Judgment Sanjeev Kumar J.—Consequent upon a dossier supplied by Senior Superintendent of Police, Pulwama, the District Magistrate, Pulwama (for brevity, the detaining authority) vide its order No.68/DMP/PSA/18 dated 27th of November, 2018 (hereinafter referred to as the detention order) ordered the detention of Nisar Ahmad Qazi S/o Ghulam Hassan Qazi R/o Ticken Pulwama (the detenue hereinafter for convenience) under J&K Public Safety Act, 1978 (the Act) with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State. The detention of the detenue was ordered on the ground that he was an overground worker of banned terrorist organization known by the name of Hizbul Mujahideen and was providing logistic support to the terrorists who were carrying on their subversive activities with the object to secede State of Jammu and Kashmir from Union of India. As is further discernible from the grounds of detention claimed to have been served upon the detenue, the detenue was involved in as many as four FIRs, all registered in the year 2018. The detaining authority, as it transpires from the record, took note of the subversive activities, the detenue was involved in, as “OGW” and thereafter derived satisfaction that his remaining at large was likely to pose threat to the security of the State and thus slapped the detention order upon him. The detaining authority, in the grounds of detention, also took note of the fact that the detenue was under police custody but was of the opinion that remaining at large of the detenue was highly prejudicial to the security of the State and, therefore, the preventive detention of the detenue was necessitated. 2. The father of the detenue, namely, Ghulam Hassan Qazi, feeling aggrieved of the preventive detention of his son filed a petition in the nature of Habeas Corpus before this Court. 2. The father of the detenue, namely, Ghulam Hassan Qazi, feeling aggrieved of the preventive detention of his son filed a petition in the nature of Habeas Corpus before this Court. The detention of the detenue was assailed, inter alia, on the following grounds: (i) That at the time of passing of the order of detention, the detenue was already in custody of State and had not even applied for bail and, therefore, it was necessary for the detaining authority to indicate the compelling circumstances for passing the impugned detention order; (ii) That the detenue was never provided the relevant material relied upon by the detaining authority to derive subjective satisfaction with regard to the necessity of putting the detenue under preventive detention; (iii) That the detaining authority has referred to some “other connected documents” in the grounds of detention but has not spelt out as to what were the said connected documents taken note of by the detaining authority to arrive at subjective satisfaction; 3. On being put on notice, the respondents appeared before the Writ Court and filed their detailed objections as also produced the relevant detention record. The detention of the detenue was sought to be justified on the grounds enumerated in detail in the grounds of detention served upon the detenue. Involvement of the detenue in as many as four FIRs and the detail of the activities narrated by Senior Superintendent of Police in the dossier placed before the detaining authority was cited as the relevant material on the basis of which the detaining authority arrived at subjective satisfaction that remaining at large of the detenue was highly prejudicial to the security of the State. 4. The Writ Court after considering the rival contentions and having gone through the detention record came to the conclusion that there was no legal infirmity in the detention of the detenue and dismissed the petition, primarily, on the ground that the material against the detenue detailed in the grounds of detention was sufficient for the detaining authority to arrive at satisfaction that it was necessary to put the detenue under preventive detention so as to restrain him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State. The Writ Court, on the basis of detention record, came to the conclusion that all safeguards Viz. The Writ Court, on the basis of detention record, came to the conclusion that all safeguards Viz. furnishing of grounds of detention along with requisite material and informing the detenue of his right to make representation against his detention had been scrupulously followed by the detaining authority and, therefore, there was no reason to interfere with the impugned detention order. The Writ Court did not advert to the other grounds of challenge urged on behalf of the petitioner holding that if a detention order was issued on more than one ground independent of each other, the detention order will survive even if one of the grounds is found to be legally unsustainable. Placing reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gautam Jain v. Union of India and anr., 2017 (1) J&K Law Times Vol. 1 (SC) p. 1, the Writ Court did not go into the star ground of challenge urged on behalf of the detenue that the detention ordered was vitiated as the detaining authority despite being aware that the detenue was already in custody did not indicate any compelling reasons to pass the detention order. This is how the Writ Court did not find any merit in the petition and, accordingly, dismissed the same. Aggrieved, the appellant is before us in this appeal. 5. The impugned order of the Writ Court is assailed by the learned counsel for the appellant, primarily, on the ground that the Writ Court erred in upholding the detention of the detenue. It is urged that the detaining authority was well aware that the detenue at the time of detention was already in custody of State in connection with commission of substantive offences and had not approached any Court of law for grant of bail. That being so, it was necessary for the detaining authority to disclose compelling reasons for putting the detenue, who was already in custody, under the preventive detention by passing the detention order. From the grounds of detention, it is argued, it is clear that the detaining authority has not indicated any compelling reasons for passing the detention order. The detenue was on affidavit before the Writ Court that he had not applied for bail in any of the FIRs he was implicated in. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. From the grounds of detention, it is argued, it is clear that the detaining authority has not indicated any compelling reasons for passing the detention order. The detenue was on affidavit before the Writ Court that he had not applied for bail in any of the FIRs he was implicated in. 6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. G. N. Shaheen, vehemently argues that the reliance by the Writ Court on the Supreme Court judgment in the case of Gautam Jain (supra) was totally misplaced. He submits that the ground of challenge which was not adverted to or considered by the Writ Court on the strength of judgment of Gautam Jain was not a ground of detention independent of other grounds of detention. 7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record, we are of the considered opinion that the view taken by the Writ Court is not a correct view in the eye of law. Admittedly, on the date the detention of the detenue was ordered, the detenu was already in jail and was involved in as many as four FIRs registered in the year 2018. It is also not disputed that the detenue had not applied for bail nor was there any likelihood of the bail being granted. The detaining authority has though shown its awareness that the detenue is under custody of the State in connection with the commission of substantive offences yet decided to place the detenue under preventive detention by invoking powers under Section 8(a) of the J&K Public Safety Act, 1978. It was thus incumbent upon the detaining authority to disclose the compelling reasons for resorting to such action. If the idea of issuing the detention order was to prevent the detenue from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State, that objective stood already achieved with the arrest of detenue in connection with commission of substantive offences for which four different FIRs were registered in the year 2018. In these circumstances, the detaining authority could not have absolved itself of the responsibility to, at least, indicate the compelling circumstances for taking such decision. In these circumstances, the detaining authority could not have absolved itself of the responsibility to, at least, indicate the compelling circumstances for taking such decision. In that view of the matter, the detention of the detenue, when he was already in police custody, cannot be said to have been made because of any undisclosed compelling reasons and, therefore, cannot be justified in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Surya Prakash Sharma v. State of U. P. and others, 1994 Supp (3) SCC 195, wherein Supreme Court while dealing with a similar question held thus: “5. The question as to whether and in what circumstances an order for preventive detention can be passed against a person who is already in custody has had been engaging the attention of this court since it state first came up for consideration before a Constitution Bench in Rameshwar Shaw vs District Magistrate Burdwan to eschew prolixity we refrain from detailing all those cases accept that of Dharmendra Sugan Chand Chelawat v. Union of India wherein a three judge Bench after considering all the earlier relevant decisions including Rameshwar Shaw answered the question in the following words: “The decisions referred to above lead to the conclusion that an order for detection can be validly passed against a person in custody and for that purpose it is necessary that the grounds of detention must show that (i) the detailing authority was aware of the fact that the detenue is already in detention; and (ii) there were compelling reasons justifying such detention despite the fact that the detenue is already in detention. The expression compelling reasons in the context of making an order for detention of a person already in custody implies that there must be cogent material before the detaining authority on the basis of which it may be satisfied that (a) the detenue is likely to be released from custody in the near future and (b) taking into account the nature of the antecedent activities of the detenue, it is likely that after his release from custody he would indulge in prejudicial activities and it is necessary to detain him in order to prevent him from engaging in such activities.” 6. When the above principles are applied to the facts of the instant case, there is no escape from the conclusion that the impugned order cannot be sustained. When the above principles are applied to the facts of the instant case, there is no escape from the conclusion that the impugned order cannot be sustained. Though the grounds of detention indicate the detaining authority’s awareness of the fact that the detenu was in judicial custody at the time of making the order of detention, the detaining authority has not brought on record any cogent material nor furnished any cogent ground in support of the averment made in the grounds of detention that if the aforesaid Surya Prakash Sharma is released on bail “he may again indulge in serious offences causing threat to public order”. (emphasis supplied) To put it differently, the satisfaction of the detaining authority that the detenu might indulge in serious offences causing threat to public order, solely on the basis of a solitary murder, cannot be said to be proper and justified. 7. On the conclusions as above we quash the order of detention.” 8. The appellant is, therefore, correct in his submission that this ground of challenge is all pervasive and goes to the root of the matter and clearly vitiates subjective satisfaction required to be derived by the detaining authority for resorting to preventive detention. This ground of challenge is one that vitiates the order of detention as having been issued by the detaining authority without any application of mind and without taking into consideration the relevant material. The judgment of Gautam Jain (supra) was, thus, clearly not applicable to the case in hand. 9. In Gautam Jain’s case the Supreme Court was dealing with Section 5A of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA, for short), which Section is pari materia with Section 10A of the J&K Public Safety Act. Both Section 5A of COFEPOSA and 10A of J&K Public Safety Act apply where the detention is based on more than one grounds and not where it is based on a single ground. In the case in hand, as can be clearly seen from the grounds of detention, the detention of the detenue has been ordered by the detaining authority on the sole ground of the detenue persistently involved in carrying out the subversive activities. In the case in hand, as can be clearly seen from the grounds of detention, the detention of the detenue has been ordered by the detaining authority on the sole ground of the detenue persistently involved in carrying out the subversive activities. The reference to allegations like detenue’s association as OGW with banned terrorist organization Hizbul Mujahideen and his involvement in four different FIRs registered in the year 2018, are all subsidiary facts constituting only one ground. Furthermore, distinction needs to be drawn between the grounds of detention and the grounds of challenge to the detention order. What is envisaged under Section 10A of the J&K Public Safety Act is a situation where detention is ordered on two or more grounds which are independent of each other and severable. It is in these circumstances, the Section provides that the order of detention shall not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are vague, non-existent, not relevant, not connected or not proximately connected with such person or invalid for any other reason whatsoever etc. 10. With a view to understand this fine distinction between the grounds of detention and grounds of challenge to the detention order, it is necessary to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court made in para 17 of the judgment rendered in the case of Hansmukh v. State of Gujarat and others, (1981) 2 SCC 175 : “17. Earlier, in Prabhu DayalDeorah etc. v. District Magistrate, Kamrup and Ors, Mathew, J., speaking for the majority, elucidated the position, thus: The detenu has a right under Article 22(5) of the Constitution to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order of detention. That constitutional right includes within its compass the right to be furnished with adequate particulars of the grounds of detention order. From these decisions it is clear that while the expression “grounds” in Article 22(5), and for that matter, in Section 3(3) of the COFEPOSA, includes not only conclusions of fact but also all the ‘basic facts’ on which those conclusions are founded, they are different from subsidiary facts or further particulars of the “basic facts. The distinction between “basic facts” which are essential factual constituents of the “grounds” and their further particulars or subsidiary details is important. The distinction between “basic facts” which are essential factual constituents of the “grounds” and their further particulars or subsidiary details is important. While the “basic facts” being integral part of the “grounds” must, according to Section 3(3) of COFEPOSA “be communicated to the detenu, as soon as may be, after the detention, ordinarily not later than five days, and in exceptional circumstances and for reasons to be recorded in writing, not later than 15 days from the date of detention”, further particulars of those grounds, in compliance with the second constitutional imperative spelled out from Article 22(5) in Khudi Ram’s case, are required to be communicated to the detenu, as soon as may be practicable, with reasonable expedition. It follows, that if in a case the so called “grounds of detention” communicated to the detenu lack the basic or primary facts on which the conclusions of fact stated therein are founded, and this deficiency is not made good and communicated to the detenu within the period specified in Section 3(3), the omission will be fatal to the validity of the detention. If however, the grounds communicated are elaborate and contain all the “basic facts” but are not comprehensive enough to cover all the details or particulars of the “basic facts”, such particulars, also must be supplied to the detenu, if asked for by him, with reasonably expedition, within a reasonable time. What is “reasonable time conforming with reasonable expedition”, required for the supply of such details or further particulars, is a question of fact depending upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case. In the circumstances of a given case, if the time taken for supply of such additional particulars, exceeds marginally, the maximum fixed by the statute for communication of the grounds it may still be regarded “reasonable”, while in the facts of another case, even a delay which does not exceed 15 days, may be unjustified, and amount to an infraction of the second constitutional imperative pointed out in Khudi Ram’s case” 11. Viewed thus, it is seen that in the present case the subjective satisfaction is based primarily on one ground i.e. the activities the detenue has been persistently involved in over a period if not prevented by putting him under preventive detention would pose serious threat to the security of the State. All other details including reference to involvement of the detenue in FIRs etc. All other details including reference to involvement of the detenue in FIRs etc. only constitute subsidiary facts giving rise to a substantive ground on the basis of which the detaining authority is of the view that the detention under preventive law should be ordered. The plea of the appellant that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, which is sine qua non for ordering the detention under preventive law, is vitiated by non-application of mind, is, strictly speaking, not a ground of detention but a ground of challenge raised to assail the order of detention itself. Subjective satisfaction without taking relevant material in consideration and the non-application of mind by the detaining authority are the grounds that go to the root of the detention and vitiates it completely. In that view of the matter we are of the firm view that the judgment of Gautam Jain (supra) is not attracted in the case in hand. The order of detention is clearly vitiated by total non-application of mind by the detaining authority and should have been held so by the Writ Court. 12. For the foregoing reasons, we accept this appeal, set aside the order of the Writ Court and quash the impugned detention order. As a consequence thereof, respondents are directed to release the detenue forthwith from the preventive custody, if not required in connection with any other case.