ORDER : Kailash Prasad Deo, J. (Through : Video Conferencing) 1. Heard, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta. 2. The appellants have assailed the impugned judgment and decree of concurrent findings by both the courts below, before this Court in second appeal. 3. The brief fact of the case is as under: The suit has been filed by the plaintiffs for declaration of absolute ownership over the suit land comprises of Khata No. 5, Plot No. 263, Area-0.96 acres of Mouza-Mohanpur, P.S. No. 92, District-Giridih out of entire land of 8 Bighas, 11 Katthas equivalent to 6.04 acres in Khata No. 5, in various Plots No. 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262 and 263, with a prayer for confirmation of possession of the plaintiffs over the suit land (Plot No. 263) and if found dispossessed during pendency of the suit, be recovered by dispossessing the defendants and also for grant of temporary injunction against the defendants. 4. Learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta, has submitted that both the courts below have not taken due consideration of Exhibit-3 & 4, in view of Order XII Rule 6 C.P.C.. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the trial court ought to have decided the suit on the basis of preponderance of evidence, but the trial court has failed to take the material brought on record and unnecessary gave weightage to order passed by the Executive Magistrate in a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C., as such both the impugned judgments and decree are bad in law. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that both the courts below have not given due weightage to the registered deeds and the averments made in the registered deed except that Chulhan Barhi has surrendered the entire raiyati land in the year 1920 by filing an application before Sub Divisional Officer, Giridih in favour of the original landlord Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. As such, prayed that the judgment and decree passed by both the courts below be set aside. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that both the courts below have not taken consideration of the documents including the rent receipts brought by the plaintiffs and unnecessarily upheld the title of the defendants, who did not produced a single chit of rent receipt before the court below. 8. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that both the courts below have not taken consideration of the documents including the rent receipts brought by the plaintiffs and unnecessarily upheld the title of the defendants, who did not produced a single chit of rent receipt before the court below. 8. Learned counsel has submitted that both the defendants have appeared. Mahabir Barhi (defendant no. 1) is son of Gopi Barhi @ Moti Barhi and Huro Barhi is son of Jago Barhi, both sons of recorded tenant Chulhan Barhi. Initially both filed their joint written statement. Subsequently, defendant no. 2 Huro Barhi filed a petition on 02.07.1994 and also filed a compromise petition with the plaintiffs, which have been marked as Exhibit-3 & 4 without objection, as such, in view of Order XII Rule 6 C.P.C., the trial court as well as appellate court ought to have decided the suit and appeal in favour of the plaintiffs, which they have miserably failed. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that both the courts below have not accepted the registered documents dated 10.12.1923, 18.7.1931 and 06.08.1960 in correct perspective and wrongly dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiffs, as such, both the judgment and decree passed by learned lower courts may be set aside. 10. Though the appeal has not been admitted and as such, respondents have no locus in the present appeal, but one of the legal heirs of defendant no. 1 Mahabir Barhi namely, Angad Barhi (respondent no. 2) has filed Vakalatnama, which has been accepted by the Registry of this Court. The matter is being heard through Virtual Court and the link has also been provided to the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2, Mrs. J. Mazumdar, as such, opportunity of hearing has been given to the learned counsel for the respondent no. 2 in special circumstances. 11. Learned senior counsel for the defendants/ respondents/respondents, Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, assisted by Mrs. J. Mazumdar has submitted that the trial court as well as appellate court has given a concurrent finding with regard to the facts which requires no interference by this Hon'ble Court in view of the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of C. Doddanarayana Reddy (Dead) by Lrs. & Others Vs. C. Jayarama Reddy (Dead) by Lrs. & Others. Para-25 to 29 of the aforesaid judgment are re-produced below:- 25. & Others Vs. C. Jayarama Reddy (Dead) by Lrs. & Others. Para-25 to 29 of the aforesaid judgment are re-produced below:- 25. The question as to whether a substantial question of law arises, has been a subject matter of interpretation by this Court. In the judgment reported as Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Anjuman-E- Ismail Madris-Un-Niswan (1999) 6 SCC 343 , it was held that findings of the fact could not have been interfered within the second appeal. This Court held as under: "12. This Court had repeatedly held that the power of the High Court to interfere in second appeal under Section 100 CPC is limited solely to decide a substantial question of law, if at all the same arises in the case. It has deprecated the practice of the High Court routinely interfering in pure findings of fact reached by the courts below without coming to the conclusion that the said finding of fact is either perverse or not based on material on record. 13. In Ramanuja Naidu v. V. Kanniah Naidu 1996 3 SCC 392 ), this Court held: "It is now well settled that concurrent findings of fact of trial court and first appellate court cannot be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code. The Single Judge of the High Court totally misconceived his jurisdiction in deciding the second appeal under Section 100 of the Code in the way he did." 14. In Navaneethammal v. Arjuna Chetty 1996 6 SCC166), this Court held: "Interference with the concurrent findings of the courts below by the High Court under Section 100 CPC must be avoided unless warranted by compelling reasons. In any case, the High Court is not expected to reappreciate the evidence just to re- place the findings of the lower courts. Even assuming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material." 15. Even assuming that another view is possible on a reappreciation of the same evidence, that should not have been done by the High Court as it cannot be said that the view taken by the first appellate court was based on no material." 15. and again in Secy., Taliparamba Education Society v. Moothedath Mallisseri Illath M.N. 1997 4 SCC 484 ), this Court held: (SCC p. 486, para 5) "The High Court was grossly in error in trenching upon the appreciation of evidence under Section 100 CPC and recording reverse finding of fact which is impermissible." 26. In a judgment reported as Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitkibai Sopan Gujar & Ors. (1999) 3 SCC 722 , this Court held that from a given set of circumstances if two inferences are possible then the one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court. In the said case, the First Appellate Court set aside the judgment of the trial court. It was held that the High Court can interfere if the conclusion drawn by the lower court was erroneous being contrary to mandatory provisions of law applicable or if it is a settled position on the basis of a pronouncement made by the court or based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. This Court held as under: "5. It is not within the domain of the High Court to investigate the grounds on which findings were arrived at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for interference in second appeal when it is found that the appellate court had given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. In a case where from a given set of circumstances two inferences are possible, one drawn by the lower appellate court is binding on the High Court in second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not permissible. The High Court cannot substitute its opinion for the opinion of the first appellate court unless it is found that the conclusions drawn by the tower appellate court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable of its settled position on the basis of pronouncements made by the apex Court, or was based upon in inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence." 27. In another judgment reported as Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari (2001) 3 SCC 179 , this Court held as under: "14. A point of law which admits of no two opinions may be a proposition of law but cannot be a substantial question of law. To be substantial, a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by law of the land or a binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case, if answered either way, in so far as the rights of the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law involving in the case there must be first a foundation for it laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point raised for the first time before the High Court is not a question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis." 28. Recently in another judgment reported as State of Rajasthan v. Shiv Dayal (2019) 8 SCC 637 , it was held that a concurrent finding of the fact is binding, unless it is pointed out that it was recorded de hors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or based on misreading of the material on records and documents. The Court held as under: "When any concurrent finding of fact is assailed in second appeal, the appellant is entitled to point out that it is bad in law because it was recorded de hors the pleadings or it was based on no evidence or it was based on misreading of material documentary evidence or it was recorded against any provision of law and lastly, the decision is one which no Judge acting judicially could reasonably have reached. (see observation made by learned Judge Vivian Bose, J. as His Lordship then was a Judge of the Nagpur High Court in Rajeshwar Vishwanath Mamidwar & Ors. vs. Dashrath Narayan Chilwelkar & Ors., AIR 1943 Nagpur 117 Para 43)." 29. The learned High Court has not satisfied the tests laid down in the aforesaid judgments. Both the courts, the trial court and the learned First Appellate Court, have examined the School Leaving Certificate and returned a finding that the date of birth does not stand proved from such certificate. May be the High Court could have taken a different view acting as a trial court but once, two courts have returned a finding which is not based upon any misreading of material documents, nor is recorded against any provision of law, and neither can it be said that any judge acting judicially and reasonably could not have reached such a finding, then, the High Court cannot be said to have erred. Resultantly, no substantial question of law arose for consideration before the High Court. 12. Learned counsel further submitted that no substantial question of law is made out to admit this appeal. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent has advanced his argument on the ground that plaintiffs have failed to prove the document with regard to surrender of land by Chulhan Barhi after having permission of S.D.O., Giridih to original landlord Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. The plaintiffs have failed to prove its own pleading, which is basis of the suit. 14. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent has advanced his argument on the ground that plaintiffs have failed to prove the document with regard to surrender of land by Chulhan Barhi after having permission of S.D.O., Giridih to original landlord Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. The plaintiffs have failed to prove its own pleading, which is basis of the suit. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that as per pleading of plaintiffs, the land was surrendered by Chulhan Barhi and Preetam Barhi in the year 1920 with a permission of S.D.O. in favour of original landlord Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. Thereafter subsequent registered deed was executed on 10.12.1923 in favour of Mrs. J.V. Richard for the entire land and subsequently, transferred the entire land in the year 1931 in favour of Ajit Kumr Chakravorty by registered deed and said Ajit Kumar Chakravorty again executed a registered deed on 06.08.1960 in favour of seven sons of Babu Chand Mull Rajgarhia, then it is not proper for the plaintiffs to only claim suit land with regard to Plot No. 263 comprising 0.96 acres of the aforesaid land. Thus, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that neither the plaintiffs have discharged their onus as required under Section 73 or Section 102 & 103 of the Indian Evidence Act to prove its case. Both the courts below have rightly dismissed the suit, affirmed by learned appellate court, as no substantial question of law is made out. The appeal being devoid of merit may be dismissed. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents has further submitted that the rent receipt has been discussed by the trial court and the trial court has categorically held that as per Exhibit-A/2 the said land is still in the name of Preetam Barhi and Chulhan Barhi. 16. The appeal being devoid of merit may be dismissed. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents has further submitted that the rent receipt has been discussed by the trial court and the trial court has categorically held that as per Exhibit-A/2 the said land is still in the name of Preetam Barhi and Chulhan Barhi. 16. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that even for the sake of argument Exhibit-3 & 4 which is subsequent written statement filed by Huro Barhi on 02.07.1994 resiling from earlier joint written statement filed by said Huro Barhi along with Mahabir Barhi and compromise petition filed by Huro Barhi with the plaintiffs are concerned, the same cannot be accepted as an evidence to create title in favour of plaintiffs in absence of examination of Huro Barhi and those two documents do not show the title of the plaintiffs, as the document has been brought on record regarding written statement resiling for earlier written statement of Huro Barhi. As such, the trial court as well as appellate court has rightly considered the same, discussed the same and rejected the same in view of Order XXIII Rule 3 C.P.C.. 17. Learned counsel for the respondents has further submitted that the suit property is not the entire property of the defendants / respondents / respondents / descendants of Chulhan Barhi and Preetam Barhi, rather a portion of the same i.e. 0.96 acres of land of Plot No. 263 of Khata No. 5 which shows that plaintiffs are not claiming the entire land of Khata No. 5 comprising of 8 Bighas 11 Kathas which is equal to 6.04 acres in various plots nos. 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262 and 263 on the basis of so called registered deeds. 18. Heard, learned counsel for the appellants and perused the material brought on record. It appears that the suit was filed by the plaintiffs with regard to portion of land of Plot No. 263, Khata No. 5, Mouza- Mohanpur, P.S. No. 92, District-Giridih recorded in the joint name of Preetam Barhi and Chulhan Barhi during last cadastral survey and settlement operation. Preetam Barhi was issueless and he left for unknown destination after survey operation and never heard again. Preetam Barhi was issueless and he left for unknown destination after survey operation and never heard again. Chulhan Barhi has made an application to the S.D.O., Giridih for permission to surrender entire Khata No. 5 comprising 8 Bighas, 11 Katthas of land in the year 1920 and after surrendering the entire land in favour of landlord Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. As per pleading, this document has not been brought on record nor proved by plaintiffs. As per case of the plaintiffs, the said land was transferred by registered patta dated 10.12.1923 on a salami of Rs. 62.12 on an annual rent of Rs. 62.12. in favour of Mrs. J.V. Richard, widow of Mr. B.S.J. Richard of Baraganda, Giridih. After that, Mrs. J.V. Richard sold the entire holding no. 5 consisting total plots no. 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262 and 263, total area 6.04 acres equivalent to 8 Bigha 11 Kathas to Ajit Kumar Chakravorty for valuable consideration amounting to Rs. 800/- through registered sale deed dated 18.07.1931. The purchaser, Ajit Kumar Chakravorty paid rent at the rate of 62.12 to the ex-landlord. In the year 1947-48, the land was numbered as holding no. 341, ward no. V by municipality and municipal tax was charged. The same was deposited by Ajit Kumar Chakravorty. The said Ajit Kumar Chakravorty after vesting of the estate was recognized as a tenant by the State of Bihar and subsequently, the holding number was changed as a holding no. 374 of ward no. V. The said Ajit Kumar Chakravorty sold entire land of Khata No. 5, measuring 8 Bighas 11 Kathas by registered sale deed dated 06.08.1960 for a total consideration amount of Rs. 9000/- in favour of seven sons of Babu Chand Mull Rajgarhia of Giridih namely, Sri Ram Ratan Lal Rajgarhia, Manik Lal Rajgarhia, Sashi Kumar Rajgarhia, Moti Lal Rajgarhia, Sajjan Kumar Rajgarhia, Birendra Kumar Rajgarhia and Narendra Kumar Rajgarhia. The commotion developed over portion of the aforesaid land being Plot No. 263 when police on a false report that defendant no. 9000/- in favour of seven sons of Babu Chand Mull Rajgarhia of Giridih namely, Sri Ram Ratan Lal Rajgarhia, Manik Lal Rajgarhia, Sashi Kumar Rajgarhia, Moti Lal Rajgarhia, Sajjan Kumar Rajgarhia, Birendra Kumar Rajgarhia and Narendra Kumar Rajgarhia. The commotion developed over portion of the aforesaid land being Plot No. 263 when police on a false report that defendant no. 1 restrained plaintiffs men from proceeding with the work, a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. was initiated which was converted into a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. The plaintiffs preferred criminal revision before the learned District & Sessions Judge, Giridih against the order of conversion of proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. to 145 Cr.P.C., which was also dismissed on 02.01.1984 and thereafter the plaintiffs preferred the suit for declaration of title, confirmation of possession or in case dispossessed, the restoration of possession. 19. The consistent case of the plaintiffs is that the land was surrendered by Chulhan Barhi to the landlord Bengal Coal Co. Ltd. in the year 1920 and subsequent thereupon the land was transferred by registered deed in the year 1923 to Mrs. J.V. Richard, in the year 1931 to Mr. Ajit Kumar Chakravorty and in the year 1960 to the sons of Babu Chand Mull Rajgarhia, who are plaintiffs before the learned court and examined altogether eight witnesses and also exhibited a number of document up to Exhibit-6. 20. Perused the impugned judgments. It appears that the trial court has discussed the entire materials brought on record with regard to pleading of the plaintiffs, with regard to surrender of land made by Chulhan Barhi. The learned trial Court has discussed the Issue no. III and contended that there was no provision of surrender under the C.N.T. Act in the year 1919. Exhibit-A/2 on record goes to show that suit land is recorded in the name of Preetam Barhi and Chulhan Barhi and no jamabandi whatsoever was opened in the name of any of the said settle /vendors/new purchasers as claimed by plaintiffs. 21. The learned trial court discussed claim of khas possession of Bengal Coal Company Limited and settlement made to Mrs. J.V. Richard and transfer made to Ajit Kumar Chakravorty in Issue Nos. 21. The learned trial court discussed claim of khas possession of Bengal Coal Company Limited and settlement made to Mrs. J.V. Richard and transfer made to Ajit Kumar Chakravorty in Issue Nos. IV and V. The learned trial court has held that all the plaintiffs witnesses though claimed the land in possession of the plaintiffs, but unable to state the boundary of the plot and their possession over the land has not been well established before the court below. They could not also prove the transfer made by the previous vendor and having actual possession over the suit land. The court below has considered that transfers were made only on the paper without delivery of actual possession of the suit land and thus decided both issues against the plaintiffs. The validity of document filed on behalf of the plaintiffs have been challenged by the defendants and the learned trial court has held that document appears to have been prepared without giving any effect to them as the transfer of the property without delivery of possession is not a valid transfer. Exhibit-1 series and Exhibit-2/A are the rent receipts, but payment of rent will not create any title in favour of the plaintiffs and Exhibit-A/2 stands in the name of Preetam Barhi and Chulhan Barhi. 22. Learned Trial Court has held that Huro @ Huruwa Barhi has initially filed a joint written statement with Mahavir Barhi denying the title of the plaintiffs, but subsequently a written statement was filed by Huro @ Huruwa Barhi, which has been marked as Exhibit-3 and compromise petition was brought on record between Huro @ Huruwa Barhi and plaintiff, which has been marked as Exhibit-4 but said Huro @ Huruwa Barhi has not been examined and as such, both the documents have been rightly rejected by the learned Trial Court under Order XXIII Rule-3 C.P.C. 23. The learned appellate Court has given a concurrent finding to all the issues given by the learned trial Court. This court has perused the same. The sale deed (Exhibit-5) dated 06.08.1960 executed by Ajit Kumar Chakravorty in favour of the appellant / plaintiff was subsequent to the enactment of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, which came in force on 01.01.1956. This court has perused the same. The sale deed (Exhibit-5) dated 06.08.1960 executed by Ajit Kumar Chakravorty in favour of the appellant / plaintiff was subsequent to the enactment of the Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950, which came in force on 01.01.1956. The plaintiff has failed to produce any document with regard to the initial surrender of land by Chulhan Barhi to the ex-landlord, Bengal Coal Company limited and also any paper to prove that before abolition of Zamindari, the rent was paid by Ajit Kumar Chakravorty or his vendors, rather the rent receipt, which has been brought on record, was not issued by the landlord in favour of Ajit Kumar Chakravorty nor jamabandi was opened and running in the name of Ajit Kumar Chakravorty and others, rather Exhibit-A/2 which is order dated 18.01.1988 passed by LRDC, Giridih, in which he found that the demand was not opened till 1960 in the name of any person in the Register-II. Exhibit-B is Khatiyan prepared under the Bihar Tenant Holding (Maintenance of Record) Act, 1975 and as per Khatiyan related to Khata No. 5 of Mouza-Mohanpur, P.S. No. 92 consisting of plot nos. 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262 and 263 (including suit property Plot No. 263) the same was standing in the name of Preetam Barhi and Chulhan Barhi, both sons of Gopal Barhi. Thus, the lower appellate Court has considered that even the records of right standing in the name of the ancestors of the defendants. 24. It is true that a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. cannot create a title in favour of any of the parties, which only decides possession of the person 60 days prior to initiation of the proceeding. 25. This Court has perused the entire materials brought on record and has found that the plaintiffs have failed to discharge their duty and onus to prove their pleading by adducing the evidence. 26. No document has been produced by the plaintiffs with regard to surrender of the land, no rent receipt was produced prior to vesting of Zamindari or soon after abolition of Zamindari, the land was never recorded in the name of Ajit Kumar Chakravorty, which is also lacking on the record. Nothing has been placed on record to show that vendor has such property to sale it to vendee. Nothing has been placed on record to show that vendor has such property to sale it to vendee. The plaintiffs never filed suit for entire land of Khata No. 5, area- 8 Bigha 11 Katha (6.04 Acre) in various plots Nos. 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262 except 263 (suit land), which also goes against plaintiffs with regard to title through registered sale deed. Since, the declaration has been made by the plaintiffs against the defendants claiming that initially land belongs to their ancestor, as such, on dismissal of suit, the title of defendants have rightly been decided against plaintiffs / appellants / appellants. 27. So far register deed of sale are concerned, a document cannot create a title, it has a presumptive value, the registering authority registered a document after verifying court fee, suit value and registered the same. A registering authority never examined the title of the person and as such, several registered deeds are being tested on the touch stone for transfer of title. A vendor can only transfer a land having title over the land only by executing some documents. But in the present case, the court below has rightly considered the same. 28. Under the aforesaid circumstances, considering the concurrent finding of both the courts below, no substantial question is made out to admit this appeal and adjudicate in this Second Appeal. 29. Under the aforesaid circumstances, both the judgments and decree passed by the courts below do not warrant any interference by this Court, as such, the second appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby accordingly, dismissed.