Order 1. This order will dispose a bunch of three appeals bearing LPA Nos. 50-52 of 2019. The facts are being noticed from LPA No. 50/2019. 2. The present appeal has been filed impugning the judgment dated 06.04.2018, passed by Learned Single Judge whereby application filed by the appellant under section 34 of the J&K Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1997 (for short ‘the Act’), was dismissed. 3. Impugning the aforesaid judgment, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that no doubt there was a delay in filing the application under section 34 of the Act, however, the fact remains that the appellant had earlier filed an application under section 33 of the Act for correction of the errors in the interim award. The same was dismissed on 02.10.2017. Immediately thereafter, application under section 34 of the Act was filed on 29.10.2017. Hence, the same cannot be said to be barred by limitation. Such an application could be filed in terms of the section 33 of the Act as there was error in the interim award passed by the Arbitral Tribunal (for short ‘the Tribunal’). Against the admitted amount, the appellant had also raised counter claim. In the light of that counter claim, interim award could not be passed by the Tribunal as even the admitted amount was subject to final adjudication of the counter claim made by the appellant. 4. She further submitted that the delay was also on account of the fact that after the interim award was passed, audit was carried out in the department and it was found that the amount was not due to the respondents. 5. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that section 34 of the Act under, which the application was filed by the appellant, clearly provides a period of three months for filing such an application. It further provides for a limited condonation up to 30 days. Beyond that, the delay cannot be condoned. In the case in hand, interim award was passed by the Tribunal on 06.03.2016, whereas the application under section 34 of the Act was filed on 29.10.2017. The same was delayed by 572 days. It further provides for a limited condonation up to 30 days. Beyond that, the delay cannot be condoned. In the case in hand, interim award was passed by the Tribunal on 06.03.2016, whereas the application under section 34 of the Act was filed on 29.10.2017. The same was delayed by 572 days. In support of the arguments, reliance was placed upon judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in cases reported as (2010) 12 SCC 210 titled as State of Himachal Pradesh and another Vs M/s Himachal Techno Engineers and others and (2019) 2 SCC 455 titled as Simplex Infrastructure Limited Vs Union of India. 6. It was further submitted that the arguments raised regarding filing of application under section 33 of the Act is totally misplaced for two reasons. Firstly, a perusal of the application shows that the same was not filed under section 33 of the Act. It was for recalling of the interim award. The same is not the scope of the section 33 of the Act. In any case, application was filed on 02.10.2017. It was more than 1½ years after the interim award was passed. Limitation for 30 days has been provided in section 33 of the Act for filing such an application. It is only with the consent of parties, where any clerical, arithmetical error is to be corrected that the period of 30 days can be extended. In the case in hand, there was no consent given by the respondents in filing such an application. Hence, filing or decision of the aforesaid application will not take the case of the appellant any further as it has nothing to do with section 33 of the Act. In support of the arguments, reliance was placed upon a judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in (2007) 10 SCC 742 titled as State of Arunachal Pradesh Vs Damani Construction Co. 7. In response the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even if the provision of law is not mentioned in the application filed before the Tribunal, however, its sources can be traced to section 33 of the Act, which clearly provides that application for such a prayer could be filed. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper book. 9. The basic facts which are not in dispute, are that an Arbitral Tribunal was constituted to resolve the dispute between the parties. 8. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the paper book. 9. The basic facts which are not in dispute, are that an Arbitral Tribunal was constituted to resolve the dispute between the parties. An interim award was passed by the Tribunal on 06.03.2016. It is pleaded that the same was on account of certain claims made by the respondents, which were admitted by the appellant before the Tribunal. Thereafter, application was filed by the appellant before the Tribunal on 02.10.2017, praying for recalling of the interim award. It was dismissed by the Tribunal on the same day. Thereafter, application was filed by the appellant before the Learned Single Judge under section 34 of the Act, on 29.10.2017. The Learned Single Judge dismissed the application, holding the same to be time barred, as there was delay of 570 days in filing thereof. 10. As far as the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the appellant regarding the objections being not time barred is concerned, the issue is no more res-integra. To appreciate the arguments, reference is required to be made to section 34 of the Act, which is extracted below. “34. Application for setting aside arbitral award: (1) Recourse to a Court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). (2) x x x x x (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter.” 11. A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that period of three months has been provided for filing application for setting aside of an award which includes an interim award. If an application has been made under Section 33 of the Act, date is to be taken from the date such a request has been disposed of. A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that period of three months has been provided for filing application for setting aside of an award which includes an interim award. If an application has been made under Section 33 of the Act, date is to be taken from the date such a request has been disposed of. The delay in filing thereof can be condoned to the extent of 30 days. In the case in hand, application was filed after 662 days from the date of interim award. There is a delay of 572 days after expiry of the prescribed period of limitation of three months. The issue as to whether delay beyond 30 days can be condoned has been gone into by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. M/s Popular Construction Co. reported as (2001) 8 SCC 470 . The relevant paras thereof are extracted below. “12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are “but not thereafter” used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the Court could entertain an application to set aside the Award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase “but not thereafter” wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result. 13. Apart from the language, “express exclusion” may follow from the scheme and object of the special or local law: “Even in a case where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extent the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation.” (SCC p. 146, para 17) 14. Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an award is an absolute and unextendible by Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an award is an absolute and unextendible by Court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives the need “to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process”. This objective has found expression m Section 5 of the Act which prescribes the extent of judicial intervention in no uncertain terms : “5. Extent of judicial intervention.-Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.” 15. The “Part” referred to in Section 5 is Part I of the 1996 Act which deals with domestic arbitrations. Section 34 is contained in Part I and is therefore subject to the sweep of the prohibition contained in Section 5 of the 1996 Act. 16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award “in accordance with” sub section (2) and sub section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application “in accordance with” that sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that “where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired.... the award shall be enforced and the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court”. This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to “proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow” (Section 17). This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to “proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award, and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow” (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the Court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the Court’s powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.” 12. Reference can also be made to subsequent judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in Simplex Infrastructure Limited’s case (supra), the relevant extract whereof is reproduced here under : “18. A plain reading of sub-section (3) along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act, shows that the application for setting aside the award on the grounds mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 34 could be made within three months and the period can only be extended for a further period of thirty days on showing sufficient cause and not thereafter. The use of the words “but not thereafter” in the proviso makes it clear that the extension cannot be beyond thirty days. Even if the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is given to the respondent, there will still be a delay of 131 days in filing the application. That is beyond the strict timelines prescribed in sub-section (3) read along with the proviso to Section 34 of the 1996 Act. The delay of 131 days cannot be condoned. To do so, as the High Court did, is to breach a clear statutory mandate.” (Emphasis supplied) 13. Issue regarding condonation of delay on the ground that in government departments there is time consuming process to obtain permissions, was also gone into in the aforesaid judgment and it was opined that the same will not be a valid reason to condone delay beyond the statutory period prescribed under section 34 of the 1996 Act. 14. Issue regarding condonation of delay on the ground that in government departments there is time consuming process to obtain permissions, was also gone into in the aforesaid judgment and it was opined that the same will not be a valid reason to condone delay beyond the statutory period prescribed under section 34 of the 1996 Act. 14. In view of the aforesaid consistent view expressed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court that condonation of delay is not possible beyond 30 days after the prescribed period expired, if applied in the present case, there is no error in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. If taken from the date of award and the date on which the application was filed by the appellant before the Court, the delay being more than 30 days cannot be condoned. The arguments raised by the appellant, therefore, is rejected. 15. As far as the argument raised by learned counsel for the appellant to take the period of limitation from the date the application filed by the appellant under section 33 of the Act, was decided is concerned, it may be noticed that the interim award was passed by the Tribunal on 06.03.2016. Section 33 of the Act provides for correction and interpretation of the award and passing of additional award. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that, within 30 days of Arbitral award unless another period of time has been agreed upon by the parties, a party can move an application to correct any computation error, clerical or typographical errors or any other error of similar type, in the award. It can also move an application for interpretation of a specific point or part of the award. Sub-section 4 thereof, on which the reliance was placed upon by the appellant, provides that unless otherwise agreed by the parties, a party with notice to the other party may within 30 days from the date of receipt of Arbitral award make an application to the Arbitral Tribunal to make additional Arbitral award as to the claim presented in the Arbitral proceedings but omitted from the Arbitral award. 16. Even the aforesaid provision also provides that such an application has to be made within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of award unless otherwise agreed between the parties. 17. In the case in hand, interim award was passed by the Tribunal on 06.03.2016. 16. Even the aforesaid provision also provides that such an application has to be made within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of award unless otherwise agreed between the parties. 17. In the case in hand, interim award was passed by the Tribunal on 06.03.2016. Whereas, the application for recalling of the award was filed by the appellant on 02.10.2017, that is more than 1½ years later. It is the definite case of the respondent that it never consented to filing of such an application after 30 days. 18. Still further if the application filed by the appellant, which is claimed to be filed under section 33 of the Act is perused, the same is termed as an application for recalling of the interim award. The ground raised is that there was no approval from the competent authority for revision of the cost of contract from Rs. 806.41 Lakhs to Rs. 1,580.80 Lakhs, on the basis of which certain admissions were made. It came out to surface when audit was conducted. 19. Firstly, filing of an application for recalling of an award does not come within the scope of section 33 of the Act as it talks about the correction of the clerical, typographical or computation errors and secondly, it talks about passing of an additional award on the issues left out erroneously. 20. In Damani Construction Co.’s case (supra), Hon’ble the Supreme Court considered the issue regarding the effect of filing application under section 33 of the Act and thereafter, application under section 34 thereof. It was a case in which one of the party filed application under section 33 seeking review of the award and further for a clarification as to whether the payment of interim award was to be made directly to the respondents or through the Court or that the respondents therein might be asked to furnish the bank guarantee. 21. The aforesaid prayers were held to be not maintainable in an application filed under section 33 of the Act. Any order passed by the arbitrator thereon did not give fresh cause of action to the applicant therein to move application under section 34(3) of the Act. Relevant para Nos. 8 and 9 are extracted below : “8. 21. The aforesaid prayers were held to be not maintainable in an application filed under section 33 of the Act. Any order passed by the arbitrator thereon did not give fresh cause of action to the applicant therein to move application under section 34(3) of the Act. Relevant para Nos. 8 and 9 are extracted below : “8. Firstly, the letter had been designed not strictly under Section 33 of the Act because under Section 33 of the Act a party can seek certain correction in computation of errors, or clerical or typographical errors or any other errors of a similar nature occurring in the award with notice to the other party or if agreed between the parties, a party may request the Arbitral Tribunal to give an interpretation of a specific point or part of the award. This application which was moved by the appellant does not come within any of the criteria falling under Section 33(1) of the Act. It was designed as if the appellant was seeking review of the award. Since the Tribunal had no power of review on merit, therefore, the application moved by the appellant was wholly misconceived. Secondly, it was prayed whether the payment was to be made directly to the respondent or through the court or that the respondent might be asked to furnish bank guarantee from a nationalised bank as it was an interim award, till final verdict was awaited. Both these prayers in this case were not within the scope of Section 33. Neither review was maintainable nor the prayer which had been made in the application had anything to do with Section 33 of the Act. The prayer was with regard to the mode of payment. When this application does not come within the purview of Section 33 of the Act, the application was totally misconceived and accordingly the arbitrator by communication dated 10.4.2004 replied to the following effect: “However, for your benefit I may mention here that as per the scheme of the Act of 1996, the issues/claims that have been adjudicated by the interim award dated 12.10.2003 are final and the same issues cannot be gone into once again at the time of passing the final award.” 9. Therefore, the reply given by the arbitrator does not give any fresh cause of action to the appellant so as to move an application under Section 34(3) of the Act. In fact, when the award dated 12.10.2003 was passed the only option with the appellant was either to have moved an application under Section 34 within three months as required under sub-section (3) of Section 34 or within the extended period of another 30 days. But instead of that a totally misconceived application was filed and there too the prayer was for review and with regard to mode of payment. The question of review was totally misconceived as there is no such provision in the Act for review of the award by the arbitrator and the clarification sought for as to the mode of payment is not contemplated under Section 33 of the Act. Therefore, in this background, the application was totally misconceived and the reply sent by the arbitrator does not entitle the appellant a fresh cause of action so as to file an application under Section 34(3) of the Act, taking it as the starting point of limitation from the date of reply given by the arbitrator i.e. 10.4.2004.” 22. In the case in hand interim award was passed by the Tribunal on the basis of admissions made by the appellant in the pleadings. Hence, in the circumstances of the case, where firstly the application filed for recalling of the award, even if taken to have been filed under section 33 of the Act, was itself highly belated. Further the same cannot be termed to be an application filed under section 33 of the Act as it did not fall within the scope thereof. The argument that limitation is to be counted from that date, hence, deserves to be dismissed being misconceived and is hereby rejected. 23. At this stage, it would be appropriate to refer to the order passed by Hon’ble the Supreme Court on October 27, 2020 in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s). 13348/2020 titled as The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another Versus. Chaitram Maywade, commenting on the government in filing appeals belatedly. These were termed to be ‘certificate cases’, filed to get stamp of the court only. Even cost was also imposed on the government there. Direction was also issued for revamping the legal department. 13348/2020 titled as The State of Madhya Pradesh and Another Versus. Chaitram Maywade, commenting on the government in filing appeals belatedly. These were termed to be ‘certificate cases’, filed to get stamp of the court only. Even cost was also imposed on the government there. Direction was also issued for revamping the legal department. The order reads as under:- “The State of Madhya Pradesh continues to do the same thing again and again and the conduct seems to be incorrigible! The Special Leave Petition has been filed after a delay of 588 days. We had an occasion to deal with such inordinately delayed filing of the appeal by the State of Madhya Pradesh in SLP[C] D.No.9217/2020– State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. V. Bheru Lal in terms of our order dated 15th October, 2020. We have penned down a detailed order in that case and we see no purpose in repeating the same reasoning again except to record what are stated to be the facts on which the delay is sought to be condoned. On 05.01.2019, it is stated that the Government advocate was approached in respect of the judgment delivered on 13.11.2018 and the Law Department permitted filing of the SLP against the impugned order on 26.5.2020. Thus, the Law Department took almost about 17 months’ time to decide whether the SLP had to be filed or not. What greater certificate of incompetence would there be for the legal Department! We consider it appropriate to direct the Chief Secretary of the State of Madhya Pradesh to look into the aspect of revamping the legal Department as it appears that the Department is unable to file appeals within any reasonable period of time much less within limitation. These kinds of excuses, as already recorded in the aforesaid order, are no more admissible in view of the judgment in Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. – (2012) 3 SCC 563 . We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the cases are only “certificate cases” to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in default. v. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. – (2012) 3 SCC 563 . We have also expressed our concern that these kinds of the cases are only “certificate cases” to obtain a certificate of dismissal from the Supreme Court to put a quietus to the issue. The object is to save the skin of officers who may be in default. We have also recorded the irony of the situation where no action is taken against the officers who sit on these files and do nothing. Looking to the period of delay and the casual manner in which the application has been worded, the wastage of judicial time involved, we impose cost on the petitioner/State of Rs.35,000/- to be deposited with the Mediation and Conciliation Project Committee. The amount be deposited within four weeks. The amount be recovered from the officer(s) responsible for the delay in filing and sitting on the files and certificate of recovery of the said amount be also filed in this Court within the said period of time. We have put to Deputy Advocate General to caution that for any successive matters of this kind the cost will keep on going up. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed as time barred in terms aforesaid We make it once again clear that the order is not complied within time, we may be constrained to initiate contempt proceedings against the Chief Secretary. A copy of the order be also placed before the Chief Secretary for the State of Madhya Pradesh.” In Jammu & Kashmir also most of the appeals are filed belatedly, hence, effort is only to obtain certificate of the court. 24. For the reasons mentioned above, we don’t find any merit in the present appeal and the same is hereby dismissed. 25. Before parting with the order, we are constrained to make certain observations regarding the seriousness with which the litigation involving crores of rupees is dealt with by the officers in the government of Jammu and Kashmir. The case is not a case in isolation. This Court has been observing these types of conduct of the officers in number of cases but hardly any improvement has been seen in the working. There was a dispute between the parties arising out of a contract. The case is not a case in isolation. This Court has been observing these types of conduct of the officers in number of cases but hardly any improvement has been seen in the working. There was a dispute between the parties arising out of a contract. The matter landed in this Court when vide order dated 14.11.2013, this Court appointed two members of the Arbitral Tribunal vide order passed in Arbitration Application No. 16 of 2013. The presiding member was appointed by the two members of the Arbitral Tribunal. It is the case set up by both the parties that after the pleadings were exchanged, on the basis of admission made by the appellant, interim award was passed on 06.03.2016. As usual, the officers of the department slept over the matter. This can be a result of connivance also as is even evident from the subsequent facts. It is not that the case in hand is in isolation with the department where the matter has been referred for arbitration. There may be numerous cases. The stringent provisions of the Arbitration Act for filing of objections or taking other steps must be in knowledge of the officers concerned. They are otherwise also well advised by the law department and represented by the counsels. Even during arbitration proceedings, they were represented by a counsel. Still, if the department was aggrieved of the interim award, necessary steps were required to be taken within the period of limitation provided in section 34 of the Act but they slept over the matter. Application was filed more than 1½ years later praying for recalling of the interim award passed by the Tribunal. The contents of the application being relevant, are reproduced hereunder : “3 That a special audit in respect of 132 KV S/C Thathri Bhallesa Transmission Line amongst others under PMRP 2004 was earned out by the audit team from Finance Department constituted vide Govt. Order No.252-F of 2017 dated 17.08. 2017. 4. That the said team after conducting the mandated audit has pointed out amongst others to the fact that there was no approval from the competent authority for the revision of cost of the contract from Rs. 806.41 lakhs to Rs. 1580.80 Lakhs. A copy of said Audit Report is also enclosed herewith for the kind perusal and facility of this Hon’ble Tribunal marked as Annexure-R.” 26. 806.41 lakhs to Rs. 1580.80 Lakhs. A copy of said Audit Report is also enclosed herewith for the kind perusal and facility of this Hon’ble Tribunal marked as Annexure-R.” 26. A perusal of the aforesaid application shows that prayer for recalling of the interim award was made with the pleadings that special audit correction of 132 KV S/C Thathri Bhallesa Transmission Line was carried out by the audit team from Finance Department, vide Government Order dated 17.08.2017. The audit team pointed out that that there was no approval from the competent authority for revision of the cost of contract from Rs. 806.41 lakhs to Rs. 1,580.80 Lakhs. It appears that there may be connivance of the officers of the appellant-department as they never thought of raising this issue in the reply filed to the claim petition. Rather claim was partially admitted by the respondents before the Tribunal. It was only when the audit was carried out by the Finance Department that scandal came to surface wherein it was pointed out that there was no approval of the competent authority for revision of the cost of the contract. 27. This is not a case in isolation in the then State of Jammu and Kashmir (now Union Territory). There had been syphoning of crores of rupees in different contracts where huge amounts were drawn from government treasury for the projects which were never sanctioned as if no financial discipline was applicable for taking out any money from the public exchequer. 28. Reference in this regard can also be made to the stand taken by the Government in WP(C) No. 983/2020 titled as SRM Contractors Pvt. Ltd. through Rajesh Kumar Jammu Vs. Union Territory of J&K and others, decided on 21.08.2020, where the petitioner had approached this Court with a simple prayer that he had executed a work which was allotted to him after issuing NIT. Even part payment had been made but the balance was not being released though the project had been executed. The stand taken by the officers of the department at lower level was that the claim of the petitioner was admitted. However, when the Secretary of the department was summoned in Court certain discrepancies in the stand taken, the facts were altogether different. It transpired that the project therein was never sanctioned by the competent authority. The stand taken by the officers of the department at lower level was that the claim of the petitioner was admitted. However, when the Secretary of the department was summoned in Court certain discrepancies in the stand taken, the facts were altogether different. It transpired that the project therein was never sanctioned by the competent authority. Certain startling facts were disclosed by him apprising the Court that hundreds of crores of rupees were drawn from the treasury against the projects, which were never sanctioned. Or the funds were diverted from project ‘A’ to project ‘B’ without any approval from the competent authority. The tenders were issued without sanction of the projects. It was a case of PWD(R&B) Department, Jammu. The case in hand is of Power Development Department. This apparently shows that this is the standard operating procedure being adopted by the officers in different departments in Jammu & Kashmir. The only reason can be that no action is taken against any of the officers, who are indulging in these types of corrupt practices and consider them to be law into themselves. They do not follow any established procedure, or financial rules. Unless, strict disciplinary action is taken against these officers, they will not mend their ways. It is only because the competent authority also keeps its eyes closed to all these illegal actions of the officers, for the reasons best known to it, that they feel encouraged in repeating these kinds of activities. Even if any enquiry is initiated the same remains pending for years together. 29. Let this be a test case in which some strict disciplinary action is initiated and taken to the logical end without wasting time, to be a message to all those who are indulging or trying to enter in these kinds of activities and mis-utilising or usurping tax payer’s money. 30. In the case in hand, the responsibility of the officers concerned be fixed on account of whose commission or omission, the government will suffer or has been made to suffer loss. The amount of loss should also be recovered from them to give a clear message to all concerned, of course after following due process of law. 31. Role and responsibility of the CAG or the local audit department is also questionable, who regularly carry out audit in the departments but still keep their eyes shut on these large scale financial bungling. 31. Role and responsibility of the CAG or the local audit department is also questionable, who regularly carry out audit in the departments but still keep their eyes shut on these large scale financial bungling. 32. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Secretary and Administrative Secretaries of Law, Finance and Power Development Departments for taking further action in the matter.