JUDGMENT : The 2nd respondent is the Thumboor Service Co-operative Bank Limited No.359, a primary Co-operative society registered and functioning under the provisions of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). The petitioner was its Secretary. The 1st respondent in exercise of powers under S.32 of the Act superseded the Managing Committee of the 2nd respondent, but though the said order was stayed by this Court, on the expiry of its term on 21.7.2019, the administration was entrusted with an Administrative Committee, the 3rd respondent herein. 2. After taking charge of the administration, the 3rd respondent resolved to place the petitioner under suspension. Her attempt to challenge the order of suspension was repelled by this Court and she was relegated to her statutory remedies. She was later served a copy of her charges and her response was sought. Thereafter, the 3rd respondent appointed the 4th respondent as the Enquiry Officer to inquire into the charges against the petitioner. On receipt of the notice to appear, the petitioner has approached this Court seeking the following reliefs: a) issue a Writ in the nature of prohibition or such other order or direction interdicting the third respondent administrative committee from proceeding with the enquiry proceedings initiated under Exhibit P 6 charge memo. (b) declare that Rule 198 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 as amended by S.R.O.No.829/10 with effect from 18/8/2010 does not empower the administrator/administrative committee appointed under Section 32/33 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 to enquire into themselves or engage the services of an external agency to enquire into the charges against the employee of the co-operative society. (c) issue a Writ declaring that the administrator or the Administrative Committee has no power to conduct the enquiry without following the statutory mandate under Rule 198(2A) of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules and actions taken otherwise are illegal and without authority. 3. Sri P. Deepak, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that it is under Rule 198 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 that disciplinary action is initiated against any member of the establishment of a Co-operative society. 3. Sri P. Deepak, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that it is under Rule 198 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 that disciplinary action is initiated against any member of the establishment of a Co-operative society. The scheme of sub-rule (2A) and (2B) of the Rules is that the appointing authority, namely, the ‘Committee of the Society’, shall constitute a ‘Disciplinary Sub Committee’ and the Disciplinary Sub Committee so constituted shall enquire into the charges against the employee by themselves or by engaging an external agency. The rule also stipulates that the President of the Committee of the Society shall not be a member of the Disciplinary Sub Committee. Sub-rule (3) specifies the authority competent to impose the various penalties on different categories of employees. According to the learned counsel, Rule 198 provides for delegation of the power of the appointing authority to enquire into the charges but also its power to impose penalties, including the power to dismiss from service. Sub-rule (4) provides that an appeal shall lie against every order imposing a penalty to the competent appellate authority shown in the table appended thereto. Sub-rule (2A) and (2B) of Rule 198 were inserted with effect from 18.8.2010 and it casts a peremptory obligation on the appointing authority, i.e., the Committee of the Society, to constitute a Disciplinary Sub Committee for inquiring into the charges against the employee. The learned counsel would also refer to the sub-rule (5) and its proviso and points out that though an appeal has to be preferred within a period of three months, where the penalties are imposed by an Administrator or an Administrative Committee, such employee can file appeal before the forthcoming elected committee and in such cases, the restriction of three months in filing the appeal shall not be applicable. According to the learned counsel, the power of the appointing authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings and more specifically to enquire into the charges against the employee has not been delegated to the Administrator/Administrative Committee and therefore the said body cannot enquire into the charges against the employee either by themselves or by engaging an external agency. According to the learned counsel, the power of the appointing authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings and more specifically to enquire into the charges against the employee has not been delegated to the Administrator/Administrative Committee and therefore the said body cannot enquire into the charges against the employee either by themselves or by engaging an external agency. All that the Administrative Committee can do is impose a penalty on the basis of the findings in an enquiry conducted by a Disciplinary Sub Committee constituted by the Committee of the Society or by an external agency engaged for the purpose by the Disciplinary Sub Committee if the situation so warrants. He would further contend that in the instant case, as the petitioner has been placed under suspension pending enquiry by the Administrative Committee, an inquiry into the charges against her cannot commence until such time as a Disciplinary Sub Committee is constituted by the Committee of the Society in terms of sub-rule (2A) of Rule 198. 4. Sri. Bimal K. Nath, the learned Government Pleader has refuted the submissions. It is submitted that the question raised by the petitioner was earlier considered by this Court and a Division Bench of this Court in Elamgulam Service Co-operative Bank Ltd v. M.Gopinathan & Ors. ( 2007 (1) KLT 147 ) relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies v. T.A.Kuttappan ( 2000 (2) KLT 480 (SC)) had repelled the same. He contends that enforcing discipline against employees and taking disciplinary action against erring employees are certainly day-to-day functions of the Society, which squarely come within the ambit of the term ‘functions’ as provided in Ss.32(4) and 33(2) of the Act. He would also contend that by virtue of S.32, the Administrator becomes the President, Sub Committee, and Managing Committee all rolled into one and merely because of the fact that all the functions to be exercised by various authorities as contemplated in Rule 198 falls on the Administrative Committee, such authority cannot be denied to the said Committee. He would also contend that by virtue of S.32, the Administrator becomes the President, Sub Committee, and Managing Committee all rolled into one and merely because of the fact that all the functions to be exercised by various authorities as contemplated in Rule 198 falls on the Administrative Committee, such authority cannot be denied to the said Committee. It is further contended that substitution of sub-rule (2A) or (2B) by Act 1 of 2000 with effect from 1.1.2000 will not make any difference in view of the insertion of the proviso to sub-rule (5) which provides that when the penalties are imposed on an employee by an Administrator or an Administrative Committee, such employee can file appeal before the forthcoming elected committee. 5. Sri.P.C.Sasidharan, the learned counsel appearing for the respondents 2 to 4 adopted the submissions of the learned Government Pleader. The learned counsel has referred to the decisions reported in Mathewkunju v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies ( 2000 (1) KLT 817 ) and V.T.Mary v. Kuzhur Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. No.540 & Anr. ( 2006 (1) KLT 323 ) to bring home his point that the contention of the petitioner that the Administrator cannot proceed with the disciplinary action against an erring employee cannot be sustained. 6. I have considered the submissions advanced. 7. Section 32 of the Act deals with supersession of Committee. Sub-section (4) of S.32 states that the Committee or Administrator or Administrators so appointed shall, subject to the control of the Registrar and to such instructions as he may from time to time, have power to exercise all or any of the powers and functions of the Committee or of any officer of the Society and take all such action as may be required in the interests of the Society. 8. Section 33 provides for the appointment of a new committee or Administrator on failure to constitute the Committee. Sub-section (2) of S.33 states that the Administrator or Administrative Committee appointed under sub-section (1) and (1A) shall, subject to the control of the Registrar and to such instructions as he may from time to time give, have power to exercise all or any of the powers and functions of the Committee or of any officer of the Society and take all such action as may be required in the interests of the Society. 9. Rule 198 provides for disciplinary action. 9. Rule 198 provides for disciplinary action. It states that any member of a Co-operative Society may, for good and sufficient reasons, be punished by imposing any of the penalties provided under (a) to (h). The proviso to Sub-clause (5) of Rule 198 provides that where the penalties are imposed on an employee by an Administrator or an Administrative Committee, such employees can file an appeal before the forthcoming elected committee and in such cases, the restriction for three months shall not be applicable. 10. In the above backdrop, if one considers the principles laid down emphatically in Elamgulam (supra), it would be evident that the contentions meticulously advanced by Sri.P.Deepak, though attractive at first blush, are liable to be rejected. Paragraph Nos. 5 and 6 of Elamgulam (supra) is extracted below for easy reference. 5. One of us (S.Siri Jagan, J.) recently had occasion to decide identical question in the decision of Mary v. Kuzhur Service Co-operative Bank Ltd. reported in ( 2006 (1) KLT 323 ). In that decision, drawing support from paragraph 6 of the decision of the Supreme Court in Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies v. T.A.Kuttappan (2002 (2) KLT 480) (sic 2000 (2) KLT 480 (SC)), it was held as follows in paragraphs 9 to 11: 9. As is clear from the above decision, it is the duty of the administrator to take such action as is necessary to enable the Society to carry on its functions as enjoined by law so as “to bring on an even keel a ship which was in doldrums”, as the Supreme Court puts it. For this, it is imperative that there is discipline among the employees of the Society. If the administrator cannot take disciplinary action, how can he maintain discipline? If discipline is not maintained, how can he bring the ship in doldrums on an even keel? If the employees are aware that in law, the administrator cannot take disciplinary action against them we need not go too far to draw the conclusion that the casualty would be discipline. I am also unable to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the administrator could have continued the petitioner under suspension till an elected committee takes charge, leaving it to the new elected committee to take further action in accordance with law. I am also unable to accept the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that the administrator could have continued the petitioner under suspension till an elected committee takes charge, leaving it to the new elected committee to take further action in accordance with law. This would be a contradiction in terms also since continuing the petitioner under suspension is part of the disciplinary proceedings. Further, there is no reason why the Society should lose its good money on subsistence allowance payable to the petitioner. Therefore, I have no doubt in my mind that the object of Sections 32 and 33 cannot be put into practice unless the administrator is invested with the powers to enforce discipline among the employees of the Society one way of doing which is to take disciplinary action against them. As such, the administrator as of necessity should have jurisdiction to impose punishment on employees. 10. Further, it cannot certainly be doubted that the function of the administrator is to see that the day-to-day functions of the Society go on smoothly. Enforcing discipline against employees and taking disciplinary action against erring employees are certainly day-to-day functions of the Society, which functions come squarely within the ambit of the term “”functions”” obtaining in Sections 32(4) and 33(2) of the Act. Therefore, it goes without saying that such functions cannot be denied to the administrator as nobody can deny to the administrator jurisdiction to do day-to-day functions of the Society. 11. Once the power to impose punishments on the employees is conceded to the administrator, the facts that under Rule 198, the Sub-Committee is the disciplinary authority and the petitioner has a right of appeal to the Managing Committee lose all relevance. By virtue of S.32, the administrator becomes the President, Sub Committee and Managing Committee all rolled into one. Therefore, all the functions to be exercised by the various authorities contemplated in Rule 198 vests with one authority, namely, the administrator. Such authority cannot be denied to the administrator simply because the petitioner would lose a right of appeal. Even a construction to the effect that when the administrator is in position, the right of appeal under Rule 198 stands suspended, is not out of place in the scheme of things as envisaged under law. 6. Such authority cannot be denied to the administrator simply because the petitioner would lose a right of appeal. Even a construction to the effect that when the administrator is in position, the right of appeal under Rule 198 stands suspended, is not out of place in the scheme of things as envisaged under law. 6. Further, applying the “”doctrine of necessity”” as elucidated in the Supreme Court decisions in Election Commission of India and Anr v. Dr.Subramanyam Swamy and Anr. ( (1994) 2 SCR 67 ) and J. Mohapatra and Co. and Anr. v. State of Orissa and Anr. ( (1985) 1 SCR 322 ), it was held thus in the said decision. In any event, this is a situation where the doctrine of necessity has to be necessarily applied, although the said doctrine is generally invoked in the context of violation of principles of natural justice, especially bias. This doctrine permits certain judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative actions to be done as a matter of necessity even though in the ordinary circumstances such action would have been held as improper or invalid.... 13. ... I am of opinion that the doctrine of necessity as explained in these two decisions squarely applies to the situation at hand. On the appointment of the administrator, the functions of the President, Sub Committee and Managing Committee contemplated under the Co-operative Societies Act vest in the administrator alone. Without exercising these functions himself. Society cannot carry on its business effectively, which is the sole object of appointment of the administrator, itself, unlike enrolment of new members to the Society which can certainly wait till an elected body takes charge without affecting the functions of the Society. Therefore, the facts that under the Rules, Sub Committee is the disciplinary authority over whose decision the petitioner has a right of appeal which has been denied to the petitioner by the administrator by the imposing the punishment, cannot affect the validity of the order of punishment imposed by the administrator ex necessitate. Hence, I hold that the administrator had jurisdiction to impose punishment on the petitioner and the challenge against the order on the two grounds raised by the petitioner is not sustainable in law. 11. As held by this Court, it is the duty of the administrator to take such action as is necessary to enable the Society to carry on its functions as enjoined by law. 11. As held by this Court, it is the duty of the administrator to take such action as is necessary to enable the Society to carry on its functions as enjoined by law. If the power to take disciplinary action is denied to the Administrator/Administrative Committee it would only lead to total chaos. Any delay in initiating action against an erring employee who has caused loss to the Society by his or her acts will cause further loss, as continuing the employee under suspension is part of the disciplinary proceedings and the Society will have to spend money on subsistence allowance for no reason. The objects of Sections 32 and 33 cannot be put into practice unless the Administrator is invested with the powers to enforce discipline among the employees of the Society. By virtue of S.32, the Administrator becomes the President, Sub Committee, and Managing Committee all rolled into one. Therefore, all the functions to be exercised by the various authorities contemplated in Rule 198 vests with one authority, namely, the Administrator. As this judgment was rendered before the insertion of the proviso to sub-rule (5), and as there was no provision to prefer an appeal against the order of the Sub Committee, applying the doctrine of necessity, it was held that such authority cannot be denied to the Administrator simply because the petitioner would lose a right of appeal. As a matter of fact, in Elamgulam (supra) the Division Bench had held that even a construction to the effect that when the Administrator is in position, the right of appeal under Rule 198 stands suspended, is not out of place in the scheme of things as envisaged under law. However, after insertion of the proviso, the employee concerned can file appeal before the forthcoming elected committee without the restriction of three months in preferring the appeal. This, according to me, would safeguard the interests of the employee, who is proceeded against by the Administrator/Administrative Committee. The insertion of sub-rule (2A) or (2B) will not dilute the principles laid down in Elamgulam as the proviso to sub-rule (5) which was inserted along with sub-rule (2A) and (2B) would certainly safeguard her interests. In that view of the matter, I find no reason to interfere. This Writ Petition will stand dismissed.