JUDGMENT Sandeep Sharma, J. - Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with order dated 7.8.2014 (Annexure P-11), passed by respondent No.3 i.e. Chief Executive Officer, Himachal Pradesh, Khadi and Village Industries Board, Shimla, H.P., whereby prayer having been made on behalf of the petitioners to revise their pay scales at par with Senior Assistants with effect from their appointments in the Board in terms of judgment dated 27.11.2012 passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in CWP(T) No. 11365 of 2008, came to be rejected, petitioners have approached this Court, praying therein for following main reliefs:- "i) For directing the respondents to release the pay-scales to the present petitioners as Assistant Development Officers at par with that of Senior Assistants, in terms of directions contained in the judgment at annexure P-5 dated 27.11.2012 which have been implemented only qua the juniors of the petitioners who were petitioners in P-5. ii) For issuing directions to the respondents to release the arrears to the petitioners on account of implementation of the judgment at annexure P-5 w.e.f. the respective date of appointments of the petitioners as Assistant Development Officers in the respondent Board or in the alternative w.e.f. any other date this Hon'ble Court deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case along with interest." 2. Precisely, facts of the case as emerge from the pleadings adduced on record are that some Assistant Development Officers working in the respondent Board approached this court earlier by way of CWP(T) No. 11365 of 2008, seeking therein direction to the respondents to remove the anomaly existing in the pay scales of Assistant Development Officers w.e.f. 1983. Coordinate Bench of this Court vide judgment dated 27.11.2012 allowed the petition and directed the respondents to revise the pay scales of the petitioners in that case at par with the Senior Assistants with effect from 1983 and to release the arrears to them along with interest @9% per annum. Petitioners herein being similarly situate to those of the petitioners in that petition (supra) filed representation dated 9.7.2014 (Annexure P-10) to respondent No.3, praying therein to extend benefit of revision of pay scale in their favour with effect from 1983 as has been done in the case of other Assistant Development Officers pursuant to judgment dated 27.11.2012 passed in CWPT No. 11365 of 2008. However fact remains that respondent No.3 rejected the aforesaid claim of the petitioners on the ground that judgment dated 27.11.2012, is /was applicable only to those petitioners, who had approached the High Court well within time and more so, for those, who being aggrieved with the anomaly in the pay scales approached the court by way of CWPT No. 11365 of 2008. Vide order dated 7.8.2014, respondent No.3 while rejecting the claim of the petitioners observed in the order that since petitioners being not aggrieved of anomaly, if any, in the revision in their pay scale, did not approach the court at that point of time, benefit of judgment dated 27.11.2012 cannot be extended in their favour being judgment in personam. In the aforesaid background, petitioners have approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for reliefs as has been reproduced herein above. 3. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused material available on record, this Court finds that counterparts of the petitioners herein had approached this Court by way of CWP(T) No. 11365 of 2008, seeking therein direction to the respondents to remove anomaly existing in the pay scales of Assistant Development Officers with effect from 1983. Coordinate Bench of this Court having taken note of the pleadings adduced on record by the respective parties in that case arrived at definite conclusion that prior to year 1978, pay scales of three categories i.e. Assistants, Accountants and Assistant Development Officers were same i.e. Rs. 160-400. Same parity was maintained upto 1.1.1978 when these categories were placed in the pay scale of Rs. 570-1080. The anomaly occurred in the year 1983 when the Assistants were granted the pay scale of Rs. 600-1120, but the Accountants and Assistant Development Officers were left out. The grievance of the Accountants was redressed by the Board by granting the pay scale at par with the Assistants, but again, the Assistant Development Officers were left out. In the general revision of pay scales, the anomaly still persisted whereby the Assistants and Accountants were granted pay scale of Rs. 1800-3200, but the Assistant Development officers were placed in the pay scale of Rs. 1500-2640. In the general revision of pay scales, the anomaly still persisted whereby the Assistants and Accountants were granted pay scale of Rs. 1800-3200, but the Assistant Development officers were placed in the pay scale of Rs. 1500-2640. Coordinate Bench of this Court having taken note of the material placed before it specifically observed in para-7 of the judgment dated 27.11.2012 that respondents permitted anomaly to occur again when with effect from 1.1.1996, the categories of Assistants and Accountants have been granted the pay scale of Rs. 5800-9200 and the category of the Assistant Development Officers was granted the pay scales of Rs. 5000-8100/-. Aforesaid anomaly again was allowed to repeat in the general revision of pay scales with effect from 1.1.2006. In the aforesaid background, Coordinate Bench of this Court returned positive finding in the aforesaid judgment that it is quite apparent from the record that posts of Assistants, Accountant and Assistant Development Officers have been treated at par for the purpose of revision of pay scales upto 1.1.1978 and it is only in the year 1983 when the Assistant Development Officers were given the pay scale of Rs. 600-1120 but such benefit was denied to the accountants and Assistant Development Officers. Having taken note of the recommendations made by the Chief Executive Officer of the Board for revision of pay scale of the petitioners in that case, Coordinate Bench of this Court specifically concluded in its judgment that "it is not understandable that when the grievance of the Accountants has been redressed in the year 1985 by granting them the pay scale of Rs. 600-1120, why the Assistant Development Officers have been denied the same pay scale." Coordinate Bench of this Court further observed in its judgment that "there was further arbitrariness in the action of the respondent Board, whereby the pay scale of Rs. 1800-3200 has been confined to the Assistants and Accountants, but denied the same to the Assistant Development Officers." Case of the Assistant Development Officers came to be recommended for revision of pay scale by the respondent-Board as emerges from the various resolutions passed by the Board, which have been taken note of by the Coordinate Bench of this court in its judgment passed in CWPT No. 11365 of 2008. 4. 4. After having perused judgment rendered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court in CWP(T) No. 11365 of 2008, which was filed by the counterparts of the present petitioners, this Court finds considerable force in the submission made by Ms. Shalini Thakur, learned counsel representing the petitioner that order dated 7.8.2014 (Annexure P-11) having been passed by the Chief Executive Officer is not sustainable because by no stretch of imagination, judgment dated 27.11.2012, passed by the Coordinate Bench of this Court can be said to be judgment in personam. 5. No doubt, Coordinate Bench of this Court while allowing the petition directed the respondents to revise the pay scales of the petitioners with Senior Assistants w.e.f. 1983, but as has been observed herein above, if the judgment is read in its entirety, it clearly suggests that court while dealing with the case of the petitioners, not only specifically dealt with the pay anomaly, if any, in the pay scale of the petitioners in that case, rather court specifically dealt with pay anomaly in the cadre of Assistant Development Officers and as such, petitioners, who at that relevant time were also working as Assistant Development Officers alongwith petitioners in that case are /were entitled for revision of their pay scales with Senior Assistants w.e.f. 1983 in terms of judgment dated 27.11.2012. It is not in dispute that judgment dated 27.11.2012, rendered by the Coordinate Bench of this Court has attained finality because appeal(s) having been filed by respondent stand rejected/dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court as well as Hon'ble Apex Court. 6. In the case at hand, perusal of order dated 7.8.2014, whereby claim of the petitioners has been rejected nowhere suggests that petitioners are not similarly situate to the persons, who came to be granted benefit of revision of pay scale in terms of judgment dated 27.12.2014, rather case of the petitioners has been rejected on the ground that they failed to approach the court of law and benefit of the judgment dated 27.11.2012, cannot be extended to them being judgment in personam. 7. By now it is well settled that all persons similarly situate should be treated similarly. Only because one person approached the Court that would not mean similarly situate persons should be treated differently. 7. By now it is well settled that all persons similarly situate should be treated similarly. Only because one person approached the Court that would not mean similarly situate persons should be treated differently. Reliance is placed on judgment dated 31.1.2006 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case titled State of Karnataka and Ors v. C. Lalitha, (2006) 2 SCC 747 , relevant para whereof is reproduced herein below: "29. Service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all persons similarly situated should be treated similarly. Only because one person has approached the court that would not mean that persons similarly situated should be treated differently. It is furthermore well-settled that the question of seniority should be governed by the rules. It may be true that this Court took notice of the subsequent events, namely, that in the meantime she had also been promoted as Assistant Commissioner which was a Category I Post but the direction to create a supernumerary post to adjust her must be held to have been issued only with a view to accommodate her therein as otherwise she might have been reverted and not for the purpose of conferring a benefit to which she was not otherwise entitled to." 8. Reliance is also placed on judgment dated 17.10.2014, passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors v Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Ors, 2015 (1) SCC 347 , which reads as under: "22. The legal principles which emerge from the reading of the aforesaid judgments, cited both by the appellants as well as the respondents, can be summed up as under: 22.1. Normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. 22.2 However, this principle is subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the Court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 22.3 However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated person. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India (supra). On the other hand, if the judgment of the Court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the Court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence." 9. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid exposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid exposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Otherwise, it would amount to discrimination and such action would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has categorically held that this principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically because the service jurisprudence evolved by the Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. It stands clearly ruled in the aforesaid judgment that normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. Another ground raised by the respondents is that since petitioners herein approached the court after an inordinate delay, their claim deserves outright rejection being barred by delay and latches. No doubt in the aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Arvind Kumar Srivastava's case (supra) has held that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly but such principle would be subject to well recognized exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held that those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons, rather they would be treated as fence-sitters. However it has been further held in the aforesaid judgment that aforesaid exception shall not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the Court was judgment in rem with an intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the Court or not. Hon'ble Apex Court has held that with such a pronouncement, the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons and whether the judgment of the Court was in rem or personam, same can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment. Hon'ble Apex Court has held that with such a pronouncement, the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons and whether the judgment of the Court was in rem or personam, same can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment. In the case at hand, as has been discussed herein above in detail, judgment dated 27.11.2012, passed in CWP No. 11365 of 2008 if read in its entirety, clearly reveals that coordinate Bench of this Court specifically dealt with pay anomaly existing in the cadre of the Assistant Development Officers. While granting benefit to the petitioners in the aforesaid case, coordinate Bench of this Court has specifically held /termed action of the respondent-board to be arbitrary and discriminatory, whereby it granted the pay scale of Rs. 1800-3200 to the Assistants and Accountants, but denied the same to the Assistant Development Officers and as such, submission having been made by the respondent-State cannot be accepted that since judgment dated 27.11.2012 is judgment in personam, no benefit can be claimed on the strength of the same by the petitioners herein. Since this Court is of the definite view that judgment dated 27.11.2012 is judgment in rem, claim of the petitioners cannot be denied on the ground of delay and laches. Otherwise also, principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/successive wrongs would be applicable in the case of the petitioners. So long petitioners are in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month to them when they are paid less salary on the basis of wrong pay scale, which otherwise stands corrected/rectified in the case of the counterparts of the petitioners in terms of judgment dated 27.11.2012. Normally, a belated service related claim deserves rejection on the ground of delay and laches, but one of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related case is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. Where a service related case is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. However, if the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. Similarly, if the claim involved issues of seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation would be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring and successive wrongs will apply. In the case at hand, revision of pay scale at par with Senior Assistants in terms of judgment dated 27.11.2012 in no manner would affect the rights of third parties and as such, claim of the petitioners cannot be allowed to be defeated on the ground of delay and latches. 10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Union of India and Ors v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 has held as under:- "4.The principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/ successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. A 'continuing wrong' refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. 'Recurring/successive wrongs' are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. This Court in Balakrishna S.P. Waghmare vs. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, (1959) AIR SC 798 , explained the concept of continuing wrong (in the context of section 23 of Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to section 22 of Limitation Act, 1963) : "It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury." 5.In M. R. Gupta vs. Union of India, (1995) 5 SCC 628 , the appellant approached the High Court in 1989 with a grievance in regard to his initial pay fixation with effect from 1.8.1978. The claim was rejected as it was raised after 11 years. This Court applied the principles of continuing wrong and recurring wrongs and reversed the decision. This Court held : "The appellant's grievance that his pay fixation was not in accordance with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a salary which was not computed in accordance with the rules. So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that if the appellant's claim is found correct on merits, he would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in the future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant's claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the pay which has become time barred would not be recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper fixation of his pay in accordance with rules and to cessation of a continuing wrong if on merits his claim is justified. Similarly, any other consequential relief claimed by him, such as, promotion etc., would also be subject to the defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay fixation, the application cannot be treated as time barred.........." 6.In Shiv Dass vs. Union of India, (2007) 9 SCC 274 , this Court held: "The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition.......... If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years." 7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. 8. In this case, the delay of 16 years would affect the consequential claim for arrears. The High Court was not justified in directing payment of arrears relating to 16 years, and that too with interest. It ought to have restricted the relief relating to arrears to only three years before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date of writ petition, whichever was lesser. It ought not to have granted interest on arrears in such circumstances. 11. Consequently, in view of the above, present petition is allowed and Annexure P-11 is set-aside and respondent-Board is directed to revise the pay scale of the petitioners at par with Senior Assistants w.e.f. 1983 in terms of direction contained in the judgment dated 27.11.2012 passed in CWPT No. 11365 of 2008 by the Coordinate Bench of this Court along with all consequential benefits. Present petition stands disposed of so also pending applications, if any.