JUDGMENT : NATARAJ RANGASWAMY J. This Regular First Appeal is filed assailing the Judgment and Decree dated 14.08.2014 passed by the III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Hubballi, in O.S. No.365/2012 refusing to grant specific performance of an agreement to sell leasehold rights of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 in the suit property. 2. In this Judgment, the parties would be referred to as they were arrayed before the Trial Court. The appellant herein was the plaintiff while the respondents herein were the defendants in the suit. 3. The plaintiff filed O.S. No.365/2012 seeking specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 31.01.2011 executed by the defendant Nos.1 to 5 by which they offered to sell their leasehold rights in the suit property. The plaintiff contended that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 possessed perpetual leasehold rights of the suit property and that they offered to sell the leasehold rights. The plaintiff came to know of such offer and thus approached the defendants 1 to 5 and negotiated to purchase the remainder term of leasehold rights for a total sale consideration of Rs.1,69,00,000/-. Accordingly, the defendant Nos.1 to 5 entered into an agreement of sale dated 31.01.2011 by which day, the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.60,00,000/- as earnest money to the defendant Nos.1 to 5 and balance consideration of Rs.1,09,00,000/- was to be paid at the time of registration. He contended that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 were required to demarcate the property and intimate the plaintiff and thereafter execute the sale deed. It is also stated that a civil suit bearing O.S. No.235/2010 was pending consideration in respect of the suit property wherein an order of injunction was passed restraining the parties from alienating or creating any charge over the property in question. The plaintiff claimed that an eviction case in RCA No.38/2004 was pending consideration and as such it was agreed that after conclusion of the said cases, the sale deed would be executed. It is alleged that the plaintiff was always ready and willing to perform his part of the contract and was ready with the balance sale consideration and was awaiting the defendant Nos.1 to 5 to complete their part of the contract. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 dilly dallied the issue and postponed the same on one pretext or the other. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 dilly dallied the issue and postponed the same on one pretext or the other. Further, the plaintiff came to know through the local real estate agents on 26.10.2012 that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 were attempting at foul play and had executed a sale deed conveying the leasehold rights in favour of defendant Nos.6 to 10. The plaintiff claimed that he verified from the office of the Sub-Registrar and came to know that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 had conveyed the leasehold rights in favour of defendant Nos.6 to 10 at a throwaway price of Rs.45,51,000/- and that they had mentioned in the sale deed that a sum of Rs.51,000/- was paid as consideration and the balance Rs.45,00,000/- was to be paid through post dated cheques. The plaintiff stated that the sale deed executed in favour of defendant Nos.6 to 10 dated 25/26.10.2012 was all fraudulent and in collusion with the defendant Nos.6 to 10 so as to deprive the right of the plaintiff. With this, the plaintiff sought for specific performance of the agreement of sale and also to set aside the sale deed dated 25.10.2012 registered on 26.10.2012 and also sought for an alternate relief for refund of the money of Rs.60,00,000/- along with interest at the rate of 24% per annum. 4. The defendant No.2 filed his written statement. Though it is mentioned in the affidavit accompanying the written statement that the affidavit was filed on behalf of the defendant Nos.1, 3 to 5, the written statement is signed only by the defendant No.2. The defendant No.2 denied the execution of the agreement of sale dated 31.01.2011 and also the receipt of the part of the sale consideration of Rs.60,00,000/-. The defendant No.2 denied the entire case of the plaintiff as set out in the plaint. The defendant No.2 contended that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 were relatives and they intended to purchase the suit property to start business by availing loan from private persons. They claimed that plaintiff was a known gold merchant money lender and pawn broker and used to advance loan by getting gold and other immovables and movables etc. pledged with him. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 claimed that they were the customers of the plaintiff and knew each other since long. They claimed that plaintiff was a known gold merchant money lender and pawn broker and used to advance loan by getting gold and other immovables and movables etc. pledged with him. The defendant Nos.1 and 2 claimed that they were the customers of the plaintiff and knew each other since long. They stated that when the persons who had advanced loan to the defendant Nos.1 to 5 were harassing them for payment, the defendant No.2 approached the plaintiff and requested a hand loan. Accordingly, it is stated that the plaintiff had agreed and paid a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- on 21.12.2010 and he obtained signatures of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 on bond paper, register and also obtained a blank cheque of the defendant No.2. It is alleged that the plaintiff took undue advantage of the signature of defendant Nos.1 to 5 on bond paper and concocted an agreement of sale with an intention to usurp the suit property. It is alleged that the transaction between the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 5 was only in respect of Rs.5,00,000/- and that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 had not executed the alleged agreement of sale in favour of the plaintiff. It is further contended that the plaintiff is a man of litigation and that there was a dispute between the plaintiff and defendant No.2 in respect of interest and also that defendant Nos.6 to 10 were relatives of the plaintiff and there was a family rivalry amongst them and for that reason, the plaintiff had got the suit filed on false and flimsy grounds with an intention to harass the defendant Nos.1 to 5 to appropriate the suit property. It is further contended that the suit is not maintainable without seeking declaration in respect of partition that took place amongst the defendant Nos.1 to 5. Therefore, defendant No.2 sought for dismissal of the suit with exemplary cost. 5. A memo was filed on 28-01-2013 purportedly by the defendant No.2, who is power of attorney holder of defendant Nos.1, 3, 4 and 5 wherein it is stated as below: “That the Written-Statement filed by the defendant No.2 is adopted by this defendant.” 6. Therefore, defendant No.2 sought for dismissal of the suit with exemplary cost. 5. A memo was filed on 28-01-2013 purportedly by the defendant No.2, who is power of attorney holder of defendant Nos.1, 3, 4 and 5 wherein it is stated as below: “That the Written-Statement filed by the defendant No.2 is adopted by this defendant.” 6. The defendant No.7 filed his written statement denying the plaint averments and contended that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 held leasehold rights in the suit property and were in possession of the property bearing CTS No.898/N. The defendant Nos.1 to 5 represented to the defendant No.7 that they were lessees in possession of the aforesaid property and thereafter sold the remaining leasehold rights to defendant Nos.6 to 10 for valuable sale consideration of Rs.45,51,000/- and executed a sale deed dated 25.10.2012, which was duly registered before the Sub-Registrar, Hubballi, on 26.10.2012. It is also stated that the defendant Nos.6 to 10 purchased the title of the suit property from the lessors/owners of the suit property in terms of the sale deed dated 30.11.2012 for Rs.6,55,000/-. The defendant Nos.6 to 10 allegedly verified the property records and came to the conclusion that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 had right, title and interest over the said property. The defendant Nos.6 to 10 claimed to be bona fide purchasers of the suit property for valuable consideration and without notice of the alleged agreement in favour of the plaintiff. It is also stated that the defendants got their names entered in the property records and the plaintiff never raised an objection at the time of transaction amongst the defendant Nos.1 to 5 and the defendant Nos.6 to 10 and at the time when the names of the defendant Nos.6 to 10 was entered in the CTS records. The defendant Nos.6 to 10 also claimed that defendant Nos.1 to 5 had not executed the agreement of sale of leasehold rights in favour of the plaintiff and that there was no transaction in respect of the suit property between the plaintiff and defendant No.1 to 5. They also contended that the suit agreement dated 31.01.2011 was hit by the principles of lis pendens since there was an order of stay granted in O.S No.235/2010 and that the sale agreement dated 31.01.2011 was not enforceable in the eye of law. They also contended that the suit agreement dated 31.01.2011 was hit by the principles of lis pendens since there was an order of stay granted in O.S No.235/2010 and that the sale agreement dated 31.01.2011 was not enforceable in the eye of law. The defendant Nos.6 to 10 also contended that they had applied for permission to construct a building over the suit property and invested huge amount for construction and collected construction materials. They also claimed that the plaintiff was related to the defendant Nos.6 to 10 and that they were all doing the same business and that there was a family feud amongst the defendant Nos.6 to 10 and the plaintiff. The plaintiff with an intention to arrogate the suit property and to harass the defendant Nos. 6 to 10, had filed the suit based on created, concocted and bogus document, namely, the agreement of sale dated 31.01.2011. 7. Based on the aforesaid pleadings of the parties, the Trial Court framed the following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiff proves that on 31-1-2011 the defendant No.1 to 5 have entered into an agreement for sale of the suit schedule property for valuable consideration of Rs.1,69,00,000/- and received Rs.60,00,000/- as an earnest money from him? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that defendant No.1 to 5 have failed to perform their part of contract ? 3. Whether the plaintiff proves that he was/is ready and willing to perform his part of contract ? 4. Whether the plaintiff proves that the alleged sale deed dated 25-10-2012 bearing Reg. No.HBL-1-10563-2012-13 in C.D. No.HBLD 63, dated 26-10-2012 executed by the defendant No.6 to 10 in respect of the suit schedule property is illegal, null and void ab-initio and not binding on him ? 5. Whether the defendants No.6 to 10 prove that they are the bonafide purchasers of the suit schedule property for valuable consideration without any notice ? 6. What order or decree ?” 8. Before the Trial Court, the plaintiff was examined as PW.1 and three witnesses were examined as PWs.2, 3 and 4 and they marked Exs.P1 to P27 while the defendant No.2 was examined as DW.1 and defendant No.7 was examined as DW.2 and they marked Exs.D1 to D8. 9. The Trial Court considered the pleadings and evidence of the parties and in terms of its judgment and decree dated 14.08.2014, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. 9. The Trial Court considered the pleadings and evidence of the parties and in terms of its judgment and decree dated 14.08.2014, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff. The plaintiff has therefore, filed this Regular First Appeal. 10. We have heard the learned counsel for the plaintiff – appellant herein and the defendants respondents in this appeal. We have perused the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence and also the Judgment and Decree of the Trial Court as well as the grounds urged in the present appeal. 11. An application, which is numbered as I.A. No.3/2016, is filed by the learned counsel for the appellant under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, by which the appellant has sought to place on record the proceedings in R.C.A No.38/2004 on the file of the Principal Civil Judge (Sr. Dn.), Hubballi, the plaint, written statement and order sheet in O.S. No.235/2010. These documents are sought to be placed on record in proof of the contention of the plaintiff that he was prevented by sufficient cause in not invoking the process of the Court for filing the suit for specific performance at the earliest point in time. It is contended by the appellant that as stated by him in the plaint, there were proceedings against the tenant in RCA No.38/2004 filed by the original owners and also that there was a suit filed in O.S. No.235/2010 for partition and separate possession of the suit properties, wherein there was an interim order restraining the defendants therein from alienating the suit schedule properties. 12. Respondent Nos.6 to 10 have filed their counter affidavit to this application and have contended that these documents are not relevant for the purpose of determining whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. They also contended that these documents were available with the plaintiff when the suit was filed and therefore, the plaintiff should not be permitted to fill in the gaps by permitting the documents produced at the appellate stage. 13. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff had knowledge of these documents and ought to have produced these documents at the earliest point of time. There is no explanation of whatsoever nature in not producing these documents before the Trial Court. 13. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff had knowledge of these documents and ought to have produced these documents at the earliest point of time. There is no explanation of whatsoever nature in not producing these documents before the Trial Court. Even otherwise, the defendants have not disputed the pendency of the eviction proceedings and the suit for partition in O.S. No.235/2010. They have also not disputed the interim injunction restraining the alienation of the suit properties. Thus these documents are not relevant for the purpose of considering this appeal. Hence, I.A. No.3/2016 is rejected. 14. The plaintiff/appellant has filed interlocutory application in I.A. No.1/2017 under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, to place on record two documents, namely, (a) acknowledgment of declaration under the Income Declaration Scheme 2016 (b) receipt/s for payment under the Income Declaration Scheme, 2016. He has stated in the affidavit accompanying this application that he has declared that a sum of Rs.60,00,000/- was paid by him to defendant Nos.1 to 5. 15. Learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 to 5 objected to this application contending that the declaration made before the income tax authorities is a post litum document and cannot be treated as additional evidence. 16. It is no doubt true that the plaintiff/ appellant has attempted to produce these two documents on the ground that he had declared about the agreement of sale by the defendants 1 to 5 in the Income Declaration Scheme of 2016. This is definitely an afterthought by the plaintiff and therefore these two documents cannot be introduced into the case at this point of time. Even otherwise, these two documents cannot in any way assist this Court in the adjudication of the dispute. Hence, I.A. I/2017 is rejected. 17. The following points arise for our consideration: 1. Whether the plaintiff has proved the lawful execution of sale agreement -Ex.P1 by the defendant Nos.1 to 5 ? 2. Whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract? 3. Whether the defendants 1 to 5 prove that the transaction between them and the plaintiff was a loan transaction in respect of Rs.5,00,000/- and that the plaintiff had misused the signatures of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 obtained by the plaintiff on stamp papers, register etc. ? 4. 3. Whether the defendants 1 to 5 prove that the transaction between them and the plaintiff was a loan transaction in respect of Rs.5,00,000/- and that the plaintiff had misused the signatures of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 obtained by the plaintiff on stamp papers, register etc. ? 4. Whether the defendant Nos.6 to 10 prove that they were the bona fide purchasers of the suit property without notice of the agreement of sale at Ex.P1.? 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of specific performance ? REASONS 18. Point No.1 : A perusal of Ex.P1, the agreement of sale of the leasehold rights indicates the following facts: The agreement was drawn on a e-stamp paper that was purchased on 21.12.2010 and the description of the document to be drawn on this e-stamp is found as “agreement of sale between the plaintiff and Ramsa Prakash Raju @ Rajesh Ravi”. It appears on the face of it that this agreement was prepared on 21.12.2010. Later, the date is scored off and is shown as 31.01.2011. This, therefore, indicates that Ex.P1 was intended to be executed on 21.12.2010 but the parties had postponed the execution of the document to 31.01.2011. A bare reading of the agreement shows that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 being the owners of the leasehold rights in the suit property had offered to sell the same in favour of the plaintiff for a total sale consideration of Rs.1,69,00,000/- and on the said date, had received a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- from him and the balance Rs.55,00,000/- was to be paid by 10.01.2011 and the remaining amount was to be paid by 10.04.2011 at the time of execution and registration of a deed of absolute sale of the leasehold rights. The agreement contained nine corrections that were not countersigned by the defendants 1 to 5 but were noted by the notary. Curiously, the agreement does not bear any reference about the way the defendants 1 to 5 came to possess the lease hold rights. It also does not set out the remainder term of lease hold rights that the defendants 1 to 5 possessed. It also does not indicate whether the defendants 1 to 5 had agreed to transfer the remainder term or a part thereof. 19. It also does not set out the remainder term of lease hold rights that the defendants 1 to 5 possessed. It also does not indicate whether the defendants 1 to 5 had agreed to transfer the remainder term or a part thereof. 19. The signatures of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 on Ex.P1 are not disputed since the defendant No.2 in his written statement has categorically stated that the plaintiff had misused the signatures obtained on blank stamp papers and created the agreement of sale (Ex.P1). Therefore, the signatures of defendant Nos.1 to 5 on Ex.P1 are not in dispute and on the overleaf of the last page of the agreement, there is an endorsement made stating that Rs.5,00,000/- was received on 10.01.2011 and Rs.55,00,000/- was received on 31.01.2011. The signatures of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 are also found as if they had acknowledged the receipt of the aforesaid sum of Rs.60,00,000/- on 10.01.2011 and 31.01.2011. In the cross-examination of PW.1, the following is suggested: xxx The suggestion makes it apparently clear that the signatures found on Ex.P1 are the signatures of defendant Nos.1 to 5. 20. This agreement was notarized before the Notary on 31.01.2011 which is evident from Ex.P19. PW.2 is the notary, who notarized the agreement Ex.P1 on 31.01.2011. In his evidence, PW.2 claimed that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 and the plaintiff appeared before him and signed the notary register maintained by him and copy of the same was marked as Ex.P19(a) and the signatures of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 as Ex.P1(a) to (e). A perusal of Ex.P19(a) shows that PW.2 had notarized a document on 31.01.2011 and the entry made in the register indicates that he had notarized an agreement of sale by the defendants 1 to 5 in favour of the plaintiff, which corresponds to Ex.P1. The signatures at Ex.P19(a) to (e) when compared to the signatures on Ex.P1 tally with each other. During the cross-examination of PW.2, except trying to drive home the fact that Ex.P1 was notarized at a place, different than the one claimed by the PW.1 and PW.3, nothing else is elicited. As a matter of fact, PW.2 claimed that he notarized the Ex.P1 in the office of Raikar in Myadara oni and that Raikara’s office is in a jewellery shop. As a matter of fact, PW.2 claimed that he notarized the Ex.P1 in the office of Raikar in Myadara oni and that Raikara’s office is in a jewellery shop. The only noticeable contradiction in the evidence of PW.2 is that he claimed to have corrected the mistakes in Ex.P1. However, except this, the defendants were unable to discredit the evidence of this witness and or prove that the signatures found on Ex.P19 were not the signatures of the defendant Nos.1 to 5. 21. Furthermore, PW.3 is the attesting witness who attested Ex.P1. A perusal of the evidence of PW.3 discloses that he was the one who introduced defendant Nos.1 to 5 to the plaintiff and he also stated categorically that the writings on Ex.P1 on page No.4 was written by him. He identified the signatures of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 on Ex.P1 and also identified his signature. The defendants were unable to discredit the evidence of this witness. 22. PW.4 is another witness who though claimed to be close to the plaintiff but had not signed Ex.P1 as a witness, yet he stated in his evidence that the plaintiff was introduced to the defendant Nos.1 to 5 by PW.3 and that the first talks of sale of the leasehold rights was held at the office of the defendant No.1 at cotton market, Hubballi. He also candidly stated that a sum of Rs.55,00,000/- was paid at the jewelry shop of the plaintiff and also mentioned that when the plaintiff paid a sum of Rs.5,00,000/-, no document was executed. He also stated that the corrections in Ex.P1 were done by PW.3 along with defendant Nos.1 to 5. 23. Apart from this oral evidence, what has to be considered is that the defendant Nos.1 to 5 were admittedly the owners of the leasehold rights of the suit property. The defendant No.2 in his written statement claimed that the plaintiff was a money lender and that the defendant No.2 had approached him to raise a loan. However, defendant Nos.1, 3 to 5 did not say or mention that they too had approached the plaintiff to raise a loan and that they had jointly executed signatures on blank papers. It therefore emerges that some transaction took place between the plaintiff and the defendant Nos.1 to 5 concerning the suit property. 24. However, defendant Nos.1, 3 to 5 did not say or mention that they too had approached the plaintiff to raise a loan and that they had jointly executed signatures on blank papers. It therefore emerges that some transaction took place between the plaintiff and the defendant Nos.1 to 5 concerning the suit property. 24. Though the defendant No.2 examined himself as DW.1, he in his examination-in-chief by way of affidavit, has stated as under: The plaintiff taking the undue advantage of the signature on papers by me and defendant Nos.1, 3 to 5 fraudulently and deceptively got concocted the said alleged agreement of sale with an ugly intention to illegally engulf the suit property or grab more money from me and defendant Nos.1, 3 to 5 and defendant Nos.1 to 10 and thereby causing wrongful gains to him and wrongful loss to the defendants. DW.1 stated in his evidence that defendant No.1 was a dealer of bags at mutton market in Hubballi while defendant No.4 was an Engineer doing the civil contract and defendant No.5 was having a stationery shop and had a good business. If DW.1 had raised a loan of Rs.5,00,000/-, it was required of him to explain the circumstances under which all five of them joined together in allegedly signing a blank sheet of paper. The defendant Nos.1, 3, 4 and 5 did not enter the witness box to deny the signatures found on Ex.P1 and Ex.P19(a) to (e). This conduct does not evince their sincerity but smacks off an attempt to suppress the truth. DW.1 categorically stated in his cross-examination: xxx Furthermore, DW.1 identified his signature as well as the signatures of defendant Nos.1, 3 to 5 on the fourth page of Ex.P1. He claimed that he had developed a layout at Gopanakoppa in partnership with the defendant No.5. DW.1, who identified the signatures of DWs.3 to 5 on Ex.P1, claimed that his signature was not found in Ex.P19(a). However, he claimed that addresses found in Ex.P19(a) were properly mentioned. 25. We have carefully examined the admitted signatures of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 on Ex-P1 and compared them with the disputed signatures on Ex-P19 and we find that the signatures clearly tally with each other. 26. However, he claimed that addresses found in Ex.P19(a) were properly mentioned. 25. We have carefully examined the admitted signatures of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 on Ex-P1 and compared them with the disputed signatures on Ex-P19 and we find that the signatures clearly tally with each other. 26. The aforesaid facts when put together drives us to irresistibly conclude that the plaintiff and defendant Nos.1 to 5 had entered into an agreement on 31.01.2011 to sell the leasehold rights of the suit property. The initial agreement was drawn on 21.12.2010, but for whatever reason the same could not fructify. Thereafter, they seem to have paid a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- on 10.01.2011 and the agreement was finalized on 31.01.2011. The agreement which was prepared on 21.12.2010 was used for the said purpose by correcting the dates in the agreement and notarizing the same before the notary public so as give it an impression of its validity / sanction. This was nothing but a case of “Penny wise Pound foolish” as the parties could have drawn the agreement on a new stamp paper instead of using a spent one. It is also to be noted that the first sheet of Ex.P1 is drawn on a stamp paper while the second sheet is drawn on a white paper. The contention of defendant No.2 was that when he raised a loan of Rs.5,00,000/- on 21.12.2010, he had signed a blank stamp paper. However, when Ex.P1 is perused, it is found that defendant Nos.1 to 5 had not only signed at the relevant place but also signed on the rear of the document to indicate that they had received a sum of Rs.55,00,000/- on 31.01.2011 and a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- on 10.01.2011. It is therefore probable that defendant Nos.1 to 5 being the holders of the leasehold rights in respect of the suit schedule property had agreed to sell the same to the plaintiff for a total sale consideration of Rs.1,69,00,000/- and had indeed received a sum of Rs.60,00,000/- from the plaintiffs as earnest money. Therefore, the point No.1 framed by us is answered in the affirmative. 27. In so far as the question as to whether defendant Nos.1 to 5 are able to prove that Ex.P1 is created by the plaintiff by misusing the signatures obtained by him on blank paper, the defendants are unable to prove the same. Therefore, the point No.1 framed by us is answered in the affirmative. 27. In so far as the question as to whether defendant Nos.1 to 5 are able to prove that Ex.P1 is created by the plaintiff by misusing the signatures obtained by him on blank paper, the defendants are unable to prove the same. The evidence on record points more towards the probability of defendant Nos.1 to 5 having executed the agreement of sale, agreeing to sell the leasehold rights in favour of the plaintiff. One of the strong circumstance which dispels the contention of the defendants is that, the defendant Nos. 1 to 5 have jointly signed the document at Ex.P1. Assuming that the signatures of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 were obtained on blank paper, it is not explained under what circumstances, all five of them joined together in affixing their signatures on a blank paper and also sign the register maintained by the notary. This could be only for the reason that they were the owners of the leasehold rights of the suit property and had entered into an agreement. It is not the case of the defendants that all of defendant Nos.1 to 5 had gone to the plaintiff to raise a hand loan of Rs.5,00,000/-. It is seen from the evidence of DW.1 that all the defendants were financially able and were admittedly doing good business. Thus, their claim that they were in need of Rs.5,00,000/- seems improbable. Assuming that also to be true, the natural conduct of person would be to pay off or offer to pay this Rs.5,00,000/- at least after the suit was filed by the plaintiff seeking for specific performance. Defendant Nos.1 to 5 have not even made an attempt to pay Rs.5,00,000/- to the plaintiff from the date the suit was filed till today. Yet another circumstance is that the defendant Nos.1, 3 to 5 have not entered the witness box to assert that they also had approached the plaintiff for raising a hand loan of Rs.5,00,000/-. The defendant No.2 who claimed that he had also passed on a cheque when he allegedly raised the loan of Rs.5,00,000/- from the plaintiff, failed to indicate the cheque number and the name of the bank. These facts therefore demonstrate that the defendants were unable to prove that Ex.P1 was a result of fraud played by the plaintiff. 28. The defendant No.2 who claimed that he had also passed on a cheque when he allegedly raised the loan of Rs.5,00,000/- from the plaintiff, failed to indicate the cheque number and the name of the bank. These facts therefore demonstrate that the defendants were unable to prove that Ex.P1 was a result of fraud played by the plaintiff. 28. Coming to the question as to whether the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract, the plaintiff had stated in his plaint that he was ready with the remaining funds to perform his part of the contract. It is seen from Ex.P1 that the plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- on the date of the agreement and a sum of Rs.55,00,000/- was to be paid on or before 10.01.2011 and the balance before 10th of April 2011. The endorsements made on the reverse of page No.3 of agreement of sale – Ex.P1 discloses that a sum of Rs.5,00,000/- was in fact paid by the plaintiff on 10.01.2011 and a sum of Rs.55,00,000/- was paid on 31.01.2011. The plaintiff was required to pay the remaining balance sale consideration within three months from the date of the agreement. 29. In this context, it is profitable to refer to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ravi Setia vs. Madan Lal reported in 2019 (9) SCC 381 , wherein it is held as under: “9. There can be no straitjacket formula with regard to readiness and willingness. It will have to be construed in the facts and circumstances of each case in the light of all attending facts and circumstances. We are of the considered opinion, that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the failure of the plaintiff to offer any explanation as to why the balance consideration was not deposited within the time granted, the filing of the application for extension of time after expiry of the prescribed period coupled with the frivolousness of the grounds taken in the application for extension that the money would lie in the bank without earning interest, are all but evidence of incapacity on part of the plaintiff to perform his obligations under the agreement and reflective of lack of readiness and willingness. He preferred to wait and abide by the gamble of a favourable decision in the first appeal. 10. He preferred to wait and abide by the gamble of a favourable decision in the first appeal. 10. The grant of relief for specific performance under Section 16 (1)(c) of the Act is a discretionary and equitable relief. Under Section 16(1)(c), the plaintiff has to demonstrate readiness and willingness throughout to perform his obligations under the contract. The plea that the amount would lie in the bank without interest is unfounded and contrary to normal banking practice. To our mind, this is sufficient evidence of the incapacity or lack of readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiff to perform his obligations. Undoubtedly, the time for deposit could be extended under Section 28 of the Act. But the mere extension of time for deposit does not absolve the plaintiff of his obligation to demonstrate readiness and willingness coupled with special circumstances beyond his control to seek such extension. The plaintiff did not aver in the application that he was ready and willing to perform his obligations and was prevented from any special circumstances from doing so. The pendency of an appeal by the defendant did not preclude the plaintiff from depositing the amount in proof of his readiness and willingness. Readiness has been interpreted as capacity for discharge of obligations with regard to payment. The High Court has rightly observed that there was no stay by the appellate Court of the decree under appeal to justify non-deposit during the pendency of the appeal. The grant of extension of time cannot ipso facto be construed as otherwise demonstrating readiness and willingness on part of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was required to plead sufficient, substantial and cogent grounds to seek extension of time for deposit because otherwise it becomes a question of his conduct along with all other attendant surrounding circumstances in the facts of the case. We therefore find no infirmity in the order of the High Court concluding that the plaintiff in the facts and circumstances was not ready and willing to perform his obligations.” Though the agreement was dated 31.01.2011, the plaintiff neither made any attempt to tender the balance sale consideration nor did he call upon the defendant Nos.1 to 5 to execute the sale deed in respect of the leasehold rights of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff in order to demonstrate his readiness to complete his part of the contract, marked Ex.P14, which is a letter dated 20.08.2011, addressed by the Karnataka State Financial Corporation (KSFC) indicating that a sum of Rs.1,00,00,000/- (Rupees one Crore only) was sanctioned as a loan to the plaintiff. He also placed on record the account statement of the plaintiff from 25.09.2010 to 10.01.2011 (Ex.P15) drawn from the Corporation Bank. However, this document is only up to 26.11.2010 and a sum of Rs.25,157.24Ps. was lying in the credit of the plaintiff as on 26.11.2010. Ex.P16 is the statement of account for the period from 01.11.2010 to 31.03.2011, which discloses that some transactions have taken place in the account of the plaintiff. Ex.P17 is the statement of accounts issued by the State Bank of India for the period 01.02.2011 to 31.08.2011. It is seen that the plaintiff had credit of Rs.1,86,67,567/- prior to 06.04.2011 and as on 31.08.2011, had a sum of Rs.1,86,82,922/-. He also placed on record Form No.16 in respect of Ashwamedha Constructions Private Limited of which the plaintiff was one of the promoters and it was found that for the assessment year 2013-14, he was drawing income of Rs.60,000/-. Though the plaintiff has shown some shades of readiness to perform his part of the contract, yet he has been unable to show that he was willing to complete his part of the contract. 30. The Apex Court in the case of A.Kanthamani vs. Nasreen Ahmed reported in (2017) 4 SCC page 654, following its earlier judgment in the case of Sukhbir Singh and Others Vs. Brij Pal Singh and Others, reported in AIR 1996 SC 2510 held as follows: “5. Law is not in doubt and it is not a condition that the respondents should have ready cash with them. The fact that they attended the Sub-Registrar’s office to have the sale deed executed and waited for the petitioners to attend the office of the Sub-Registrar is a positive fact to prove that they had necessary funds to pass on consideration and had with them the needed money with them for payment at the time of registration. It is sufficient for the respondents to establish that they had the capacity to pay the sale consideration. It is sufficient for the respondents to establish that they had the capacity to pay the sale consideration. It is not necessary that they should always carry the money with them from the date of the suit till the date of the decree. It would, therefore, be clear that the courts below have appropriately exercised their discretion for granting the relief of specific performance to the respondents on sound principles of law.” The suit itself was filed on 05.11.2012 i.e., after nearly one year from the date of the agreement. The plaintiff has not explained the circumstances under which, he did not file the suit within time and / or did not offer the balance sale consideration to the defendants. It is found that the defendants had by then sold the suit property to the defendant Nos.6 to 10 and the defendant Nos.6 to 10 thereafter had purchased the property itself from its owners. It therefore cannot be said that the plaintiff was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. 31. As regards the last question as to whether the plaintiff is entitled for the relief of specific performance, the plaintiff contended that he had paid substantial portion of the consideration and that he possessed the ability to pay the balance sale consideration. On the contrary, the defendant Nos.1 to 5 contended that since the agreement is not concluded but is vague, such a document should not be enforced. 32. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.1 to 5 relied upon the judgment in the case of Giribala Dasi v. Kalidas Bhanja and others reported in AIR 1921 Privy Council 71 to contend that if no date is fixed as the beginning of the term of lease then specific performance of such contract is not enforceable. The learned counsel also relied upon a judgment of this Court in Regular First Appeal No.150/2010 (Mr. Arjun M. Menda v. Smt. Narasamma and others) disposed of on 10.09.2015 wherein too the date of commencement of the lease was not fixed and this Court held that such a lease is not concluded and therefore, unenforceable. 33. The learned counsel also relied upon a judgment of this Court in Regular First Appeal No.150/2010 (Mr. Arjun M. Menda v. Smt. Narasamma and others) disposed of on 10.09.2015 wherein too the date of commencement of the lease was not fixed and this Court held that such a lease is not concluded and therefore, unenforceable. 33. In response, the learned counsel for the appellant sought to draw support from the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta in the case of Durgi Nikarini vs. Goberdhan Bose reported in 24 Ind Cas 183 to contend that a lessee could make an under lease for the remaining tenure of the term. The learned counsel for the appellant also relied upon the Judgment of the Privy Council in the case of Hunsraj vs. Bejoy Lal Seal (decided on 12.12.1929) wherein it is held as under: “In India a lessor is expressly empowered to grant a lease in perpetuity, and is not obliged for that purpose, as in England, to grant a lease for lives, or for a term, with a covenant for perpetual renewal; and, similarly, a lessee as sub-lessor can create a sub-lease for the unexpired residue of the term with the same incidents as any other sub-lease.” (underlining supplied) 34. He further relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in the case of V. Muralidhar vs. S. Anjaiah Goud and others (S.A. No.1308 of 2006 disposed of on 06.06.2007) and brought to our notice paragraph No.13, wherein it is observed as under: “13. It is well known that sub-lease is a contract between the lessee and the sub-lessee and as the original landlord is not a party thereto to the sub-lease, there would be no privity of contract between the sub-lessee and the landlord. At page 869 of Mulla on the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, (18th edition) it is stated: A sub-lease is an assignment of a lesser term and accordingly there is no privity of estate between the lessor and the sub-lessee and this is so in Indian Law although the sub-lease is for the whole residue of the term. A sub-lease which specifies no term is construed as one for the whole residue of the term. A sub-lease which specifies no term is construed as one for the whole residue of the term. Sub-letting postulates two distinct persons-the head tenant and sub-tenant parting of the premises but only an arrangement for management of the business of the tenant on fixed monthly payments the Supreme Court held that this could not be construed as an agreement of sub-tenancy.. At page 921 of the same book it is stated: A surrender is an yielding up of the term of the lessee's interest to him who has the immediate reversion or the lessor's interest.... The lessee cannot therefore surrender, unless the term is vested in him and the surrender must be to a person in him and the surrender must be to a person in whom the immediate reversion expectant on the term is vested.” Learned counsel contended that the agreement to sell the lease hold rights was in respect of the entire remaining term of the defendant Nos.1 to 5. 35. The defendant Nos.1 to 5 also contended that several corrections were found in the agreement and therefore, it is not safe to grant specific performance of such materially altered document-Ex.P1. The defendant Nos.1 to 5 sought support from the judgment of the Apex court in the case of Seth Loonkaran Sethia and others v. Mr.Ivan E. John and Others reported in (1977) 1 Supreme Court Cases 379. 36. It is true that the agreement – Ex.P1 does not set out whether the remainder term or a reduced tenure of the lease offered to be sold under Ex.P1. Since there is no clarity on this crucial aspect, we consider that the agreement was not concluded but was in its nature inchoate. Further, Ex.P1 contains many corrections as noted by the notary and these corrections are not countersigned or accepted by the defendant Nos.1 to 5. Since there is no clarity on this crucial aspect, we consider that the agreement was not concluded but was in its nature inchoate. Further, Ex.P1 contains many corrections as noted by the notary and these corrections are not countersigned or accepted by the defendant Nos.1 to 5. We are therefore not inclined to grant the relief of specific performance of Ex.P1 for the following reasons : (i) the agreement contains corrections which are not correspondingly accepted by the defendant Nos.1 to 5 but are merely countersigned by the notary (ii) the agreement itself does not specify the term of the lease that was offered to be sold (iii) the plaintiff miserably failed to demonstrate that he was willing to complete his part of the contract (iv) the plaintiff miserably failed in pursuing the defendant Nos.1 to 5 to complete their part of the contract by receiving the sale consideration. 37. It is found that the plaintiff had agreed to purchase only the leasehold rights for a total sale consideration of 1,69,00,000/-. On the contrary, the defendant Nos.1 to 5 seem to have sold the very same leasehold rights to the defendant Nos.6 to 10 for a paltry sum of Rs.45,51,000/- and executed sale deed -Ex.P2. A perusal of Ex.P2 shows that a sum of Rs.51,000/- was paid as on the date of the agreement and the remaining consideration of Rs.45,00,000/- was paid over staggered installments spread over nearly up to March 2011. Therefore, the conduct of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 does not indicate that they are honest in their dealings, but seem to be more an attempt to subvert or indulge in subterfuge to deny the rights of the plaintiff. The defendant Nos.6 to 10 who are also businessmen in the area and who are familiar to the plaintiff are not bona fide purchasers since there is no evidence on record which indicates that they had made any due diligence before purchasing the leasehold rights of the suit property from the defendant Nos.1 to 5. They ought to have made local searches and enquiries about the title of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 and claims if any of any third parties. The way in which defendant Nos.6 to 10 have offered the sale consideration to the defendant Nos.1 to 5 is not trustworthy. They ought to have made local searches and enquiries about the title of the defendant Nos.1 to 5 and claims if any of any third parties. The way in which defendant Nos.6 to 10 have offered the sale consideration to the defendant Nos.1 to 5 is not trustworthy. Thus, we hold that the defendant Nos.6 to 10 were not bona fide purchasers of the leasehold rights from the defendant Nos.1 to 5. 38. We are therefore of the view that the plaintiff is not entitled for the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 31.01.2011. Since the plaintiff has sought alternate relief of refund, we are constrained to pass a decree granting the refund of a sum of Rs.60,00,000/- (Rupees sixty lakhs) paid by the plaintiff under Ex.P1 to the defendant Nos.1 to 5 along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the suit till the date of realization. Hence, the following: ORDER The Appeal is allowed in part. The Judgment and Decree dated 14.08.2014 passed by the Court of III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Hubballi, in O.S. No.365/2012 in so far as it relates to rejecting the relief of specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 31.01.2011 and the rejection of the relief of declaration that the sale deed dated 25/26.10.2012 executed by defendant Nos.1 to 5 in favour of defendant Nos.6 to 10 as null and void is confirmed. However, in exercise of the power under Section 22 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, defendant Nos.1 to 5 are directed to refund a sum of Rs.60,00,000/- (Rupees sixty lakhs only) to the plaintiff – appellant herein along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of the suit till the date of realization. The plaintiff is entitled for proportionate cost of the suit. Office is directed to draw a decree.