Mohd. Aashique Hussain, son of late Md. Ismail v. Union of India through the Secretary, Ministry of Labour, New Delhi, P. O. and P. S. – New Delhi
2020-06-24
RAVI RANJAN, SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
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DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : The matter has been heard through video conferencing with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. They have no complaint about any audio and visual connectivity. 2. The instant intra-court appeal has been filed under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against the order/judgment dated 18.05.2019 passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (L) No. 1454 of 2012, whereby and whereunder the Award dated 26.12.2011 passed by the Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Dhanbad in Reference Case No. 01 of 2005 has been declined to be interfered with. 3. The brief facts of the case, which are required to be enumerated herein for proper adjudication of the lis, are as under: The writ petitioner-appellant was appointed as Drill Operator in Category III (Grade E) on 28.04.1976. His case is that in the month of March, 1978, he suffered from mental disorder and was under treatment from 17.03.1978 to 02.07.1983 and this fact was intimated to the Management seeking leave from time to time and finally when he was found fit to join the duty, he reported for duty on 04.07.1983 but he was not allowed to join his duty. Further case of the writ petitioner-appellant is that on 14.03.1985, the Management of colliery informed him that his case is not fit to be considered and with his consent the dispute was referred before the Joint Arbitrator. The Joint Arbitrator has given a finding that the workman had actually not fallen ill during the period in question and, therefore, the Joint Arbitrator having found no merit in the case of the workman had rejected his claim. The grievance of the writ petitioner-appellant is that no consent was given by him to consider his case under the Code of Discipline and as such, he ventilated his grievance by submitting a representation before the Project Manager, General Manager and Chairman-cum-Managing Director, M/s Central Coalfields Limited requesting them to reinstate him in services which however was not acceded to.
The grievance of the writ petitioner-appellant is that no consent was given by him to consider his case under the Code of Discipline and as such, he ventilated his grievance by submitting a representation before the Project Manager, General Manager and Chairman-cum-Managing Director, M/s Central Coalfields Limited requesting them to reinstate him in services which however was not acceded to. Hence, he raised an industrial dispute against the order of termination dated 14.03.1985, but since the conciliation failed, failure report was submitted to the Government of India, Ministry of Labour, who had initially refused to refer the dispute for adjudication, against which, a writ petition being C.W.J.C No. 1080 of 1996(R) was filed, which was dismissed vide order dated 13.02.1997, against which, an intra-court appeal, being L.P.A. No. 201 of 1997(R) was preferred, which was disposed of by remanding the matter to the learned Single Judge for disposal of the matter on merit. Pursuant to that order, the writ petition was disposed of vide order dated 01.09.2004 with a direction to respondent no. 1 to refer the dispute for adjudication to the Tribunal. The appropriate Government had made the reference to the effect, which reads as under: “Whether the action of the management of Tapin North Colliery of M/s C.C. Ltd. in terminating the services of Ashique Hussain, Drill Operator vide order dated 13/14.3.1985 is legal and justified? If not, what relief the workman concerned is entitled to?” The Tribunal has adjudicated the matter by answering reference against the workman, the writ petitioner-appellant, against which, the writ petitioner-appellant filed a writ petition, being W.P. (L) No. 1454 of 2012, which was dismissed showing no interference with the finding recorded by the Tribunal in the Award, which is the subject matter of present intra-court appeal. 4. Mr. A. Allam, learned senior counsel appearing for the writ petitioner-appellant has submitted that the Tribunal has not appreciated the various documents, which the writ petitioner had submitted in support of his contention about suffering of the writ petitioner-appellant from mental illness and as such, the Tribunal has committed gross error in not considering the said documents. It has further been submitted that since the writ petitioner-appellant was not in a position to discharge his duties, he did not attend his duty but when he was found fit to join duty, he was not allow to join duty.
It has further been submitted that since the writ petitioner-appellant was not in a position to discharge his duties, he did not attend his duty but when he was found fit to join duty, he was not allow to join duty. These facts were agitated before the learned Single Judge, but without appreciating these facts in right perspective the writ petition was dismissed, therefore, the instant intra-court appeal. 5. Per contra, Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-CCL has raised the issue of power of the writ Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India about judicial review. According to him, Award since has been passed upon appreciation of the evidences led by the parties before the Tribunal, the same can only be looked into by the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, if there is any jurisdictional error or there is perversity in the finding recorded by the Tribunal, but this is not the case of the writ petitioner-appellant, therefore, the learned Single Judge by showing no interference with the Award has committed no error. Learned counsel for the respondents-CCL has further submitted that the Tribunal has come to a conclusive finding that the writ petitioner-appellant cannot be said to suffer from mental illness since no medical prescription has been submitted, save and except one medical certificate, therefore, the Tribunal has taken a right view by answering the reference in favour of the Management since unauthorized absence for the period 17.03.1978 to 02.07.1983 has not been properly explained showing the proof of suffering from ailment. 6. This Court, having heard learned counsel for the parties and on appreciation of the rival submissions as also finding recorded by the learned Single in the impugned order, deem it fit and proper first to discuss about power of judicial review of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter of Award. At this juncture, it would be proper for this Court to refer the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Ors, reported in A.I.R. 1964 477 Supreme Court, wherein at paragraph no.
At this juncture, it would be proper for this Court to refer the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob Vrs. K.S. Radhakrishnan & Ors, reported in A.I.R. 1964 477 Supreme Court, wherein at paragraph no. 7 their Lordships have been pleased to held as follows:- “7.The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari.
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point 11 and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised.” In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Sawarn Singh & Anr. Vrs. State of Punjab & Ors reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868 their Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for issuance of writ of certiorari has been please to hold at paragraph nos.12 and 13 as under: “12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will be useful to notice the general principles indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court in writ proceedings under Article 226. It is well settled that certiorari jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as an appellate court. As was pointed out by this Court in Syed Yakoob case, “this limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior court or tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.” “13.
An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be.” “13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice.” In another judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pepsico India Holding Private Limited Vrs. Krishna Kant Pandey reported in (2015) 4 SCC 270 their Lordships while discussing the scope of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in the matter of interference with the finding of the tribunal has been pleased to hold by placing reliance upon the judgment rendered in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao Vrs. Ashalata S. Guram reported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 at paragraph 14 has held as under:- “14.While discussing the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution interfering with the facts recorded by the courts or the tribunal, this Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram [ (1986) 4 SCC 447 ] , held as under: “17. In case of finding of facts, the Court should not interfere in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. Reference may be made to the observations of this Court in Bathutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta [ (1975) 1 SCC 858 : AIR 1975 SC 1297 ] where this Court observed that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a court of appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating.
The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and re-appreciating. Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, J. as the learned Chief Justice then was, observed at AIR p. 1301 of the Report as follows: ‘7. The special civil application preferred by the appellant was admittedly an application under Article 227 and it is, therefore, material only to consider the scope and ambit of the jurisdiction of the High Court under that article. Did the High Court have jurisdiction in an application under Article 227 to disturb the findings of fact reached by the District Court? It is well settled by the decision of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath [ AIR 1954 SC 215 ] (AIR p. 217, para 14) that the “power of superintendence conferred by Article 227 is, as pointed out by Harries, C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. v. Sukumar Mukherjee [ AIR 1951 Cal 193 ], to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors”. This statement of law was quoted with approval in the subsequent decision of this Court in Nagendra Nath Bora v. Commr. of Hills Division [ AIR 1958 SC 398 ] and it was pointed out by Sinha, J., as he then was, speaking on behalf of the Court in that case: (AIR p. 413, para 30) “30. … It is, thus, clear that the powers of judicial interference under Article 227 of the Constitution with orders of judicial or quasi-judicial nature, are not greater than the power under Article 226 of the Constitution. Under Article 226, the power of interference may extend to quashing an impugned order on the ground of a mistake apparent on the face of the record. But under Article 227 of the Constitution, the power of interference is limited to seeing that the tribunal functions within the limits of its authority.” It is evident from the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex court in the judgments as referred hereinabove that the scope of High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in exercise of power of judicial review on the finding of the Tribunal is very limited. 7.
7. Hence, we proceeded to examine the factual aspects of the matter in the light of the proposition, as has been held by Hon’ble Apex Court in the above-mentioned cases. Undisputedly, the writ petitioner-appellant was appointed as Drill Operator in Category III (Grade E) on 28.04.1976. According to him, he had suffered from mental disorder in the month of March, 1978 and was under treatment from 17.03.1978 to 02.07.1983. His further claim was that during that period he was under treatment of one doctor, namely, Dr. B.P. Sinha at Ranchi and when he was examined by the Doctor of C.C.L. on 02.07.1983, he was found fit for duty, upon which, he reported for duty before the Project Manager, Tapin North Colliery on 04.07.1983 but was not allowed to join his duties. The writ petitioner-appellant was subsequently terminated from services w.e.f. 13/14.03.1985. The writ petitioner-appellant had raised a dispute, which according to the Management was referred to the Arbitrator with the consent of the writ petitioner-appellant, wherein the Joint Arbitrator has found no merit in the case and has rejected the claim. The writ petitioner-appellant has questioned the adjudication made by the Joint Arbitrator on the ground that he has given no consent for adjudication by the Joint Arbitrator. The writ petitioner-appellant, consequent upon the finding recorded by the Joint Arbitrator, has raised a dispute before the competent authority of the C.C.L for referring the dispute for adjudication, but no decision was taken, as such the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was invoked by filing writ petition, being C.W.J.C No. 1080 of 1996(R) but the same was dismissed, which was challenged in intra-court appeal, being L.P.A. No. 201 of 1997(R), wherein the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court remanded the matter to the learned Single Judge to decide the matter on its merit. In terms thereof, the learned Single Judge of this Court while disposing of the writ petition has directed the respondent no. 1 to refer the dispute for its adjudication by the Tribunal having its jurisdiction. The appropriate Government has made a reference for its adjudication to the effect as to whether the order of termination of the writ petitioner is legal and justified. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal has answered the reference, being Reference Case No. 01 of 2005, in favour of the Management and against the workman-writ petitioner.
The appropriate Government has made a reference for its adjudication to the effect as to whether the order of termination of the writ petitioner is legal and justified. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal has answered the reference, being Reference Case No. 01 of 2005, in favour of the Management and against the workman-writ petitioner. The writ petitioner-appellant has taken the plea before the Tribunal that he was suffering from mental illness and to that effect he had submitted medical prescription and certificate to show the reason of absent, which was beyond his control. On the other hand, the Management had seriously disputed this fact and had taken a plea that save and except one medical certificate, no medical prescription was submitted before the Tribunal. 8. This Court, in order to appreciate the aforesaid finding has travelled across the finding recorded by the Tribunal in the Award and has found therefrom that the writ petitioner-appellant has absented himself from duty for the period 17.03.1978 to 02.07.1983 and after absent from duty of about four months he sent an application dated 07.11.1978 from the district Hazaribagh requesting leave on the ground of his sickness without enclosing any medical certificate. It has further been recorded in the Award that at regular interval, the workman used to send application from Hazaribagh by post requesting therein for extension of sick leave without enclosing any medical certificate/prescription and failed to report any Medical Officer of the Colliery. It further appears from the Award that one letter dated 07.06.1979 was sent from Colliery Management at his home address under registered cover intimating him that a team of officers including Medical Officer will visit his residence on 15.06.1979 to see his physical condition with a view to arrange specialized treatment, but the said letter was returned undelivered. However, the team of officers consisting of Colliery Medical Officer, Colliery Manager and Labour Welfare Officer visited the residence of the concerned workman on 15.06.1979 but the workman-writ petitioner was not available at home. On enquiry, the father of the concerned workman informed the Committee members that the concerned workman had gone out for treatment since long. He further informed that whereabouts of his son is not known to him as he is out of Hazaribagh.
On enquiry, the father of the concerned workman informed the Committee members that the concerned workman had gone out for treatment since long. He further informed that whereabouts of his son is not known to him as he is out of Hazaribagh. It further appears that on such physical verification, when the response of the family members of the writ petitioner was found to be not satisfactory and the writ petitioner was found physically unavailable in his home, a charge-sheet was issued on 29.06.1979 for unauthorized absence since 01.07.1978, which was sent to his home address under registered post but the same was returned undelivered with postal remark “out of station for long period”. In such circumstances, the respondents-authorities have come to the conclusion that the workman-writ petitioner has given false application for sick leave. The workman has appeared before the Tribunal and in course of cross-examination, he has stated that he absented from duty with effect from 01.04.1978 without leave application stating that he was ill. He further admitted that he had not enclosed any medical certificate with his application. He has further stated he had applied for passport. The Tribunal, on the basis of evidences, has recorded in the Award that the writ petitioner-appellant had given application for leave stating his illness without any medical certificate and other applications sent were signed by his wife and further he was not present at the residence when the officers of the Management visited his home. He had not filed the details of his treatment by Dr. B.P. Sinha, which may show that he was actually ill. The Tribunal has come to the conclusive finding, on the basis of the aforesaid facts, and answered the reference in favour of the Management and against the Workman-writ petitioner. 9. This Court, after going across the finding recorded by the Tribunal, has found therefrom that the writ petitioner-appellant has been given ample opportunity to defend his case and put forth his defence but he failed to show any evidence showing therein the reason for absence from duty for the period 17.03.1978 to 02.07.1983 which was beyond his control, save and except one medical certificate, and as such, according to our considered view the Tribunal has passed the award after considering each and every aspect of the matter.
It is not the case of the writ petitioner that he has not been allowed an opportunity to put forth his defence before the Tribunal rather it is an admitted case of the writ petitioner-appellant that he had not submitted any medical prescription as also the details of his treatment by Dr. B.P. Sinha, a psychiatric and as such it cannot be said that the findings recorded by the Tribunal suffer from perversity. 10. This Court, apply the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob (supra), Pepsico India Holding Private Limited (supra) and Sawarn Singh (supra), wherein the principle for interference with the award passed by the Tribunal as under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been laid down that only in a case if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted the inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding and similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, and further a finding of fact recorded by Tribunal cannot be challenged in a proceeding of writ of certiorari on the ground that relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. This Court has found no such material and, therefore, is of the view that the findings recorded by the Tribunal are not in such a nature warranting any interference in exercise of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 11. This Court is of the considered view that the learned Single Judge, by showing no interference to the finding recorded by the Tribunal in the Award passed in Reference Case No. 01 of 2005, has not committed any error. Accordingly, we find no merit in the appeal. 12. In the result, the appeal fails and is, accordingly, dismissed.