JUDGMENT : MADHAV J. JAMDAR, J. 1. The appellant-original accused, by the present criminal appeal, is challenging the judgment and order dated 23.10.2019 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Akola in Sessions Case No. 115/2016. By the said judgment and order, the appellant was found guilty of committing offence under Section 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code and was sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and imprisonment for life respectively and also to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/- and Rs. 25,000/- respectively. 2. The prosecution case briefly stated is as follows: On 13.1.2016, Police Sub-Inspector Smt. P.S. Lanjewar (PW-5) when on duty between 8.00 pm to 8.00 am at Police Station, Civil Lines, Akola, received the information that Sahidabee Mohd. Zakir, resident of Tajnagar, Shivni, Akola is burnt 35%. PSI PW-5 recorded the statement of the deceased wherein the deceased inter-alia disclosed that she has three daughters and two sons and out of three daughters, two daughters are married. Her husband is habitual drunkard and frequently quarrels with her and abuses her. Therefore, her one daughter and two sons resided at the house of her brother namely Mohammad Harun Buraji Solanki residing adjacent to her house. On 13.1.2016 at 8.30 pm in the night, her husband Mohammad Jakir Mohammad Bashir demanded Rs. 100/- from her for drinking liquor and she gave him Rs. 50/- only. Therefore, he quarreled with her, abused her for not fulfilling his demand of Rs. 100/- and poured kerosene on her person and set her on fire. As she was shouting, neighbours and her brother Mohd. Harun and nephew Mohd. Asman came and they extinguished the fire by pouring water on her person and took her to the hospital. On the basis of the said statement of the deceased, initially First Information Report bearing No. 10/2016 under section 307 of the Indian Penal Code came to be registered with Civil Line, Police Station, Akola on 14.1.2016 at 3.30 am. The time and date of the incident mentioned in the FIR was at 8.30 pm at 13.1.2016. Thereafter, the deceased died at about 10.00 am on 14.1.2016 and, therefore, the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code came to be added. The time and date of the incident mentioned in the FIR was at 8.30 pm at 13.1.2016. Thereafter, the deceased died at about 10.00 am on 14.1.2016 and, therefore, the offence under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code came to be added. On completion of investigation, the charge-sheet came to be filed against the appellant and as offences punishable under sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code are exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the same was committed. The charge was framed against the appellant on 24.1.2017 under sections 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. 3. During the trial, the prosecution examined total six witnesses. PW-1 Shantaram Amrutrao Navkar is the panch witness of spot and seizure panchanama, PW-2 Mohd. Haru @ Kallu Bapuji Solanki is the brother of the deceased and PW-3 Akil Solanki Pir Mohammad is the son-in-law of the deceased and both of them have not supported the case of the prosecution and declared as hostile. PW-4 Sanjay Ramji Mishra, PSI is the investigating officer, who carried out further investigation after 16.1.2016 and filed the chargesheet. PW-5 P.S. Lanjewar, PSI has recorded the dying declaration (Exh.29) and also carried out part investigation. PW-6 Dr. T.O. Padole is the Medical Officer, who performed postmortem. The defence of the appellant is that on 13.1.2016 in the night at about 8.30 pm, he had gone to the house of his brother-in-law for dinner as the guests had come there and as his wife was not invited, she raised objection for his attendance for dinner at the house of his brother-in-law and in spite of the same, he went to the house of his brother-in-law and when he was having dinner in the house of his brother-in-law, at that time, he heard shouts of the neighbours and, therefore, they all came out and saw that his wife was burning in front of his house and, therefore, he along with his brother-in-law and the guests went running and extinguished the fire and during that process, he also sustained some burn injuries. Thereafter, they took the deceased to the hospital in the auto-rickshaw. It is his further contention that he was also treated in the same hospital and on the next day he came to be apprehended. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Akola convicted and sentenced the appellant as stated hereinabove. 4. Thereafter, they took the deceased to the hospital in the auto-rickshaw. It is his further contention that he was also treated in the same hospital and on the next day he came to be apprehended. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Akola convicted and sentenced the appellant as stated hereinabove. 4. We have heard Shri Parvez Mirza, learned advocate for appellant and Shri S.A. Ashirgade, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State. With their assistance, we have gone through the record of the case including the depositions of the witnesses, relevant exhibits, other documents and the impugned judgment and order. 5. It is the contention of Shri Parvez Mirza, learned Advocate for the appellant, that the deceased expired on 14.1.2016 at 10.00 am and the incident had occurred on 13.1.2016 at 8.30 pm and in spite of that no efforts were made to see that the dying declaration was recorded by the Executive Magistrate. It is his further contention that letter dated 13.1.2016 (Exh.31) addressed to the Medical Officer seeking injury certificate (injury form) was recorded by PW-5 at the Police Station and the same was recorded prior to recording of dying declaration and in the said form itself it is stated that the husband of the deceased had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire and, therefore, with this mind set, PW-5 has recorded the dying declaration and, therefore, no reliance can be placed on the same. It is his further contention that deceased narrated the incident in Hindi, however, the dying declaration was recorded in Marathi and the same was read over in Marathi. It is not the case of PW-5 that the dying declaration was read over in Hindi. He further submitted that the doctor, who gave medical certificate of fitness, is not examined and, therefore, an opportunity of the defence and the court to put questions to the doctor, is denied. It is not the case of PW-5 that the dying declaration was read over in Hindi. He further submitted that the doctor, who gave medical certificate of fitness, is not examined and, therefore, an opportunity of the defence and the court to put questions to the doctor, is denied. It is his further contention that although doctor’s certificate regarding the health condition of the deceased while recording dying declaration is not mandatory, however, in this case PW-5 has not stated that she herself had ascertained about the health condition of the deceased before and after recording the dying declaration and it is not the case where PW-5 has satisfied herself about the health condition of the deceased and, therefore, non-examination of the doctor, who gave medical certificate that deceased was fit to give statement is very crucial and the said evidence is not placed before the court. It is his further contention that what is stated by deceased to PW-5 is not at all mentioned in her evidence and, therefore, substantive evidence of what deceased has stated has not come before the court. There is no evidence of substantive satisfaction of mental condition of deceased by PW-5. There is no evidence of reading over the dying declaration in Hindi to the deceased. There is no second certificate certifying that deceased was fit during recording of her statement. There is no evidence at what time the recording of the dying declaration started and when it was completed. It is his further submission that the postmortem report clearly shows that both the upper limbs were completely affected by burning and, therefore, it was not possible for the deceased to put thumb impression on the dying declaration. It is his further contention that, in fact, the deceased committed suicide, as she was angry as her brother had not invited her for dinner and only invited the appellant for the dinner along with the guests and the appellant along with others extinguished the fire and took the deceased to the hospital and during that process, in fact, he was also injured and was treated in the said hospital. However, the evidence regarding this aspect is purposely not placed before the court. However, the evidence regarding this aspect is purposely not placed before the court. It is his further contention that the contents of the dying declaration are not put to the appellant while recording his statement u/s 313 of Cr.P.C. and, therefore, his conviction based on the dying declaration is required to be quashed and set aside. The learned advocate of the appellant has relied on large number of authorities regarding various aspects of reliance on dying declaration as well as aspect regarding the mandatory requirement that all incriminating circumstances be brought to the notice of the accused while recording his statement u/s 313 of the Cr.P.C. and also on some other aspects. The authorities cited by the advocate of the appellant which are necessary for the disposal of the present appeal will be referred at the appropriate place. 6. Shri S.A. Ashirgade, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State, supported the judgment of the learned trial court. He contended that the dying declaration recorded by PW-5 and even the evidence of the witnesses, who turned hostile, clearly shows that the accused has committed the crime. He further argued that the report dated 26.2.2016 (Exh.26) of the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, State of Maharashtra, Nagpur specifically establishes that on the shirt and pant of the appellant kerosene residues were found and, therefore, it is clear that the crime has been committed by the appellant. 7. Before analyzing the evidence on record we deem it appropriate to set out legal position regarding the manner in which evidence regarding dying declaration is required to be appreciated:- (a) In the case between Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 6 SCC 710 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as follows: “3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on death bed is so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross- examination, the court insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration look up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or in writing and in any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. In most cases, however, such statements are made orally before death ensues and is reduced to writing by someone like a magistrate or a doctor or a police officer. When it is recorded, no oath is necessary nor is the presence of a magistrate is absolutely necessary, although to assure authenticity it is usual to call a magistrate, if available for recording the statement of a man about to die. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. There is no requirement of law that a dying declaration must necessarily be made to a magistrate and when such statement is recorded by a magistrate there is no specified statutory form for such recording. Consequently, what evidential value or weight has to be attached to such statement necessarily depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. What is essentially required is that the person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Where it is proved by the testimony of the magistrate that the declarant was fit to make the statement even without examination by the doctor the declaration can be acted upon provided the court ultimately holds the same to be voluntary and truthful. A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and therefore the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise.” (b) In the case between Kashi Vishwanath vs. State of Karnataka, 2013 (7) SCC 162 , the Hon’ble Apex Court was dealing with the case when deceased narrated the incident in Telugu and the dying declarations were recorded in Kannada and held as follows: “30. The prosecution has failed to state as to why three dying declarations were recorded in Kannada, if the deceased, Neelamma was talking in Telugu. It has also not made clear as to who amongst the Tehsildar, PSI or SI or the Doctors who has signed in Ex.P.12 and Ex.P.29 had knowledge of Telugu and translated the same in Kannada for writing dying declarations in those exhibits and that in the bottom of three dying declarations it has not been mentioned that they were read over in Kannada and explained in Telugu that the deceased understood the contents of the same. The above mentioned facts create doubt in our mind as to the truthfulness of the contents of the dying declarations as the possibility of she being influenced by somebody in making the dying declarations cannot be ruled out. (c) In the Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2018 (2) Mh. L.J. 786 : 2018 (2) Bom. C.R. (Cri.) 289 in the matter between Ganpat Bakramji Lad vs. State of Maharashtra, to which one of us has been party, it has been held as follows: “29. (c) In the Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2018 (2) Mh. L.J. 786 : 2018 (2) Bom. C.R. (Cri.) 289 in the matter between Ganpat Bakramji Lad vs. State of Maharashtra, to which one of us has been party, it has been held as follows: “29. In respect of the dying declaration, the general principles to be kept in mind are (i) that it is not a weaker kind of evidence and it stands on the same footing as other evidence, and (ii) that there is no absolute rule of law that it cannot form the sole basis of conviction, unless corroborated by other independent evidence. The first step required to be taken in every case, is to consider the threefold questions as under: (a) Whether a declarant had an opportunity to observe and identify the assailant or the accused? (b) Whether a declarant was in a conscious and fit condition at the time of recording the statement? (c) Whether the Court is so convinced of the truthfulness and voluntary nature of the statement of the declarant that it inspires confidence to such an extent that it can be the sole basis of conviction? “30. While considering the aforesaid three questions, the Court has to keep in mind the rules of caution laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of Khushal Rao and Laxman, to rest the conviction solely on the dying declaration. The rules of caution so laid down are summarized as under: (a) The provision has been made by the Legislature, advisedly as a matter of sheer necessity by way of an exception to the general rule that hearsay is no evidence. (b) The statement made by the declarant is not on oath and is not subject to cross-examination to test its veracity. (c) The declaration is not the product of tutoring, prompting, imagination or vindictive. (d) In case of any doubt or suspicion, it should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (e) Each case must be decided on its own facts keeping in view the circumstance in which the dying declaration is made. “32. The Court has to see that the statements are consistent with the natural course of events and the other facts and circumstances brought on record. (e) Each case must be decided on its own facts keeping in view the circumstance in which the dying declaration is made. “32. The Court has to see that the statements are consistent with the natural course of events and the other facts and circumstances brought on record. In case of any doubt, the Court has to go to the corroborative circumstance and evidence, if brought on record, to find out that they are consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused.” “37. Normally, a dying declaration is to be recorded in the language of the declarant. However, there is no prohibition to record such declaration in the language other than the language of the declarant and there cannot be a rejection of it on this count. If an independent witness records such declaration, the requirement of reading over and explaining it in vernacular to the declarant by another person and the declarant accepting it to be true and correct may assume great significance for its acceptability. In such a situation, the Court may be justified in looking for such endorsement in a written dying declaration.” “45. In view of above, we answer the question referred to us as under: A dying declaration cannot be rejected merely because the same is not read over to the declarant and the declarant admitting the same to have been correctly recorded. We hold and clarify that this can be one of the facts, if it assumes significance in the facts and circumstances of the case. (d) In the Division Bench judgment of this Court reported in 2016 (3) Bom. C.R. (Cri.) 597 : 2016 (5) Mh. L.J. (Cri.) 607 in the case between Smt. Nirmala W/o Vinayakrao Sonone vs. State of Maharashtra, it has been held as follows: “6. A conviction can be recorded on the Dying Declaration alone if the Court finds the Dying declaration to be wholly reliable. It is, therefore, necessary for the Court to examine the evidence in minute details and should place reliance on Dying Declaration only if it is found that the evidence of recording of Dying Declaration is of “Sterling” quantity. “7. According to the evidence of Subhash Sangale (PW-4), the doctor examined Pranita and gave his opinion on Exh.28 itself. The Certificate that the patient is able to give statement, is not proved by the prosecution. “7. According to the evidence of Subhash Sangale (PW-4), the doctor examined Pranita and gave his opinion on Exh.28 itself. The Certificate that the patient is able to give statement, is not proved by the prosecution. The evidence of PW-4 Subhash Sangale is completely silent that he himself was satisfied about the condition of Pranita to give statement. On the contrary, his evidence shows that after doctor gave opinion that she is fit to give statement, he started recording of her statement. Thus, Subhash Sangle (PW-4) relied upon the certification of the doctor about fitness of Pranita. In that view of the matter, it was obligatory on the part of the prosecution to prove the certificate given by him regarding the fitness of Pranita to give statement.” 8. From the above authorities of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court following criteria can be set out while appreciating the evidence of the Dying Declaration: (i) Great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to the evidence of dying declaration on account of many circumstances which may affect their truth. (ii) The court should insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. (iii) The Court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind. Before accepting the evidence of dying declaration, the court must be completely satisfied that the declarant was in conscious and fit condition at the time of recording of declaration. (iv) The dying declaration can be recorded by someone like a magistrate or a doctor or a police officer and, therefore, presence of a magistrate is not absolutely necessary. However, to assure authenticity it is usual to call a magistrate, if available for recording the dying declaration. (v) A certification by the doctor is essentially a rule of caution and, therefore, the voluntary and truthful nature of the declaration can be established otherwise. The person who records a dying declaration must be satisfied that the declarant was in a fit state of mind. (vi) In case of any doubt or suspicion the dying declaration should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vii) Each case must be decided on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration is made. (vi) In case of any doubt or suspicion the dying declaration should not be acted upon without corroborative evidence. (vii) Each case must be decided on its own facts keeping in view the circumstances in which the dying declaration is made. (viii) The Court has to see that the declaration is consistent with the natural course of events and the other facts and circumstances brought on record. (ix) Normally, a dying declaration is to be recorded in the language of the declarant. However, there is no prohibition to record such declaration in the language other than the language of the declarant and there cannot be a rejection of it on this count. If an independent witness records such declaration, the requirement of reading over and explaining it in vernacular to the declarant and the declarant accepting it to be true and correct may assume great significance for its acceptability. In such a situation, the Court may be justified in looking for such endorsement in a written dying declaration. (x) A conviction can be recorded relying on the Dying Declaration alone if the Court finds the Dying declaration to be wholly reliable. It is, therefore, necessary for the Court to examine the evidence in minute details and should place reliance on Dying Declaration only if it is found that the evidence of recording of Dying Declaration is of “Sterling” quantity. We will hereinafter analyze the evidence of this case on the touchstone of the above principles. 9. The evidence on record show that PW-5 has recorded the dying declaration which is at Exh.29 and it appears that the said dying declaration was recorded between 11.20 pm to 11.35 pm, as mentioned in the dying declaration. However, there is no evidence about the handwriting of the person writing the said timing on the dying declaration. The dying declaration is written by PW-5 and the said writing regarding timing is in different handwriting and ink than the writing by which the dying declaration is written. At the start of the page on the left side of the dying declaration “start 11.25 pm” is written and at the end of the dying declaration on the left side, it is mentioned as “close 11.35 pm.” However, the said entries are not signed by anybody and there is nothing on record who had recorded the said timings. At the start of the page on the left side of the dying declaration “start 11.25 pm” is written and at the end of the dying declaration on the left side, it is mentioned as “close 11.35 pm.” However, the said entries are not signed by anybody and there is nothing on record who had recorded the said timings. The PW-5, in her oral evidence, has also not stated at what point of time the recording of the dying declaration has started and when the same has completed and who had written about the said aforesaid entries. 10. It is further significant to note that although on the dying declaration, there is a certificate given by Dr. Akansha on 13.1.2016 as “Pt. is conscious and cognitive for D.D.” still said doctor was not examined. In any case even PW-5 has also not independently stated that she had ascertained about the mental fitness of the deceased for recording the dying declaration and thus there is substance in the contention of the learned advocate of the appellant that it has not been proved that the mental condition of the deceased was fit when the dying declaration was recorded. 11. It is also significant to note that the dying declaration was recorded in the hospital between 11.20 pm and 11.35 pm, however, PW-5 has admitted that she has on her own written letter dated 13.1.2016 (Exh.31) which is a letter (Inquiry Form) addressed by her to the Medical Officer of the Hospital and the same was written at the Police Station. In the said letter, it is specifically mentioned that the husband of the deceased on 13.1.2016 at about 8.00 pm had poured kerosene on her and put her on fire and, therefore, burn injuries are on the entire body and, therefore, the request was made to issue injury certificate. Although said Exh.31 is dated 13.1.2016, no time is mentioned on the same. But a perusal of her evidence clearly shows that the same was prepared at the Police Station and the same was prepared before recording of the dying declaration. Thus, it is clear that before recording the dying declaration, PW-5 had already made up her mind that appellant had poured kerosene on the deceased and put her on fire. Thus with this mind set the PW-5 proceeded to record dying declaration of the deceased. 12. Thus, it is clear that before recording the dying declaration, PW-5 had already made up her mind that appellant had poured kerosene on the deceased and put her on fire. Thus with this mind set the PW-5 proceeded to record dying declaration of the deceased. 12. It is further significant to note that although the deceased was a Muslim lady and although she had answered in Hindi to the queries put up by the PW-5 and although PW-5 could write in Hindi, she had translated the narration of the deceased into Marathi and accordingly reduced in writing the oral dying declaration of the deceased in Marathi. The dying declaration i.e. Exh.29 at the fag end although mentions that the same was read over and explained to the deceased, however, it is not mentioned in the dying declaration that the contents of the dying declaration were read over and explained to the deceased by translating the same into Hindi. Even in the oral evidence of the PW-5 it is not stated that the contents of the dying declaration were translated in Hindi and read over and explained to the deceased in Hindi. 13. It is further to be noted that the dying declaration was bearing the thumb impression of the deceased. It is not specified below the thumb impression whether the said impression is of left thumb or right thumb. In any case, the thumb impression is appearing on the dying declaration at Exh.29. In view of the said position if the inquest panchanama (Exh.16) dated 14.1.2016 is perused then it is clear that it is specifically mentioned that both the hands are burnt. A perusal of the postmortem report at Exh.36 shows in column no. 17 that there are 9% burn injuries on right upper limb and 9% burn injuries on left upper limb i.e. entire right upper limb and left upper limb are burnt and it is specifically mentioned that no spared area has remained. Therefore, it is clear that the deceased could not have put her thumb impression on the dying declaration and, therefore, it is very doubtful that the thumb impression on the dying declaration is of the deceased. Therefore, it is clear that the deceased could not have put her thumb impression on the dying declaration and, therefore, it is very doubtful that the thumb impression on the dying declaration is of the deceased. It is mentioned in the oral evidence of PW-5 that the dying declaration bears the thumb impression of the left hand of the injured, however, the postmortem report clearly shows that entire left upper limb is affected by burning and nothing is spared and, therefore, it is very doubtful whether thumb impression appearing on the dying declaration is of deceased. In similar factual position this Hon’ble Court in the judgment reported in 2017 (5) Mh. L.J. (Cri.) 258 found that appearance of left hand thumb impression on dying declaration is a suspicious circumstance. 14. It is also very significant to note that the incident had occurred at about 8.30 pm on 13.1.2016. The dying declaration at Exh.29 has been recorded between 11.20 pm to 11.35 pm on 13.1.2016 and the deceased died on 14.1.2016 at 10.00 am, however, no attempt is made to record the dying declaration of the deceased through the magistrate. 15. The learned Advocate of the appellant has also submitted that a bare perusal of the oral evidence of PW-5, PSI, who recorded the dying declaration, shows that what was stated by the deceased to her is not at all mentioned in the oral evidence and, therefore, substantive evidence of what deceased has stated to PW-5 has not come before the court. However, in the judgment of full bench of this Court reported in 2011 All MR (Cri.) 3536 in the matter between Ramesh S/o Gyanoba Kamble vs. State of Maharashtra, it has been held that even if the magistrate does not repeat the words spoken by the deceased or the contents of his statement that would not cause any prejudice to the accused. Therefore, there is no substance in the said contention. 16. However, several factors set out hereinabove create doubt as regards the dying declaration. If all these factors are examined on the touchstone of the legal position regarding appreciation of the dying declaration as set out hereinabove, then it is clear that the same do not inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. 16. However, several factors set out hereinabove create doubt as regards the dying declaration. If all these factors are examined on the touchstone of the legal position regarding appreciation of the dying declaration as set out hereinabove, then it is clear that the same do not inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. We have found that it is not proved that at the time of recording of dying declaration the deceased was in a fit state of mind. There is nothing on record to show that the dying declaration was read over to the deceased by translating the same into Hindi. It is also not proved that the thumb impression on the dying declaration is of the deceased. Thus, for all the above reasons we find that the dying declaration at Exh.29 is not at all reliable and the appellant cannot be convicted on the basis of said evidence. Apart from these aspects the contents of the dying declaration are not put to the appellant while recording his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and therefore also the same cannot be considered. 17. In this case, the main evidence of the prosecution is the dying declaration which we have found that the same is wholly unreliable. Other evidence is of PW-2, who is the brother of the deceased and PW-3, who is the son-in-law of the deceased and both of them have not supported the prosecution case and have been declared as hostile. Their evidence on record do not connect the accused to the crime. However, without appreciating evidence on record in proper perspective, the learned Trial Court has convicted the appellant. 18. In this particular case, what is further important to note is that the prosecution has not put before the court entire evidence. It is settled legal position that it is for the prosecution to put forward entire evidence before the court whether the same supports the prosecution or not, so that the true position comes before the court. It is the duty of the prosecution to act fairly. It is settled legal position that it is for the prosecution to put forward entire evidence before the court whether the same supports the prosecution or not, so that the true position comes before the court. It is the duty of the prosecution to act fairly. In this particular case, it is the specific defence of the accused that the deceased committed suicide as she was angry as her brother had not invited her and only invited the appellant for the dinner and, therefore, she was insisting that the appellant should not also attend the said dinner and against her wish the appellant attended the dinner and, therefore, deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene on her person. It is his further case that after shouts were heard, he, his brother-in-law and other relatives immediately rushed to his house which is adjoining and extinguished the fire and in that process he was also injured. The certain documentary evidence on record supports this contention of the appellant. The seizure panchanama at Exh.15 dated 17.1.2016 shows that shirt and full pant were seized from the accused. The said full shirt was partly burnt and the said full pant was also partly burnt. In this background, if the arrest panchanama dated 14.1.2016 is perused, then it is clearly seen that the appellant was arrested on 14.1.2016 at 8.46 pm and in Column No. 7 regarding the injuries found on the person of the accused, it is specifically mentioned that the same are as per medical certificate attached and in the said medical certificate issued by the Government Medical College and Hospital at Akola, it is specifically mentioned that “left hand was burnt yesterday 8.30 pm” and that blisters were found over left hand with burns.” Thus, it is clear that not only the full shirt and full pant of the appellant was found to be partly burnt but there were burns found over his left hand. The said evidence although forming part of the investigation papers is not brought before the court while leading the evidence. Thus, it is clear that not only the clothes on the person of the appellant were partly burnt, but also his left hand was also partly burnt. It is not the case of the prosecution that while putting the deceased on fire the accused sustained burn injuries and the clothes on his body were also caught fire. Thus, it is clear that not only the clothes on the person of the appellant were partly burnt, but also his left hand was also partly burnt. It is not the case of the prosecution that while putting the deceased on fire the accused sustained burn injuries and the clothes on his body were also caught fire. It is for the prosecution to explain this circumstance and the same is not explained in the evidence. Thus, the seizure panchanama at Exh.15 dated 17.1.2016 along with the report of Regional Forensic Science Laboratory at Exh.26 clearly show that the clothes on the person of the appellant were burnt as well as the arrest panchanama along with medical certificate shows that his left hand was partly burnt. This evidence and this circumstance is not explained by the prosecution. Apart from that, this evidence supports the case of the defence that the deceased had committed suicide and, in fact, appellant tried to save her by extinguishing the fire and he was also injured and he was also treated in the same hospital where the deceased was treated and ultimately died in the said hospital. 19. The evidence of PW-2, who is brother of the deceased as well as evidence of PW-3, who is son-in-law of the deceased, who turned hostile, show that when the incident took place, PW-2, PW-3 and the appellant were having dinner along with the guests at the place of PW-2 and at that time they heard the noise and shouts. Thus, it is clear that the evidence of PW-2 and PW-3 also supports the case of the appellant. This is not the case where some of the witnesses have turned hostile and has not supported the prosecution case, but this is a case where their evidence is supporting the case put by the appellant and the same is also supported by the documentary evidence, as stated hereinabove. It is also significant to note that the incident had taken place at 8.30 pm and several neighbours were present. However, the prosecution has failed to examine any of the neighbour. 20. Thus, it is clear that the prosecution case stands only on the basis of the dying declaration and the same does not inspire confidence for convicting the appellant on the basis of said sole evidence. However, the prosecution has failed to examine any of the neighbour. 20. Thus, it is clear that the prosecution case stands only on the basis of the dying declaration and the same does not inspire confidence for convicting the appellant on the basis of said sole evidence. We have already set out hereinabove the reasons why the said dying declaration does not inspire confidence. Apart from that, the other evidence on record which is also stated hereinabove clearly supports the defence raised by the accused. Therefore, this is a case where at least the accused should get benefit of doubt and in any case the accused cannot be convicted on the sole evidence of the dying declaration as the same does not inspire confidence. Looking to all these circumstances, we are of the opinion that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it would be very risky to place reliance on the dying declaration. In this case, there is no other reliable evidence to connect the appellant with the crime and, therefore, we are of the opinion that the conviction of the appellant u/s 307 as well as u/s 302 of the I.P.C. deserves to be set aside. Hence, the following order. 21. The Criminal Appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 23.10.2019 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Akola in Sessions Case No. 115 of 2016 of conviction and sentence of the appellant is hereby quashed and set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The appellant be released forthwith if not required in any other case.