JUDGMENT : The present case is taken up through video conferencing. 2. The present writ petition has been filed for issuance of writ of certiorari for quashing the notice dated 07.08.2019 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) issued under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets & Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 [in short to be referred as “the SARFAESI Act”], by the respondent no.2- the Authorised Officer, Allahabad Bank Hazaribagh whereby the petitioner was informed about the outstanding dues of Rs.7,89,420/- as on 07.08.2019 (inclusive of up to date interest on the loan amount of Rs.4,25,000/- taken by the petitioner) along with costs, charges and expenses and thereby she was called upon to discharge the entire liability as on date and also future interest thereon along with cost, charge and expenses to the respondent-Bank (Secured Creditor) within 60 days from the date of the said notice, failing which the respondent-Bank was to exercise the power conferred under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. The petitioner has also prayed to quash the possession notice dated 28.11.2019 issued under Rule 8 (1) of the Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (in short “the Rules, 2002”) by the respondent no. 2 whereby the possession of the property in question of the petitioner was taken by the respondent-Bank and the borrower in particular and public in general were cautioned not to deal with the said property. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is a disabled lady and the owner of land situated at khata no. 35, plot nos. 295, 296, 297 and 298 measuring an area of 06 decimals in village Dharmu, P.S.-Ichak, District- Hazaribagh. In the year 2004, the petitioner took home loan from the respondent-Allahabad Bank, Main Branch, Hazaribagh to the tune of Rs. 4,25,000/-. During the said period, the interest rate over the loan amount was 7.25%. It is further submitted that the petitioner has already paid Rs.8,00,000/- (approx.) to the respondent-Bank through her Bank Account no.20264679966. In the year 2004, the petitioner took home loan from the respondent-Allahabad Bank, Main Branch, Hazaribagh to the tune of Rs. 4,25,000/-. During the said period, the interest rate over the loan amount was 7.25%. It is further submitted that the petitioner has already paid Rs.8,00,000/- (approx.) to the respondent-Bank through her Bank Account no.20264679966. Since the petitioner is a disabled lady, a huge amount was spent on her treatment at Vellore and as such, she was not able to pay EMI of the said home loan due to which her loan account became irregular and was subsequently declared as N.P.A. The petitioner also demanded the statement of the said loan account from the respondent-Bank but the Bank provided the statement for the period from 2008 to 2019 and the statement for the period from 2004 to 2007 was not provided to her. On 07.08.2019, the respondent no. 2 issued notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act to the petitioner making a demand of Rs.7,89,420/- which was said to be the outstanding dues as on 07.08.2019 calling upon to discharge her the entire liability as on date and also future interest thereon along with cost, charge and expenses within 60 days from the date of said notice, failing which the Bank was to exercise the power conferred under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act. After issuance of the notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, the respondent also issued notice to the petitioner on 28.11.2019 under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act read with Rule 8 (1) of the Rules, 2002. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the petitioner had also represented the respondent-Bank on 23.10.2017 requesting inter alia to compute the proper interest rate over the outstanding loan amount so as to enable her to pay the loan, however the said representation was never responded by the respondent-Bank which ultimately led to the loan account of the petitioner being irregular which was subsequently declared as N.P.A. 4. Mr. P.A.S. Pati, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank, raises a preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the present writ petition in view of remedy of preferring application/appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the contents of the writ petition. 6. Mr. P.A.S. Pati, learned counsel for the respondent-Bank, raises a preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the present writ petition in view of remedy of preferring application/appeal under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the contents of the writ petition. 6. Admittedly, the respondent-Bank issued notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act on 07.08.2019 and subsequently notice under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act read with Section 8 (1) of the Rules, 2002 has also been issued by the respondent-Bank on 28.11.2019. The petitioner is the borrower of loan, hence in my opinion, the petitioner has efficacious/alternative remedy provided under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act challenging the possession notice issued by the respondent-Bank under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act read with Section 8 (1) of the Rules, 2002 and other related issues. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “United Bank of India Vs. Satyawati Tondon & Ors.” reported in (2010) 8 SCC 110 , has held as under: “42. There is another reason why the impugned order should be set aside. If Respondent 1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression “any person” used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also the guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4) or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective.” 8. Further, in the case of “Standard Chartered Bank Vs. Vs. Noble Kumar & Ors.” reported in (2013) 9 SCC 620 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “27. The “appeal” under Section 17 is available to the borrower against any measure taken under Section 13(4). Taking possession of the secured asset is only one of the measures that can be taken by the secured creditor. Vs. Noble Kumar & Ors.” reported in (2013) 9 SCC 620 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under: “27. The “appeal” under Section 17 is available to the borrower against any measure taken under Section 13(4). Taking possession of the secured asset is only one of the measures that can be taken by the secured creditor. Depending upon the nature of the secured asset and the terms and conditions of the security agreement, measures other than taking the possession of the secured asset are possible under Section 13(4). Alienating the asset either by lease or sale, etc. and appointing a person to manage the secured asset are some of those possible measures. On the other hand, Section 14 authorises the Magistrate only to take possession of the property and forward the asset along with the connected documents to the borrower (sic the secured creditor). Therefore, the borrower is always entitled to prefer an “appeal” under Section 17 after the possession of the secured asset is handed over to the secured creditor. Section 13(4)(a) declares that the secured creditor may take possession of the secured assets. It does not specify whether such a possession is to be obtained directly by the secured creditor or by resorting to the procedure under Section 14. We are of the opinion that by whatever manner the secured creditor obtains possession either through the process contemplated under Section 14 or without resorting to such a process obtaining of the possession of a secured asset is always a measure against which a remedy under Section 17 is available.” 9. So far as invoking of writ jurisdiction in the matters of realization of loan by the financial institutions are concerned, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of “Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore & Anr. Vs. Mathew K.C.” reported in (2018) 3 SCC 85 , while considering the earlier judicial pronouncements made in this regard, has held thus: “16. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order:- “46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, Whirlpool Corpn. v.Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 17. v.Registrar of Trade Marks and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. and some other judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order.” 17. The writ petition ought not to have been entertained and the interim order granted for the mere asking without assigning special reasons, and that too without even granting opportunity to the Appellant to contest the maintainability of the writ petition and failure to notice the subsequent developments in the interregnum. The opinion of the Division Bench that the counter affidavit having subsequently been filed, stay/modification could be sought of the interim order cannot be considered sufficient justification to have declined interference.” 10. Considering the provisions of the SARFAESI Act, 2002 as well as the aforesaid judicial pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court, I am not inclined to entertain the present writ petition at this stage and the same is accordingly dismissed as not maintainable. The petitioner is, however, at liberty to take recourse before the appropriate forum as provided under the law, if so advised.