JUDGMENT Michael Zothankhuma, J. - Heard Mr. B. Lalramenga, the learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. C. Zoramchhana, the learned Public Prosecutor for the State. 2. This bail petition has been filed by the petitioner in connection with the seizure of 1,10,000 tablets of Methamphetamine from the house of Sh. Haukhenkham and from the possession of Smt. Chingsianding W/o Haukhenkham. Sh. Haukhenkham and Smt. Chingsianding were accordingly arrested on 02.06.2019. During interrogation, Sh. Haukhenkham implicated one Sh. Lalengzauva, who in turn implicated the present petitioner. 3. In pursuant to the recovery of 1,10,000 Methamphetamine tablets, the Police registered Champhai Police Case No. 44/2019 under Sections 22(c) and 29 of the ND & PS Act, 1985. On the request of the Mizoram Police, the Tripura Police apprehended the petitioner on 05.06.2019 and produced him before the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sonamura, Tripura on 06.06.2019. The Court of the CJM, Sonamura, Tripura thereafter issued a transit warrant for taking the petitioner from Tripura to Champhai. The petitioner was thereafter brought to Champhai on 07.06.2019 and he was formally arrested by the Champhai Police On 08.06.2019. 4. The petitioner thereafter moved a bail application before the Special Court, ND&PS Act, Champhai on 29.11.2019 and in the bail application, one of the grounds taken for grant of bail was that no charge sheet had been submitted and as such, the petitioner was to be released on bail under Section 167(2) CrPC, even though 180 days had not expired as on 29.11.2019. 5. The bail application was rejected by the Special Court, ND&PS Act, Champhai vide Order dated 03.12.2019 holding that the case I.O had submitted his charge sheet within 177 days and the seized contraband involved commercial quantity. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the finding of the Special Court, ND&PS Act, that the case I.O submitted his charge sheet within 177 days is not correct, inasmuch as the CJM, Champhai Order dated 03.12.2019 shows that charge sheet had been filed only on 03.12.2019. As the petitioner was remanded to police custody by the Court of the CJM, Sonamura, Tripura on 06.06.2019, the period of remand would have to be counted from the date of police remand, i.e. 06.06.2019. As such, the 180 days required for filing of a charge sheet would end on 02.12.2019. As the petitioner was remanded to police custody by the Court of the CJM, Sonamura, Tripura on 06.06.2019, the period of remand would have to be counted from the date of police remand, i.e. 06.06.2019. As such, the 180 days required for filing of a charge sheet would end on 02.12.2019. The petitioner''s counsel submits that as the bail application submitted by the petitioner was heard and decided on 03.12.2019, wherein one of the stand taken by the petitioner was that the petitioner was entitled to be released on bail under Section 167 CrPC, bail had to be granted to the petitioner, due to the one day delay in filing the charge sheet. In support of his submission that the period of 180 days had to be counted from the date of police remand, the learned counsel has relied upon the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Anupam J. Kulkarni, (1992) 3 SCC 141 . 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that the limitation for granting bail specified in Clause (b) of sub-section 1 of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act is not attracted when grant of bail is automatic on account of default in filing the charge sheet under Section 167(2) CrPC. In this regard, the learned counsel has relied on the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India Vs. Thamisharasi and Others, (1995) 4 SCC 190 . 8. Besides the above ground, the learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that nothing was seized from the petitioner and he was arrested only due to being implicated by the co-accused Sh. Lalengzauva. He submits that as there is no evidence to show the involvement of the petitioner in the seizure of the contraband, the petitioner should be released on bail. 9. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that as the petitioner had filed his bail application under Section 167(2) CrPC prior to filing of the charge sheet, he was entitled to be released on bail. In support of the same, he relies upon the Order dated 10.01.2012 passed by this Court in Bail Application No. 2020/2011, Shri Jayanandan Prasad and Another Vs. State of Assam. 10. Mr. In support of the same, he relies upon the Order dated 10.01.2012 passed by this Court in Bail Application No. 2020/2011, Shri Jayanandan Prasad and Another Vs. State of Assam. 10. Mr. C. Zoramchhana, learned Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submits that the petitioneer was not arrested by the Tripura Police and he was only appointed with the intention of being forwarded to the Mizoram Police at Champhai. He submits that a perusal of the charge sheet would clearly go to show that the petitioner was apprehended by the Tripura Police and brought before the Court of the CJM, Sonamura, Tripura on 06.06.2019. The CJM, Sonamura, Tripura, thereafter, issued a transit warrant on 06.06.2019 for producing the petitioner before the Champhai Police. Thereafter, on production of the petitioner before the Champhai Police, the Champhai Police arrested the petitioner on 08.06.2019. The learned Public Prosecutor submits that as the petitioner was arrested only from 08.06.2019, the order of remand by the Magistrate, could have been only from a date subsequent to 08.06.2016. He submits that the charge sheet also recorded the fact that the Magistrate Court in Champhai had granted police remand of the petitioner for the first time on 08.06.2019. As such, the 180 days period of filing of charge sheet for commercial quantity of drugs would have expired only on 05.12.2019. 11. At the time of filing of the bail application by the petitioner on 29.11.2019, Section 167 CrPC was not applicable as the period of 180 days had not lapsed as on 29.11.2019. He thus submits that the petitioner''s bail application was only a regular bail application and not under Section 167 CrPC. He also submits that even if it is assumed that the 180 days period for filing the charge sheet expired on 02.12.2019, as the charge sheet had been filed on 03.12.2019, the bail application under Section 167 CrPC does not survive, as on the date of hearing of the bail application, the right under Section 167(2) CrPC stood extinguished. He accordingly prays for dismissal of the bail application. 12. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 13. The first question that has to be decided by this Court is the date when the charge sheet was filed by the Police. He accordingly prays for dismissal of the bail application. 12. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 13. The first question that has to be decided by this Court is the date when the charge sheet was filed by the Police. In the copy of the Order Sheet of the Court of the CJM, Champhai, the Order which was signed on 03.12.2019 reflects that charge sheet No. 105 of 2019 dated 29.11.2019 had been submitted. Thus, it can be assumed that charge sheet was filed on 03.12.2019. 14. In the case of Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Anupam J. Kulkarni (Supra), the Apex Court while discussing Section 167(2) CrPC held in paras 4 and 7 as follows:- wxyz "4. .........The Magistrate under this section can authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as he thinks fit but it should not exceed fifteen days in the whole. Therefore the custody initially should not exceed fifteen days in the whole. The custody can be police custody or judicial custody as the Magistrate thinks fit. The words "such custody" and "for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole" are very significant. It is also well-settled now that the period of fifteen days starts running as soon as the accused is produced before the Magistrate." zyxw wxyz "7. .........In Chaganti Satyanarayana v. State of A.P.7 this Court examined the scope of Section 167(2) provisos (a)(i) and (ii) and held that the period of fifteen days, ninety days or sixty days prescribed therein are to be computed from the date of remand of the accused and not from the date of his arrest under Section 57 and that remand to police custody cannot be beyond the period of fifteen days and the further remand must be to judicial custody." zyxw 15. In the case of Pragyna Singh Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra, (2011) 10 SCC 445 , the Apex Court has held in paragraphs 54, 55, 56 and 58 as follows:- wxyz "54. There is yet another aspect of the matter. The right under Section 167(2) CrPC to be released on bail on default if charge-sheet is not filed within 90 days from the date of first remand is not an absolute or indefeasible right. The said right would be lost if charge-sheet is filed and would not survive after the filing of the charge-sheet. The right under Section 167(2) CrPC to be released on bail on default if charge-sheet is not filed within 90 days from the date of first remand is not an absolute or indefeasible right. The said right would be lost if charge-sheet is filed and would not survive after the filing of the charge-sheet. In other words, even if an application for bail if filed on the ground that charge-sheet was not filed within 90 days, but before the consideration of the same and before being released on bail, if charge-sheet is filed, the said right to be released on bail would be lost. After the filing of the charge-sheet, if the accused is to be released on bail, it can be only on merits. This is quite evident from the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in Sanjay Dutt v. State [paras 48 and 53(2)(b)]. The reasoning is to be found in paras 33 to 49. zyxw wxyz 55. This principle has been reiterated in the following decisions of this Court: zyxw wxyz (1) State of M.P. v. Rustam, SCC para 4; zyxw wxyz (2) Bipin Shantilal Panchal v. State of Gujarat, SCC para 4. It may be mentioned that this judgment was delivered by a three-Judge Bench of this Court; zyxw wxyz (3) Dinesh Dalmia v. CBI, SCC para 39; and zyxw wxyz (4) Mustaq Ahmed Mohammed Isak v. State of Maharastra, SCC para 12. zyxw wxyz 56. In Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharastra a three-Judge Bench of this Court considered the meaning of the expression "if already not availed of" used by this Court in the decision rendered in Sanjay Dutt in para 48 and held that if an application for bail is filed before the charge-sheet is filed, the accused could be said to have availed of his right under Section 167(2) even though the court has not considered the said application and granted him bail under Section 167(2) CrPC. This is quite evident if one refers to para 13 of the reported decision as well as the conclusion of the Court at P. 747. zyxw wxyz 58. This is quite evident if one refers to para 13 of the reported decision as well as the conclusion of the Court at P. 747. zyxw wxyz 58. From the discussion made above, it is quite clear that even if an application for bail is filed on the ground that charge-sheet was not filed within 90 days, before the consideration of the same and before being released on bail if charge-sheet is filed, the said right to be released on bail, can be only on merits. So far as merits are concerned the learned counsel for the appellant has not addressed this Court at all and in fact bail is not claimed on merits in the present appeal at all." zyxw 16. On reading of the Judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Central Bureau of Investigation Vs. Anupam J. Kulkarni (Supra) and in the case of Pragyna Singh Thakur Vs. State of Maharashtra (Supra), it is clear that the period of 90 days or 60 days as required under Section 167(2) CrPC would have to be computed from the date of remand of the accused and not from the date of his arrest. Further, it has been held that the right under Section 167(2) CrPC to be released on bail on default if charge sheet is not filed within time, is not an absolute or indefeasible right. Thus, even if an application for bail is filed on the ground that charge sheet was not filed within the specified time period, but before consideration of the same and before being released on bail, if charge sheet is filed, the said right to be released on bail can only be on merit. In the case of Union of India v. Nirala Yadav, (2014) 9 SCC 457 , the Apex Court has impliedly over-ruled the case of Pragyna Singh Thakur (Supra) by holding that it was made per-incuriam. In the Nirala Yadav (Supra), the Apex Court held that an accused gained indefeasible right to be released on bail under section 167 (2)Cr.PC read with Section 36-A(4) of the ND & PS Act, if the charge sheet came to be filed after the accused had been in custody for a period exceeding 180 days and a compulsive bail application had been moved. In the present case, the compulsive bail application had been moved prior to the petitioner being in custody for a period of 180 days. Be that as it may, the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P Vs. Rustam and Others, (1995) Supp3 SCC 221 has held that for counting the days of the period prescribed for filing a charge sheet, clear 90 days has to expire before the right for bail under Section 167(2) CrPC begins. It also states that one of the days on either side has to be excluded in computing the period of 90 days. The Apex Court in the above case had taken note of the fact that the accused had been sent by the Magistrate to Judicial Custody on 03.09.1993 and the period of filing the charge sheet under Section 302 IPC was 90 days. The charge sheet was submitted on 02.12.1993 in the Court. The respondents in the above case applied for compulsive/ automatic bail on the ground that the period of 90 days for filing the charge sheet had expired on 01.12.1993. The Apex Court held that the prescribed period of 90 clear days for filing of the charge sheet had to be computed, by taking into consideration Sections 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act. In computing the prescribed period of 90 clear days, the commencement of 90 days would begin either from 04.09.1993 (by excluding from it 03.09.1993) or 03.12.1993 (by including in it 02.12.1993). By adopting the method of computation of clear 90 days as mentioned above, the Apex Court held that the charge sheet had been filed within time and accordingly, Section 167(2) CrPC was not applicable. wxyz The Apex Court in the case of State of M.P Vs. Rustam and Others (Supra) has held in paragraphs 3 and 4 as follows:- zyxw wxyz "3. We find that the High Court was in error both in the matter of computation of the period of 90 days prescribed as also in applying the principle of compulsive bail on entertaining a petition after the challan was filed as the so-called "indefeasible right'' of the accused, in our view stood defeated by efflux of time. The prescribed period of 90 days, in our view, would instantly commence either from 4-9-1993 (excluding from it 3-9-1993) or 3-12-1993 (including in it 2-12-1993). The prescribed period of 90 days, in our view, would instantly commence either from 4-9-1993 (excluding from it 3-9-1993) or 3-12-1993 (including in it 2-12-1993). Clear 90 days have to expire before the right begins. Plainly put, one of the days on either side has to be excluded in computing the prescribed period of 90 days. Sections 9 and 10 of the General Clauses Act warrant such an interpretation in computing the prescribed period of 90 days. The period of limitation thus computed on reckoning 27 days of September, 31 days of October and 30 days of November would leave two clear days in December to compute 90 days and on which date the challan was filed, when the day running was the 90 th day. The High Court was, thus, obviously in error in assuming that on 2-12- 1993 when the challan was filed, period of 90 days had expired. zyxw wxyz 4. We may also observe that the High Court''s view in entertaining the bail petition after the challan was filed was erroneous. The matter now stands settled in Sanjay Dutt v. State in which case Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharastra has aptly been explained away. The court is required to examine the availability of the right of compulsive bail on the date it is considering the question of bail and not barely on the date of the presentation of the petition for bail. This well settled principle has been noticed in Sanjay Dutt case on the strength of three Constitution Bench cases Naranjan Singh Nathawan v. State of Punjab, Ram Narayan Singh v. State of Delhi and A.K. Gopalan v. Govt. of India. On the dates when the High Court entertained the petition for bail and granted it to the accused-respondents, undeniably the challan stood filed in court, and then the right as such was not available." zyxw 17. In the present case, as per the petitioner''s counsel''s submission, the petitioner having been sent on Police remand on 06.06.2019 by the Court of the CJM, Sonamura, Tripura, the period of filing of the charge sheet within 90 days expired on 02.12.2019. The records state that the Court of the CJM, Sonamura, Tripura issued transit warrant, so as to enable the Tripura Police to take the petitioner from Tripura to Champhai, Mizoram and hand him over to the Mizoram Police in Champhai on 7.6.2019. The records state that the Court of the CJM, Sonamura, Tripura issued transit warrant, so as to enable the Tripura Police to take the petitioner from Tripura to Champhai, Mizoram and hand him over to the Mizoram Police in Champhai on 7.6.2019. Thus this Court is of the view that the transit warrant cannot be the same as Police remand as understood strictly as per section 167 Cr.P.C. However, let us assume that the Police remand commenced on 6-6-2019. This Court has also to keep in mind that as per Section 36-A(4) of the ND&PS Act, 1985, 180 days is the prescribed period for filing a chargesheet for commercial quantity involving Methamphetamine tablets. Thus, in the present case, by applying the period of commencement of the remand period as provided in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Judgment of the Apex Court in the case of State of M.P Vs. Rustam and Others (Supra), wherein it has directed one of the days on either side has to be excluded in computing the prescribed period, the prescribed period of 180 days would commence either from 07.06.2019 (excluding from it 06.06.2019) or 03.12.2019 (including in it 02.12.2019). As the period of 180 days would have expired only on 03.12.2019, as per paragraph 3 of the above judgment of the Apex Court in State of M.P Vs. Rustam and Others (Supra), this Court finds that the charge sheet has been filed on the 180th day and accordingly, grant of compulsive bail under Section 167 (2) CrPC is not applicable to the facts of this case. 18. On considering the petitioner''s prayer for bail on merit, this Court finds that as charge sheet has been filed and as there is a prima facie case found against the petitioner by the case I.O, this Court is not inclined to grant the prayer for bail. The bail application is accordingly rejected.