ORDER : 1. In the recruitment conducted by the Telangana State Police Recruitment Board, petitioner was selected as Stipendiary Cadet Trainee Reserve Police Constable (AR) and was deputed for training by assigning Chest No. 854 and Registration No. 1321209. The training commenced on 25.01.2020. On the ground of sickness, petitioner was pass-ported on 12.04.2020, initially for a period of six days. However, the medical leave was extended from 18.04.2020 to 22.04.2020. Thus, the petitioner was on medical leave for 11 days. After completion of the medical leave, when petitioner reported to the Academy, he was served with memorandum dated 29.04.2020 informing that as he was pass-ported out of the Academy and was on leave on medical grounds for 11 days, he should be on quarantine for a period of 28 days and therefore the total absence from training would be 39 days and therefore petitioner was advised to undergo training in the next batch. This memorandum is under challenge in this writ petition. 2. This Court by order dated 22.05.2020 directed the respondents to permit the petitioner to join back in the training. The petitioner was not admitted to training and praying to vacate the interim order, I.A. No. 2 of 2020 is filed. By the time the vacate petition and the writ petition are heard, petitioner lost more than four months of training out of nine months of total training. 3. Heard Sri. Ramesh Chilla, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. M.V. Rama Rao, learned counsel for respondents. With the consent of both learned counsel, the writ petition is taken up for hearing and disposal. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that as per Rule 9 of the Telangana Police (Stipendiary Cadet Trainee) Rules, 1999 notified vide G.O.Ms. No. 315, Home (Pol-C) Department, dated 13.10.1999, a person can avail leave on medical grounds up to 30 days in the entire training period, whereas petitioner was on medical leave only for 11 days. Thus, there was no justification in not admitting the petitioner to training. When petitioner was not diagnosed with COVID-19 virus, there was no reason to ask him to be quarantined for 28 days and treat the total period of absence from training as 39 days. All this is wholly illegal, without any justification and amounts to arbitrary exercise of power. Thus, there was no justification in not admitting the petitioner to training. When petitioner was not diagnosed with COVID-19 virus, there was no reason to ask him to be quarantined for 28 days and treat the total period of absence from training as 39 days. All this is wholly illegal, without any justification and amounts to arbitrary exercise of power. He further contends that during the same period, person with Chest No. 806 was permitted to report back to training after medical leave and allowed to undergo the training. He further contends that another trainee with Chest No. 467 was also permitted to report back to training after medical leave. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that three candidates with Chest Nos. 651, 652 and 653 were admitted to training by the Special Protection Force on 03.08.2020, even though the training commenced on 11.01.2020. 5. Learned counsel for the respondents Sri. M.V. Rama Rao submits that as per the then prevailing Government instructions, whenever a person was suspected to be moving freely, there was every possibility for that person to be infected with virus and he should be quarantined for 28 days. As petitioner was out of the Academy for 11 days, it was suspected that he could have interacted with other people and if he was infected with COVID-19 virus, there was risk of spreading of virus in the Academy affecting all other trainees. Thus, in the interests of other trainees, petitioner was not allowed to report back to training and decision was taken to drop him from present batch and he would be deputed to training whenever next batch commences. 6. With reference to the contention urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that petitioner was illegally denied resumption of training, whereas other trainees were permitted to resume training, learned counsel for the respondents submits that person with Chest No. 806 was hospitalized from 24.04.2020 to 27.04.2020 due to injury suffered during the training. After he was discharged from the hospital, he was asked to be quarantined. He later underwent testing for virus and as test results showed that he was not infected with virus, he was allowed to resume training. With reference to candidates with Chest Nos. After he was discharged from the hospital, he was asked to be quarantined. He later underwent testing for virus and as test results showed that he was not infected with virus, he was allowed to resume training. With reference to candidates with Chest Nos. 467, 651, 652 and 653 he submits that the candidates were selected for the Special Protection Force and the Special Protection Force conducts separate training to all its recruits and therefore the Academy has no information as to how the candidates were admitted for training. 7. Learned counsel for petitioner further submits that there is a system of foot back where the trainees, who had fallen short of required period of training for various reasons, were subjected to separate training to cover up the period lost and the same should have been extended to the petitioner. 8. Learned counsel for the respondents clarifies that there is no such system adopted by the Academy. At the end of the training, trainees are subjected to examination. If any of the trainees fail in the examination, they are permitted to write the examination held immediately after the announcement of the results. Whenever there is a short fall in the training the trainee has to undergo the training in the next batch only. 9. The issue for consideration is whether decision of respondents to drop the petitioner from the present batch of trainees on the ground that while on medical leave he was moving freely in the public, therefore, could have been infected with COVID-19 virus is valid and legal? 10. Relevant portion of the order impugned in the writ petition reads as under: “......In this regard, in view of prevailing extraordinary pandemic situation, the SCTPC cannot be allowed to undergo training in the present batch because along with the designated 28 days quarantine period, his total absence will be of 39 days. Also, from the records available, it can be inferred that the SCTPC did not have proper reason to utilize 11 days of medical leave. Further, he just ignored to follow the procedure of availing leave and was recklessly moving around in Suryapet district which is one of the highly affected areas of COVID-2019.” 11. Also, from the records available, it can be inferred that the SCTPC did not have proper reason to utilize 11 days of medical leave. Further, he just ignored to follow the procedure of availing leave and was recklessly moving around in Suryapet district which is one of the highly affected areas of COVID-2019.” 11. From the reading of this portion of the order, it is apparent that since petitioner was away from the Academy and was suspected to be moving freely, the Director General of Police assumed that petitioner could have been infected with virus and therefore ought to be quarantined for 28 days. It is not the case of the respondents that petitioner was diagnosed with virus infection and therefore should be subjected to treatment and be quarantined. Neither the order nor the counter affidavit explain the reasons why it was assumed that petitioner ought to be quarantined for 28 days and therefore he would be missing 39 days of training. It was pure and simple imagination. It cannot be said that even if the trainee freely interacted with several people, he would have been infected with virus. 12. It is interesting to note, candidate with Chest No. 806 was undergoing treatment in a private hospital for about four days. After he was discharged from the hospital, he did not immediately report to the Academy. He reported back to training only on 14.05.2020. Thus, he was out of the Academy for more than 20 days. It is now stated that when that trainee reported to the Academy he has produced a negative virus report and therefore he was admitted to training. Two aspects to be noted here. Firstly, it is not the case of respondents that said trainee took permission of the Academy to be quarantined on suspected virus infection and to report back to the Academy after the quarantine period; Secondly, he was not quarantined for 28 days. When it comes to petitioner, it was assumed straightaway that he should be quarantined for 28 days even without subjecting him to tests. It is also not stated how respondents assumed that petitioner could have been infected by virus even if he was moving freely in Suryapet district. Fact remains petitioner was not infected with virus. It is also appropriate to note that both trainees were pass-ported out on medical grounds during the same period. It is also not stated how respondents assumed that petitioner could have been infected by virus even if he was moving freely in Suryapet district. Fact remains petitioner was not infected with virus. It is also appropriate to note that both trainees were pass-ported out on medical grounds during the same period. In other words, two similarly situated trainees are treated differently. The entire action smacks of arbitrariness. Apparently, there was some unspecified reason to deny resumption of training which does not meet the eye. 13. Another strange aspect to be noticed is the adamant attitude of the respondents and their reluctance to comply with the orders of the Court. Ordinarily, in matters of this nature, the Court would not direct the Academy to admit a trainee in the middle of the training, but having found merit in the claim of the petitioner that he was illegally denied to resume training and to ensure that the petitioner does not miss further training, interim direction was issued. Only on the ground that vacate petition was moved, the said interim order was not complied, and petitioner was not admitted back to training. The only justification given in the counter affidavit is that by the time interim order was passed petitioner missed major portion of training. 14. Having regard to the facts noticed above, the action of the respondents in preventing the petitioner to resume training after medical leave, is ex facie illegal, amounts to arbitrary exercise of power and authority and is discriminatory which cannot be countenanced by this Court. 15. At this stage, it is expedient to consider the precedent law on improper exercise of power by statutory authority and when a decision can be said as arbitrary. 16.1. In Rameshwar Prasad vs. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1 , Supreme Court held: “241. It is an unwritten rule of law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote. [See Shalini Soni vs. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 544 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 38].” 16.2. [See Shalini Soni vs. Union of India, (1980) 4 SCC 544 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 38].” 16.2. The view expressed by Professor Bernand Schwartz in his book ‘Administrative Law’ (3rd Edn.) approved by Supreme Court in Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel vs. Anibhai Nathubhai Patel and Others, (2006) 7 SCC 200 aptly applies to this case. Supreme Court observed in Paragraph-19 as under: “19. The following passage from Professor Bernard Schwartz's book Administrative Law, (3rd Edn.) aptly echoes our thoughts on the scope of judicial review: “Reviewing courts, the cases are now insisting, may not simply renounce their responsibility by mumbling an indiscriminate litany of deference to expertise. Due deference to the agency does not mean abdication of the duty of judicial review and rubber-stamping of agency action: We must accord the agency considerable, but not too much deference; it is entitled to exercise its discretion, but only so far and no further.” Quoting Judge Leventhal from Greater Boston Television Corporation vs. FCC, 444 F 2d 841 : 851 (DC Cir 1970) he further says: “.....the reviewing court must intervene if it “becomes aware....that the agency has not really taken a “hard look” at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making...” (Emphasis supplied) 16.3. In Asha Sharma vs. Chandigarh Administration and Others, (2011) 10 SCC 86 , Supreme Court held as under: “12. Arbitrariness in State action can be demonstrated by existence of different circumstances. Whenever both the decision-making process and the decision taken are based on irrelevant facts, while ignoring relevant considerations, such an action can normally be termed as “arbitrary.” Where the process of decision making is followed but proper reasoning is not recorded for arriving at a conclusion, the action may still fall in the category of arbitrariness. Of course, sufficiency or otherwise of the reasoning may not be a valid ground for consideration within the scope of judicial review. Rationality, reasonableness, objectivity and application of mind are some of the prerequisites of proper decision making. The concept of transparency in the decision-making process of the State has also become an essential part of our administrative law. 14. Action by the State, whether administrative or executive, has to be fair and in consonance with the statutory provisions and rules. Rationality, reasonableness, objectivity and application of mind are some of the prerequisites of proper decision making. The concept of transparency in the decision-making process of the State has also become an essential part of our administrative law. 14. Action by the State, whether administrative or executive, has to be fair and in consonance with the statutory provisions and rules. Even if no rules are in force to govern executive action still such action, especially if it could potentially affect the rights of the parties, should be just, fair and transparent. Arbitrariness in State action, even where the rules vest discretion in an authority, has to be impermissible. The exercise of discretion, in line with principles of fairness and good governance, is an implied obligation upon the authorities, when vested with the powers to pass orders of determinative nature. The standard of fairness is also dependent upon certainty in State action, that is, the class of persons, subject to regulation by the Allotment Rules, must be able to reasonably anticipate the order for the action that the State is likely to take in a given situation. Arbitrariness and discrimination have inbuilt elements of uncertainty as the decisions of the State would then differ from person to person and from situation to situation, even if the determinative factors of the situations in question were identical. This uncertainty must be avoided. 23. On a proper analysis of the principles stated by this Court in a catena of judgments including the judgment afore referred, it is clear that the courts can issue directions with regard to the dispute in a particular case, but should be very reluctant to issue directions which are legislative in nature. Be that as it may, because of the new dimensions which constitutional law has come to include, it becomes imperative for the courts in some cases, to pass directions to ensure that statutory or executive authorities do not act arbitrarily, discriminatorily or contrary to the settled laws.....” 16.4. In Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel (supra), Supreme Court held as under: “18. Be that as it may, because of the new dimensions which constitutional law has come to include, it becomes imperative for the courts in some cases, to pass directions to ensure that statutory or executive authorities do not act arbitrarily, discriminatorily or contrary to the settled laws.....” 16.4. In Jayrajbhai Jayantibhai Patel (supra), Supreme Court held as under: “18. Having regard to it all, it is manifest that the power of judicial review may not be exercised unless the administrative decision is illogical or suffers from procedural impropriety or it shocks the conscience of the court in the sense that it is in defiance of logic or moral standards but no standardized formula, universally applicable to all cases, can be evolved. Each case has to be considered on its own facts, depending upon the authority that exercises the power, the source, the nature or scope of power and the indelible effects it generates in the operation of law or affects the individual or society. Though judicial restraint, albeit self-recognized, is the order of the day, yet an administrative decision or action which is based on wholly irrelevant considerations or material; or excludes from consideration the relevant material; or it is so absurd that no reasonable person could have arrived at it on the given material, may be struck down. In other words, when a court is satisfied that there is an abuse or misuse of power, and its jurisdiction is invoked, it is incumbent on the court to intervene. It is nevertheless, trite that the scope of judicial review is limited to the deficiency in the decision-making process and not the decision.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. From the above decisions, it emerges that arbitrariness in State action, even where the rules vest discretion in an authority is impermissible. Though authority is entitled to exercise its discretion, such exercise must be well considered and supported by reasons and non-interference is only thus far and no further. There can be no rubber-stamping of administrative authority action merely because he has discretion to take a view. Whenever, a decision is made in exercise of powers vested in the authority, it must be supported by reasons recorded in the order and uniformly applied to all similarly situated persons. In the case on hand, two similarly situated trainees are treated differently, one was allowed to resume training and another denied. Such course is plainly not permissible. Whenever, a decision is made in exercise of powers vested in the authority, it must be supported by reasons recorded in the order and uniformly applied to all similarly situated persons. In the case on hand, two similarly situated trainees are treated differently, one was allowed to resume training and another denied. Such course is plainly not permissible. Further, it is elementary that whenever an authority vested with power takes a decision affecting a person, such decision must be supported by reasons spelt out in the order. Reasons in support of the decision cannot remain in the antechamber of the mind of the decision making person. 18. Whenever a decision of the administrative authority is tested before the writ Court, in exercise of power of judicial review, its legality is examined by looking into the document as it reads but not by going into the record nor Court can assess the mind of the decision making authority. The reasons for the decision cannot be supplemented in the form of an affidavit. No justification is shown why petitioner was not allowed to resume training. Without supporting material, no assumption can be made to suspect a person as infected with virus and deny resumption of training on that ground. The order impugned does not meet the parameters of a valid decision making process and cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny. 19. This leaves to the issue of granting relief to the petitioner. The total training of a Stipendiary Cadet Trainee Police Constable is nine months. The training commenced on 25.01.2020. Out of nine months of training, seven months of training is already over. Out of this seven months petitioner has lost four months and only two months of training is left. Petitioner cannot make up the training period lost in the remaining period of training course. He would be missing continuity of the training. As the police force requires higher standard of physical fitness and alertness, the requirement to undergo full training cannot be dispensed with and respondents cannot be directed to admit him to remaining session of the training. Therefore, by force he has to undergo training whenever a new training session commences. However, as all this has happened for no fault of him, he has to be compensated. 20. Therefore, by force he has to undergo training whenever a new training session commences. However, as all this has happened for no fault of him, he has to be compensated. 20. Learned counsel representing the respondents informs the Court that selections are finalized for recruitment of Trainee Police Constables in Special Police Battalions and soon after completion of training of the present batch, they would be inducted for training. He submits that the petitioner can be subjected to training with that batch. 21. The writ petition is allowed, the order impugned is set aside and the following directions are issued: (1) The petitioner should be inducted for training along with the Stipendiary Cadet Trainee Police Constables of Special Police Battalions whenever the training commences to them. (2) On successful completion of training and passing all the tests conducted by the Academy, petitioner shall be given the protection of seniority and other benefits treating him as part of recruits who were subjected to training from 25.01.2020. (3) Since As for no fault of him, petitioner lost opportunity to undergo training with his batch-mates, was made to sit idle till the next training commences and that he is not entitled to take up any other employment during the interregnum period to eke out a living, he can not be left in the lurch. Therefore, the respondents are directed to continue to pay stipend payable to a trainee till the petitioner is admitted to training in the next batch. 22. Before parting with this case, I deem it necessary to make the following observations: (i) As the physical training is rigorous, it is possible that some trainees may suffer injuries and become sick. If a trainee suffers some health problems, he is treated within the Academy and/or, for the reasons recorded, if it is not possible to treat a trainee within the Academy, he would be referred to a hospital as per the procedure or allowed to avail medical leave. The trainee can be pass-ported to undergo treatment outside the Academy. If a trainee suffers some health problems, he is treated within the Academy and/or, for the reasons recorded, if it is not possible to treat a trainee within the Academy, he would be referred to a hospital as per the procedure or allowed to avail medical leave. The trainee can be pass-ported to undergo treatment outside the Academy. Once a person undergoes treatment outside the Academy/goes out of the Academy on medical leave and reports back, invariably the person should be admitted to training and then he should be dealt with in accordance with the rules and guidelines formulated for the purpose, but candidate cannot be refused to be admitted to training, such as on the grounds mentioned in the impugned order. It may be true that some trainees may fake injury or illness only to avoid intense training. When such situation arises, it should be handled by following due process, but, it cannot be generalized. (ii) The recruitment does not take place every year and in fact after more than two years, the present recruitment has taken place. For any reason, if a trainee misses the training with his batch-mates, he would have to wait till the next recruitment takes place and commencement of training which is uncertain. After having been selected to the Police Force, if a person is sent out by the Academy asking him to resume his training whenever the next training batch commences, he would have to be idle, and a free man left to fend himself as he does not receive even stipend when he does not undergo training and can not take up any other employment. Further, as idle a person is not conducive to the discipline required in the Police Force. (iii) Therefore, it may be necessary to put in place a procedure to deal with such contingencies and to ensure to the extent possible, continue to train to such persons. 23. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, shall stand closed.