JUDGMENT : 1. The matter has been heard with the consent of learned counsel for the parties through video conferencing. There is no complaint about any audio and visual connectivity. L.P.A. No.795 of 2019 The instant intra-court appeal is directed against the order/judgment dated 22.10.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in W.P.(S) No.4285 of 2016, whereby and whereunder, the writ Court has refused to interfere with the order of punishment to the effect of dismissal from service inflicted in terms of Regulation 4(j) of Bank of India Office Employee (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976, hereinafter referred to as ‘‘The Regulation, 1976’’ for the sake of gravity. 2. The brief facts of the case are required to be referred herein, reads as under:- The appellant-writ petitioner while posted as Branch Manager at Barbindia Branch, Dhanbad was suspended vide order dated 21.11.2011 in contemplation of departmental proceeding. The writ petitioner was served with a charge-sheet mentioning therein that irregularities alleged to have been committed while he was posted as Officer at K.I. Branch and as Branch Manager in Barbindia Branch from 28.04.2008 to 23.06.2009 and 24.06.2009 to 17.11.2011 respectively. The writ petitioner has submitted his response in his defence by denying the charges leveled against him under the article of charges and statement of allegations. The writ petitioner was subsequently subjected to a departmental proceeding. He has submitted his defence reply. Subsequently, a corrigendum was issued on 24.01.2013 to the statement of allegations mentioning therein that some mistake has occurred in the memo of charge due to some typographical errors. The disciplinary authority, subsequently, has withdrawn the memorandum of charge issued on 10.12.2012 and the corrigendum dated 24.01.2013 and thereafter, issued a fresh memorandum on 25.02.2013 containing therein the article of charges, statement of witnesses, list of documents and witnesses as also a corrigendum dated 02.05.2013 for rectification of some clerical errors. The writ petitioner has participated in the departmental enquiry in which charges have been found to be proved by the Enquiry Officer and a report to that effect was submitted on 29.06.2013. The disciplinary authority, after receipt of the enquiry report dated 29.06.2013 had asked the writ petitioner to submit his reply to the show cause vide letter dated 18.07.2013. The writ petitioner has participated in the departmental enquiry in which charges have been found to be proved by the Enquiry Officer and a report to that effect was submitted on 29.06.2013. The disciplinary authority, after receipt of the enquiry report dated 29.06.2013 had asked the writ petitioner to submit his reply to the show cause vide letter dated 18.07.2013. The writ petitioner has submitted his reply to second show cause but having not been found satisfactory, the disciplinary authority has imposed major punishment of dismissal from service. The writ petitioner had preferred appeal against the order passed by the disciplinary authority before the competent authority as also review has been preferred but both the authorities i.e., the appellate as well as the reviewing authority, have refused to interfere with the order of punishment of dismissal from service. The writ petitioner being aggrieved with the order of punishment has preferred writ petition assailing the said order by invoking the jurisdiction of this Court conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but the learned Single Judge, of this Court, has refused to interfere with the order of punishment of dismissal from service, against which, the present intra-court appeal has been preferred. 3. Mr. Sudarshan Srivastava, assisted by Mr. Lukesh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner, has assailed the order passed by the learned Single Judge along with the order of punishment inter-alia on the grounds:- (i) The appellate authority, who is the Zonal Manager since has issued the order of suspension but also has exercised the jurisdiction of the appellate authority and as such, he has become the judge of his own cause as because since he has issued the order of suspension, therefore, he cannot be said to be unbiased and hence, the writ petitioner has seriously been prejudiced; (ii) The fact about prejudice by the action of the appellate authority in deciding the appeal has been agitated before the reviewing authority but not considered; (iii) On the same set of allegation, an FIR was also instituted but the Police have not found sufficient evidence to proceed for trial but that point has not been taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge (iv) Lastly the order of punishment of dismissal from service has been said to be disproportionate considering the gravity of punishment. 4. Per contra, Mr. 4. Per contra, Mr. A. Allam, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-Bank of India has vehemently argued by refuting the grounds agitated by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-writ petitioner. It has been submitted by him that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has got little scope to interfere with the order of punishment in exercise of power of judicial review which can only be exercised if there is any malafide or perversity in the finding or violation of principle of natural justice or the punishment, if it shocks the conscience of the Court about its quantum or if there is any jurisdictional error but none of these grounds are available and therefore, the learned Single Judge, after appreciating these facts, has rightly not interfered with the order of punishment. He further submits by making response to the grounds pertaining to prejudice caused to the writ petitioner on the ground that the appellate authority ought not to have exercised the power of appellate authority since he has issued the order of suspension, submission has been made in this regard that suspension order since has been passed in contemplation of departmental proceeding which is on the basis of prima-facie evidence compelling the delinquent employee to participate in the departmental proceeding/enquiry in order to find out the truth and therefore, merely on account of the fact that the order of suspension has been passed by the appellate authority i.e., the Zonal Manager being the head of the Zone holding the Scale-VI rank, cannot be said to have cause any prejudice since the writ petitioner has got sufficient and adequate opportunity to defend his case before the Enquiry Officer. He has further submitted that if the contention of the writ petitioner would be accepted in that circumstances the disciplinary authority if has issued the order of suspension, which he can always issue the power to impose punishment by the disciplinary authority will also be questionable and as such, it cannot be said to be a legally sound argument advanced on behalf of the learned counsel for the appellant, that is for the reason that when the disciplinary authority being the competent authority has got power to put an employee under suspension in contemplation of a departmental proceeding, the disciplinary authority will competent enough to impose punishment as per the Discipline and Appeal Rule and when the disciplinary authority can pass an order of suspension equally he can also pass the order of punishment, the same principle would also be applicable with respect to the appellate authority and therefore, this argument of causing prejudice to the writ petitioner is not worth to be considered. The second ground pertaining to agitating the point of prejudice due to action of the appellate authority since he has passed the order of suspension, he ought not to have exercised the power of appellate authority, the said fact has been agitated before the reviewing authority but not considered, submission has been made in this regard that the point of causing prejudice has not been agitated by the writ petitioner before the appellate authority and when such ground has not been agitated by the appellate authority questioning the jurisdiction on the ground of prejudice, the said fact if agitated and not considered by the reviewing authority, cannot be said to have any error as because the power of appeal and the power of review are two different fields while on the one hand, the power of appeal is having enormous scope in comparison to that of power of review. With respect to third submission about continuation of departmental proceeding simultaneously with the criminal case, the said ground is also having no substance as because departmental proceeding admittedly in this case has been initiated after submission of the final form by the Investigating Agency and it is well settled position of law that the departmental proceeding can be allowed to continue even in course of pendency of judicial proceeding but when the final form has already been submitted and thereafter if the departmental proceeding has been decided to be initiated, the same cannot be a subject to question by the writ petitioner. So far as the argument pertaining to quantum of punishment, submission has been made that the writ petitioner since was holding the post of Branch Manager from whom it was expected to discharge his duty with utmost care and integrity but he in complete mis-utilization of his official position has committed gross irregularities as would appear from the statement of allegations and therefore, he is not in any way deserves sympathy. Learned senior counsel, on the basis of the aforesaid argument, has submitted that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is having no error and therefore, the same may not be interfered with. 5. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone across the materials available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. 6. This Court before considering the legality and propriety of the order impugned, deem it fit and proper to refer certain undisputed facts in this case along with the statement of allegations to look into the gravity of charges, which reads hereunder as:- Admittedly, the writ petitioner while working as Branch Manager, Barbindia Branch, Dhanbad was suspended vide order dated 21.11.2011 in contemplation of a departmental proceeding. The ground upon which the writ petitioner was suspended is that he has misused his official position, by debiting the accounts of K.I. Estate Branch and Barbindia Branch by crediting the amounts to various accounts of his relatives and his own account. The ground upon which the writ petitioner was suspended is that he has misused his official position, by debiting the accounts of K.I. Estate Branch and Barbindia Branch by crediting the amounts to various accounts of his relatives and his own account. Thereafter, show cause notice was issued to the writ petitioner on 01.06.2012 served on 10.06.2012 mentioning therein that the respondent authority has decided to proceed against him under Regulation 6 of the Bank of India Office Employee (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 with respect to the acts of misconduct alleged to have been committed by the writ petitioner during his tenure as Officer at K.I. Estate branch and as Branch Manager at Barbindia Branch from 28.04.2008 to 23.06.2009 and from 24.06.2009 to 17.11.2011 respectively. Accordingly, the memorandum of charge has been issued vide memorandum dated 10.12.2012. The writ petitioner has submitted his reply denying the charges. The respondent-bank has come out with a corrigendum on 24.01.2013 to the statement of allegations wherein it has been mentioned that due to some mistakes in the memo of charge, a corrigendum in respect to memorandum has been issued with respect to typographical and clerical errors which have been crept up in issuing article of charges, statement of allegations, list of documents and witnesses. But subsequently, vide letter dated 19.02.2013, further proceeding in the departmental enquiry has been stopped till further instruction pertaining to memorandum of charge dated 10.12.2012, subsequently, it has been withdrawn with an instruction contained in the said letter that a fresh notice regarding the fate of enquiry in respect of article of charges and related documents will be communicated to the appellant-writ petitioner, in terms thereof, the respondent bank has issued a fresh memorandum dated 25.02.2013 containing therein the article of charges, statement of witnesses, list of documents and witnesses as also a corrigendum had been issued on 02.05.2013 with respect to correction in the account number etc. The writ petitioner was asked to participate before the enquiry officer, in compliance to that, the writ petitioner has appeared before the Enquiry Officer and put-forth his defence. The Enquiry Officer has submitted his report dated 29.06.2013 along with its letter dated 18.07.2013. The writ petitioner was asked to participate before the enquiry officer, in compliance to that, the writ petitioner has appeared before the Enquiry Officer and put-forth his defence. The Enquiry Officer has submitted his report dated 29.06.2013 along with its letter dated 18.07.2013. The disciplinary authority after receipt of enquiry report has issued show cause to the writ petitioner asking him to reply within five days, in terms thereof, reply has been submitted but having not found satisfactory, the disciplinary authority has passed an order inflicting penalty of “dismissal which shall ordinarily be a disqualification for further employment” in exercise of power conferred under Regulation 4(j) of Bank of India Office Employee (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976 for the acts of misconduct alleged against the writ petitioner in terms of article of charges dated 25.02.2013. The writ petitioner has assailed the order of punishment dated 16.08.2013 before the statutory appellate authority but he has refused to interfere with the order of punishment, against which, the power of review has been invoked by filing review before the statutory reviewing authority i.e., the General Manager holding the rank of Scale-VII but he has also refused to exercise the power of review by dismissing it, against which, the writ petition has been filed and the learned Single Judge, on deliberating upon the various issues, has refused to interfere with the order of punishment, which is the subject matter of the present intra-court appeal. 7. This Court before further proceeding, deem it fit and proper to deal with the scope of judicial review which is to be exercised by the High Court in the matter of decision taken by the Administrative Authority in exercise of power conferred under Discipline and Appeal Rules. It is settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has got limited scope of interference in the decision taken by the authorities. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in AIR 2015 SC 545 , wherein at paragraph 13, the following guidelines has been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision, which reads hereunder as: “13. P. Gunasekaran, reported in AIR 2015 SC 545 , wherein at paragraph 13, the following guidelines has been laid down for showing interference in the decision taken by the disciplinary authority and not to interfere with the decision, which reads hereunder as: “13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority; b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i). re-appreciate the evidence; (ii). interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii). go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv). go into the reliability of the evidence; (v). interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of State Bank of India Vs. interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi). correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii). go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Management of State Bank of India Vs. Smita Sharad Deshmukh and Anr., reported in (2017) 4 SCC 75 , has laid down therein that it is equally settled position of law that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can certainly interfere with the quantum of punishment, if it is found disproportionate to the gravity of offence. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. Vs. Abrar Ali, reported in AIR (2017) SC 200, has laid down the guidelines at paragraph-8 showing interference by the High Court in the matter of punishment imposed on conclusion of the departmental proceeding, which is quoted herein below: “8. Contrary to findings of the Disciplinary Authority, the High Court accepted the version of the Respondent that he fell ill and was being treated by a local doctor without assigning any reasons. It was held by the Disciplinary Authority that the Unit had better medical facilities which could have been availed by the Respondent if he was really suffering from illness. It was further held that the delinquent did not produce any evidence of treatment by a local doctor. The High Court should not have entered into the arena of facts which tantamounts to re-appreciation of evidence. It is settled law that re-appreciation of evidence is not permissible in the exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. Nemi Chand Nalwaiya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 : ( AIR 2011 SC 1931 , Para 6), this Court held as follows: "7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic inquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. If the inquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. In Union of India and Ors. v. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 this Court held as follows: "12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the inquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into re-appreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the inquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the inquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; 13.(i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. 13. Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: (i) re-appreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the inquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based. (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience." It also requires to refer herein the judicial pronouncement of the Hon’ble Apex Court dealing with the case of the employees working in the financial institutions like the bank, holding therein that the bankers are supposed to perform their duty with utmost sincerity and integrity and they are to be treated differently to the other civil servants on the ground that they are dealing with the public money. Reference in this regard be made to the judgment rendered in the case of Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank & Ors. Vs. P.C. Kakkar, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 364 , which reads hereunder as: “14. A bank officer is required to exercise higher standards of honesty and integrity. He deals with the money of the depositors and the customers. Every officer/employee of the bank is required to take all possible steps to protect the interests of the bank and to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and to do nothing which is unbecoming of a bank officer. Good conduct and discipline are inseparable from the functioning of every officer/employee of the bank. As was observed by this Court in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [ (1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194] it is no defence available to say that there was no loss or profit resulted in case, when the officer/employee acted without authority. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. The very discipline of an organization more particularly a bank is dependent upon each of its officers and officers acting and operating within their allotted sphere. Acting beyond one's authority is by itself a breach of discipline and is a misconduct. The charges against the employee were not casual in nature and were serious. These aspects do not appear to have been kept in view by the High Court.” It is equally settled that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can exercise the power of judicial review with respect to the quantum of punishment if the punishment is found to be disproportionate to the gravity of charge shocking the conscience of the Court. Simultaneously, it is also settled that on sympathy there should not be any interference in the quantum of punishment if the charge is grave one and the same has been found to be proved by the enquiry officer. Otherwise, if any, interference would be shown leaving apart the gravity of charge, same will be an example of misplaced sympathy towards the delinquent employee, as has been decided by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Karnataka Bank Ltd Vs. A.L. Mohan Rao reported in (2006) 1 SCC 63 , wherein it has been observed that it is not for the Courts to interfere in cases of gross misconduct of this nature with decision of disciplinary authority, on any mistaken notion of sympathy, so long as inquiry has been fair and proper, and misconduct proved. In such matter it is for disciplinary authority to decide what is the fit punishment. Further in the case of Deputy Commissioner, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangthan & Ors Vs. J. Hussain, reported in (2013) 10 SCC 106 , it has been held at paragraph 16, which reads hereunder as: "16. In the present case, it cannot be imputed that the departmental authorities while imposing the punishment acted in a manner which manifests lack of reasonableness or fairness. In Karnataka Bank Ltd. v. A.L. Mohan Rao [ (2006) 1 SCC 63 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 59], charge against the delinquent employee was that he had colluded with one of the Branch Managers and enabled grant of fictitious loan. The High Court interfered with the punishment of dismissal and ordered reinstatement on sympathetic ground even when it found that the misconduct was proved. The High Court interfered with the punishment of dismissal and ordered reinstatement on sympathetic ground even when it found that the misconduct was proved. This Court reversed the judgment of the High Court. Repeatedly this Court has emphasised that the courts should not be guided by misplaced sympathy or continuity ground, as a factor in judicial review while examining the quantum of punishment." The further issue about continuation of departmental proceeding simultaneously with the judicial proceeding is also one of the grounds agitated by the learned counsel for the appellant and as such, it is appropriate for us to also deliberate on the issue. The Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with this issue in the case of Depot Manager Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Vrs. Md. Yousuf Miya and Ors., reported in (1997) 2 SCC 699 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has been pleased to make difference between the purpose of departmental enquiry and criminal trial while holding therein it has been laid down that purposes of departmental enquiry and the prosecution are two different and distinct aspects. The criminal prosecution is launched for an offence in violation of duty, the offender owes to the society or for breach of which law has provided that the offender shall make satisfaction to the public, so crime is an act of commission in violation of law or omission of public duty. The departmental enquiry is to maintain discipline in service and efficiency of public servant. It would, therefore, be expedient that the disciplinary proceedings are conducted and completed as expeditiously as possible. It is not, therefore, desirable to lay down any guideline as inflexible rules in which the departmental proceeding may or may not be stayed pending trial in criminal case against the delinquent officer. Each case requires to be considered in the backdrop of its own facts and circumstances. There would be no bar to proceed simultaneously with the departmental proceeding and trial of a criminal case unless the charge in a criminal trial is of grave nature involving complicated questions of fact and law. Offence generally implies infringement of public as distinguished from mere private right punishable under criminal law, when trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with the proof of offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Offence generally implies infringement of public as distinguished from mere private right punishable under criminal law, when trial for criminal offence is conducted it should be in accordance with the proof of offence as per the evidence defined under the provisions of the Evidence Act. Converse in the case of departmental enquiry in a departmental proceeding relates to conduct or breach of duty of the delinquent officer who punished him for his misconduct defined under the relevant statute/rule or law that strict standard of rule or applicability of Evidence Act stands excluded in a settled legal position. The enquiry in the departmental proceeding relates to the conduct of the delinquent officer and proof in that behalf is not as high as in an offence in criminal charge. It is seen that invariably the departmental enquiry has to be conducted expeditiously so as to effectual efficiency in public administration and the criminal trial will take its own course. The nature of evidence in criminal trial is entirely different from the departmental proceeding. In the former, prosecution is to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt under touch stone of human conduct. The stand of proof in the departmental proceeding is not the same as in the criminal trial. The evidence is also on different stand point of Evidence Act. The evidence required in the departmental enquiry is not regulated on the facts under these circumstances, what is required to be seen is whether the departmental enquiry would seriously prejudice the delinquent employee in his defence at the trial in a criminal case. It is always a question of fact to be considered in each case depending on its own facts and circumstances. In other judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex court in the case of State of Rajasthan Vs. B.K. Meena and Others, reported in (1996) 6 SCC 417 the same view has been reiterated by the Hon'ble Apex court. In the case of judgment rendered in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Another, reported in (1999) 3 SCC 679 the Hon'ble Apex court while dealing with the situation of simultaneous continuation of departmental proceeding vis-à-vis criminal proceeding, has arrived at following conclusions” (i) Departmental proceeding as well as proceeding in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously though separately. (ii) If the departmental proceeding and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charges in the criminal case against the delinquent employee involves complicated question of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceeding till conclusion of the criminal case. (iii) Whether the nature of the charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated question of facts and law involved in that case will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of a case launched against the delinquent employee on the basis of evidence and the material facts against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge. (iv) The factors mentioned at (i) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceeding but due regard has to be given to the facts that the departmental proceeding cannot be unduly delayed. (v) If the criminal case does not proceed or disposal is unduly delay, the departmental proceeding, even if there is stay on account of pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceed with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that the employee if found not guilty his honour may be protected and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at an earliest. In the case of Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd. Vs. Girish V. and Others, reported in (2014) 3 SCC 636 , their lordships of Hon'ble Apex Court, while dealing with the situation of continuation of simultaneous proceeding both in departmental as well as criminal proceeding, has been pleased to hold by taking note of all the earlier judgments rendered by it, holding at paragraph 16 therein which reads as follows:— “16. Suffice it to say that while there is no legal bar to the holding of the disciplinary proceedings and the criminal trial simultaneously, stay of disciplinary proceedings may be an advisable course in cases where the criminal charge against the employee is grave and continuance of the disciplinary proceedings is likely to prejudice their defence before the criminal court. Gravity of the charge is, however, not by itself enough to determine the question unless the charge involves complicated question of law and fact. Gravity of the charge is, however, not by itself enough to determine the question unless the charge involves complicated question of law and fact. The court examining the question must also keep in mind that criminal trials get prolonged indefinitely especially where the number of accused arraigned for trial is large as is the case at hand and so are the number of witnesses cited by the prosecution. The court, therefore, has to draw a balance between the need for a fair trial to the accused on the one hand and the competing demand for an expeditious conclusion of the ongoing disciplinary proceedings on the other. An early conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings has itself been seen by this court to be in the interest of the employees.” It is evident from all the judgments referred herein above that there is no bar in simultaneous continuation of departmental proceeding as well as criminal proceeding and each and every case has to be adjudged on the related facts of the case. 8. The question which has been agitated by the learned counsel for the appellant pertaining to causing prejudice due to the reason that the appellate authority since has issued the order of suspension, he should have restrained himself in exercising the power of appellate authority. In this regard, rival submission has been made as has been referred hereinabove. It is not in dispute that a man cannot be a judge of his own cause and if the aforesaid settled position deviated, serious prejudice would be caused to the party concerned. 9. This Court is now proceeding to scrutinize the facts as to whether merely by passing an order of suspension in contemplation of a departmental proceeding by the Zonal Manager, who happens to be appellate authority under the Regulation, 1976, and if he has acted as appellate authority, any prejudice would be caused to the writ petitioner. Admittedly herein, the order of suspension has been passed by the Zonal Manager in the capacity of the head of zone holding the rank of Scale-VI. It is evident from the order of suspension dated 21.11.2011 as contained under annexure-1 annexed to the paper book issued by the Zonal Manager, Dhanbad Zone that due to serious irregularities as briefly narrated in the order of suspension, the writ petitioner has been decided to be put under suspension in contemplation to initiate departmental proceeding. It is evident from the order of suspension dated 21.11.2011 as contained under annexure-1 annexed to the paper book issued by the Zonal Manager, Dhanbad Zone that due to serious irregularities as briefly narrated in the order of suspension, the writ petitioner has been decided to be put under suspension in contemplation to initiate departmental proceeding. The aforesaid power has been exercised by the Zonal Manager in terms of provision of Regulation 12 (i)(a) of the Bank of India Office Employee (Discipline & Appeal) Regulations, 1976. It is evident from the provision of Regulation 12(i)(a), by which, the power has been conferred upon the appellate authority to put an Officer under suspension where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated upon its pending. It is, thus, evident that order of suspension since is in contemplation of departmental proceeding in exercise of power of Regulation 12(i)(a) of the Regulation, 1976 and as such, it cannot be said that the authority who has passed the order of suspension has adjudicated any issue before passing the order of suspension. The aforesaid question would be, unless the writ petitioner will take a plea of causing prejudice due to the action of the appellate authority who has exercised the power of appellate authority as conferred to him under Regulation, 1976 but it has not been pleaded by the writ petitioner before the appellate authority of causing prejudice as also before the Writ Court. 10. It is settled position of law that if delinquent employee will fail to show any prejudice, there cannot be any consideration about the issue of prejudice, as has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Managing Director ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. Vrs. B. Karunakar and Ors., reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 . The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case has considered the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in another judgment in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vrs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 . Vrs. B. Karunakar and Ors., reported in (1993) 4 SCC 727 . The Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case has considered the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in another judgment in the case of Union of India and Ors. Vrs. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, reported in (1991) 1 SCC 588 . The Hon’ble Apex Court has dealt with the effect of non-supply of report of Enquiry Officer to the delinquent employee in the disciplinary proceeding and in that context, the conclusion has been arrived at therein that if after hearing the parties, the Court/Tribunal comes to the conclusion that non-supply of the report would have made no difference to the ultimate findings and the punishment given, the Court/Tribunal should not interfere with the order of punishment. The Court/Tribunal should not mechanically set aside the order of punishment on the ground that the report was now furnished. Here in the given facts of this case, it is not the case of the writ petitioner that he has not been allowed to participate in the full-fledged enquiry before the Enquiry Officer rather as would appear from the materials available on record that the writ petitioner has been provided with adequate and sufficient opportunities to defend his case before the Enquiry Officer, after submission of the enquiry report the second show cause was also issued which has duly been responded by the writ petitioner and on due deliberation of enquiry report vis-à-vis the reply to second show cause, disciplinary authority has passed the order of punishment. The writ petitioner has filed an appeal before the Zonal Manager who has dismissed the appeal. The further admitted fact that before the appellate authority the issue about causing any prejudice by the appellate authority since he has passed the order of suspension has not been agitated before him and therefore, the appellate authority in terms of power of appeal as has been conferred upon him under the Regulation, 1976 has exercised the power of appeal by dismissing it. Although, the writ petitioner has preferred review against the order of appellate authority raising the point of causing prejudice by the appellate authority since he has passed the order of suspension but the reviewing authority has not dealt with this issue. Although, the writ petitioner has preferred review against the order of appellate authority raising the point of causing prejudice by the appellate authority since he has passed the order of suspension but the reviewing authority has not dealt with this issue. The question herein is that the fact about causing prejudice by the appellate authority has been agitated before the reviewing authority, although the same has not been answered but merely on the ground that the same has not been answered by the reviewing authority, can this Court come to the conclusion that the writ petitioner has been prejudiced by the action of the appellate authority, the answer of this Court is in negative, it is due to settled position of law that there is wide difference with respect to scope of appeal vis-à-vis review as the power of appeal is having large scope in comparison to that of review. If the same fact has been agitated either before the original authority or the appellate authority but has not been dealt with that can be a factor to be considered by the reviewing authority but as has been admitted by the writ petitioner that the fact about causing prejudice by the action of the appellate authority since he has passed the order of suspension has not been agitated in the memo of appeal filed before the appellate authority, as such, according to our considered view, it was not incumbent upon the reviewing authority to deal with the said issue since the power of review can only be exercised by the reviewing authority if there is any error apparent on the face of record or any fact could not have been brought in spite of due diligence of the party or any fact which has been agitated before the appellate authority but has not been considered by the said authority, as has been held in the case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. Vrs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Ors., reported in AIR 1954 SC 526 particularly at paragraph-32 which read as hereunder:- “32. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Before going into the merits of the case it is as well to bear in mind the scope of the application for review which has given rise to the present appeal. It is needless to emphasis that the scope of an application for review is much more restricted than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar in terms to Order XL VII, Rule I of our Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court of review has only a limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive limits fixed by the language used therein. It may allow a review on three specified, grounds, namely (i) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and (iii) for any other sufficient reason.” In the case of Sow. Chandra Kanta and Anr. Vrs. Sheik Habib, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1500 wherein it has been held that:- “A review of a judgment is a serious step and reluctant resort to it is proper only where a glaring omission or patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier by judicial fallibility. A mere repetition through different counsel of old and overruled arguments, a second trip over ineffectually covered ground or minor mistakes of inconsequential import are obviously insufficient.” It is the settled proposition as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment discussed hereinabove that the scope of review can only be done in case of discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the applicant’s knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record and for any other sufficient reason. 11. This Court, on the basis of the settled position of law as referred in the judgment hereinabove and since the fact about causing prejudice has never been raised before the appellate authority, is of the considered view that if the point of causing prejudice has not been dealt with by the reviewing authority, the order passed by the reviewing authority cannot be faulted with. 12. 12. This Court, therefore, is of the view that since the order of suspension has been passed prima-facie observing the alleged irregularities committed by the writ petitioner in contemplation of departmental proceeding but while exercising the power of appellate authority, he had, before with him the entire material i.e., the enquiry report finding by the Enquiry Officer as also the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority and by deliberating on the various factors as also considering the defence agitated by the writ petitioner, the appellate authority since has applied its mind, therefore, it cannot be said that any prejudice has been caused to the writ petitioner and in that view of the matter, the order passed by the appellate authority cannot be said to suffer from any infirmity. Further, according to our considered view which we have reached by going through the Regulations, 1976 as also the order dated 31st July, 2009, whereby and whereunder, the order has been passed conferring power to act as disciplinary authority, appellate authority and the reviewing authority. It would be evident from the aforesaid order that the Zonal Manager being the head of the Zone in Scale-VI/Deputy General Manager is the single post in the Zone, who has been conferred with the power of the Zonal Manager and therefore, on the principle of necessity also the Zonal Manger is competent enough to exercise the power of appeal. The matter would have been different if in a Zone, if there is more than one Zonal Manager but that is not the factual position herein since it is admitted at bar that there is only one Zonal Manager in the Zone where the writ petitioner was posted. 13. The further ground has been agitated that the departmental proceeding ought not to have been initiated since for the same set of allegation, the criminal case has been instituted by instituting an FIR which has been culminated into submission of final form finding no evidence against the writ petitioner. It has been referred hereinabove that there is no bar in simultaneous initiation of departmental proceeding vis-à-vis the judicial proceeding as per the ratio laid down in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vrs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. (supra). It has been referred hereinabove that there is no bar in simultaneous initiation of departmental proceeding vis-à-vis the judicial proceeding as per the ratio laid down in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vrs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. (supra). But the factual aspect is quite different herein to the effect that an FIR was instituted on 08.04.2013 against the writ petitioner for alleged offence committed under Sections 406/409/420 of the Indian Penal Code. The Investigating Agency has investigated and submitted report finding no evidence against the writ petitioner as would be evident from the final report submitted on 27.03.2015. The departmental proceeding was initiated on 10.12.2012 by issuance of first memorandum of charge on the said date but the final form was submitted on 27.03.2015. It is well settled position of law as has been dealt with in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vrs. Bharat Gold Mines (supra) coupled with the judgment rendered in the case of Stanzen Toyotetsu India (P) Ltd. Vrs. Girish (supra) that there is no bar in simultaneous continuation of departmental proceeding as well as criminal proceeding and each and every case has to be adjudged on the related facts of this case. The given fact of the instant case is that the criminal case was instituted against the writ petitioner by instituting an FIR for commission of offence under Sections 406/409/420 of the Indian Penal Code, the investigation has proceeded, but final form has been submitted finding no evidence against the writ petitioner on 27.03.2015 however, a departmental proceeding has also been initiated by issuance of memorandum of charge on 10.12.2012 in exercise of power conferred under applicable Discipline and Appeal Rule. 14. We have gathered from the judgments which pertains to continuation of departmental proceeding simultaneously with the judicial proceeding but the question herein is that when the final order of punishment has already been passed dismissing the writ petitioner from service, whether the writ petitioner can be allowed to take advantage of submission of final form finding no evidence against him. We have gathered from the judgments which pertains to continuation of departmental proceeding simultaneously with the judicial proceeding but the question herein is that when the final order of punishment has already been passed dismissing the writ petitioner from service, whether the writ petitioner can be allowed to take advantage of submission of final form finding no evidence against him. It is settled position of law that the departmental proceeding and the criminal proceeding run on two different concepts, while the departmental proceeding stands on preponderance of probability while the criminal case depends upon the allegation to be proved beyond all reasonable doubts and if final form has been submitted by the investigating agency that cannot be construed that a departmental proceeding is not to be initiated or if be dropped. Further, it is evident from the nature of allegation vis-à-vis the Regulation, basis upon which, the order of punishment has been inflicted which mainly based upon the moral turpitude of the writ petitioner as also the lack of confidence with the employer about functioning of the employee the writ petitioner herein and therefore, we are of the view that since the departmental proceeding stands on preponderance of probability, as such, merely because the final form has been submitted, the departmental proceeding ought to have been dropped, cannot be said to be a correct legal position and therefore, the fact as has been agitated by the learned counsel for the appellant that since the FIR has been culminated into submission of final form finding no evidence against the writ petitioner by the Investigating Agency, the departmental proceeding is fit to be dropped is having no substance, accordingly, rejected. 15. The fourth issue has been agitated about the quantum of punishment. It is settled position of law as has been discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran (supra) as also Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. Vs. Abrar Ali (supra) that in the matter of quantum the interference can be made by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in exercise of power of judicial review, the same can only be done if it shocks its conscience. P. Gunasekaran (supra) as also Central Industrial Security Force and Ors. Vs. Abrar Ali (supra) that in the matter of quantum the interference can be made by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in exercise of power of judicial review, the same can only be done if it shocks its conscience. It is also settled position of law that on sympathy no order can be passed on quantum as would be evident from the proposition laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the cases of Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Ors. Vrs. P.C. Kakkar (supra) and Karnataka Bank Ltd. Vrs. A.L. Mohan Rao (supra), wherein dealing with the Officer/employee of the bank which deals with the public money held therein that bankers are supposed to perform their duties with utmost sincerity and integrity and they are to be treated differently to the other civil servants on the ground that they are dealing with the public money and therefore, on sympathy there should not be any interference in the quantum of punishment if the charge is grave one and the same has been found to be proved by the enquiry officer, otherwise, if any, interference would be shown leaving apart the gravity of charge, the same will be an example of misplaced sympathy toward the delinquent employee. This Court has gathered from the factual aspects in order to answer the question of quantum of punishment and found therefrom more particularly the article of charges wherefrom it is evident that the charges are serious in nature since it has been alleged therein that with a fraudulent motive, the loan accounts deposits/loan against LIC/KVP/NSC Accounts without any application/security/security documents in various names including his name and his relative’s name and transferred the money debiting the said account to various accounts for enjoying the funds. Further, a large number of transactions were done in the different accounts unauthorisedly by the writ petitioner by using others User IDs and mostly without preparation of vouchers. It has further been alleged that the writ petitioner has fraudulently transferred funds from various KCC accounts to Office account number on 8 occasions. However, the eligible KCC accounts were not credited with full amount. The amount of Rs.1,44,749/-was diverted to nine other KCC accounts. It has further been alleged that the writ petitioner has fraudulently transferred funds from various KCC accounts to Office account number on 8 occasions. However, the eligible KCC accounts were not credited with full amount. The amount of Rs.1,44,749/-was diverted to nine other KCC accounts. Further, it has been alleged that the writ petitioner has availed excess amount towards Staff Housing Loan sanctioned to him while he was transferred from bank’s Saram Bazaar Branch to K.I. Estate Branch and Barbindia Branch, and has unauthorisedly debited the amount of Rs.10,000/-through office account and credited to another account, subsequently, the said entry was reversed on 03.06.2011 while doing so, he was credited an amount of Rs.2980/-only to the said office account and credited an amount of Rs.7020/-to the saving bank account of one Mr. Saryu Manjhi and without any tangible reason causing loss to the bank and therefore, misconduct under Section 4 of the Regulation, 1976 has been found to be committed. 16. We after going across the article of charge, is of the view that the writ petitioner being holding the rank of Officer under the respondent Bank but he has acted in the manner which he should not have been being an Officer working in the bank and therefore, according to our considered view that the allegation which has been proved in the enquiry is grave in nature and as such, the writ petitioner is not deserve to be given any sympathy and if in such a grave nature of allegation which has been proved in the enquiry if any leniency would be shown by this Court, the same would nothing but a case of misplaced sympathy which is not permissible. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the case of the writ petitioner-appellant is also not fit to be considered on the ground of quantum of punishment. 17. This court, on the basis of the discussion made hereinabove and after going across the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, has found therefrom that each and every aspects of the matter has been dealt with elaborately, has refused to interfere with the order of dismissal, which according to our considered view requires no interference by this Court. 18. Therefore, we find no merit in the instant appeal, accordingly, the appeal fails and is, dismissed. 19. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of.