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2020 DIGILAW 619 (AP)

Kalyani Tobacco Suppliers v. Union Bank of India

2020-09-17

J.UMA DEVI, RAKESH KUMAR

body2020
ORDER : 1. Heard Sri. P.S. Rajasekhar, learned counsel for the petitioners and Smt. V. Dyumani, learned counsel who had filed caveat on behalf of the 2nd respondent-Union Bank of India. 2. The petitioners, borrower and guarantors, have invoked extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, primarily, with a prayer to issue writ of Mandamus declaring the action of the respondents in rejecting the objections of petitioners by letter, dated 14.11.2019, and also for declaring E-Auction sale notice, dated 06.08.2020, as violative of Articles 19(1)(g), 21 and 300A of the Constitution of India. 3. It is not in dispute that the petitioners, borrower and guarantors, had availed a loan from the respondent-bank, which was not regularized, and it was declared as Non Performing Asset (NPA). Subsequently, notice under Section 13(2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'the SARFAESI Act') was issued on 02.08.2019 granting 60 days time to the petitioners to liquidate the loan amount. Learned counsel for the petitioners admits that, on the date of issuance of notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act Rs. 3,70,67,465.05 (Rupees three crore seventy lakhs sixty seven thousand four hundred sixty five and five paisa only) was outstanding. After issuance of notice, which was issued on 02.08.2019, the petitioners filed objections on 18.10.2019 obviously beyond 60 days as prescribed in the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that after issuance of notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act, the petitioners filed objections under Section 13(3A) of the SARFAESI Act giving details of irregularities committed by the respondent-bank. Copy of the same, vide Exs.P-16 and P-17, has been brought on record by learned counsel for the petitioners. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the objections which were raised by the petitioners were not considered by the respondent-bank in its right perspective and in a perfunctory manner the objections were rejected by the respondent-bank. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, in view of Section 13(1A), if any objection is filed, it” is duty on the part of the respondent-bank-secured creditor to examine the objection and communicate the reasons for non-acceptance of the objection. According to learned counsel for the petitioners, in view of Section 13(1A), if any objection is filed, it” is duty on the part of the respondent-bank-secured creditor to examine the objection and communicate the reasons for non-acceptance of the objection. He further submits that rejection of objection is not formality but it should be done in accordance with law assigning reasons for rejection dealing with the objections. However, according to learned counsel for the petitioners, no such detailed reasons have been assigned by the respondent-bank. To strengthen his submission on this very point, he has placed heavy reliance on a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in Mardia Chemicals Limited and Others vs. Union of India and Others, 2004 (4) ALT 4 (SC) : (2004) 4 SCC 311 and referred Para No. 45, which is extracted herein-below: “45. In the background we have indicated above, we may consider as to what forums or remedies are available to the borrower to ventilate his grievance. The purpose of serving a notice upon the borrower under Sub-Section (2) of Section 13 of the Act is, that a reply may be submitted by the borrower explaining the reasons as to why measures may or may not be taken under Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 in case of noncompliance of notice within 60 days. The creditor must apply its mind to the objections raised in reply to such notice and an internal mechanism must be particularly evolved to consider such objections raised in the reply to the notice. There may be some meaningful consideration of the objections raised rather than to ritually reject them and proceed to take drastic measures under Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. Once such a duty is envisaged on the part of the creditor it would only be conducive to the principles of fairness on the part of the banks and financial institutions in dealing with their borrowers to apprise them of the reason for not accepting the objections or points raised in reply to the notice served upon them before proceeding to take measures under Sub-Section (4) of Section 13. Such reasons, overruling the objections of the borrower, must also be communicated to the borrower by the secured creditor. Such reasons, overruling the objections of the borrower, must also be communicated to the borrower by the secured creditor. It will only be in fulfilment of a requirement of reasonableness and fairness in the dealings of institutional financing which is so important from the point of view of the economy of the country and would serve the purpose in the growth of a healthy economy. It would certainly provide guidance to the secured debtors in general in conducting the affairs in a manner that they may not be found defaulting and being made liable for the unsavoury steps contained under Sub-Section (4) of Section 13. At the same time, more importantly we must make it clear unequivocally that communication of the reasons not accepting the objections taken by the secured borrower may not be taken to give an occasion to resort to such proceedings which are not permissible under the provisions of the Act. But communication of reasons not to accept the objections of the borrower, would certainly be for the purpose of his knowledge which would be a step forward towards his right to know as to why his objections have not been accepted by the secured creditor who intends to resort to harsh steps of taking over the management/business of viz. secured assets without intervention of the court. Such a person in respect of whom steps under Section 13(4) of the Act are likely to be taken cannot be denied the right to know the reason of non-acceptance and of his objections. It is true, as per the provisions under the Act, he may not be entitled to challenge the reasons communicated or the likely action of the secured creditor at that point of time unless his right to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal as provided under Section 17 of the Act matures on any measure having been taken under Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 of the Act.” 6. Further, he has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in ITC Limited vs. Blue Coast Hotels Limited and Others, (2018) 15 SCC 99 and for just decision in the matter, Para Nos. 20 and 26 are extracted herein-below: “20. Further, he has also placed reliance on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in ITC Limited vs. Blue Coast Hotels Limited and Others, (2018) 15 SCC 99 and for just decision in the matter, Para Nos. 20 and 26 are extracted herein-below: “20. The Security interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’) framed under the Act elaborate on the manner in which the representation of the borrower is required to be dealt with Section 13(4) enables any creditor to enforce any security interest without the intervention of a court or tribunal. The procedure prescribed is that after classifying the debt as a non-performing asset, the creditor may, by a notice in writing require the debtor/borrower to discharge his liabilities within 60 days. On receipt of a notice, the borrower may make a representation or raise any objection. The creditor is then bound to consider the representation or objection. If the creditor comes to the conclusion that the representation is not acceptable or tenable, the creditor is required to communicate the reasons for the non-acceptance of the representation/objection within fifteen days. Where the borrower fails to discharge his liability in full, the creditor may take any of the actions under Sub-Section (4) which include the taking over of possession of the secured assets etcetera. 26. There is no doubt that if a reply with reasons is an integral and indispensable part of the statutory scheme, the Courts would not excuse a departure from it. But, on the other hand, if the reply is merely a direction and not of substance to the scheme, the noncompliance may be excused.” 7. Taking aid from the principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the rejection of objections by the respondent-bank are required to be declared as illegal and, consequently, it has been argued that E-Auction sale notice, dated 06.08.2020 may also be quashed. 8. Smt. V. Dyumani, learned counsel for the respondent-bank, has raised preliminary objection in the admission on the point of maintainability of the Writ Petition. 8. Smt. V. Dyumani, learned counsel for the respondent-bank, has raised preliminary objection in the admission on the point of maintainability of the Writ Petition. She submits that even if the petitioners were aggrieved with the action of the respondent-bank in taking notional possession of the property, under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, or even against the physical possession of the secured creditor, the petitioners were having a statutory remedy under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act to approach the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Instead of preferring to avail statutory remedy, the petitioners have invoked the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court, which is to be invoked sparingly, and accordingly the Writ Petition is not maintainable. 9. She further submits that of course the rejection of objection was to be done within 15 days, however, some delay has occurred, however, according to her, rejection within 15 days has been considered as directory not mandatory and on this technical ground the rejection order communicated few days after 15 days to the petitioners may not be treated as illegal. She tried to persuade the Court that on this issue there are number of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel for the” respondent-bank has also argued that notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act was issued on 02.08.2019 asking the petitioners to liquidate the outstanding amount within 60 days. However, objections, after expiry of 60 days, were filed on 18.10.2019. Even thereafter their objections were considered and by assigning detailed reasons the objections were rejected and as such the rejection of objections may not be looked into. 10. Besides hearing learned counsel for the parties, we have minutely examined the material available on record. It is an admitted fact that the 1st petitioner-borrower was liable to clear the outstanding loan amount of more than three crores of rupees on the date of issuance of notice under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act i.e., on[02.08.2019. Despite the fact that the petitioners were required to liquidate the outstanding dues within 60 days, in a casual manner objections were filed on 18.10.2019, which is beyond the statutory period. However, the respondent-bank has considered the same and rejected. We are not examining the rejection of objection orders in detail but cursorily we have examined the same. Despite the fact that the petitioners were required to liquidate the outstanding dues within 60 days, in a casual manner objections were filed on 18.10.2019, which is beyond the statutory period. However, the respondent-bank has considered the same and rejected. We are not examining the rejection of objection orders in detail but cursorily we have examined the same. It is also not in dispute that after rejection of the objections, oh 14.11.2019 itself, possession under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act was taken over the secured property. Though possession, under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, was taken in the month of November, 2019, there is nothing on record to suggest as to why the petitioners did not take any step or question possession notice for about nine (9) months from the date of possession. The present Writ Petition was filed on 10.09.2020, only after issuance of E-Auction sale notice, which was issued on 06.08.2020 fixing date of auction as 15.09.2020. In such view of the matter, the Court may draw an inference that the present Writ Petition was filed only with an object to deviate the right of the respondent-bank to get E-Auction completed in accordance with law. 11. The Court is of the opinion that if the petitioners were aggrieved by the rejection of their objections which was rejected in the month of November, 2019, there was nothing to prevent them to question the possession order passed under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, which was passed in the month of November, 2019 and only after issuance of auction notice, which was issued on 06.08.2020, the petitioners directly approached this Court invoking extraordinary writ jurisdiction of this Court, without availing the statutory remedy available to them. Petitioners being borrower and guarantors were having a statutory remedy, under Section 17 of the SARFAESl Act, immediately after possession notice issued under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, which was issued in the month of November, 2019, by way of filing. a petition under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Petitioners are silent on this issue. 12. Time without number it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if an aggrieved person is having a statutory remedy, he may not be allowed to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. a petition under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. Petitioners are silent on this issue. 12. Time without number it has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that if an aggrieved person is having a statutory remedy, he may not be allowed to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction. In respect of SARFAESI Act the Hon'ble Supreme Court with a view to protect the secured creditor, particularly banks which deals with public money, had examined even the object and other provisions. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a case reported in United Bank of India vs. Satyawati Tondon and Others, (2010) 8 SCC 110 , has elaborately dealt with the issue. We may not do better than to reproduce the relevant paragraphs of the judgment as follows: “(2) With a view to give impetus to the industrial development of the country, the Central and State Governments encouraged the banks and other financial institutions to formulate liberal policies for grant of loans and other financial facilities to those who wanted to set up new industrial units or expand the existing units: Many hundred thousand took advantage of easy financing by the banks and other financial institutions but a large number of them did not repay the amount of loan, etc. Not only this, they instituted frivolous cases and succeeded in persuading the Civil Courts to pass orders of injunction against the steps taken by banks and financial institutions to recover their dues. Due to lack of adequate infrastructure and non-availability of manpower, the regular Courts could not accomplish the task of expeditiously adjudicating the” cases instituted by banks and other financial institutions for recovery of their dues. As a result, several hundred crores of public money got blocked in unproductive ventures. In order to redeem the situation, the Government of India constituted a committee under the chairmanship of Shri T. Tiwari to examine the legal and other difficulties faced by banks and financial institutions in the recovery of their dues and suggest remedial measures. The Tiwari Committee noted that the existing procedure for recovery was very cumbersome and suggested that special tribunals be set up for recovery of the dues of banks and financial institutions by following a summary procedure. The Tiwari Committee noted that the existing procedure for recovery was very cumbersome and suggested that special tribunals be set up for recovery of the dues of banks and financial institutions by following a summary procedure. The Tiwari Committee also prepared a draft of the proposed legislation which contained a provision for disposal of cases in three months and conferment of power upon the Recovery Officer for expeditious execution of orders made by adjudicating bodies. The issue was further examined by the Committee on the Financial System headed by Shri M. Narasimham. In its First Report, the Narasimham Committee also suggested setting up of special tribunals with special powers for adjudication of cases involving the dues of banks and financial institutions. After considering the reports of the two Committees and taking cognizance of the fact that as on 30-9-1990 more than 15 lakh cases filed by public sector banks and 304 cases filed by financial institutions were pending in various Courts for recovery of debts, etc. amounting to Rs. 6000 crores, the Parliament enacted the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short ‘the DRT Act’). The new legislation facilitated creation of specialised forums i.e., the Debts Recovery Tribunals and the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunals for expeditious adjudication of disputes relating to recovery of the debts due to banks and financial institutions; Simultaneously, the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was barred and all pending matters were transferred to the Tribunals from the date of their establishment. An analysis of the provisions of the DRT Act shows that primary object of that Act was to facilitate creation of special machinery for speedy recovery of the dues of banks and financial institutions. This is the reason why the DRT Act not only provides for establishment of the Tribunals and the Appellate Tribunals with the jurisdiction, powers and authority to make summary adjudication of applications made by banks or financial institutions and specifies the modes of recovery of the amount determined by the Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal but also bars the jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court and the High Courts in relation to the matters specified in Section 17. The Tribunals and the Appellate Tribunals have also been freed from the shackles of procedure contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. The Tribunals and the Appellate Tribunals have also been freed from the shackles of procedure contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. To put it differently, the DRT Act has not only brought into existence special procedural mechanism for speedy recovery of the dues of banks and financial institutions, but also made provision for ensuring that defaulting borrowers are not able to invoke the jurisdiction of Civil Courts for frustrating the proceedings initiated by the banks and other financial institutions. For few years, the new dispensation worked well and the officers appointed to man the Tribunals worked with great zeal for ensuring that cases involving recovery of the dues of banks and financial institutions are decided expeditiously. However, with the passage of time, the proceedings before the Tribunals became synonymous with those of the regular Courts and the lawyers representing the borrowers and defaulters used every possible mechanism and dilatory tactics to impede the expeditious adjudication of such cases. The flawed appointment procedure adopted by the Government greatly contributed to the malaise of delay in disposal of the cases instituted before the Tribunals. The survey conducted by the Ministry of Finance, Government of India revealed that as in 2001, a sum of more than Rs. 1,20,000/- crores was due to the banks and financial institutions and this was adversely affecting the economy of the country. Therefore, the Government of India asked the Narasimham Committee to suggest measures for expediting the recovery of debts due to banks and financial institutions. In its Second Report, the Narasimham Committee noted that the non-performing assets of most of the public sector banks were abnormally high and the existing mechanism for recovery of the same was wholly insufficient. In Chapter' VIII of the Report, the Committee noted that the evaluation of legal framework has not kept pace with the changing commercial practice and financial sector reforms and as a result of that the economy could not reap full benefits of the reform process. The Committee made various suggestions for bringing about radical changes in the existing adjudicatory mechanism. By way of illustration, the Committee referred to the scheme of mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act and suggested that the existing laws should be changed not drily for facilitating speedy recovery of the dues of banks, etc. but also for quick resolution of disputes arising out of the action taken for recovery of such dues. By way of illustration, the Committee referred to the scheme of mortgage under the Transfer of Property Act and suggested that the existing laws should be changed not drily for facilitating speedy recovery of the dues of banks, etc. but also for quick resolution of disputes arising out of the action taken for recovery of such dues. The Andhyarujina Committee constituted by the Central Government for examining banking sector reforms also considered the need for changes in the legal system. Both, the Narasimham and Andhyarujina Committees suggested enactment of new legislation for securitisation and empowering the banks and financial institutions to take possession of the securities and sell them without intervention of the court. The Government of India accepted the recommendations of the two committees and that led to enactment of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short ‘the SARFAESI Act’), which can be: termed as one of the most radical legislative measures taken by the Parliament for ensuring that dues of secured creditors including banks, financial institutions are recovered from the defaulting borrowers without any obstruction. For the first time, the secured creditors have been empowered to take steps for recovery of their dues without intervention of the Courts or Tribunals. (3) Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act contains detailed mechanism for enforcement of security interest. Sub-Section (1) thereof lays down that notwithstanding anything contained in Sections 69 or 69A of the Transfer of Property Act, any security interest created in favour of any secured creditor may be enforced, without the intervention of the court or tribunal, by such creditor in accordance with the provisions of this Act. Sub-Section (2) of Section 13, enumerates first of many steps needed to be taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security interest. This Sub-Section provides that if a borrower, who is under a liability to a secured creditor, makes any default in repayment of secured debt and his account in respect of such debt is classified as non-performing asset, then the secured creditor may require the borrower by notice in writing to discharge his liabilities within sixty days from the date of the notice with an indication that if he fails to do so, the secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise all or any of its rights in terms of Section 13(4). Sub-Section (3) of Section 13 lays down that notice issued under Section 13(2) shall contain details of the amount payable by the borrower as also the details of the secured assets intended to be enforced by the bank or financial institution. Sub-Section (3-A) of Section 13 lays down that the borrower may make a representation in response to the notice issued under Section 13(2) and challenge the classification of his account as non-performing asset as also the quantum of amount specified in the notice. If the bank or financial institution comes to the conclusion that the representation/objection of the borrower is not acceptable, then reasons for non-acceptance are required to be communicated within one week. Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 specifies various modes which can be adopted by the secured creditor for recovery of secured debt. The secured creditor can take possession of the secured assets of the borrower and transfer the same by way of lease, assignment or sale for realising the secured assets. This is subject to the condition that the right to transfer by way of lease, etc. shall be exercised only where substantial part of the business of the borrower is held as secured debt. If the management of whole or part of the business is severable, then the secured creditor can take over management only of such business of the borrower which is relatable to security. The secured creditor can appoint any person to manage the secured asset, the possession of which has been taken over. The secured creditor can also, by notice in writing, call upon a person who has acquired any of the secured assets from the borrower to pay the money, which may be sufficient to discharge the liability of the borrower. Sub-Section (7) of Section 13 lays down that where any action has been taken against a borrower under Sub-Section (4), all costs, charges and expenses properly incurred by the secured creditor or any expenses incidental thereto can be recovered from the borrower. The money which is received by the secured creditor is required to be held by him in trust and applied, in the first instance, for such costs, charges and expenses and then in discharge of dues of the secured creditor. Residue of the money is payable to the person entitled thereto according to his rights and interest. The money which is received by the secured creditor is required to be held by him in trust and applied, in the first instance, for such costs, charges and expenses and then in discharge of dues of the secured creditor. Residue of the money is payable to the person entitled thereto according to his rights and interest. Sub-Section (8) of Section 13 imposes a restriction on the sale or transfer of the secured asset if the amount due to the secured creditor together with costs, charges and expenses incurred by him are tendered at any time before the time fixed for such sale or transfer. Sub-Section (9) of Section 13 deals with the situation in which more than one secured creditor has stakes in the secured assets and lays down that in the case of financing a financial asset by more than one secured creditor or joint financing of a financial asset by secured creditors, no individual secured creditor shall be entitled to exercise any or all of the rights under Sub-Section (4) unless all of them agree for such a course. There are five unnumbered provisos to Section 13(9) which deal with pari passu charge of the workers of a company in liquidation. The first of these provisos lays down that in the case of a company in liquidation, the amount realised from the sale of secured assets shall be distributed in accordance with the provisions of Section 529A of the Companies Act, 1956. The second proviso deals with the case of a company being wound up on or after the commencement of this Act. If the secured creditor of such company opts to realise its security instead of relinquishing the same and proving its debt under Section 529(1) of the Companies Act, then it can retain sale proceeds after depositing the workmen's dues with the liquidator in accordance with Section 529A. The third proviso requires the liquidator to inform the secured creditor about the dues payable to the workmen in terms of Section 529A. If the amount payable to the workmen is not certain, then the liquidator has to intimate the estimated amount to the secured creditor. The third proviso requires the liquidator to inform the secured creditor about the dues payable to the workmen in terms of Section 529A. If the amount payable to the workmen is not certain, then the liquidator has to intimate the estimated amount to the secured creditor. The fourth proviso lays down that in case the secured creditor deposits the estimated amount of the workmen's dues, then such creditor shall be liable to pay the balance of the workmen's dues or entitled to receive the excess amount, if any, deposited with the liquidator. In terms of the fifth proviso, the secured creditor is required to give an undertaking to the liquidator to pay the balance of the workmen's dues, if any. Sub-Section (10) of Section 13 lays down that where dues of the secured creditor are not fully satisfied by the sale proceeds of the secured assets, the secured creditor may file an application before the Tribunal under Section 17 for recovery of balance amount from the borrower. Sub-Section (11) states that without prejudice to the rights conferred on the secured creditor under or by this section, it shall be entitled to proceed against the guarantors or sell the pledged assets without resorting to the measures specified in Clauses. (a) to (d) of Sub-Section (4) in relation to the secured assets. Sub-Section (12) of Section 13 lays down that rights available to the secured creditor under the Act may be exercised by one or more of its officers authorised in this behalf. Sub-Section (13) lays down that after receipt of notice under Sub-Section (2), the borrower shall not transfer by way of sale, lease or otherwise (other than in the ordinary course of his business) any of his secured assets referred to in the notice without prior written consent of the secured creditor. In terms of Section 14, the secured creditor can file an application before the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate, within whose jurisdiction the secured asset or other documents relating thereto are found for taking possession thereof. If any such request is made, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, is obliged to take possession of such asset or document and forward the same to the secured creditor. If any such request is made, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate or the District Magistrate, as the case may be, is obliged to take possession of such asset or document and forward the same to the secured creditor. (4) Section 17 speaks of the remedies available to any person including borrower who may have grievance against the action taken by the secured creditor under Sub-Section (4) of Section 13. Such an aggrieved person can make an application to the Tribunal within 45 days from the date on which action is taken under that Sub-Section. By way of abundant caution, an Explanation has been added to Section 17(1) and it has been clarified that the communication of reasons to the borrower in terms of Section 13(3A) shall not constitute a ground for filing application under Section 17(1). Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 casts a duty on the Tribunal to consider whether the measures taken by the secured creditor for enforcement of security interest are in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder. If the Tribunal, after examining the facts and circumstances of the case and evidence produced by the parties, comes to the conclusion that the measures taken by the secured creditor are not in consonance with Sub-Section (4) of Section 13, then it can direct the secured creditor to restore management of the business or possession of the secured assets to the borrower. On the other hand, if the Tribunal finds that the recourse taken by the secured creditor under Sub-Section (4) of Section 13 is in accordance with the provisions of the Act and the Rules made thereunder, then, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, the secured creditor can take recourse to one or more of the measures specified in Section 13(4) for recovery of its secured debt. Sub-Section (5) of Section 17 prescribes the time limit of sixty days within which an application made under Section 17 is required to be disposed of. The proviso to this Sub-Section envisages extension of time, but the outer limit for adjudication of an application is four months. If the Tribunal fails to decide the application within a maximum period of four months, then either party can move the Appellate Tribunal for issue of a direction to the Tribunal to dispose of the application expeditiously. The proviso to this Sub-Section envisages extension of time, but the outer limit for adjudication of an application is four months. If the Tribunal fails to decide the application within a maximum period of four months, then either party can move the Appellate Tribunal for issue of a direction to the Tribunal to dispose of the application expeditiously. Section 18 provides for an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. (5) Section 34 lays down that no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding in respect of any matter which a Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal is empowered to determine. It further lays down that no injunction shall be granted by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken under the SARFAESI Act or the DRT Act. Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act is substantially similar to Section 34(1) of the DRT Act. It declares that the provisions of this Act shall have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law. (6) However, effective implementation of the SARFAESI Act was delayed by more than two years because several writ petitions were filed in the High Courts and this Court questioning its vires. The matter was finally decided by this Court in Mardia Chemicals vs. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311 and the validity of the SARFAESI Act was upheld except the condition of deposit of 75% amount enshrined in Section 17(2). The Court referred to the recommendations of the Narasimham and Andhyarujina Committees on the issue of constitution of special tribunals to deal with cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks etc. and observed: “One of the measures recommended in the circumstances was to vest the financial institutions through special statutes, the power of sale of the assets without intervention of the court and for reconstruction of assets. It is thus to be seen that the question of non-recoverable or delayed recovery of debts advanced by the banks or financial institutions has been attracting attention and the matter was considered in depth by the Committees specially constituted consisting of the experts in the field. It is thus to be seen that the question of non-recoverable or delayed recovery of debts advanced by the banks or financial institutions has been attracting attention and the matter was considered in depth by the Committees specially constituted consisting of the experts in the field. In the prevalent situation where the amounts of dues are huge and hope of early recovery is less, it cannot be said that a more effective legislation for the purpose was uncalled for or that it could not be resorted to. It is again to be noted that after the Report of the Narasimham Committee, yet another Committee was constituted headed by Mr. Andhyarujina for bringing about the needed steps within the legal framework. We are, therefore, unable to find much substance in the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that while the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act was in operation it was uncalled for to have yet another legislation for the recovery of the mounting dues. Considering the totality of circumstances and the financial climate world over, if it was thought as a matter of policy to have yet speedier legal method to recover the dues, such a policy decision cannot be faulted with nor is it a matter to be gone into by the courts to test the legitimacy of such a measure relating to financial policy.” This Court then held that the borrower can challenge the action taken under Section 13(4) by filing an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act and a civil suit can be filed within the narrow scope and on the limited grounds on which they are permissible in the matters relating to an English mortgage enforceable without intervention of the Court. In paragraph 31 of the judgment, the Court observed as under: “In view of the discussion held in the judgment and the findings and directions contained in the preceding paragraphs, we hold that the borrowers would get a reasonably fair deal and opportunity to get the matter adjudicated upon before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. In paragraph 31 of the judgment, the Court observed as under: “In view of the discussion held in the judgment and the findings and directions contained in the preceding paragraphs, we hold that the borrowers would get a reasonably fair deal and opportunity to get the matter adjudicated upon before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The effect of some of the provisions may be a bit harsh for some of the borrowers but on that ground the impugned provisions of the Act cannot be said to be unconstitutional in view of the fact that the object of the Act is to achieve speedier recovery of the dues declared as NPAs and better availability of capital liquidity and resources to help in growth of the economy of the country and welfare of the people in general which would sub serve the public interest.” 13. Again in the year 2018, in Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore vs. Mathew K.C. (2018) 3 SCC 85 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated the settled principle and deprecated interference by the High Courts in exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in a case arising out of SARFAESI Act. This Court is reminded by the observation made in Paragraph 27 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Satyawati Tondon (supra), which is as follows: “27. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection.” 14. Following the judgment in Satyawati Tondon (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Bank of Travancore (supra), has gone to the extent of deprecating the High Courts in interfering in the issue directly. In such view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that it is difficult to entertain this Writ Petition. Following the judgment in Satyawati Tondon (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State Bank of Travancore (supra), has gone to the extent of deprecating the High Courts in interfering in the issue directly. In such view of the matter, this Court is of the opinion that it is difficult to entertain this Writ Petition. The main reason for declination of this Court is that, in the present case, the rejection of objection orders which have been assailed were issued in the month of November, 2019 and in the month of November, 2019 possession notice under Section 13(4) of SARFAESI Act was issued, but without availing the statutory remedy under Section 17 of SARFAESI Act, the present Writ Petition was filed after about nine (9) months that too only after issuance of E-Auction sale notice, dated 06.08.2020. 15. Accordingly, we do not find any ground to entertain the present Writ Petition and the Writ Petition stands dismissed. 16. As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this Writ Petition shall stand closed.