JUDGMENT : R.K. Deshpande, J. Admit. Heard finally by consent of the learned counsel appearing for the respective parties. 1. Both these appeals filed under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short “the said Act”) challenge the common judgment and order dated 21st January, 2020, delivered by the learned Single Judge of this Court in Arbitration Petition Nos. 977 of 2016 and 978 of 2016, in exercise of his jurisdiction under Section 34 of the said Act. 2. The facts, in brief, not in dispute, leading to the case are as under : - 2.1 The respondent, in both these matters, is the original claimant, whereas the appellant is the original respondent before the Arbitral Tribunal. The parties shall be referred accordingly to their status. The dispute between the parties pertains to two franchisee agreements -one dated 20th May, 2008, in respect of shop Nos. 1 and 2, Linking Road (Khar Retail Outlet Premises) and another dated 7th June, 2008, in respect of Lower Parel Retail Outlet Premises. 2.2 The claimant filed the statement of claim on 13th November, 2010, praying for an aggregate sum of Rs.12,19,86,457/-with interest at the rate of 24% per annum from the date of filing of the statement of claim till the payment/or realisation. The claim was opposed by the appellant herein by filing written statement on 8th December, 2010. The appellant also filed counter claim interaliapraying for a sum of Rs. 3,16,06,316.50 paise with interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of filing counter claim up to the date of award and interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of award till payment. 2.3 During the course of meetings before the arbitrator, it was decided that the proceedings of reference, to a limited extent would be split into two and the arbitrator would pass a partial final award covering all issues which arise for consideration, other than the final calculation and quantification of the amounts awarded (if any) to either party together with interest thereon. 2.4 On 5th June, 2015, the arbitrator answered 13 issues, which were framed and passed partial final award. The final award was passed on 14th December, 2015. The claimant was awarded a sum of Rs.7,69,97,242/-with further interest on the principal sum of Rs.3,92,51,369/-at the rate of 18% from the date of award. 2.4 On 5th June, 2015, the arbitrator answered 13 issues, which were framed and passed partial final award. The final award was passed on 14th December, 2015. The claimant was awarded a sum of Rs.7,69,97,242/-with further interest on the principal sum of Rs.3,92,51,369/-at the rate of 18% from the date of award. Aggrieved by the partial final award dated 5th June, 2015, and the final award dated 14th December, 2015, Arbitration Petition Nos. 977 and 978 of 2016 were preferred under section 34 of the said Act, which are decided by a common judgment and order dated 21st January, 2020, passed by learned Single Judge of this Court. This is the subject matter of challenge in both these appeals before us. 3. The challenge to the partial final award in both the matters delivered on 5th June, 2015, was rejected being barred by time as prescribed under sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the said Act. However, the final awards passed on 14th December, 2015, are modified by reducing the rate of interest awarded by the arbitrator at 18% per annum for pendentelite period and future interest is reduced to 9% per annum. The challenge to the rest of final award is rejected by upholding it. 4. The learned Single Judge has held that the issues decided by the arbitrator in partial final award dated 5th June, 2015, in both the matters had sub-summed within expression “arbitral award” under Section 2(1)(c) of the said Act and challenge to it is barred by time prescribed under Section 34(3) of the said Act. It further holds that most of the grounds in the petition relate to the challenge to the partial final award, which has attained finality and its validity cannot be questioned in a challenge to a final award passed on 14th December, 2015. 5. We have heard Mr. Kevic Setlvad, learned senior advocate assisted by Mr. Sushant Prabhune for the appellant in both the appeals and Mr. Prateek Sekseria, learned counsel for the respondent/claimant, in whose favour, the awards are passed by the arbitrator. 6. Mr. Setlvad, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants has urged that the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the partial final award passed in this case had sub-sumed within the expression “arbitral award”, is in ignorance of two vital tests; one of the “functus officio” and another of “executability”. 6. Mr. Setlvad, the learned senior advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants has urged that the view taken by the learned Single Judge that the partial final award passed in this case had sub-sumed within the expression “arbitral award”, is in ignorance of two vital tests; one of the “functus officio” and another of “executability”. According to him, after passing the partial final award in the present case, the arbitrator did not become functus officio but was required to pass final award, which only becomes executable and enforceable under Section 34 of the said Act. According to him, mere declaration of certain rights and liabilities in the partial final award is not enough to hold that it sub-sumed within the expression “arbitral award” under Section 2(1)(c) of the said Act so as to attract the bar of limitation specified under sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the said Act to challenge the final award passed on 14th December 2015 under Section 34 of the said Act. Reliance is placed upon the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Satwant Singh Sodhi v/s. State of Punjab [(1999)3SCC487], the decision by Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in America delivered on 29th September 2015 in the case of Rbino. Little field [Manu/FETC/0872/2015], decision of the learned Single Judge of ainryan vad this Court in the case of Hraa. Shreal FC Pvt Ltd [2003 (2) Mh.L.J.592, and a decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Commissioner Kolhapur Municipal Corporation Fairdeal constructions [(2008) 1BomCR403] 7. Mr. Sekseria, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-claimant, has urged that the learned Single Judge has, after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, the evidence available on record and the arguments advanced, taken a possible view of the matter holding that the partial final award passed in this case had sub-sumed within the expression of “arbitral award” under Section 2(1)(c) of the said Act, which does not call for any interference. He further submitted that the learned Single Judge has placed reliance upon the decision of this Court in the case of Indian Farmers fertilizers Co-operative Ltd v/s. Bhadra Pouts [AIR2018 SC 627] and another decision of the Apex Court in the case of National Thermal Power Corporation v/s. Siemens Atkeingesellschaft [(2007)4SCC451] and the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Jhang Co-operative Group Housing Society Ltd vs. Pt. Munshi Ramand Associates [ILR(2013) II Delhi1632.] He further submitted that decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner have also been considered. 8. It is not disputed before us that if in the facts of this case it is held that the partial final award passed on 5th June 2015 had sub-sumed within the expression “arbitral award” under section 2(1)(c) of the said Act, then, the bar of limitation contained under sub-section (3) of section 34 of the said Act will be attracted. Therefore, the question which falls for our consideration in these two appeals is formulated as under : “Whether the partial final award passed in this case by the Arbitrator on 5th June 2015 had sub-sumed in the expression “arbitral award” under section 2(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 so as to attract the bar of limitation contained under sub-section (3) of section 34, to challenge it under section 34 of the said Act.” 9. In order to consider the question framed, we would like to understand first what is an “arbitral award” and an “interim award” or “partial final award”. The partial final award is called as an interim award. The provision of section 2(1)(c) of the said Act states that an “arbitral award includes an interim award”. The expressions “award” or “interim award” or “partial final award” are nowhere defined under the said Act. We have gone through the various judgments cited before us by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. It is not necessary for us to deal with the facts involved in all those judgments individually and it would be suffice, if we state the law as has been laid down and understood by us as under : 10. We have gone through the various judgments cited before us by the learned counsel appearing for the parties. It is not necessary for us to deal with the facts involved in all those judgments individually and it would be suffice, if we state the law as has been laid down and understood by us as under : 10. The Courts have tried to understand the meaning of the aforesaid expressions with reference to the provisions of subsections (1), (2) and (3) of section 31 of the said Act regarding the form and contents of an arbitral award, which sets out the requirements of an award. An award to be valid, must satisfy the following requirements : (1) that it must be in writing; (2) it is signed by the member or the members of the Tribunal; (3) it contains the reasons upon which it is based, except for the exceptions set out under section (3) therein; and (4) it bears the date and place of arbitration. 10.1 Sub-section (6) of section 31 of the said Act delineates the scope of an interim award and it states that the arbitral tribunal may make an interim award on any matter with respect to which it may make a final arbitral award. 10.2 It is not the every order, decision or adjudication of the arbitral tribunal on the matters referred to it becomes an award or an interim award. The arbitral tribunal has power under section 16 of the said Act to rule on its own jurisdiction including the ruling on any objection with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. If the arbitral tribunal holds that it has no jurisdiction, the remedy under the said Act is to prefer a statutory appeal under sub-section (2)(a) of section 37 of the said Act to the Court authorised by law to hear the appeals from the original decrees of the Court passing the award. 10.3 Section 32 of the said Act deals with the termination of the arbitral proceedings. Sub-section (1) therein states that the arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order of the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (2). Thus, the arbitral proceedings would be terminated only by final arbitral award as opposed to an interim award. 10.3 Section 32 of the said Act deals with the termination of the arbitral proceedings. Sub-section (1) therein states that the arbitral proceedings shall be terminated by the final arbitral award or by an order of the arbitral tribunal under sub-section (2). Thus, the arbitral proceedings would be terminated only by final arbitral award as opposed to an interim award. There can be one or more interim awards prior to final award which ultimately decides all the remaining issues between the parties. What proceedings can be terminated other than by an award, are set out under sub-section (2) of section 32 of the said Act. It is not the every order, decision or adjudication terminating the arbitral proceedings under section 32 of the said Act can be called as an award. 10.4 The arbitrator even after signing the interim award or partial final award becomes functus officio, but that does not mean that in no circumstances could there be further arbitration proceedings where the same arbitrator could never have anything to do with the award with respect to the same dispute. 10.5 The question whether an interim award is final to the extent it goes, or has the effect till the final award is delivered, depends upon the form and contents of an award. If the interim award is intended to have the effect only so long as the final award is not delivered, it will have the force of the interim award and it will cease to have the effect after the final award is made. If on the other hand, the interim award is intended to be determination of all the rights of the parties, it will have the force of a complete award and will have the effect even after the final award is delivered. 11. If on the other hand, the interim award is intended to be determination of all the rights of the parties, it will have the force of a complete award and will have the effect even after the final award is delivered. 11. In view of the aforesaid position of law, which we have culled out from the binding precedents, we crystalize the position of law as under : (A) It is not the every order, decision or adjudication at an interim stage of the arbitral proceedings; whether called as “partial final award” or an “interim award”, that would assume the character of an “arbitral award” under section 2(1)(c) of the said Act so as to attract the bar of limitation prescribed under sub-section (3) of section 34 of the said Act; (B) The question as to whether the interim award or partial final award; by whatever name it is called, sub-sumes within the expression an “arbitral award” under section 2(1)(c) of the said Act, is essentially a question of fact to be decided in the facts and circumstances of each case; (C) The predominant tests to treat an “interim award” or “partial final award” as an “arbitral award” under section 2(1)(c) of the said Act would be three fold : [i] that it satisfies the tests of the form and contents of an award under sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of section 31 of the said Act; [ii] it is in relation to “any matter” with respect to which a final arbitral award can be made; as specified under sub-section (6) of section 31 of the said Act; and [iii] the nature, extent and intendment of such order, decision or adjudication. If all these tests are satisfied, then, interim award or partial final award shall become an “arbitral award” as per section 2(1)(c) of the said Act and consequently, the bar of limitation under sub-section (3) of section 34 of the said Act shall be attracted in each case, even in respect of such an award. 12. In the light of aforesaid position of law, we have perused the partial final award passed by the arbitrator on 5th June 2015. The arbitrator has framed 13 points for determination in the said order, which are answered as under : 1. 12. In the light of aforesaid position of law, we have perused the partial final award passed by the arbitrator on 5th June 2015. The arbitrator has framed 13 points for determination in the said order, which are answered as under : 1. Does the Arbitral Tribunal not have jurisdiction to decide the present disputes for the reasons alleged in paragraph 1 of the Written Statement ? Does not arise as the Respondent did not press the same. 2. Do the Respondents prove that representations were made and assurances were given by the Claimant as alleged in paragraphs 2(iii)(a) to (e) of the Written Statement ? No. 3. Does the Claimant prove that the Respondents took over the obligations to run the showroom under the Agreement dated 07.06.2008 as contended in paragraph 9 of the Statement of Claimant ? Yes. 4. Does the Claimant prove that the Respondents had agreed to pay minimum Guarantee Commission in terms of the Franchisee Agreement and that the Claimant is entitled to claim the same from the Respondents for the period upto August, 2009 ? Yes and even there after by way of damages for the balance lock in period. 5. Does the Claimant prove that the Claimant had agreed for reduction of the Minimum Guarantee Commission to 50% effect from November 2008 as alleged in the Written Statement ? No. 6. Does the Claimant prove the breach of its obligation under the Franchise Agreement on the part of the Respondents ? Yes. 7. Do the Respondents prove that the Respondent were entitled to terminate the Agency / Franchisee Agreement on account of the breach of its obligations by the Claimant ? No. 8. Does the Claimant prove that they are entitled to Minimum Guarantee Commission in terms of the Franchise Agreement from the Respondents for the balance period between September 2009 and May 2013 ? Yes, by way of damages only up to the expiry of the lock in period and subject to the deductions set out herein. 9. Does the Claimant prove that it is entitled to an award in the sum of Rs.3,15,21,746.0 (Rupees Three Crores Fifteen Lacs Twenty one Thousand seven hundred and forty six only) or any part thereof as claimed in the Statement of Claim ? The amount of Award will be adjudicated upon after parties submit their calculations based upon the principles enumerated herein. 10. The amount of Award will be adjudicated upon after parties submit their calculations based upon the principles enumerated herein. 10. Do the Respondents prove that the Respondents are entitled to an award for Rs.1,10,57,746.65/-(Rupees one Crore Ten Lacs Fifty seven Thousand Seven hundred forty six and sixty five paise only) or any part thereof as claimed in the counter claim ? No. However, the amount of security deposit would be adjusted against the amounts due to the Claimant. 11. Whether any party is entitled to interest on any amount awarded, if so at what rate and from what date ? The Claimant is entitled to interest at the rate of 24% per annum as per clause 5(g) of the agreement in respect of the MGC amounts due upto and till the date of invocation. Post invocation the Claimant is awarded pendente lite and postawardinterestat18% p.a.. The detailed calculations in this regard should be submitted by the parties. 12. What Award ? The present Award is partial final award determining the issues set out herein. The quantification of the claims would be carried out on calculations being submitted by the parties hereafter based on the findings herein and after hearing submissions thereon. 13. What order as to costs ? The same will be decided in the final award on quantification of the claims. 13. In respect of issue No.9, i.e. Does the claimant prove that it is entitled to an award in the sum of Rs.12,19,86,457/-or any part thereof, as claimed in the statement of claim, it is held by the arbitrator that an amount of award will be adjudicated upon after the parties submit their calculations based upon principle enumerated in partial final award. 14. In respect of issue No.10, which pertains to the claim of the appellant herein for an amount of Rs.3,41,28,587.34 or any part thereof, the arbitrator rejected this counter claim by holding that the appellant had failed to prove the entitlement in respect of the award for an amount of Rs.1,10,57,746.65 paise. The arbitrator has further held that the amount of security deposit would be adjusted against the amounts due to the claimant. The arbitrator awarded interest at the rate of 24% per annum as per clause 5(g) of the agreement. The arbitrator has further held that the amount of security deposit would be adjusted against the amounts due to the claimant. The arbitrator awarded interest at the rate of 24% per annum as per clause 5(g) of the agreement. In respect of minimum guarantee commission amounts due up to and till the date of invocation, the arbitrator directed that post invocation, the claim is awarded pendent elite, and post award, interest at the rate of 18% per annum and parties were directed to submit their detailed calculations in that regard. 15. In respect of issue No.12, the arbitrator held that the quantification of the claims would be carried out on calculations being submitted by the parties based on the finding of partial final award and after hearing submissions thereon. 16. Point Nos.4, 6, 8, 9, 11 and 12 deal with the entitlement of claimants in respect of the minimum guarantee commission in terms of the franchisee agreement, the period of entitlement, the breach of obligations under the franchisee agreement on the part of the appellants in the present case, the rate and the amount of interest to which the claimant would be entitled. The adjudication in the partial final award also pertain to rights of the appellants in respect of the counter claim and the liabilities of the claimant in respect of it. The only thing left out by the arbitrator in the partial final award was to adjudicate upon the calculations in respect of the amount of damages, the interest thereon as per the rate determined and to issue direction to pay the same, so as to make that partial final award and the final award executable and enforceable under section 36 of the said Act as if it were a decree of a civil Court. 17. It is neither necessary for us nor we intend to go into the question in detail as to whether the partial final award dated 5th June 2015 sub-sumed within the expression an “arbitral award” under section 2(1)(c) of the said Act, though we have, to some extent dealt with it in earlier paras. We have already held that it is essentially a question of fact and the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge on this aspect is based upon the material available on record, the appreciation of the controversy adjudicated by the partial final award and its nature, extent and intendment. We have already held that it is essentially a question of fact and the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge on this aspect is based upon the material available on record, the appreciation of the controversy adjudicated by the partial final award and its nature, extent and intendment. We concur with such a view expressed by the learned Single Judge. 18. Out of the three predominant tests pointed out in earlier paragraphs, there is no dispute about test No.[i] i.e. partial final award satisfies the requirements of sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 31 of the said Act. After going through the judgment delivered by learned Single Judge, we have no hesitation to record the finding that the partial final award passed in the present matter on 15th June, 2015, is in relation to the matters with respect to which, final award was passed on 14th December, 2015. Thus, the test No.[ii] is satisfied in terms of the provision of sub-section (6) of Section 31 of the said Act. In our view, the nature, extent and intendment of the partial final award is to enable the arbitrator to determine the amount payable with interest on the basis of rights and liabilities of the parties arising out of the agreement in question. Thus, the test No.[iii] is also satisfied. 19. Relying upon the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Commissioner Kolhapur Municipal Corporation(supra), it is urged by Mr. Setlvad, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants that it is the test of excitability of an award, which is required to be applied to find out whether an interim award can assume the character of final award. According to him, mere declaration of rights and liabilities without its enforceability is not enough to call such an order partial final award so as to attract the bar under sub-section (3) of section 34 of the said Act. 20. We have gone through the aforesaid decision of this Court. The question involved was whether an order made by the sole arbitrator on 23rd November 2005 was an executable award. Relying upon the statement made by applicant–Municipal Corporation, the respondent proprietory concern in the said case was held entitled to receive certain amounts. A declaration was granted in respect of it. The question involved was whether an order made by the sole arbitrator on 23rd November 2005 was an executable award. Relying upon the statement made by applicant–Municipal Corporation, the respondent proprietory concern in the said case was held entitled to receive certain amounts. A declaration was granted in respect of it. The contention of the applicant– Corporation was that the order merely declared the entitlement to receive the amount referred to therein and it was not executable. The contention was rejected by the trial Court against which civil revision application preferred before this Court was allowed. It was held that such order cannot be considered to be an award enforceable under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, as if it were a decree of the Court, as provided for in section 36 of the said Act. 21. No doubt, that in the case of Commissioner, Kolhapur Municipal Corporation (cited supra), the learned Single Judge of this Court was considering the question of excitability of an interim award which ascertained the amount to be paid and also determined that the interest was payable equal to PLR of the State Bank of India for each year from 1996-97 on the amount that has been calculated. Three things are significant in this decision : (1) that the Court found that interim award was deficient in issuing specific positive direction to pay the amount determined; (2) that the exact rate of interest was not specified; and (3) that there was no determination of liability which constituted the basis to hold that the interim award was not executable. 22. In our view, the decision is clearly distinguishable for the following reasons : (1) In the present case, it is not the question of excitability of an interim award that is involved, but it is the question of interim award assuming the character of an arbitral award under section 2(1)(c) of the said Act so as to attract the bar of limitation under sub-section (3) of section 34 of the said Act, which is involved. (2) In the present case, rights and liabilities of the parties arising out of the agreement are determined by partial final award, whereas in the reported judgment, the Court specifically made it clear that the interim award does not declare the liabilities in law to pay the amount. (2) In the present case, rights and liabilities of the parties arising out of the agreement are determined by partial final award, whereas in the reported judgment, the Court specifically made it clear that the interim award does not declare the liabilities in law to pay the amount. (3) In the present case, there is an agreement determining the procedure under section 19 of the said Act stating that it will be in two parts : (a) to determine the rights and liabilities by the partial final award; and (b) the amount if any due shall be decided in the final award. This does not find place in the reported judgment. The decision is, therefore, not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. 23. In our view, the question of excitability or the enforcement of an arbitral award under section 2(1)(c) of the said Act is governed by section 36 therein. The question involved in the present case is of setting aside of partial final award by invoking the provision of section 34 of the said Act and it does not depend upon the excitability or enforceability of such arbitral award. The intendment is to pass final award which may become executable or enforceable. The proceedings under section 34 of the said Act regarding challenge to an interim arbitral award, cannot be confused or mixed up with the proceedings of excitability or enforcement of final arbitral award under section 36 of the said Act. The provision of section 36 operates after an arbitral award becomes executable or enforeceable and the period of limitation prescribed under section 34 expires to challenge an arbitral award. The test of excitability or enforceability of an arbitral award under section 36 cannot be artificially invoked to bring the challenge to an interim award or partial final award within the period of limitation prescribed under sub-section (3) of section 34 of the said Act on the ground that It has now become executable or enforceable. Merely because the interim award is found to be declaratory in nature, without making it executable, would not mean that it cannot assume the character of an arbitral award under section 2(1)(c) of the said Act so as to attract bar of limitation under sub-section (3) of section 34 of the said Act. 24. We tried strenuously, to ascertain from Mr. 24. We tried strenuously, to ascertain from Mr. Setlvad, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of appellant, the basis of his argument that an arbitral award, whether interim or final, if it is declaratory in nature of the rights and liabilities, cannot be made a subject matter of challenge under section 34 of the said Act, unless it is made executable. However, we remained unsuccessful. We also asked Mr. Setlvad, learned senior counsel to point out to us any provision of law or any judgment, either of the Apex Court or any High Court in support of such contention advanced. However, we are at loss to know any such provision or judgment. 25. Relying upon the decision of the Apex Court in case of Satwant Singh Sodhi (supra), it is urged that another vital test to be applied is that of the functus officio. It is urged that after passing the partial final award, the arbitrator did not become functus officio, but is required to pass final award, which only becomes executable and enforceable under section 34 of the said Act. It is not possible to accept such contention for the reason that in the said decision itself, it is held by the Apex Court in paragraph 11, that “an arbitrator having signed his award becomes functus officio, but that did not mean that in no circumstances, could there be further arbitration proceedings, where the award was set aside or that the same arbitrator could never have any thing to do with the award with respect to the same dispute”. In the decision of this Court in the case of HarinaryanGBajaj (cited supra), the learned single Judge has held that the arbitrator becomes functus officio after passing of an “interim award” in respect of the subject matter of such award made and to that extent only. It cannot further decide that part of claim or counter claim which has been adjudicated by an interim award. 26. In our view, the partial final award passed in these matters has determined completely, all the rights and liabilities of the parties and will have the force even after the final award is delivered. The final award, in this case, is completely based upon the determination in the partial final award. In the absence of challenge to partial final award, the challenge to the final award cannot succeed. The final award, in this case, is completely based upon the determination in the partial final award. In the absence of challenge to partial final award, the challenge to the final award cannot succeed. Therefore, the test of functus officio would not be decisive of the question for our consideration. The contention is, therefore, rejected. 27. It is an undisputed position that if in the facts of this case, it is held that the partial final award passed on 5th June 2015 had sub-sumed within the expression “arbitral award” under section 2(1)(c) of the said Act, the bar of limitation contained in sub-section (3) of section 34 of the said Act will be attracted and the challenge to it will have to be rejected on the ground it is barred by law of limitation. Taking into consideration the aforesaid discussion, we answer the question formulated by us holding that the partial final award passed in this case by the arbitrator on 5th June 2015 had sub-sumed within the expression “arbitral award” under section 2(1)(c) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 so as to attract the bar of limitation contained under sub-section (3) of section 34, to challenge it under section 34 of the said Act. We further hold that there is no case made out for interference in our appellate jurisdiction in a challenge to final award passed on 14th December 2015 adjudicated upon by the learned Single Judge. 28. In the result, both these appeals are dismissed. No order as to costs. At this stage, learned counsel appearing for the appellant pray for continuation of interim order, which was operating till 13th March, 2020, on which date, we heard learned counsel appearing for the respective parties and closed the matters for judgment. Undisputedly till this date, the Bank Guarantee has not been invoked though a period of operation of stay has expired. The prayer is opposed by learned counsel appearing for the respondent in both the matters. In view of the fact that the interim order was operating till 13th March, 2020, we extend it by further period of six weeks from today. After expiry of this period, the interim order shall stand automatically vacated without reference to this Court and respondent shall be at liberty to invoke the Bank Guarantee.