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2020 DIGILAW 63 (TRI)

Matir Ali v. State of Tripura

2020-05-21

AKIL ABDUL HAMID KURESHI, ARINDAM LODH

body2020
JUDGMENT : Arindam Lodh, J. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 16.05.2017, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Unakoti Judicial District, Kailashahar, Tripura, in connection with Case No. ST 36(NT/K)/2014 whereby and whereunder the appellant is sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life along with a fine of Rs. 10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) with default stipulation for committing offence under Section 302 of IPC and further sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for a period of 1(one) year for the offence under Section 417 of IPC. 1. Preliminary: 1.1. In a brief outline, prosecution case was launched on the basis of an oral statement of the deceased herself having suffered burn injuries wherein she informed the Women Police Officer that about one year ago one night at about 12/12-30 am when her younger brother was out of station with his family to the house of his father-in-law, the appellant Matir Ali suddenly entered her hut and involved in sexual intercourse on the promise that he would marry her. Their relationship was continued and she became pregnant. Thereafter she asked the appellant to marry her but he declined. Under compelling circumstances she approached the local Panchayat. In the Panchayat meeting the appellant had denied the claim of the complainant, now deceased. Thereafter, on 10.01.2013 at about 5/5-00 am, when she was cooking in her room at that time the accused came and threatened as to why she complained to the Panchayat against him and during that time, the appellant suddenly pushed her in the "Chula" (furnace) of the kitchen. As a result, her clothes were caught with fire. She raised hue and cry and tried to extinguish the fire by rolling on the floor. But the accused had fled away. Hearing her cry the nearby people had rushed to the spot and shifted her to Kailashahar Hospital. She underwent treatment. While she was under treatment at the Hospital, she lodged the oral ejahar. Due to the fire burn, the lower part of her body including abdomen upto leg was burnt. 1.2. The oral complaint being reduced into writing, by the Women Sub Inspector (WSI) of Police, Smt. Sampa Das of Kailashahar Women Police Station, a formal FIR was registered under KLS PS Case No. 15/2013 under Sections 376/417/326/307 of IPC. Due to the fire burn, the lower part of her body including abdomen upto leg was burnt. 1.2. The oral complaint being reduced into writing, by the Women Sub Inspector (WSI) of Police, Smt. Sampa Das of Kailashahar Women Police Station, a formal FIR was registered under KLS PS Case No. 15/2013 under Sections 376/417/326/307 of IPC. She was entrusted with the investigation and during investigation she visited the place of occurrence, examined available witnesses and recorded their statements under Section 161 of CrPC. Further, she recorded dying declaration of the victim in presence of one Executive Magistrate on 27.01.2013. However, the victim succumbed to her burn injuries on 29.01.2013. 1.3. The wearing apparel of the victim such as the blouse etc. was seized by the I.O. on 29.01.2013. Inquest report over the dead body was prepared and the body was sent for postmortem examination. She collected the report. On conclusion of investigation the investigating officer submitted charge-sheet against the accused Matir Ali under Sections 376/417/302 of IPC. It is stated in the charge-sheet that the appellant all along was absconding. On 04.02.2013, she submitted prayer to the Chief Judicial Magistrate for adding Section 302 of IPC and accordingly it was added in the case. 2. Being committed the case to the Court of Sessions Judge, charge was framed under Section 376(1)/417/302 of IPC against the appellant when he pleaded his innocence and claimed to be tried. 3. In course of trial, the prosecution had examined 11 witnesses altogether to substantiate the charge. On completion of recording of evidence, the accused-appellant was examined under Section 313, CrPC wherein he was given opportunity to bring it to the notice of the Court about his defence against the incriminating materials surfaced from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses. But the appellant only claimed that the prosecution witnesses had given false evidence against him and he did not commit any mistake. However, he declined to produce any witness on his behalf. 4. Findings of the trial Court: After hearing learned counsel for the parties, learned trial Judge came to the finding that on the basis of dying declaration, the prosecution case against the appellant that he committed murder of the victim deceased was fully established. However, he declined to produce any witness on his behalf. 4. Findings of the trial Court: After hearing learned counsel for the parties, learned trial Judge came to the finding that on the basis of dying declaration, the prosecution case against the appellant that he committed murder of the victim deceased was fully established. Learned Judge found that there was no material to disbelieve the statements given by the victim in front of the witnesses as well as the doctor and Executive Magistrate. The learned trial Judge further concluded that the appellant exploited the helplessness of the victim lady. The appellant persuaded the victim to involve in sexual intercourse on the promise that he would marry her. The appellant had allured the victim that prompted her to believe his assurance and surrendered herself to the lust and desire of the appellant resulting her pregnancy. Accordingly, the learned trial Judge convicted and sentenced the appellant as aforestated. 5. In the appeal before this Court, we have heard Mr. H.K. Bhowmik, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Samrat Ghosh, learned Addl. Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State-respondent. 6. Submissions: Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel for the appellant had questioned the reliability as well as the legality of the dying declaration recorded by police. He submitted that there were multiple dying declarations. There were contradictions. In the said dying declarations the victim was found to emboss her thumb impression which was not identified in accordance with law. Learned counsel further contended that it was not established that the victim was in fit state of affairs while she gave dying declarations. According to learned counsel, the prosecution had failed to produce and adduce any evidence what kind of medicine was applied upon the victim during her treatment as that in a burn case the doctors usually prescribe such medicines which are enough to cause the patient to sleep and such burned patient always in a state of drowsiness leading them unable to make to give proper statement. 7. Per contra, Mr. S. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P. strongly defended the judgment passed by the learned trial Judge and urged to maintain the conviction and sentenced passed against the appellant. He had drawn our attention to the evidence of PW-5, who according to him, an independent witness being a patient of the same Ward where the victim deceased was admitted and treated. S. Ghosh, learned Addl. P.P. strongly defended the judgment passed by the learned trial Judge and urged to maintain the conviction and sentenced passed against the appellant. He had drawn our attention to the evidence of PW-5, who according to him, an independent witness being a patient of the same Ward where the victim deceased was admitted and treated. He further submitted that the FIR itself could be treated as dying declaration. All the witnesses according to learned Addl. P.P. had testified that dying declaration was recorded in their presence. The evidence of PW-7 could not be shaken. More so, PW-9 the Executive Magistrate who was present at the time of recording dying declaration had no business to tell lie against the appellant. 8. On the basis of aforesaid submission, we have proceeded to peruse the evidence of the prosecution witnesses as well as the materials on record. 9. Evidence: 9.1. PW-1, Amitabha Bhattacharjee deposed that on 29.01.2013 he went to RGM Hospital for his personal purpose where he found police personal of Kailashahar Police Station seizing one blouse by preparing a seizure list. He put his signature on the seizure list as a witness. He identified his signature on the seizure list which was marked as Exbt. 1 and the blouse of the victim was marked as Exbt. M.O. 1 on identification. 9.2. PW-6 is also a seizure witness and stated the same version as deposed by PW-1. His signature on identification was marked as Exbt. 1/1 and he also identified the Exbt. M.O. 1. 9.3. PW-2 is a formal witness. PW-3 Sri Sudip Dhar deposed that while he was performing his duty as Nurse on 27.01.2013, the victim was admitted with burn injuries and one police officer had recorded her statement in present of one Magistrate. He was also present at the time of recording of such statement and he himself signed on the statement of the victim after it was recorded by one lady officer as per the version of the victim. He identified his signature as Exbt. 2. No material contradiction was elicited in his cross-examination. 9.4. PW-4, Mangal Rani Debbarma also reiterated the versions of PW-3. 9.5. PW-5, Nakul Das deposed that on 27.01.2013 he was admitted to RGM Hospital as a patient. On that day he was also admitted in the next bed. He identified his signature as Exbt. 2. No material contradiction was elicited in his cross-examination. 9.4. PW-4, Mangal Rani Debbarma also reiterated the versions of PW-3. 9.5. PW-5, Nakul Das deposed that on 27.01.2013 he was admitted to RGM Hospital as a patient. On that day he was also admitted in the next bed. He deposed that on that day, one police officer in presence of one doctor and Magistrate recorded the statement of the victim and he signed thereon. He identified his signature (Exbt. 2/2). 9.6. PW-7, Inuch Ali is the younger brother of the victim. He deposed that at the relevant time he went to Panisagar in search of work and on his return he was informed by his grandmother that the victim was carrying for six months. From the victim herself, PW-7 came to know that Matir Ali is the biological father of the baby in her womb. At that time, the victim also told him that she surrendered her chastity to the appellant as he promised to marry her. This witness took up the issue with one Siraj Ullah, his maternal uncle who arranged a 'salishi' (meeting) where his sister had divulged the story of love affairs with Matir Ali, the appellant. He further deposed that the appellant denied the relationship and refused to marry her, although, the village leaders gave a verdict directing the appellant to keep his promise and marry his sister (victim). This witness further deposed that on 10.01.2013 while he was in the house of his in-laws at Balicherra he received a telephone that his sister had sustained burn injuries and she was hospitalized. He went to RGM Hospital and found that the lower portion of her body had sustained burn injuries and on his queries the victim told him that while she had been cooking in her house, the appellant Matir Ali went there and pushed her in the 'earthen oven'/furnace and fled away. She raised alarm when the local people came and they shifted her to hospital where she succumbed to her injuries after 7(seven) days. 9.7. The defence could not elicit any contradictory materials against the statement of PW-7 made in his examination-in-chief. 9.8. PW-8, Layla Begam is the mother of the victim. She deposed that the appellant being a co-villager used to visit their house off and on. 9.7. The defence could not elicit any contradictory materials against the statement of PW-7 made in his examination-in-chief. 9.8. PW-8, Layla Begam is the mother of the victim. She deposed that the appellant being a co-villager used to visit their house off and on. She advised the appellant not to mix with the victim but in vain. One day when she was working in a brick field the victim told her that she became pregnant as she surrendered her chastity to the appellant on the basis of promise made by the appellant that he would marry her. She further deposed that meetings were held where the village leaders had directed the appellant to marry her but he denied to marry. She further deposed that one morning when her victim daughter was cooking, the appellant pushed her to the flaming oven as a result of which she sustained burn injuries. The victim had raised alarm, villagers came and shifted her to the Kailashahar hospital. During her treatment she succumbed to burn injuries. She further deposed that when she visited hospital the victim told her that the appellant was forcing her victim daughter to withdraw the case and being refused he pushed the victim to the earthen oven. She further deposed that the lower portion of the body of the victim was completely burnt. She also identified the Exbt. M.O. 1, the blouse of the victim. 9.9. In her cross-examination, PW-8 stated that her daughter was given 'talaq' by Jonab ali for the reason that she became pregnant for which Jonab was not responsible. In her cross-examination she further told that she used to pass her night at brickfield off and on. 9.10. PW-9, Animesh Dhar is the Executive Magistrate. He deposed that on 27.01.2013 he was posted as Executive Magistrate in the office of the SDM, Kailashahar and on that day as per requisition of police and instruction given by SDM, Kailashahar he visited the RGM Hospital. He further deposed that at that time WSI, Sampa Das recorded the dying declaration of the victim in his presence and on the written dying declaration, he put his signature identified as Exbt. 2/3. He further deposed that in his presence the victim put her thumb impression on the dying declaration as was recorded. 9.11. He further deposed that at that time WSI, Sampa Das recorded the dying declaration of the victim in his presence and on the written dying declaration, he put his signature identified as Exbt. 2/3. He further deposed that in his presence the victim put her thumb impression on the dying declaration as was recorded. 9.11. In his cross-examination he denied the suggestion put forth by the defence that no dying declaration was recorded in his presence and no thumb impression of the victim was taken in his presence. 9.12. PW-10 Dr. Sandipan Bhattacharjee who was posted as Medical officer at RGM Hospital, Kailashahar deposed that on 29.01.2013 he conducted postmortem examination over the dead body of the victim and he opined that the cause of death was hypovolemic shock due to burn wound. He identified the report bearing his signature which was marked as Exbt. 3. He further deposed that he knew the signature of Dr. Debabrata Debnath as he worked with him. PW-10 had identified the signature of Dr. Debabrata Debnath which he put in the dying declaration of the victim. Being identified, the signature of Dr. Debnath on the dying declaration was marked as Exbt. 2/4. 9.13. In his cross-examination PW-10 stated that it was a case of 50% burn injury. He further deposed that he could not say under what circumstances Dr. Debnath put his signature in the dying declaration. 9.14. PW-11, Sampa Das is the investigating officer who deposed that on 14.01.2013 she was working as S.I. of Police at Irani P.S. and on that day one Layla Begam lodged a complaint stating that Matir Ali (appellant) set her daughter on fire and she was admitted to RGM Hospital, Kailashahar with burn injury. The said information was entered in GD Book vide GDE No. 669 dated 14.01.2013. Thereafter being instructed by the Officer-in-Charge of the P.S., she proceeded to RGM Hospital with staff and recorded the oral ejahar (Exbt. 5) of the victim in her own hand writing. She also took the signature of the victim on the said recorded ejahar (Exbt. 5). PW-11 further deposed that she recorded the statement of two witnesses namely Inuch Ali and Siraj Ullah under Section 161 of CrPC. Thereafter she came back to the police station and submitted written ejahar to the Officer-in-Charge. She also took the signature of the victim on the said recorded ejahar (Exbt. 5). PW-11 further deposed that she recorded the statement of two witnesses namely Inuch Ali and Siraj Ullah under Section 161 of CrPC. Thereafter she came back to the police station and submitted written ejahar to the Officer-in-Charge. Upon receipt of the said ejahar the Officer-in-Charge registered the case bearing KLS PS Case No. 15/13 under Sections 376/417/326/307 of IPC and endorsed the case to PW-11. The printed FIR was marked as Exbt. 6 and the signature of the O.C., Bidhu Bhusan Das being identified by PW-11 was marked as Exbt. 5/2. 9.15. In her examination-in-chief she further deposed that she visited the Place of occurrence at Kalachara but could not prepare the site map for the reason that by that time it became dark. On the next date, she visited the place of occurrence again and prepared the site map with separate index (Exbt. 7 and Exbt. 8 respectively) and had recorded statement of one witness namely Abdul Rashid. She raided to arrest the appellant but he was absconding. On 16.01.2013 she went to the place of occurrence and examined Layla Begam and recorded her statement under Section 161, CrPC. She further deposed that on subsequent raids the accused was also found absconding. This witness further deposed that on 21.01.2013 since the condition of the victim deteriorated she submitted a request to the Executive Magistrate for recording dying declaration of the victim. Accordingly, the Executive Magistrate Sri Animesh Dhar visited RGM Hospital and in his presence she recorded the dying declaration of the victim at the instance of Dr. Debabrata Debnath and after recording the same she took the thumb impression of the victim in the dying declaration. In her examination-in-chief she identified the said dying declaration which was written in her own hand writing and marked as Exbt. 2/5. 9.16. Thereafter, she deposed that Dr. D. Debnath and the Executive Magistrate, Animesh Dhar also put their respective signatures on the dying declaration. She examined four available witnesses namely Dr. Debabrata Debnath, Mangal Rani Debbarma, Sudip Dhar and Nakul Das. On 29.01.2013 the victim died at the hospital. She was informed about the death by Dr. Swapan Kr. Barman then she visited RGM Hospital and found the victim dead at the female ward and thereafter, she prepared inquest over the dead body of the deceased. Debabrata Debnath, Mangal Rani Debbarma, Sudip Dhar and Nakul Das. On 29.01.2013 the victim died at the hospital. She was informed about the death by Dr. Swapan Kr. Barman then she visited RGM Hospital and found the victim dead at the female ward and thereafter, she prepared inquest over the dead body of the deceased. In the inquest report three witnesses namely Siraj Ullah, Surfan Ali, Inuch Ali had put their respective signatures. The inquest report bearing her signature on identification was marked as Exbt. 9. 9.17. The body was sent for postmortem examination through one constable namely Rajib Dey who gave her the wearing apparels of the deceased i.e. brown coloured blouse which was seized by preparing seizure memo. She identified the blouse which was marked as Exbt. M.O. 1. PW-11 had further examined and recorded the statements of three witnesses namely Amitabha Bhattacharjee, constable Rajib Dey and Layla Begam. 9.18. On 04.02.2013, she submitted prayer to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, for adding Section 302 of IPC and accordingly it was added. She further raided to arrest the appellant but failed as he was found absconding. After conclusion of investigation she submitted charge-sheet against the appellant under Section 376/417 and 302 of IPC. 9.19. In her cross-examination, PW-11 denied the suggestion put forth by the defence that the victim did not put her thumb impression on the dying declaration. 10. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the evidence and materials on record. Keeping in view the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that there are multiple dying declarations which suffers from serious contradictions and discrepancies, we have scanned the first oral statement made by the victim which was reduced into writing by PW-11, the I.O. and treated as FIR (Exbt. 5). We find that the victim has put her own signature on the said complaint. PW-11, in her examination-in-chief has identified the signature of the victim which was marked as Exbt. 5/1 without any objection from the side of the defence. In the said complaint the victim had categorically stated that she became pregnant due to sexual intercourse with the appellant on several occasions. She has further stated in the complaint that the appellant had promised to marry her and only after that assurance, she surrendered her chastity to the lust and desire of the appellant. The victim requested the appellant to marry her but he refused. She has further stated in the complaint that the appellant had promised to marry her and only after that assurance, she surrendered her chastity to the lust and desire of the appellant. The victim requested the appellant to marry her but he refused. She was compelled to lodge complaint to the village leaders to which he got annoyed. She has further stated that on 10.01.2013 A.D. at about 5:00 am while she was cooking there was fire in the earthen oven (chulah), the appellant suddenly entered into her room and scolded her saying that why she informed the matter to Panchayat, and threatened to burn her to death. At that instance itself, the appellant pushed her on the burning furnace (earthen oven) and with a match light the appellant set the lower portion of her clothes on fire. She has further stated that she had tried to put off the fire by rolling herself. On hearing her screaming local people had rushed to her and took her to Kailashahar Hospital. She has further stated that she sustained burn injuries from lower abdomen upto legs. Then, she has specifically stated that the appellant Matir Ali set her on fire with an intention to kill her. She has further stated that the filing of 'ejahar' got delayed as she was bed-ridden and undergoing treatment in the hospital. Her said statements were reduced into writing and it was read over to her by the police officer and thereafter, she put her own signature admitting the writings in the 'ejahar' as true and correct versions of her. 11. In our opinion, the said oral statement which was reduced into writing by the police officer itself constitute a dying declaration. When the victim had given her statement to the police officer on 14.01.2013 the victim was full conscious as being mentally and physically fit. Thereafter we have scrutinized the statements of the victim made in her dying declaration dated 27.01.2013 (Exbt. 2). She has stated in the said dying declaration that the appellant was known to him for the last one year and she used to stay alone. The appellant used to visit her house. She has further stated that she was married for 10 years but she did not conceive and on 31.07.2012 her husband left her. 2). She has stated in the said dying declaration that the appellant was known to him for the last one year and she used to stay alone. The appellant used to visit her house. She has further stated that she was married for 10 years but she did not conceive and on 31.07.2012 her husband left her. Thereafter, the appellant had told her that he would marry her and by saying so he used to behave with her as like as her husband. She has further stated that she also used to behave with the appellant as his wife. One day she realized that she became conceived when she requested the appellant to marry, he denied. Thereafter, she was compelled to lodge complaint to the village leaders where the appellant had denied to marry her. Thereafter, at around 5 O'clock in the early morning when all were sleeping then the appellant had entered into her house when she had lit the earthen woven to prepare tea at that time the victim had told him that "if you do not marry me, I will not withdraw the case". The victim has specifically stated that hearing such statement the appellant had lit fire on her clothes and pushed her into the 'chulah' (earthen woven) and the appellant ran away. When she had screamed, Rashid Miah, Imam of the Mosque came after 10 (ten) minutes. Seeing such condition he left. After hearing her cry local people had rushed to the spot. 12. According to us there is no discrepancy between the earlier statement of the victim as she had told to PW-11 which was treated as FIR (Exbt. 5) and the statement she made in dying declaration on 27.01.2013. More so, we find enough consistency in her statement that is very much relevant to the fact of the case in respect of her sexual relationship with the appellant on the basis of assurance and promise made by the appellant that he would marry her. Further, the victim is very consistent to her statement that the appellant had entered into her kitchen when she lit fire in the 'chulah' (earthen woven) to prepare tea, threatened her to withdraw the case and further the appellant lit fire on her clothes and pushed her into the 'chulah' (earthen woven) and ran away. 13. Further, the victim is very consistent to her statement that the appellant had entered into her kitchen when she lit fire in the 'chulah' (earthen woven) to prepare tea, threatened her to withdraw the case and further the appellant lit fire on her clothes and pushed her into the 'chulah' (earthen woven) and ran away. 13. Next, we find that her statement in the dying declaration that her husband had left her has been corroborated by the evidence as led by PW-8, her mother when she has stated in her cross-examination that the victim "was given talaq by Jonab Ali". The statement of PW-11, the I.O. that the incident of burn injury suffered by the victim was first informed by her mother i.e. PW-8 has also been corroborated by PW-8 when she has specifically stated in her cross-examination that she visited the hospital and lodged the information to the police station as per the version of her victim daughter and she visited the police station on the day the victim had sustained burn injuries. The subsequent statement of PW-11 that on the basis of that information she made a G.D. Entry to that effect and has visited the hospital when the victim herself has narrated about the circumstances how she sustained burn injuries has also been confirmed. 14. Now, proceeding to determine the genuinity and legality of the dying declaration (Exbt. 2), we have noticed that PW-11 in her deposition has stated that she was prompted to record dying declaration of the victim for the reason that her condition was gradually deteriorating. The question raised by the learned counsel for the appellant that putting of thumb impression of the victim on the said dying declaration by the I.O. casts a serious doubt and created a suspicious circumstance about the genuinity of the said dying declaration. We find no force in the said submission of learned counsel for the appellant. From the deposition of PW-11 it has become crystal clear that the physical condition of the victim at the time of recording of dying declaration was serious and in this circumstance, we do not find any infirmity to take thumb impression of the victim on the said dying declaration. It is clearly written in the dying declaration that the police officer has taken right thumb impression (RTI) of the victim. It is clearly written in the dying declaration that the police officer has taken right thumb impression (RTI) of the victim. Further, there are witnesses who were the patients admitted in the same ward adjacent to the beds of the victim. 15. PW-5, Nakul Das has stated that he was a patient admitted in the next bed of the victim on 27.01.2013. He stated that-"when one police officer in presence of one doctor and Magistrate has recorded statement of Asma, I signed thereon (Exbt. 2/2) as a witness." 16. PWs-3 and 4 Sri Sudip Dhar and Smt. Mangal Rani Debbarma were performing their duties as Nurse. They also have stated that in presence of one medical officer and a Magistrate, the statement of the victim was recorded by one lady police officer and they also signed on the said dying declaration as witnesses. We have noticed that PW-5, PW-3 and PW-4 have put their respective signatures in the dying declaration which were identified by them during their depositions as Exbt. 2, Exbt. 2/1 and Exbt. 2/2 respectively). 17. Furthermore, PW-9 the Executive Magistrate has categorically stated that on being requisitioned he went to the RGM Hospital, Kailashahar to remain present at the time of recording dying declaration. He has stated that the dying declaration was recorded by PW-11 in his presence and being satisfied he put his signature on the said dying declaration. On identification his signature was marked as Exbt. 2/3. He has further stated that the victim has put her thumb impression on the dying declaration as recorded. There is no reason to dis-believe the statement of the Executive Magistrate, he being a disinterested person and is a responsible officer having no animus with the accused. 17.1. Taking into account of the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that Dr. Debabrata Debnath in whose presence the dying declaration was recorded has not been examined, we have noticed that before recording dying declaration, the victim was asked to furnish information about what is her name, age, profession, residence, the name of husband and the cause of her admission to the hospital. PW-10, Dr. Sandipan Bhattacharjee in his evidence has categorically stated that the signature of Dr. Debabrata Debnath in whose presence the dying declaration was recorded by the police is known to him. The said witness (PW-10) has identified the signature of Dr. PW-10, Dr. Sandipan Bhattacharjee in his evidence has categorically stated that the signature of Dr. Debabrata Debnath in whose presence the dying declaration was recorded by the police is known to him. The said witness (PW-10) has identified the signature of Dr. Debbarta Debnath on the dying declaration. In this situation, non-examination of concerned doctor should not be thrown out when said dying declaration is found to be consistent with other circumstances elicited from other evidence. From the answers given by the victim we are satisfied that she was fit to give statement because all the answers she replied were correct. Moreover, we find no reason to disbelieve the statement of the Executive Magistrate (PW-9) as well as the depositions of PW-3, 4 and 5. 17.2. In Rabi Chander & Ors. v. State of Punjab (1998) 9 SCC 303 ], the Apex Court has held that for not examining the doctor, the dying declaration recorded by the Magistrate and the dying declaration orally made to others need not be doubted. 17.3. We have further noticed that in his cross-examination, PW-10, Dr. S. Bhattacharjee who conducted postmortem examination over the dead body of the victim has stated that victim suffered 50% burn injury. This witness has categorically stated that the cause of death was hypovolemic shock due to burn injury which is found to be consistent with the report (Exbt. 3). 18. According to us, for a patient having 50% burn injury it would not be impossible for her to give dying declaration when it is revealed that the said patient breathed her last after a couple of days of giving such dying declaration i.e. on 29.01.2013. 19. Apart from what we have stated hereinabove, according to us, the post crime conduct of the appellant is relevant to point towards the guilt of the accused under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. For convenience we may reproduce illustration of Section 8 of the Evidence Act which provides thus:- "(i) A is accused of a crime. The facts that, after the commission of the alleged crime, he absconded, or was in possession of property or the proceeds of property acquired by the crime, or attempted to conceal things which were or might have been used in committing it, are relevant." 20. The facts that, after the commission of the alleged crime, he absconded, or was in possession of property or the proceeds of property acquired by the crime, or attempted to conceal things which were or might have been used in committing it, are relevant." 20. The appellant did not make himself available to the police officer and his intention not to co-operate with the investigating officer has forced us to draw an adverse inference against the appellant. If he is not guilty and is not related to the offence, then, why the appellant was absconding? In his examination under Section 313, CrPC, the appellant has simply stated that the incriminating evidence as are surfaced from the statements of the prosecution witnesses are false and in his explanation he has stated that "I did not do any mistake". On all other assumption of the evidence and materials on record, we are of the opinion that the appellant has failed to establish any circumstances which can persuade us to suspect the dying declaration (Exbt. 2) only for the reason that the victim has given thumb impression upon the said dying declaration whereas she has put her signature on the ejajar (Exbt. 5). 20.1. Each and every dying declaration has to be assessed separately and independently, where there are multiple dying declarations in a case, on its own merits, as evidentiary value of one cannot be rejected solely because of certain variations in another dying declaration. In Ashabai & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 2 SCC 224 , wherein it is held that when there are multiple dying declarations, each dying declaration has to be separately assessed and evaluated on its own merits. 20.2. According to us, Exbt. 5, the oral ejahar which has been reduced into writing itself constitutes a dying declaration. The later dying declaration (Exbt. 2) is found to be well consistent with Exbt. 5 which was treated as FIR. 20.3. In the case in hand, the oral complaint (Exbt. 2) being treated as FIR after the same was reduced into writing by the police officer (PW-11) should be treated as first dying declaration for the reason that it was lodged and made with promptness when the deceased was in fit state of mind, abled and well conscious. She had given vivid description how she suffered burn injury, and who was responsible for that. She had given vivid description how she suffered burn injury, and who was responsible for that. Further, she specifically mentioned the name of Matir Ali, the appellant, herein. As per Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, such FIR should be treated as dying declaration. "1. when it relates to cause of death.--When the statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. Such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not, at the time when they were made, under expectation of death, and whatever may be the nature of the proceeding in which the cause of his death comes into question." 20.4. The Apex Court in Dayaram & Ors. v. State of MP AIR 2019 SC 5739 ] while discussing the legal aspect on this issue had observed thus:- "This Court in Dharam Pal and Ors. v. State of U.P., (2008) 17 SCC 337 held that: 17. The report dictated by the deceased fully satisfied all the ingredients for being made admissible as dying declaration. To ascertain this aspect, we may refer to some of the general propositions relating to a dying declaration. Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act deals with dying declaration and lays down that when a statement is made by a person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, such a statement is relevant in every case or proceeding in which the cause of the person's death comes into question. Further, such statements are relevant whether the person who made them was or was not at the time when they were made under the expectation of death and whatever may be the nature of the proceedings in which the cause of his death comes into question. 18. The principle on which a dying declaration is admissible in evidence is indicated in the Maxim "Nemo Moriturus Praesumitur Mentire", which means that a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth. 18. The principle on which a dying declaration is admissible in evidence is indicated in the Maxim "Nemo Moriturus Praesumitur Mentire", which means that a man will not meet his maker with a lie in his mouth. Thus it is clear that a dying declaration may be relating to: a) As to the cause of death of the deceased b) As to "any of the circumstances of the transaction" which resulted in the death of the deceased 20..If we look at the report dictated by the deceased in the light of the aforesaid propositions, it emerges that the names of the Accused and the important features of the case have been clearly mentioned in the report. It contains a narrative by the deceased as to the cause of his death, which finds complete corroboration from the testimony of eye witnesses and the medical evidence on record." (Emphasis supplied) 20.5. Further, we have given our anxious consideration to the submission of learned counsel for the appellant that the dying declaration (Exbt. 2) does not reflect that the doctor has given certificate about the status of health condition of the deceased. In this regard, in our opinion, non-certification of the dying declaration by the doctor is not always fatal to suspect its genuinity. The requirement of certification by a doctor is a mere rule of prudence to make it full-proof and to rise above from all suspicious circumstances. It is settled proposition of law that when on a reading of the statements as a whole, it appears that such statements are clear and specific and does not suffer from any infirmity, there is no reason not to accept the said dying declaration in absence of any certificate by a competent doctor as to the mental and physical condition of the deceased. What is needed, the Courts should be satisfied that from the material on record it is safe to place reliance on such uncertified declaration [Ram Bai v. State of Chattisgarh, AIR 2003 SC 265 : 2003 CriLJ 441]. 20.6. More importantly, we have noticed that PW-11, the investigating officer has followed the general guidelines prescribing that as far as possible the dying declaration should be in question and answer form and in the exact words or language of the decease. 20.6. More importantly, we have noticed that PW-11, the investigating officer has followed the general guidelines prescribing that as far as possible the dying declaration should be in question and answer form and in the exact words or language of the decease. To remove any confusion, we make it clear that if for good reasons the general guidelines could not be followed, it is not obvious that it would vitiate or destroy the evidentiary value of the dying declaration. 21. Another important feature is that we have noticed that the dying declaration has been recorded in Bengali language [having knowledge of the said language by one of us, A. Lodh, J], it is found clear that the statements given by the victim have been taken down the way she has expressed herself while describing the incident. According to us the said dying declaration (Exbt. 2) is certainly the best dying declaration which inspires confidence to us. However, we make it clear that it is not the requirement of law that a dying declaration ought in all cases to be rejected simply because the very words uttered by the injured are not reproduced [Bhabanand Kakoti V. State of Meghalaya, 2008, Cri. LJ 194, (199) (Gau-DB)]. 22. Further, conviction can be declared against an accused on the basis of sole dying declaration if it inspires confidence of the Court about its truthfulness, voluntariness and correctness. In Poonam Bai v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2019) 6 SCC 145 a four Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has held that a dying declaration can be the sole basis for convicting the accused. But the dying declaration may not be invalid solely on the ground that it was not certified by the doctor. 23. Considering the totality of the evidence including the two dying declarations (Exbt. 2 and Exbt. 5) which are both consistent with each other coupled with the evidence and the testimonies of PW-9, PW-3, 4 and 5, we are satisfied that the prosecution has proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. Total chain of circumstances starting from the deceased's information to her mother Layla Begam (PW-8) who further informed the matter to her son (PW-7) leading to submit a complaint to the village leaders, and subsequently, suddenly entering into the kitchen of the victim by the appellant and setting her on fire and further, the dying declarations (Exbt. Total chain of circumstances starting from the deceased's information to her mother Layla Begam (PW-8) who further informed the matter to her son (PW-7) leading to submit a complaint to the village leaders, and subsequently, suddenly entering into the kitchen of the victim by the appellant and setting her on fire and further, the dying declarations (Exbt. 5) made to the police officer (PW-11) in close proximity to the time of incident and coupled with the statements of the witnesses which is found consistent with the later dying declaration (Exbt. 2) is found to be complete beyond any shadow of doubt. Accordingly, the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Unakoti Judicial District, Kailashahar, Tripura, in ST 36(NT/K) 2014 is affirmed. The appeal being bereft of merit, is dismissed. 24. Send back the LCRs forthwith.