ORDER : 1. This revision petition is filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Criminal Procedure Code seeking to set aside the order passed by the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Ranny in C.M.P. No. 4685/2005 in C.C. No. 588/2003 and to drop the proceedings against the revision petitioner in C.C. No. 588/2003. 2. The revision petitioner is the accused in C.C. No. 588/2003 before the trial court. The allegation against him is that he had committed theft of energy from the service connection obtained for an Industry under the name and style M/s Modern Rock Mining by tampering with the electricity meter during the period from 11.8.1999 to 16.10.1999. An FIR was registered as Crime No. 292/1999 at the Ranny Police Station on 18.10.1999 under Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). 3. Section 39 of the Act reads as follows:- “39. Theft of energy - Whoever dishonestly abstracts, consumes or uses any energy shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine which shall not be less than one thousand rupees, or with both and if it is proved that any artificial means or means not authorised by the licensee exist for the abstraction, consumption or use of energy by the consumer, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that any abstraction, consumption or use of energy has been dishonestly caused by such consumer.” 4. The case was registered against the accused on 18.10.1999 and the police filed final report in the case after investigation before the court on 01.09.2003. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the case on 14.11.2003 and numbered the case as C.C. No. 588/2003. Upon summons, the accused entered appearance before the trial court and filed a petition under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. as C.M.P. No. 4685/2005 seeking permission to drop the proceedings against him. The learned Magistrate dismissed the petition stating that there is no infirmity in taking cognizance. An extract of the order dated 23.12.2005 in C.M.P. No. 4685/2005 is stated as hereunder:- “The petition to stop further proceeding as the case is allegedly barred by limitation prescribed u/s 468 Cr.P.C. The allegation against the accused is that he committed theft of electricity by removing two wires near the electric meter in his Rock Mining Industry at Kompanoli. An extract of the order dated 23.12.2005 in C.M.P. No. 4685/2005 is stated as hereunder:- “The petition to stop further proceeding as the case is allegedly barred by limitation prescribed u/s 468 Cr.P.C. The allegation against the accused is that he committed theft of electricity by removing two wires near the electric meter in his Rock Mining Industry at Kompanoli. The learned APP filed an objection along petition to condone delay filed by the SHO Ranny Police Station. It is stated by the SHO that the file has been misplaced and hence the delay has occurred. It is alleged that the accused is in the regular habit of committing theft of electricity. Considering facts of the case regarding delay, this court finds it just and proper to condone the delay. There is no infirmity in taking cognizance and the CMP is accordingly dismissed.” 5. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner Sri. M.V.S. Namboothiri, learned Public Prosecutor Sri. M.S. Breeze and Sri. A. Arunkumar, learned Standing Counsel for the Kerala State Electricity Board Ltd. 6. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner Sri. M.V.S. Namboothiri contended that the learned Magistrate was not empowered to take cognizance for the offence under Section 39 of the Act, 1910 against the accused under Section 468 of Cr.P.C. as the three year limitation period prescribed therein had already expired. The learned counsel further contended that the prosecution had not even approached the trial court with a plea to condone the delay. According to the learned counsel, it was only after the revision petitioner had filed a petition to drop the proceeding, that the prosecution could file an objection with an application to condone the delay. Thus, it is argued that there is clear violation of the provisions under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. 7. Coming to the facts of this case, it is clear that the offence involved is barred by limitation and the offence alleged to have been committed is not a continuing offence. Along with the final report, there is no prayer explaining the delay in submitting the final report or seeking an extension of time as contemplated under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. No written or oral application was also made along with the final report for condoning the delay in filing the final report. Along with the final report, there is no prayer explaining the delay in submitting the final report or seeking an extension of time as contemplated under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. No written or oral application was also made along with the final report for condoning the delay in filing the final report. The accused entered appearance before the learned Magistrate and filed an application to drop the proceedings on the ground of limitation. Thereafter, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor filed an objection to the petition along with a petition to condone the delay under Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. The learned Magistrate condoned the delay in filing the final report as a matter of course. In the case on hand, initially, the learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence under Section 39 of the Indian Electricity Act without notice to the accused and without affording an opportunity to the accused to have his say in the matter. Whenever a complaint or charge sheet is filed at the instance of any person or any police officer, the court taking cognizance of the offence must see in the first instance as to whether Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. is attracted or not. If it is attracted to the offence alleged in the complaint or charge sheet as the case may be, it would be in the interest of justice to issue notice to the person or persons accused of the offence with a view to give an opportunity to him or them of being heard and pass orders thereafter on the application granting or rejecting the prayer on merits. Though there is no rule of law requiring the court to issue notice to the proposed accused in an application for condonation of delay yet, principles of natural justice require that such application be disposed of after giving an opportunity to the proposed accused. In State of Maharashtra vs. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre and Others, AIR 1995 SC 231 , the Apex Court held that the delay, if any, for launching the prosecution could not have been condoned without notice to the accused and behind their back and without recording any reasons for condonation of the delay. Thus, the court is obliged to give an opportunity to the accused of being heard before passing an order condoning the delay and taking cognizance. 8. Thus, the court is obliged to give an opportunity to the accused of being heard before passing an order condoning the delay and taking cognizance. 8. Even after cognizance is taken, it is open to the accused to plead before the court at any stage of the proceedings that Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. is not attracted. In a case where the learned Magistrate condones the delay, takes cognizance of the offence and issue process; the accused after entering appearance may object to the prosecution on the ground of limitation. In other words, when cognizance is taken without consideration of the question of condonation of delay, the court is not precluded from considering such question at a later stage. 9. In Provident Fund Inspector vs. Mohammed, 1980 KLT 698 , a Division Bench of this Court has held in paragraph 19 of the judgment is as follows:- “19. It is clear from the language of S.468 that there is a legislative interdiction against taking cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2) after the expiry of the period of limitation, except as otherwise provided elsewhere in the Code S.195 to 199 prohibit taking cognizance of certain offences except upon a proper complaint, sanction, etc. Protection has been given to an accused person under S.468(1) Cr.P.C. against belated and time barred prosecutions and this certainly is a benefit given to an accused. It cannot therefore be said that S.468 does not confer a right on an accused person to plead that an offence or offences disclosed in a complaint filed against him should not have been taken cognizance of as the prosecution was barred by limitation. We are unable to agree with the contention of the counsel for the petitioner that this is a matter purely between the magistrate and the prosecutor and the accused has no right to come in or question the legality of taking cognizance of the offence against him. At any stage in the course of enquiry or trial of the case it is open to the accused to raise the plea that the magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offence in question in view of the bar under S.468.” 10. At any stage in the course of enquiry or trial of the case it is open to the accused to raise the plea that the magistrate could not have taken cognizance of the offence in question in view of the bar under S.468.” 10. In the case on hand, after the investigation was completed, the officer in charge of the police station forwarded a final report to the learned Magistrate, who was empowered, to take cognizance on a police report under Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. The learned Magistrate was obviously satisfied with the sufficiency of the materials placed by the prosecution before him with the report for taking cognizance of the offence and therefore, the learned Magistrate proceeded further after taking cognizance and directed to issue process against the accused. The purpose of the submission of the police report with the details enumerated under Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. is to enable the learned Magistrate to satisfy himself as to whether on the basis of the report and the materials filed along with the police report, a case for taking cognizance under Section 39 of the Act has been made out or not. Merely because process has been issued, it cannot be presumed that delay has been condoned. There is nothing on record in this case to show that how the learned Magistrate has come to the conclusion to condone the delay in the interest of justice. Delay cannot be condoned as a matter of routine without sufficient reasons. It is the duty of the learned Magistrate to state expressly the grounds by which he is satisfied that the delay is properly explained. 11. The application filed by the accused to drop the proceedings on the ground of limitation is maintainable at any stage of the proceedings. However, in the case on hand, the delay has been properly explained at a later stage and the learned Magistrate is satisfied that it is just and proper to take cognizance of the offence after the expiry of the period of limitation in the interest of justice. Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. confers power on the court to take cognizance after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that delay has been properly explained and that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. 12. Section 473 of the Cr.P.C. confers power on the court to take cognizance after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that delay has been properly explained and that it is necessary so to do in the interest of justice. 12. In this case, the occurrence took place from 11.8.1999 to 16.10.1999. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the case only on 14.11.2003. No cognizance could have been taken on 14.11.2003 in view of the bar contemplated under Section 468 of the Cr.P.C. However, the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor filed an application on 04.10.2005 before the learned Magistrate for condoning the delay and also explaining the delay at a later stage. Such an application was filed before taking evidence in this case. PW1 was examined before the trial court on 27.1.2006. 13. In Sukhdev Raj vs. State of Punjab, 1994 Supp (2) SCC 398, the Apex Court has held that Section 473 of the Cr.P.C does not in any clear terms lay down that the application should be filed at the time of filing a final report. In paragraph 1 of the judgment, the Apex Court held as follows:- “The appellant has been convicted under Section 9 of the Opium Act and sentenced to three years' RI and to pay a fine of Rs. 5000/- in default to undergo six months' RI. He was found in possession of 23 kgs. of opium. In the appeal before the High Court the only question raised was that though occurrence took place on 31-5-1974 challan was filed on 29-8-1977, therefore, no cognizance could have been taken in view of Section 468 Cr.P.C. The High Court has considered this aspect and after referring to Section 473 Cr.P.C. held that in the facts and circumstances of the case the court can take cognizance, if the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice. In any event in this case an application was filed for condoning the delay and also explaining the delay at a later stage. According to the learned counsel for the appellant such an application was filed only after almost at the time of conclusion of trial and before judgment was delivered. In any event in this case an application was filed for condoning the delay and also explaining the delay at a later stage. According to the learned counsel for the appellant such an application was filed only after almost at the time of conclusion of trial and before judgment was delivered. It may be noted Section 473 Cr.P.C. does not in any clear terms lay down that the application should be filed at the time of filing a challan itself. The words “so to do in the interest of justice” are wide enough and the court accepted the explanation. Therefore, there are no merits in this appeal. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.” 14. Judged by the above standards, this Court is of the view that the impugned order of the learned Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence under Section 39 of the Act after the expiry of the period of limitation has been exercised judicially on well recognized principles. The court exercised its discretion by way of a speaking order indicating the satisfaction of the court that the delay is satisfactorily explained and condonation of the same is just and proper. 15. The object of the provision of criminal revision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be well founded error and it may not be appropriate for this court to scrutinise the impugned order, which upon the face of it bears a token of careful consideration and appears to be in accordance with law. Hence the impugned order is not liable to be set aside. 16. In the result, the Criminal Revision Petition is dismissed. The trial court shall dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible in accordance with the law and in the light of this order.