Smt. Soma Das being the wife of her brother-in-law (the accused, Biplab) was her sister-in-law. Her marriage was solemnized on 12th December, 2008 with Badal Das, brother of accused Biplab Das. 17. Bulti Das had appeared as DW-1, who deposed that the accused persons namely, Biplab Das, Sujit Das and Chaitan Das were known to her and deceased Smt. Soma Das being the wife of her brother-in-law (the accused, Biplab) was her sister-in-law. Her marriage was solemnized on 12th December, 2008 with Badal Das, brother of accused Biplab Das. She further deposed that the incident took place at about 11/11:30 pm when she was at their house. After 4/5 months of marriage the accused along with deceased wife had started living in a separate mess. On the day of occurrence there was 'kirtan', (a religious programme) in the school field of their village. The sound of 'kirtan' was audible from their house. Thereafter, this witness stated that "At about 11/11:30 pm I heard cry of Soma from the courtyard. On hearing her cry I came out from my dwelling hut. Coming out from my room I found that my brother in law Biplab and my mother in law were trying to extinguish the flame in the body of Soma. After extinguishing the fire we took the victim to AGMC and GBP Hospital. Accused Biplab, Sujit, myself and one neighbour of nearby of our house accompanied the victim to GB Hospital. On the way to GB Hospital when we asked victim Soma as to how fire was caught she told that she herself put her on fire as she was angry upon her husband because of that her husband broke the glass of her showcase with his motor cycle and on that issue there was a altercation in between the victim Soma Das and her husband Biplab Das. When my marriage was solemnized at that time accused Biplab had a shop in the house of accused Chaitan Das. After the marriage of accused Biplab Das he closed down the shop in the house of Chaitan Das and since then accused Chaitan Das did not visit to our house. After the marriage of accused Biplab Das his wife deceased Soma raised objection to keep the key of the shop in the house of Chaitan Das as used to do before his marriage. On hearing this accused Chaitan Das asked accused Biplab Das to shift his shop from his house and accordingly, accused Biplab Das shifted his shop at his own house i.e. at our house. On hearing this accused Chaitan Das asked accused Biplab Das to shift his shop from his house and accordingly, accused Biplab Das shifted his shop at his own house i.e. at our house. After coming back to our house from the hospital I found the glass of the showcase was broken in the dwelling hut of accused Biplab Das. I noticed that all the accused persons used to make good behaviour in the family after coming to the house of the accused persons. The nature of deceased Soma was very angry." Nothing material was elicited in her cross-examination. 18. Based on the aforesaid evidence, I have heard learned counsel Mr. S. Sarkar for the appellant. Also heard Mr. Ratan Datta, learned Public Prosecutor appearing for the State-respondent. At the outset, Mr. Sarkar, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that in the instant case none of the ingredients of Section 498A of IPC and Section 306 IPC are fulfilled. There is no allegation that the deceased was subjected to continuous torture with such extent and gravity that the appellant wanted to drive her to commit suicide or to abet her to commit suicide. Mr. Sarkar, learned counsel for the appellant has drawn my attention to the inquest report (Exbt.2) and simultaneously urged this Court to go through the statement of PW-8, Sri Arunoday Das, SI of Police who prepared inquest report. 19. On the other hand, Mr. R. Datta, learned P.P. appearing for the State-respondent has contended that the prosecution case is well proved. He has defended the judgment of the learned trial Judge. He has pointed out that the FIR has been taken into proof and exhibited. The contents of the FIR have not been denied by the defence. The learned P.P. relying upon the evidence of PWs 1, 2, 3,4 and 10 has argued that prosecution has been able to prove the ingredients of "cruelty" and "abetment" against the accused appellant. 20. In view of the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties the question that falls consideration is as to whether the conviction of the appellant under Section 306 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code would be sustainable or not. 21. The relevant provisions that are called upon to address, are as under: "Section 107 of IPC: 107. Abetment of a thing. 21. The relevant provisions that are called upon to address, are as under: "Section 107 of IPC: 107. Abetment of a thing. A person abets the doing of a thing, who First Instigates any person to do that thing; or Secondly Engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or Thirdly Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Explanation 1. A person who, by wilful misrepresentation, or by wilful concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing. Section 306 of IPC: 306. Abetment of suicide. If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. Section 498A of IPC: 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation. For the purpose of this section, "cruelty" means (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.] " 21.1 The relevant provision of the Indian Evidence Act that also requires consideration is as follows: "Section USA of the Evidence Act: 113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman. When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband." 22. Keeping in mind the aforesaid provisions coupled with the submissions of the learned counsels as recorded above, let me assess the evidentiary value of the testimonies let in by the prosecution witnesses as well as the defence witnesses. 23. One of the striking feature, in the instant case, is that, PW-8 in his examination-in-chief has stated that while preparing the inquest report he asked the near relatives of the deceased who were present at that time about the background of the incident. All the persons namely Bhulu Deb (PW-10), Pradip Das (PW-1) and one Sujit Das were present at the time of preparation of inquest report. Their statements were recorded in inquest report. On perusal of the inquest report it is gathered that PW-8 came to know from their statements that the deceased had committed suicide by setting her own body on fire at the house of her husband. More importantly, in the said inquest report, I have noticed that said Bhulu Deb (PW-10) and Pradip Das (PW-1) have also put their signatures and on proof their signatures were marked as Exbt.1/1 and Exbt.2/2. From the said statements of PW-8 read with the inquest report (Exbt.2), it is further gathered that these statements made by Bhulu Deb and Pradip Das were after about 26 days of the incident of setting fire. The incident had occurred on 13.01.2011 and the deceased died on 07.02.2011 at 11 O'clock when the Inquest (Surathal) Report was prepared. Pradip Das being PW-1 while making such statement before PW-8 at the time of preparation of inquest report did not reveal any such statements of fact made by the victim which entail elements implicating the present appellant with commission of offence under Section 498A of IPC and 306 of IPC. Pradip Das being PW-1 while making such statement before PW-8 at the time of preparation of inquest report did not reveal any such statements of fact made by the victim which entail elements implicating the present appellant with commission of offence under Section 498A of IPC and 306 of IPC. He did not allege that the appellant or any of the accused who were acquitted had inflicted torture upon the deceased to say the least, torture was of such extent and gravity that had driven her to commit suicide. 24. In State of West Bengal v. Orilal Jaiswal, reported in (1994) 1 SCC 73 , the Apex Court has observed that -"the Court should be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact induced her to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to the court that a victim committing suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance discord and differences in domestic life quite common to the society to which the victim belonged and such petulance discord and differences were not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty. " 25. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chattisgarh, reported in (2001) 9 SCC 618 , the Apex Court after reproducing the provision of Section 306 of IPC and Section 113A of the Evidence Act, 1872 observed thus:- "20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do "an act". To satisfy the requirement of instigation though it is not necessary that actual words must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The present one is not a case where the Accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. The present one is not a case where the Accused had by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which case an instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation. 22. Section 498-A and 306 Indian Penal Code are independent and constitute different offences. Though, depending on the facts and circumstances of an individual case, subjecting a woman to cruelty may amount to an offence Under Section 498-A and may also, if a course of conduct amounting to cruelty is established leaving no other option for the woman except to commit suicide, amount to abetment to commit suicide. However, merely because an Accused has been held liable to be punished Under Section 498-A Indian Penal Code it does not follow that on the same evidence he must also and necessarily be held guilty of having abetted the commission of suicide by the woman concerned...." 26. From a bare reading of the definition of 'Cruelty', it reveals that it is an willful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical, of the woman. Further, harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand, would also attract 'cruelty' as used under Section 498-A of the IPC. 27. The Apex Court in Manju Ram Kalita vs. State of Assam, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 330 , after referring the provision of Section 498-A IPC, had observed that [SCC p.335, para 14]: "14. In the instant case, as the allegation of demand of dowry is not there, we are not concerned with clause (b) of the Explanation. 27. The Apex Court in Manju Ram Kalita vs. State of Assam, reported in (2009) 13 SCC 330 , after referring the provision of Section 498-A IPC, had observed that [SCC p.335, para 14]: "14. In the instant case, as the allegation of demand of dowry is not there, we are not concerned with clause (b) of the Explanation. The elements of cruelty so far as clause (a) is concerned, have been classified as follows: (i) any wilful' conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide; or (ii) any wilful' conduct which is likely to cause grave injury to the woman; or (iii) any wilful' act which is likely to cause danger to life, limb or health, whether physical or mental of the woman. 15. In S. Hanumantha Rao v. S. Ramani, AIR 1999 SC 1318 , this Court considered the meaning of cruelty in the context of the provisions under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and observed that [SCC p. 624, para 8]: "8......Mental cruelty broadly means, when either party causes mental pain, agony or suffering of such a magnitude that it severs the bond between the wife and husband and as a result of which it becomes impossible for the party who has suffered to live with the other party. In other words, the party who has committed wrong is not expected to live with the other party. " 16. In V. Bhagat v. Mrs. D. Bhagat, AIR 1994 SC 710 , this court, while dealing with the issue of cruelty in the context of Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, observed as under [ SCC pp 347 & 349, paras 16-17]: "16. .......It is not necessary to prove that the mental cruelty is such as to cause injury to the health of the petitioner. While arriving at such conclusion, regard must be had to the social status, educational level of the parties, the society they move in, the possibility or otherwise of the parties ever living together in case they are already living apart and all other relevant facts and circumstances which it is neither possible nor desirable to set out exhaustively. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. What is cruelty in one case may not amount to cruelty in another case. It is a matter to be determined in each case having regard to the facts and circumstances of that case. If it is a case of accusations and allegations, regard must also be had to the context in which they were made. 17......18..... The context and the set up in which the word 'cruelty' has been used in the section seems to us, that intention is not necessary element in cruelty. That word has to be understood in the ordinary sense of the term in matrimonial affairs. If the intention to harm, harass or hurt could be inferred by the nature of the conduct or brutal act complained of, cruelty could be easily established. But the absence of intention should not make any difference in the case, if by ordinary sense in human affairs, the act complained of could otherwise be regarded as cruelty....." 17. In Mohd. Hoshan v. State of A.P., (2002) 7 SCC 414 , this Court while dealing with the similar issue held that mental or physical torture should be continuously practiced by the accused on the wife. The Court further observed as under [SCC p.418, para 6]: "Whether one spouse has been guilty of cruelty to the other is essentially a question of fact. The impart of complaints, accusations or taunts on a person amounting to cruelty depends on various factors like the sensitivity of the individual victim concerned, the social background, the environment, education etc. Further, mental cruelty varies from person to person depending on the intensity of sensitivity and the degree of courage or endurance to withstand such mental cruelty. In other words, each case has to be decided on its own facts to decide whether the mental cruelty was established or not." 18. In Smt. Raj Rani v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 2000 SC 3559 , this Court held that while considering the case of cruelty in the context to the provisions of Section 498A I.P.C., the court must examine that allegations/accusations must be of a very grave nature and should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 19. In Smt. Raj Rani v. State (Delhi Administration), AIR 2000 SC 3559 , this Court held that while considering the case of cruelty in the context to the provisions of Section 498A I.P.C., the court must examine that allegations/accusations must be of a very grave nature and should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. 19. In Sushil Kumar Sharma vs. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 3100 , this Court explained the distinction of cruelty as provided under Section 306 and 498A IPC observing that under Section 498A cruelty committed by the husband or his relation drive woman to commit suicide etc. while under Section 306 IPC, suicide is abated (sic abetted) and intended. Therefore, there is a basic difference of the intention in application of the said provisions. 20. In Girdhar Shankar Tawade v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2002 SC 2078 , this Court held that "cruelty" has to be understood having a specific statutory meaning provided in Section 498A I.P.C. and there should be a case of continuous state of affairs of torture by one to another. 21. "Cruelty" for the purpose of Section 498-A I.P.C. is to be established in the context of Section 498-A IPC as it may be a different from other statutory provisions. It is to be determined/inferred by considering the conduct of the man, weighing the gravity or seriousness of his acts and to find out as to whether it is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide etc. It is to be established that the woman has been subjected to cruelty continuously/persistently or at least in close proximity of time of lodging the complaint. Petty quarrels cannot be termed as ^cruelty' to attract the provisions of Section 498-A IPC. Causing mental torture to the extent that it becomes unbearable may be termed as cruelty ". 28. Here, I may profitably refer to a decision of the Apex Court in Rajbabu and another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (2008) 17 SCC 526 , wherein the Apex Court has observed as under: "20. The mere fact that a woman committed suicide within seven years of her marriage and that she had been subjected to cruelty by her husband or any relative of her husband, does not automatically give rise to the presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband. The mere fact that a woman committed suicide within seven years of her marriage and that she had been subjected to cruelty by her husband or any relative of her husband, does not automatically give rise to the presumption that the suicide had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband. The court is required to look into all the other circumstances of the case. One of the circumstances which has to be considered by the court is whether the alleged cruelty was of such nature as was likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman. The law has been succinctly stated in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh reported in (2001) 9 SCC 618 wherein this Court observed [SCC pp 626-27, para 12]: "12. This provision was introduced by the Criminal Law (Second) Amendment Act, 1983 with effect from 26-12-1983 to meet a social demand to resolve difficulty of proof where helpless married women were eliminated by being forced to commit suicide by the husband or in-laws and incriminating evidence was usually available within the four corners of the matrimonial home and hence was not available to anyone outside the occupants of the house. However, still it cannot be lost sight of that the presumption is intended to operate against the accused in the field of criminal law. Before the presumption may be raised, the foundation thereof must exist. A bare reading of Section 113-A shows that to attract applicability of Section 113-A, it must be shown that (i) the woman has committed suicide, (ii) such suicide has been committed within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage, (iii) the husband or his relatives, who are charged had subjected her to cruelty. On existence and availability of the abovesaid circumstances, the court may presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. Parliament has chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory; it is only permissive as the employment of expression may presume' suggests. On existence and availability of the abovesaid circumstances, the court may presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relatives of her husband. Parliament has chosen to sound a note of caution. Firstly, the presumption is not mandatory; it is only permissive as the employment of expression may presume' suggests. Secondly, the existence and availability of the abovesaid three circumstances shall not, like a formula, enable the presumption being drawn; before the presumption may be drawn the court shall have to have regard to all the other circumstances of the case'. A consideration of all the other circumstances of the case may strengthen the presumption or may dictate the conscience of the court to abstain from drawing the presumption. The expression the other circumstances of the case' used in Section 113-A suggests the need to reach a cause-and-effect relationship between the cruelty and the suicide for the purpose of raising a presumption. Last but not the least, the presumption is not an irrebuttable one. In spite of a presumption having been raised the evidence adduced in defence or the facts and circumstances otherwise available on record may destroy the presumption. The phrase ^may presume' used in Section 113-A is defined in Section 4 of the Evidence Act, which says 'Whenever it is provided by this Act that the court may presume a fact, it may either regard such fact as proved, unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it.' (emphasis in original) 29. In Girdhar Shankar Tawade vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 177 , the Apex Court has observed thus: "3. The basic purport of the statutory provision is to avoid 'cruelty' which stands defined by attributing a specific statutory meaning attached thereto as noticed herein before. In Girdhar Shankar Tawade vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 177 , the Apex Court has observed thus: "3. The basic purport of the statutory provision is to avoid 'cruelty' which stands defined by attributing a specific statutory meaning attached thereto as noticed herein before. Two specific instances have been taken note of in order to ascribe a meaning to the word 'cruelty' as is expressed by the legislatures : whereas Explanation (a) involves three specific situations viz., (i) to drive the woman to commit suicide or (ii) to cause grave injury or (iii) danger to life, limb or health, both mental and physical, and thus involving a physical torture or atrocity, in explanation (b) there is absence of physical injury but the legislature thought it fit to include only coercive harassment which obviously as the legislative intent expressed is equally heinous to match the physical injury : whereas one is patent, the other one is latent but equally serious in terms of the provisions of the statute since the same would also embrance the attributes of 'cruelty' in terms of Section 498-A ". Thereafter, in para 18, it has been observed that: "18. A faint attempt has been made during the course of submissions that explanation (a) to the Section stands attracted and as such no fault can be attributed to the judgment. This, in our view, is a wholly fallacious approach to the matter by reason of the specific finding of the trial Court and the High Court concurred therewith that the death unfortunately was an accidental death and not suicide. If suicide is left out, then in that event question of applicability of explanation (a) would not arise - neither the second limb to cause injury and danger to life or limb or health would be attracted. In any event the willful act or conduct ought to be the proximate cause in order to bring home the charge under Section 498- A and not de-hors the same. To have an event sometime back cannot be termed to be a factum taken note of in the matter of a charge under Section 498-A. The legislative intent is clear enough to indicate in particular reference to explanation (b) that there shall have to be a series of acts in order to be a harassment within the meaning of explanation (b). The letters by itself though may depict a reprehensible conduct, would not, however, bring home the charge of Section 498-A against the accused. Acquittal of a charge under Section 306, as noticed hereinbefore, though not by itself a ground for acquittal under Section 498-A, but some cogent evidence is required to bring home the charge of Section 498-A as well, without which the charge cannot be said to be maintained". 30. Next striking feature, in the instant case, is that from the evidence of the investigating officer (PW-11), it is crystal clear that a dying declaration was recorded by a competent Magistrate of the Office of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, but, the prosecution for unknown reasons has withheld the said dying declaration. Non-production of the same before the Court can lead the Court to draw adverse inference about the genuinity of the prosecution case in view of Section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act. 31. Section 114 and 114(g) of the Evidence Act reads as follows:- "114. Court may presume existence of certain facts. the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. (a)...........; (b)...........; (c)..........; (d)............; (e)............; (f)............; (g) That evidence which could be and is not produced would, if produced, be unfavourable to the person who withholds it. (h)............; (i) ...........; (j) ............." 32. In the instant case, prosecution was well aware of the existence of the recorded dying declaration, but, it was withheld without any reason or cogent explanation before the Court. Withholding of such important and relevant evidence in the context of the case, will draw a natural presumption as envisaged under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act which is unfavourable to prosecution case. 33. PW-10, Bhulu Deb is the informant of the case. He lodged the FIR. Withholding of such important and relevant evidence in the context of the case, will draw a natural presumption as envisaged under Section 114(g) of the Evidence Act which is unfavourable to prosecution case. 33. PW-10, Bhulu Deb is the informant of the case. He lodged the FIR. A close scrutiny of his deposition reveals that he did not say anything what he has stated in his FIR that his deceased sister had told him that the appellant had damaged the household goods with the help of the motorbike resulting a dispute between themselves; and thereafter, his sister had poured kerosene oil on her person; and that the appellant had given her a 'safety match' (fire box); and that the appellant had told the deceased that if she wanted to die, she might die by fire on her; and that thereafter Biplab went away. Curious enough, this witness is found to be completely silent about the statement he made in his ejahar lodged before the police station. But, this witness very categorically has stated in his cross-examination that he met Soma at GB Hospital and she talked with him. It is hard to believe that had that part of the contents reflected in the FIR was at all the true statements of the victim, then, PW-10 being her full-blooded brother of the victim must have adduced and supported his above versions in the FIR in course of his examination before the trial Court. Another feature is that he has stated in his examination-in-chief that he does not know the name of the scribe who has written the ejahar. It is settled proposition of law that the contents of a document are to be proved by its maker himself or any of the attesting witnesses of the said document. In the instant case, the prosecution did not produce the scribe. Even the name of the scribe is absent in the ejahar. It creates a suspicious circumstance about the actual maker of the FIR as well as the contents therein, and naturally, doubt will arise to the genuinity of the contents of the ejahar (Exbt.4). 34. In the instant case, the prosecution did not produce the scribe. Even the name of the scribe is absent in the ejahar. It creates a suspicious circumstance about the actual maker of the FIR as well as the contents therein, and naturally, doubt will arise to the genuinity of the contents of the ejahar (Exbt.4). 34. Even if, this Court believes that part of the evidence, that the accused once had slapped the victim as is elicited from the evidence of PW-2, then, also in my opinion, this is one single isolated single act and it does neither fall within the purview of definition of 'cruelty' under Section 498A of IPC nor meets the essential ingredients of committing offence of 'abetment' envisaged under Section 306 of IPC. 35. Next, PW-1 and PW-4 have stated that the deceased had told them that the appellant had poured kerosene oil on her person and gave a 'safety-match' and asked her to fire the match and to die, are not found to be consistent with the assessment of totality of the entire circumstances. The statements on this aspect are also found to be inconsistent between the statement of PW-1 and PW-4. In the statement of PW-1, the fact of slapping is absent while in the statement of PW-4 it is stated that the appellant had made a slap on her. 36. Here, the most important feature to be noticed that the deceased was admitted with only 47% burn injury in the hospital. From the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as well as the defence witness (DW-1), it has come to fore that all of them had conversed with the deceased during the days of her admission in the hospital. In this situation, the normal human conduct is that if a woman is set ablazed by her husband, then, she would divulge the fact what prompted to set on fire and who was responsible for that at the first instance, at least, to her close relative. 37. Now, PW-10 coming to the conduct of the PW-10 who is the full-blooded brother being the guardian had negotiated her marriage with the appellant. The deceased had no parents. Interestingly, PW-10 did not level any allegations or complain against the appellant after the incident. Curious enough, during the entire period of her admission in the hospital the victim did not say anything to his elder brother PW-10. The deceased had no parents. Interestingly, PW-10 did not level any allegations or complain against the appellant after the incident. Curious enough, during the entire period of her admission in the hospital the victim did not say anything to his elder brother PW-10. The FIR was lodged when the deceased had expired after 26 days. In my view, had there been at all any complain from the victim against her husband or any of his relatives, then, definitely, a case would have been lodged to the police station just after the occurrence of the incident or within a reasonable period of the incident. In the context of the present case, the lodging of the FIR after 26 days when she was alive with only 47% burn injury, naturally raises a big question mark about its integrity. Delay in setting the law in motion by lodging the complaint or registration of FIR is normally viewed by the Courts with suspicion. 38. In a catena of decisions, Supreme Court has observed that it is safe for the prosecution to lodge FIR with all promptitude because the delay may enable the maker of the FIR to concoct or fabricate the story. There would be ample scope to improve and exaggerate the story substantially. Furthermore, the complaint based on which the FIR is registered must be of such a character that there would not be any space left for the Courts to draw an impression that the narrated facts are afterthought, rather, the FIR should instill confidence upon the Courts to form an opinion that the same is free from any embellishment. Even though, it is not a substantive piece of evidence, but, would be used for contradiction and corroboration. 39. Considering the entire scenario of the present case, in my opinion, delay of 26 days in lodging the FIR without any plausible and cogent explanation is fatal to the prosecution case. As I said earlier, the story of torture and pouring of kerosene oil on the person of the deceased by the appellant appeared to be introduced for the first time in the FIR and that too on the death of the victim after 26 days of the occurrence of the incident. In this situation, in my considered view, it would not be safe to sustain the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 40. In this situation, in my considered view, it would not be safe to sustain the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. 40. Accordingly, the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 02.01.2016, passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Court No. 5, West Tripura, Agartala, in connection with Case No. ST 111/2013, is set aside and quashed. 41. Consequently, the instant appeal preferred by the appellant stands allowed. The appellant Biplab Das is acquitted. It is submitted that the appellant is on bail. As such, his bail bond is discharged. Surety is also discharged from liability. Send down the LC records.