JUDGMENT : Songkhupchung Serto, J. 1. Heard Mr. Joshua Sheqi, learned counsel for the petitioner and also heard Mr. K. Sema, learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General appearing for the State respondents assisted by Ms. Livika, learned Government Advocate. 2. The petitioners herein are un-employed trained nurses and they filed the petition through their Association, a registered Society. By filing this petition the petitioners have sought for quashing of; (1) the Notification No. HFW(A) COVID-19/Appt-13/17/2020/269, dated 05.07.2020, issued by the Commissioner & Secretary, Health & Family Welfare Department, in pursuance of the Cabinet decision taken on 23.06.2020 wherein, it was stated among others that, the newly created post in the Health & Family Welfare Department shall be filled up within a months' time with proper advertisement and while filling up such post due weightage shall be given to marks obtained by the candidates in the qualifying degree and years of work experience; and in the case of staff nurse, appointment to 50% of the post should be made by following queue system and for appointment to the other 50% through direct recruitment, in order to give equal opportunity to all and to promote merit; and the queue system of recruitment will be discontinued in due course. (2) And, to quash and set aside the Advertisement No. DHFW-5/COVID-19/SN/2019-2020/5023-26, dated 16.07.2020, issued by the Principal Director, Government of Nagaland wherein applications are invited for recruitment against the newly created 110 post of staff nurse. (3) And, prayed for a direction directing the State respondents to implement the Memorandum No. CAB-2/2013, dated 12.06.2020, wherein it is stated among others that the Cabinet in its meeting held on 11.06.2020 has approved creation of 143 posts of staff nurse to be deployed in district hospitals, and appointment to such post shall be made through the existing system. 3. Before I proceed any further, the facts and circumstances which led to the filing of this writ petition are briefly given as follows; (i) On 12.06.2020, the Addl. Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Cabinet Secretariat (Cabinet Cell), issued a Memorandum No. CAB-2/2013, wherein the Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting held on 11.06.2020 was given. The memorandum is reproduced here below; "GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND CABINET SECRETARIAT (CABINET CELL) No. CAB-2/2013 Dated, Kohima, the 12th June, 2020 MEMORANDUM Sub:- Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting held on held on 11th June, 2020. The memorandum is reproduced here below; "GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND CABINET SECRETARIAT (CABINET CELL) No. CAB-2/2013 Dated, Kohima, the 12th June, 2020 MEMORANDUM Sub:- Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting held on held on 11th June, 2020. The undersigned is directed to forward herewith an extract of the minutes of the Cabinet meeting held on 11th June, 2020, for kind information and necessary action. Agenda No. 1: Appointment of Doctors and Nurses under Health & Family Welfare. The Cabinet considered the proposal of the Health & Family Welfare Department and deliberated in detail in the backdrop of Coivd-19 pandemic. The Department explained that there is severe shortage of Doctors & Nurses in comparison with IPHS norms which is 23% as against 50% in case of specialist doctors and 25% as against 75% in case of staff nurses as per IPHS norms and that the department was unable to provide required number of doctors in the districts. Further, in view of the large number of positive cases being reported in many districts, deployment of additional doctors and nurses is required for containment and treatment facilities. In view of the prevailing extra-ordinary situation, the Cabinet having considered the views of the P & AR Department including related Hon'ble High Court judgment dated 03-08-2018 and order dated 07-02-2019 and the financial implications, reviewed the urgent requirement and decided to approve the proposal of the Health & Family Welfare Department as follows; 1. Creation of 53 (fifty three) posts of Specialist Doctors for 11 (eleven) District Hospitals in the State. 2. Creation of 1 (one) post of Director (Medical Education & Radiation Safety) at the level of Special Selection Grade (Pay Level-18). 3. Creation of 5 (five) posts of Zonal Leprosy Officer (Longleng, Kiphire, Peren, Phek & Zunheboto) at the level of Senior Grade (Pay Level-15). 4. Encadrement of 2 (two) posts of District Vector Borne Officer (Tuensang & Zunheboto) into the cadre of the Nagaland Health Service, as and when the present incumbents vacates the same, to be manned by medical doctors. 5. Creation of 143 (one hundred & forty three) posts of Staff Nurse to be deployed in all the District Hospitals. The Cabinet also approved for appointment on the existing system of the nurses while ensuing, judicious deployment in a just and fair manner in the hospitals/health centres. The existing instructions on reservation of posts for the backward tribes should be followed. 6. The Cabinet also approved for appointment on the existing system of the nurses while ensuing, judicious deployment in a just and fair manner in the hospitals/health centres. The existing instructions on reservation of posts for the backward tribes should be followed. 6. Age condonation of 28 (twenty eight) Staff Nurses under Health & Family Welfare Department and fresh appointment be made against the sanctioned post. 7. Regularization of 19 (nineteen) serving contract Medical Officers under the Health & Family Welfare Department. 8. Regularization of 27 (twenty seven) existing Medical Officers who were engaged by the Department for a period of 1 (one) year. 9. The Cabinet also approved for change of nomenclature/re-designation of posts as proposed by the Department. 10. The Health & Family Welfare Department should inform the Hon'ble High Court in view of the judgment dated 03-08-2018 and order dated 07-02-2019 passed in connection with regularization of government employees. The Cabinet further directed that this approval is one-time relaxation of laid down rules and procedures for recruitment, regularization and condonation of age. Further, this one-time measure in view of prevailing situation in the backdrop of Covid-19 pandemic shall not be treated as a precedent. Action taken on the matter may be intimated to the Cabinet Cell. Sd/- (NCHUMBEMO KOTHA) Addl. Secretary to the Government of Nagaland." What can be seen from the above and what is relevant for this case is that the Cabinet after having considered the prevailing circumstances arising out of the wide spread infection of COVID-19 accepted the proposal of the Health & Family Welfare Department and approved creation of 143 posts of staff nurse to be deployed in all the district hospitals and at the same approved also the proposal for filling up of the posts so created through the existing system. (ii) In pursuance of the above memorandum, a Notification No. HFW(A) COVID-19/Appt-13/17/2020(Pt), dated 26.06.2020 was issued by the Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, wherein a number of post in the Health & Family Welfare department among which 143 posts of staff nurse were created. The notification is reproduced here below; "GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND HEALTH & FAMILY DEPARTMENT NOTIFICATION Dated, Kohima, the 26th June, 2020 No. HFW(A) COVID-19/Appt-13/17/2020(Pt) /// In the interest of public service, the Governor of Nagaland is pleased to order the creation of various categories of post under Health & Family Welfare Department. Sr.no. The notification is reproduced here below; "GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND HEALTH & FAMILY DEPARTMENT NOTIFICATION Dated, Kohima, the 26th June, 2020 No. HFW(A) COVID-19/Appt-13/17/2020(Pt) /// In the interest of public service, the Governor of Nagaland is pleased to order the creation of various categories of post under Health & Family Welfare Department. Sr.no. Name of the Post No. of Posts Levels 1 Director (Medical Education And Radiation Safety) 1 (one) Level 18 (123600-198300) of the pay Matrix 2 Consultants (Selection Grade & Dimapur, Kohima, Mokokchung, Mon & Tuensang 15 (fifteen) Level 16 (Pay Matrix : 79900-193700) 3 Senior Specialist (to be deployed at all 11 districts) 12 (twelve) Level 15 (Pay Matrix : 67300-189300 4 Zonal Leprosy office (Longleng, kiphire, Peren, Phek and Zunheboto 5 (five) Level 15 (67300-189300) of the pay Matrix 5 Junior Specialist (to be deployed at all 11 distructs) 26 (Twentry six) Level 13 (Pay Matrix 56100-177500) 6 Staff Nurse ( to be deployed al all 11 distructs) 143 (Posts) Level 8 (Pay Matrix 28700-91300) The nomenclature/re-designation of certain posts and encadrement of 2 (two) posts of District Vector Borne Officer (Tuensang & Zunheboto) into the cadre of Nagaland Health Services will be made as per the Cabinet approval thereon. 7. The expenditure is debitable to the Head of Account 2210-01 001.01 Direction, 01 Salaries 2210-06-800-01.07 National Leprosy Control Programme, 10-Salaries. 2210-01, 110 Hospitals & Dispensaries, 01-Other Hospitals, 01-Salaries. 8. This in Non-Development Expenditure. 9. This has the approval of the Cabinet vide No. CAB-2/2013, dated 12/06/2020. Sd/- AHOLA THOSE, IAS Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Nagaland." (iii) On 23.05.2020 at 10:00 A.M. another Cabinet meeting was held in the Office Chamber of Chief Minister of Nagaland and in that meeting the Agenda No. 1 was for recruitment of Doctors, Nurses and other para-medical staff in the Health & family Welfare department. The Cabinet, keeping in view the situation arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic deliberated on the agenda and decided to create various posts of medical personnel including 78 posts of staff nurse to be posted in the PHC's. The relevant portion of the Minutes of the Cabinet are reproduced here below; " Minutes of the Cabinet Meeting held on 23 rd June, 2020 at 10:00 A.M. in the Office Chamber of Chief Minister, Nagaland, Kohima. List of Minister and Special invitees who attended the meeting are enclosed. List of Minister and Special invitees who attended the meeting are enclosed. Agenda No. 1: Recruitment of Doctors, Nurses and other para-medical staff in the Health & Family Welfare Department. The Health & Family Welfare Department submitted a comprehensive proposal for creation of posts. The Department presented the manpower status indicating existing regular and contractual manpower, as compared to the norms of Indian Public Health Standard (IPHS). The Cabinet deliberated the matter at length in the backdrop of unprecedented situation arising out of the COVID-19 pandemic and the need to address the inadequacies of the State health system including shortage of manpower at requisite levels. After detailed deliberations, the Cabinet approved creation of the following posts in the department of health and Family Welfare. 1 ................... 2 ............... 3 ..................... 4 ............................ 5. Creation of 78 (seventy eight) posts of Staff Nurse in the PHCs. 6 ............. 7 ................ 8 ................. 9 ................... The Cabinet further directed that: (A) All the newly created posts should be filled up by the H & FW Department within a month's time with proper advertisement. While filling up the posts due weightage should be given to the marks obtained by the candidate in the qualifying degree of the University/Medical College and years of work experience. The interview panel should include independent experts from outside the state. (B) The Department should clearly indicate that these appointments will be temporary and regular recruitment shall be conducted through special NPSC recruitment drive. (C) The existing reservation of posts for the backward Tribes shall be followed wherever applicable. (D) The standard conditions of No Study Leave requirement to serve in any part of the state assigned by the Department, signing of the bond not to engage in private practice etc shall be applied to such temporary engagement. (E) For the post of Staff Nurse, and as per the recommendation of the Manpower Rationalization Committee (MRC), the Department should filled up 50% of the post of Staff Nurse from the queue of former Nursing Diploma/Graduates and the remaining 50% should be filled up through direct recruitment and open competition. For direct recruitment posts, the existing reservation of posts for the Backward Tribes shall be followed wherever applicable. (F) The earlier decision of the Cabinet to regularize the services of the existing contractual employees and new appointees stands revoked in view of the legal opinion given. For direct recruitment posts, the existing reservation of posts for the Backward Tribes shall be followed wherever applicable. (F) The earlier decision of the Cabinet to regularize the services of the existing contractual employees and new appointees stands revoked in view of the legal opinion given. (G) With a view to give equal opportunity to all and to promote merit, the queue system of recruitment for Staff Nurse will be discontinued in due course. (H) The Cabinet directed that the issue of Non-Practising Allowance to doctors be reviewed. (I) The Cabinet directed the Health Department to carry out an exercise on rationalization of SCs/PHCs/CHCs." (iv) In pursuance of the above Cabinet decision, a Notification No. HFW(A) COVID-19/Appt-13/17/2020, dated 05.07.2020 was issued by the Commissioner & Secretary, Health & Family Welfare Department. The notification is self explanatory and the same is also reproduced here below; "GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND HEALTH & FAMILY DEPARTMENT NAGALAND: KOHIMA NOTIFICATION Dated, Kohima, the 5th July, 2020 No. HFW(A) COVID-19/Appt-13/17/2020 //// On the recommendation of the Cabinet vide No. CAB-2/2013 dated, Kohima, the 23rd June, 2020, the Governor of Nagaland is pleased to frame the following basic guidelines for recruitment and service condition of the Medical Officers, Nurses, Technicians and other Para-medical staff as under;- 1. All the newly created posts to be filled up by the H & FW Department within a month's time with proper advertisement. While filling up the posts, due weightage should be given to the marks obtained by the candidate in the qualifying degree of the University/Medical College any years of work experienced. The interview panel to include independent experts from outside the State. 2. These appointment will be temporary/fixed and regular recruitment shall be conducted through a special NPSC recruitment drive for all post coming under the purview of NPSC. 3. The existing reservation of posts for the Backward Tribes shall be followed wherever applicable. 4. The standard condition of No Study Leave, recruitment to serve in any part of the State assigned by the Department, signing of the bond not to engage in private practice etc shall be applied to such temporary engagement. 5. As per the recommendation of the Manpower Rationalization Committee (MRC), the Department should filled up 50% of the post of Staff Nurse from the queue of former Nursing Diploma/Graduates and the remaining 50% should be filled up through direct recruitment and open competition. 5. As per the recommendation of the Manpower Rationalization Committee (MRC), the Department should filled up 50% of the post of Staff Nurse from the queue of former Nursing Diploma/Graduates and the remaining 50% should be filled up through direct recruitment and open competition. For direct recruitment posts, the existing reservation of posts for the Backward Tribes shall be followed wherever applicable. 6. With a view to give equal opportunity to all and to promote merit, the queue system of recruitment for Staff Nurse will be discontinued in due course. 7. The earlier decision of the Cabinet to regularize the services of the existing contractual employees and new appointees stands revoked in view of the legal opinion given. Sd/- AHOLA THOSE, IAS Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Nagaland." (v) Following the issuance of the above given memorandum and notification, the petitioner's association, on 09.07.2020, through a Memorandum urged the Hon'ble Chief Minister of Nagaland to continue with the practice of queue system in appointing trained nurses to all the newly created post of nurse, and copy of the same was endorsed to the Hon'ble Minister of Health & Family Welfare Department, Nagaland and all the other Hon'ble Ministers and Hon'ble Advisors, the Chief Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, the Commissioner & Secretary to the Government of Nagaland, Department of Health & Family Welfare, the Joint Director Nursing, Directorate of Health & Family Welfare etc. (vi) On 16.07.2020, the Principal Director, Health & Family Welfare, Government of Nagaland, issued an Advertisement No. DHFW-5/COVID-19/SN/2019-2020/5023-26 inviting applications for recruitment to the newly created staff nurse post, on regular basis, through the departmental recruitment board and the number of post was given as 110. The advertisement is reproduced here below; "GOVERNMENT OF NAGALAND DIRECTORATE OF THE HEALTH & FAMILY DEPARTMENT NAGALAND: KOHIMA ADVERTISEMENT Dated, Kohima, the 16th July, 2020 No. DHFW-5/COVID-19/SN/2019-2020/5023-26: In pursuance to Notification No. HFW(A) COVID-19/Appt-13/17/2020/251 dated 26th June, 2020 and HFW(A) COVID-19/Appt-13/17/2020(Pt) dated 2nd July, 2020, applications are invited for recruitment against newly created posts on regular basis under the Department of Health & Family Welfare through the Department Recruitment Board, in the manner prescribed below; 1. Name of post: Staff Nurse 2. No. of post: 110 (one hundred & ten) posts in various health units. 3. Pay Matrix & Level: Level & (Pay Matrix: 28700-91300). 4. Name of post: Staff Nurse 2. No. of post: 110 (one hundred & ten) posts in various health units. 3. Pay Matrix & Level: Level & (Pay Matrix: 28700-91300). 4. The terms and conditions and prescribed format application can be downloaded from the department web site:nagahealth.nagaland.gov.in 5. Last date of submission of application shall be 25th July, 2020. Duly filled application in PDF format with requisite supporting documents should be submitted through email to;- hfw.recruitment2020@gmail.com N.B.: No application forms will be issued from the office. Incomplete application, if submitted will be rejected summarily. List of rejected application will be published in the office Notice Board. Sd/- (DR. VIZOLIE SUOKHRIE) Principal Director Directorate of Health & Family Welfare Nagaland: Kohima" 4. Being aggrieved by the notification No. HFW(A) COVID-19/Appt-13/17/2020, dated 06.07.2020, issued by the Commissioner & Secretary, Health & Family Welfare Department and the advertisement No. DHFW-5/COVID-19/SN/2019-2020/5023-26, dated 16.07.2020, issued by the Principal Director, Health & Family Welfare which are already reproduced hereinabove, the petitioners' are here before this Court challenging the same and praying as stated above. 5. The case of the petitioners as submitted by their learned counsel can be divided into two; (i) based on facts and law, (ii) based on facts. The first is as follows; 1. (a). That all along recruitment to the post of nurses under the Government of Nagaland has been done by following the queue system, that is to say, those who completed their graduation from recognised Nursing Institute were given appointment to the existing vacancies based on their seniority in the completion of their graduation and merit, year after year without any advertisement and examination. And, this practice has been followed for the last 30 years in spite of the existence of the recruitment rules. And, by following this system of appointment members of the petitioners' association have been appointed till 2002. But from there on since the Government did not create anymore post of nurse, they have not been appointed to Government service which has resulted in a back log of more than 1200 unemployed nurses. However, in the year 2019, by following the same system 7 of their members were appointed to the vacancies arising out of retirement of some employees and recently too i.e. on the 2nd July, 2020 another 28 of them were appointed following the same system. However, in the year 2019, by following the same system 7 of their members were appointed to the vacancies arising out of retirement of some employees and recently too i.e. on the 2nd July, 2020 another 28 of them were appointed following the same system. Therefore, the members of the association have been under legitimate expectation of being appointed following the same system as and when vacancies arise. As such, when the Cabinet decided in their Meeting held on 11.06.2020 (which was notified on 12.06.2020) to create 143 posts of staff nurse and appointment to such post would be through the existing system which means queue system and, consequently notification creating 143 posts of staff nurse was issued on 26.06.2020 they were happy and expecting that, at least some of them would get appointment in Government service after having waited for such a long time. However, their hope and legitimate expectation was dashed to the ground when the impugned Advertisement No. DHFW-5/COVID-19/SN/2019-2020/5023-26, dated 16.07.2020 was issued wherein, 110 posts were advertised for recruitment, completely ignoring the aged old practice of appointment through queue system and in violation of the decision of Cabinet Minutes taken on 11.06.2020 which was notified on 12.06.2020 and, the notification dated 26.06.2020. Thus, the impugned advertisement dated 16.07.2020 being not in consonance with the aged old system of appointment to the post of nurses and the Cabinet decision taken on 11.06.2020 and the consequential notification issued on 26.06.2020 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 1. (b). Mr. Joshua submitted that appointment through queue system is creation of the respondents and it has been followed for such a long time, therefore, the petitioners who had waited for their turn to be appointed without any murmuring are entitled to their legitimate expectation when such opportunity has come. Therefore, to deny them of such opportunity when it has come would amount to denial of their legitimate expectation. 1. (c). Mr. Therefore, to deny them of such opportunity when it has come would amount to denial of their legitimate expectation. 1. (c). Mr. Joshua also submitted that the petitioners were sponsored by the Government for their graduation and when they were selected to go for the same they were asked to sign a bond which provided that they should serve under the Government after completion of their training if they are called to do so, and that they will have to repay all the expenses incurred by the Government, in case they leave their studies before the completion of the course for any reason. Therefore, the petitioners had every reason to have a legitimate expectation of being employed by the Government as and when vacancies arise. In support of all the above submissions, Mr. Joshua referred to paragraph-58 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Jitendra Kumar & Others -versus- State of Haryana & Another, reported in (2008) 2 SCC 161 . The contents of the para-58 are given here below; "58. Application of doctrine of legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel must also be considered from the aforementioned view-point. A legitimate expectation is not the same thing as an anticipation. It is distinct and different from a desire and hope. It is based on a right. [See Chanchal Goyal (Dr.) v. State of Rajasthan : (2003) 3 SCC 485 and Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. (1993) 3 SCC 499 ]. It is grounded in the rule of law as requiring regularity, predictability and certainty with the Government's dealings with the public. We have no doubt that the doctrine of legitimate expectation operates both in procedural and substantive matters. 1. (d). Mr. Joshua also submitted that since the Government of Nagaland had instituted and followed the queue system of appointment in the post of nurse for a long time they are estopped from introducing any method of recruitment at this juncture. He also submitted that, if they are allowed do so, the petitioners who have waited for their chance for along time and without any murmuring would be deprived of their chance of being appointed in Government service for all their life time. 1. (e). Mr. He also submitted that, if they are allowed do so, the petitioners who have waited for their chance for along time and without any murmuring would be deprived of their chance of being appointed in Government service for all their life time. 1. (e). Mr. Joshua further submitted that many of the petitioners are on the verge of being overage and some in fact are overaged, but they have waited their turn believing and hopping that the Government would one day appoint them to vacancies arising due to retirement or due to creation of post by following the same system. Therefore, it would be unjust on the part of the respondents to suddenly change the method of recruitment when such vacancies has arisen. In support of the submissions above, Mr. Joshua referred to paragraph-24 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana & Others -versus- Mahabir Vegetable Oils Private Limited, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 778 . The contents of the para-24 are reproduced here below; "24. This Court in Motital Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. -versus- State of U.P. held as under; (SCC pp. 442-44, para-24) "24. This Court finally, after referring to the decision in the Ganges facturing Co. v. Surujmull (supra). The Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. The Secretary of State for India (supra) and Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay & Ors. Ltd. -versus- State of U.P. held as under; (SCC pp. 442-44, para-24) "24. This Court finally, after referring to the decision in the Ganges facturing Co. v. Surujmull (supra). The Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. The Secretary of State for India (supra) and Collector of Bombay v. Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay & Ors. (supra), summed up the position as follows: "Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future conduct and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the Judge of its own obligation to the citizen on an ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen." The law may, therefore, now be taken to be settled as a result of this decision that where the Government makes a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promises and, in fact, the promisee, acting in reliance on it, alters his position, the Government would be held bound by the promise and the promise would be enforceable against the Government at the instance of the promises, notwithstanding that there is no consideration for the promise and the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by Article 299 of the Constitution. It is elementary that in a Republic governed by the rule of law, no one, howsoever high or low, is above the law. Everyone is subject to the law as fully and completely as any other and the Government is no exception. It is indeed the pride of constitutional democracy and rule of law that the Government stands on the same footing as a private individual so far as the obligation of the law is concerned: the former is equally bound as the latter. It is indeed difficult to see on what principle can a Government, committed to the rule of law, claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Can the Government say that it is under no obligation to act in a manner that is fair and just or that it is not bound by considerations of "honesty and good faith"? It is indeed difficult to see on what principle can a Government, committed to the rule of law, claim immunity from the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Can the Government say that it is under no obligation to act in a manner that is fair and just or that it is not bound by considerations of "honesty and good faith"? Why should the Government not be held to a high "standard of rectangular rectitude while dealing with its citizens"? There was a time when the doctrine of executive necessity was regarded as sufficient justification for the Government to repudiate even its contractual obligations, but let it be said to the eternal glory of this Court, this doctrine was emphatically negatived in the Indo-Afghan Agencies case and the supremacy of the rule of law was established. It was laid down by this Court that the Government cannot claim to be immune from the applicability of the rule of promissory estoppel and repudiate a promise made by it on the ground that such promise may fetter its future executive action. If the Government does not want its freedom of executive action to be hampered or restricted, the Government need not make a promise knowing or intending that it would be acted on by the promisee and the promisee would alter his position relying upon it. But if the Government makes such a promise and the promises acts in reliance upon it and alters his position, there is no reason why the Government should not be compelled to make good such promise like any other private individual. The law cannot acquire legitimacy and gain social acceptance unless it accords with the moral values of the society and the constant endeavor of the Courts and the legislatures must, therefore, be to close the gap between law and morality and bring about as near an approximation between the two as possible. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is a significant judicial contribution in that direction. But it is necessary to point out that since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is a significant judicial contribution in that direction. But it is necessary to point out that since the doctrine of promissory estoppel is an equitable doctrine, it must yield when the equity so requires. If it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. The doctrine of promissory estoppel would be displaced in such a case because, on the facts, equity would not require that the Government should be held bound by the promise made by it. When the Government is able to show that in view of the facts as have transpired, public interest would be prejudiced if the Government were required to carry out the promise, the Court would have to balance the public interest in the Government carrying out a promise made to a citizen which has induced the citizen to act upon it and after this position and the public interest likely to suffer if the promise were required to be carried out by the Government and determine which way the equity lies. It would not be enough for the Government just to say that public interest requires that the Government should not be compelled to carry out the promise or that the public interest would suffer if the Government were required to honour it. The Government cannot, as Shah, J., pointed out in the Indo-Afghan Agencies case, claim to be exempt from the liability to carry out the promise "on some indefinite and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency", nor can the Government claim to be the sole judge of its liability and repudiate it "on an ex-parte appraisement of the circumstances". If the Government wants to resist the liability, it will have to disclose to the Court what are the facts and circumstances on account of which the Government claims to be exempt from the liability and it would be for the Court to decide whether these facts and circumstances are such as to render it inequitable to enforce the liability against the Government. Mere claim of change of policy would not be sufficient to exonerate the Government from the liability: the Government would have to show what precisely is the changed policy and also its reason and justification so that the Court can judge for itself which way the public interest lies and what the equity of the case demands. It is only if the Court is satisfied, on proper and adequate material placed by the Government, the over-riding public interest requires that the Government should not be held bound by the promise but should be free to act unfettered by it, that the Court would refuse to enforce the promise against the Government. The Court would not act on the mere ipse dixit of the Government, for it is the Court which has to decide and not the Government whether the Government should be held exempt from liability. This is the essence of the rule of law. The burden would be upon the Government to show that the public interest in the Government acting otherwise than in accordance with the promise is so overwhelming that it would be inequitable to hold the Government bound by the promise and the Court would insist on a highly rigorous standard of proof in the discharge of this burden. But even where there is no such over-riding public interest, it may still be competent to the Government to resile from the promise "on giving reasonable notice which need not be a formal notice, giving the promisee a reasonable opportunity of resuming his position" provided of course it is possible for the promisee to restore status quo ante. If however, the promisee cannot resume his position, the promise would become final and irrevocable." 1. (f). Mr. Joshua further submitted that the bargaining power of the State respondents is bigger than that of the petitioners when it comes to public employment, therefore the decision of the Government has to be judge on the ground of reasonability. In case, the decision of the Government is found to be unreasonable, the same ought to be quashed and set aside. In support of his submission, Mr. Joshua referred to paragraph-21 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mary -versus- State of Kerala & Others, reported in (2014) 14 SCC 272 . In case, the decision of the Government is found to be unreasonable, the same ought to be quashed and set aside. In support of his submission, Mr. Joshua referred to paragraph-21 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mary -versus- State of Kerala & Others, reported in (2014) 14 SCC 272 . The relevant portion of paragraph-21 referred to by the learned counsel is reproduced here below; "21. It is pointed out that in a contract of the present nature, the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties cannot be overlooked. Viewed from this angle, the rule is opposed to public policy, contends the learned counsel. Reference in this connection has been made to a decision of this Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Another etc. (1986) 3 SCC 156 . In this case, the terms in the contract of employment as also service rules provided for termination of service of permanent employees without assigning any reason on three months' notice or pay in lieu thereof on either side was under challenge. Taking into account unequal bargaining power between the employer and the employee, the term in contract and the rules were held to be unconscionable, unfair, unreasonable and against the public policy. On these grounds, this Court struck down the termination as void. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows SCC pp. 222-23, para 100) ................................... .............................. " 1. (g). The learned counsel, thereafter went on and submitted that the test of reasonability in exercise of the executive power must be fair and not arbitrary. He then referred to paragraph-17 & 22 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hari Ram & Another -versus- State of Haryana & Others, reported in : (2010) 3 SCC 621 . The contents of the two paragraphs are reproduced here below; "17. While dealing with the scope of judicial review in the matter of policy decision of Government, this Court in International Trading Co. 3 held: "14. It is trite law that Article 14 of the Constitution applies also to matters of governmental policy and if the policy or any action of the Government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. 15. 3 held: "14. It is trite law that Article 14 of the Constitution applies also to matters of governmental policy and if the policy or any action of the Government, even in contractual matters, fails to satisfy the test of reasonableness, it would be unconstitutional. 15. While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of the executive power, when not trammelled by any statute or rule is wide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article 14 is that a change in policy must be made fairly and should not give the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulterior criteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement of every State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstone irrespective of the field of activity of the State is an accepted tenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is the heartbeat of fair play. Actions are amenable, in the panorama of judicial review only to the extent that the State must act validly for a discernible reason, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose. The meaning and true import and concept of arbitrariness is more easily visualized than precisely defined. A question whether the impugned action is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered on the facts and circumstances of a given case. A basic and obvious test to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does it really satisfy the test of reasonableness. 22. It was held: (Sube Singh case, SCC pp. 548-49, paras 10-11) "10. . ..... It remains to be seen whether the purported classification of existing structures into 'A', 'B' and 'C' Classes is a reasonable classification having an intelligible differentia and a rational basis germane to the purpose. If the State Government fails to support its action on the touchstone of the above principle, then this decision has to be held as arbitrary and discriminatory. It is relevant to note here that the acquisition of the lands is for the purpose of planned development of the area which includes both residential and commercial purposes. If the State Government fails to support its action on the touchstone of the above principle, then this decision has to be held as arbitrary and discriminatory. It is relevant to note here that the acquisition of the lands is for the purpose of planned development of the area which includes both residential and commercial purposes. That being the purpose of acquisition, it is difficult to accept the case of the State Government that certain types of structures which according to its own classification are of 'A' Class can be allowed to remain while other structures situated in close vicinity and being used for same purposes (residential or commercial) should be demolished. At the cost of repetition, it may be stated here that no material was placed before us to show the basis of classification of the existing structures on the lands proposed to be acquired. This assumes importance in view of the specific contention raised on behalf of the appellants that they have pucca structures with RC roofing, mosaic flooring etc. No attempt was also made from the side of the State Government to place any architectural plan of different types of structures proposed to be constructed on the land notified for acquisition in support of its contention that the structures which exist on the lands of the appellants could not be amalgamated into the plan. 11. On the facts and circumstances of the case revealed from the records, we are persuaded to accept the contention raised on behalf of the appellants that the rejection of the request of the appellants for exclusion of their land having structures on them was not based on a fair and reasonable consideration of the matter. We are of the view that such action of the Government is arbitrary and discriminatory ...... " 1. (h). Mr. Joshua further submitted that in this case the fault is of the Government and not of the petitioners in having institutionalised the queue system of appointment and of having followed the same for such a long time. Therefore, it would be just and fair for this Court to grant exceptional relief. In support of his submission, the learned counsel referred to paragraph-33.2 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandigarh Administration & Another -versus- Jasmine Kaur & Others, reported in : (2014) 10 SCC 521 . Therefore, it would be just and fair for this Court to grant exceptional relief. In support of his submission, the learned counsel referred to paragraph-33.2 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chandigarh Administration & Another -versus- Jasmine Kaur & Others, reported in : (2014) 10 SCC 521 . The contents of the paragraph are reproduced here below; "33.2. Under exceptional circumstances, if the court finds that there is no fault attributable to the candidate i.e., the candidate has pursued his or her legal right expeditiously without any delay and that there is fault only on the part of the authorities or there is an apparent breach of rules and regulations as well as related principles in the process of grant of admission which would violate the right to equality and equal treatment to the competing candidates and the relief of admission can be directed within the time schedule prescribed, it would be completely just and fair to provide exceptional reliefs to the candidate under such circumstance alone." 1. (i) Mr. Joshua, lastly submitted that the principle of equality provided under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India should be applied according to the varying needs of different class of persons, for each class of persons requires separate treatment depending on their special needs. And, it should not be applied in a straight jacket manner or in the manner of blanket application. Mr. Joshua, thereafter submitted also that, in this case the members of the association consist of all the trained nurses in Nagaland and they are in agreement to follow the existing queue system of appointment, therefore, there is no question of anyone being discriminated or likely to be discriminated by continuing with queue system of appointment. The learned counsel also submitted that the existing queue system has taken into account intelligible differentia and reasonable classification among the trained nurses. He further submitted that equality should be among the equals and who belong to the same class and it is not among those who belong to different class. Thereafter, the learned counsel submitted that, in this case, the seniors get priority and the juniors wait for their turn, therefore, intelligible and reasonable classification among the trained nurses had been maintained based on their standing in the seniority list. Thereafter, the learned counsel submitted that, in this case, the seniors get priority and the juniors wait for their turn, therefore, intelligible and reasonable classification among the trained nurses had been maintained based on their standing in the seniority list. As such, the question of violation of Article 14 and Article 16 does not arise at all. In support of the above submissions, the learned counsel referred to paragraph-38 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay & Another -versus- F.N. Balsara, reported in (1951) AIR (SC) 318; and paragraph-54 of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in the case of the State of West Bengal -versus- Anwar Ali Sarkar & Another, reported in (1952) AIR SC 75; and paragraph-18 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Satyawati Sharma -versus- Union of India & Another, reported in (2008) 5 SCC 287 . The contents of the three paragraphs of the judgments referred to are reproduced here below one after the other; (i) In the case of State of Bombay & Another -versus- F.N. Balsara; "38. I now come to section 39 of the Act which has been impugned on the ground that it offends against article 14 of the Constitution which states that "the State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India". The meaning and scope of this article has been fully discussed in the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Others(1), and the principles laid down in that case may be summarized as follows: (1) The presumption is always in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment, since it must be assumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and its discriminations are based on adequate grounds. (2) The presumption may be rebutted in certain cases by showing that on the face of the statute, there is no classification at all and no difference peculiar to any individual or class and not applicable to any other individual or class, and yet the law hits only a particular individual or class. (2) The presumption may be rebutted in certain cases by showing that on the face of the statute, there is no classification at all and no difference peculiar to any individual or class and not applicable to any other individual or class, and yet the law hits only a particular individual or class. (3) The principle of equality does not mean that every law must have universal application for all persons who are not by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same position, and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment. (1) /SC/0009/1950 : [1950] S.C.R. 869. (4) The principle does not take away from the State the power of classifying persons for legitimate purposes. (5) Every classification is in some degree likely to produce some inequality, and mere production of inequality is not enough. (6) If a law deals equally with members of a well defined class, it is not obnoxious and it is not open to the charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that it has no application to other persons. (7) While reasonable classification is permissible, such classification must be based upon some real and substantial distinction bearing a reasonable and just relation to the object sought to be attained, and the classification cannot be made arbitrarily and without any substantial basis. (ii) In the case of the State of West Bengal -versus- Anwar Ali Sarkar & Another; "54. Article 14 of our Constitution, it is well known, corresponds to the last portion of section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the American Constitution except that our Article 14 has also adopted the English doctrine of rule of law by the addition of the words "equality before the law." It has not however, been urged before us that the addition of these extra words has made any substantial difference in its practical application. The meaning, scope and effect of Article 14 of our Constitution have been discussed and laid down by this Court in the case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhury v. The Union of India and Others (/SC/0009/1950 : [1950] S.C.R. 869). Although Sastri J., as he then was, and myself differed from the actual decision of the majority of the Court, there was no disagreement between us and the majority as to the principles underlying the provisions of Article 14. Although Sastri J., as he then was, and myself differed from the actual decision of the majority of the Court, there was no disagreement between us and the majority as to the principles underlying the provisions of Article 14. The difference of opinion in that case was not so much on the principles to be applied as to the effect of the application of such principles. Those principles were again considered and summarised by this Court in The State of Bombay v. F.N. Balsara [1951] S.C.R. 682). It is now well established that while Article 14 is designed to prevent a person or class of persons from being singled out from others similarly situated for the purpose of being specially subjected to discriminating and hostile legislation, it does not insist on an "abstract symmetry" in the sense that every piece of legislation must have universal application. All persons are not, by nature, attainment or circumstances, equal and the varying needs of different classes of persons often require separate treatment and, therefore, the protecting clause has been construed as a guarantee against discrimination amongst equals only and not as taking away from the state the power to classify persons for the purpose of legislation. This classification may be on different bases. It may be geographical or according to objects or occupations or the like Mere classification, however, is not enough to get over the inhibition of the Article. The classification must not be arbitrary but must be rational, that is to say, it must not only be based on some qualities or characteristics which are to be found in all the persons grouped together and not in others who are left out but those qualities or characteristics must have a reasonable relation to the object of the legislation. In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from others and that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act. The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them. In short, while the Article forbids class legislation in the sense of making improper discrimination by conferring privileges or imposing liabilities upon persons arbitrarily selected out of a large number of other persons similarly situated in relation to the privileges sought to be conferred or the liability proposed to be imposed, it does not forbid classification for the purpose of legislation, provided such classification is not arbitrary in the sense I have just explained. The doctrine, as expounded by this Court in the two cases I have mentioned, leaves a considerable latitude to the Court in the matter of the application of Article 14 and consequently has the merit of flexibility. (iii) In the case of Satyawati Sharma -versus- Union of India & Another; "18. In Mohd. Shujat Ali vs. Union of India 1975 (3) SCC 76 ], the Court observed that Article 14 ensures to every person equality before law and equal protection of the laws. However, the constitutional code of equality and equal opportunity does not mean that the same laws must be applicable to all persons. It does not compel the State to run "all its laws in the channels of general legislation". It recognises that having regard to differences and disparities which exist among men and things, they cannot all be treated alike by the application of the same laws. "To recognise marked differences that exist in fact is living law; to disregard practical differences and concentrate on some abstract identities is lifeless logic." The Legislature must necessarily, if it is to be effective at all in solving the manifold problems which continually come before it, enact special legislation directed towards specific ends limited in its application to special classes of persons or things. "Indeed, the greater part of all legislation is special, either in the extent to which it operates, or the objects sought to be attained by it." At the same time, the Court cautioned against the readymade invoking of the doctrine of classification to ward off every challenge to the legislative instruments on the ground of violation of equality clause and observed: "24 ....... The equal protection of the laws is a "pledge of the protection of equal laws". The equal protection of the laws is a "pledge of the protection of equal laws". But laws may classify. And, as pointed out by Justice Brawer, "the very idea of classification is that of inequality". The Court has tackled this paradox over the years and in doing so, it has neither abandoned the demand for equality nor denied the legislative right to classify. It has adopted a middle course of realistic reconciliation. It has resolved the contradictory demands of legislative specialization and constitutional generality by a doctrine of reasonable classification. This doctrine recognises that the legislature may classify for the purpose of legislation but requires that the classification must be reasonable. It should ensure that persons or things similarly situated are all similarly treated. The measure of reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly situated." "25 ..... A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law. There should be no discrimination between one person or thing and another, if as regards the subject-matter of the legislation their position is substantially the same. This is sometimes epigrammatically described by saying that what the constitutional code of equality and equal opportunity requires is that among equals, the law should be equal and that like should be treated alike. But the basic principle underlying the doctrine is that the Legislature should have the right to classify and impose special burdens upon or grant special benefits to persons or things grouped together under the classification, so long as the classification is of persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the legislation, so that all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike by law. The test which has been evolved for this purpose is and this test has been consistently applied by this Court in all decided cases since the commencement of the Constitution that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes certain persons or things that are grouped together from others and that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation." "26 ...... We have to be constantly on our guard to see that this test which has been evolved as a matter of practical necessity with a view to reconciling the demand for equality with the need for special legislation directed towards specific ends necessitated by the complex and varied problems which require solution at the hands of the Legislature, does not degenerate into rigid formula to be blindly and mechanically applied whenever the validity of any legislation is called in question. The fundamental guarantee is of equal protection of the laws and the doctrine of classification is only a subsidiary rule evolved by courts to give a practical content to that guarantee by accommodating it with the practical needs of the society and it should not be allowed to submerge and drown the precious guarantee of equality. The doctrine of classification should not be carried to a point where instead of being a useful servant, it becomes a dangerous master, for otherwise, as pointed out by Chandrachud, J., in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa the guarantee of equality will be submerged in class legislation masquerading as laws meant to govern well-marked classes characterised by different and distinct attainments". Overemphasis on the doctrine of classification or an anxious and sustained attempt to discover some basis for classification may gradually and imperceptibly deprive the guarantee of equality of its spacious content. That process would inevitably end in substituting the doctrine of classification for the doctrine of equality: the fundamental right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws may be replaced by the overworked methodology of classification. Our approach to the equal protection clause must, therefore, be guided by the words of caution uttered by Krishna Iyer, J. in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa: (at SCC p. 42)"Mini-classifications based on micro-distinctions are false to our egalitarian faith and only substantial and straightforward classifications plainly promoting relevant goals can have constitutional validity. To overdo classification is to undo equality." [Emphasis added] 5.2. The second part of the petitioners' case is as follows; 2. (a). To overdo classification is to undo equality." [Emphasis added] 5.2. The second part of the petitioners' case is as follows; 2. (a). That though after the creation of 143 posts, the State Cabinet, in their meeting held on 23.06.2020 once again created more post of medical personnel including 78 staff nurse posts and also decided to fill up 50% of the post so created through the queue system and the other 50% through direct recruitment/open competition with a rider that, the queue system will be discontinued in due course; and in pursuance of this Cabinet decision, a notification No. HFW(A) COVID-19/Appt-13/17/2020 was issued on 05.07.2020, notifying the basic guideline for recruitment to the post created, and among the guidelines it was included that 50% of the post of staff nurse is to be filled up through queue system and 50% through direct recruitment and open competition with the same rider that, the queue system of recruitment will be discontinued in due course; from the Minutes of the Cabinet meeting held on 23.06.2020 and the notification dated 05.07.2020, it is quite clear that the decision to fill up 50% of the staff nurse post through queue system and the remaining 50% through direct recruitment relates only to 78 posts of staff nurse created in the second Cabinet meeting held on 23.06.2020, and did not include the 143 staff nurse post, which was created by the first Cabinet meeting. Therefore, the impugned advertisement dated 16.07.2020 is not keeping in tune or in consonance with the Cabinet decisions taken on 11.06.2020 and on 23.06.2020. 2. (b) And that, though the petitioner's are not totally against the direct recruitment through competition, filling up of the vacancies to the extent of 50% through such method exceeded the reasonable limit since the petitioner have been legitimately and patiently waiting for their chance to be appointed through the age old practice of recruitment i.e. queue system. Therefore, the percentage of recruitment through direct recruitment should be reduced to 30% and that of the recruitment through queue system should be maintained at the level of 70% of the vacancies. 6. Opposing the case of the petitioners, Mr. K. Sema, learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General submitted as follows; (a). At the very outset, Mr. K. Sema submitted that the practice of appointment by queue system was not based on any decision or policy of the Government. 6. Opposing the case of the petitioners, Mr. K. Sema, learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General submitted as follows; (a). At the very outset, Mr. K. Sema submitted that the practice of appointment by queue system was not based on any decision or policy of the Government. It was a practice created by the association and followed at the Directorate level. Therefore, it has no legal or administrative sanctity. Secondly, Mr. K. Sema submitted that there is no pleadings from the side of the petitioners that the practice of queue system is in tune with Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India. The fact that the system was followed by members of the association does not make the same legal. In fact, the system is illegal, therefore it cannot be enforced by Court of law. (b). Thereafter, Mr. K. Sema went on and submitted that an expectation to be enforceable has to be legitimate in law first and it should be justifiable in law. Mr. Sema further submitted that a circumstance to be termed exceptional and to attract special consideration under law must be within the four walls of law. Therefore, a circumstance, however exceptional it may be, unless it is within the four walls of law cannot attract special consideration under law. Mr. K. Sema also submitted that the petitioners are asking for appointment outside the scope of law when the Government is throwing the door open for every eligible candidate within the State to apply for the post, including the petitioners, so as to get the best among the eligible candidates, and also to give opportunity to everyone eligible and interested. (c). Mr. K. Sema also submitted that the principle of promissory estoppel does not apply in this case because, no promise either in written or oral form has been made by the Government to the petitioners that they would be appointed to Government service and through queue system. The learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General, further submitted that the petitioner must first satisfied the Court that they have a legal right to be appointed to Government service in the manner submitted by them but, there is nothing in their petition to show that they have such right. Mr. Sema, thereafter submitted also that, training sponsored by the Government does not guarantee appointment in Government service. Mr. Sema, thereafter submitted also that, training sponsored by the Government does not guarantee appointment in Government service. There is no such agreement in the bond signed by the petitioners. The bond merely provides that they should serve in the Government if they are asked to. Therefore, there is no promise or guarantee from the side of the Government. The completion of their training only gives them the qualification to be eligible for appointment to Government service. Furthermore, the learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General submitted also that, the fact that some of the petitioners are getting overage does not entitled them or does not give them any legal right of appointment in Government service. (d). Mr. K. Sema also submitted that the queue system of appointment to the post of nurse provides opportunity of appointment only to the trained persons who are in the higher echelon of the seniority. And, since vacancies come into existence very rarely the trained nurses who are junior in the seniority list would be deprived of the opportunity of appointment. Therefore, the queue system of appointment is against the very principles of equality as enshrined in Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India. 7. Mr. Sema went further and submitted that, for a valid and legal method of appointment, compliance with the constitutional requirement is a must. He also submitted that equality clause enshrined in Article 16 requires that every such appointment should be made by an open advertisement so as to enable all eligible persons to compete on merit. He also submitted that it is a settled legal proposition that, Article 14 does not perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equality. Therefore, even if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefits inadvertently or by mistake, such instances does not confer any legal right on the petitioners to get the same relief. In support of his submission, the learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General referred to paragraph-36 & 56 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Orissa & Another -versus- Mamata Mohanty, reported in : (2011) 3 SCC 436 . The contents of the two paragraphs are given here below; "36. Therefore, it is a settled legal proposition that no person can be appointed even on a temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting applications from all eligible candidates. The contents of the two paragraphs are given here below; "36. Therefore, it is a settled legal proposition that no person can be appointed even on a temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting applications from all eligible candidates. If any appointment is made by merely inviting names from the Employment Exchange or putting a note on the Notice Board etc. that will not meet the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Such a course violates the mandates of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as it deprives the candidates who are eligible for the post, from being considered. A person employed in violation of these provisions is not entitled to any relief including salary. For a valid and legal appointment mandatory compliance of the said Constitutional requirement is to be fulfilled. The equality clause enshrined in Article 16 requires that every such appointment be made by an open advertisement as to enable all eligible persons to compete on merit. 56. It is a settled legal proposition that Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality and it does not envisage negative equality. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the same relief. (Vide Chandigarh Administration & Anr. v. Jagjit Singh & Anr.,: AIR 1995 SC 705 ; Yogesh Kumar & Ors. v. Government of NCT Delhi & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1241 ; M/s. Anand Buttons Ltd. etc. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 565 ; K.K. Bhalla v. State of M.P. & Ors., AIR 2006 SC 898 ; Maharaj Krishan Bhatt & Anr. v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 24 ; Upendra Narayan Singh (supra); and Union of India & Anr. v. Kartick Chandra Mondal & Anr., AIR 2010 SC 3455 )." Mr. Sema in continuation of his earlier submission further submitted that only those who suffer legal injury or has the legal right over the matter in question can approach this High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In other words, the petitioners must first show that they have judicially enforceable right. However, in this case, the petitioners have not shown that they have any legally enforceable right, therefore no relief can be granted by this Court. In other words, the petitioners must first show that they have judicially enforceable right. However, in this case, the petitioners have not shown that they have any legally enforceable right, therefore no relief can be granted by this Court. In support of his submission, the learned counsel referred to paragraph-9, 10 & 11 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan -versus- State of Maharashtra & Others, reported in (2013) 4 SCC 465 . The contents of the three paragraphs referred to are given here below; "9. It is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to meddle in any proceeding, unless he satisfies the Authority/Court, that he falls within the category of aggrieved persons. Only a person who has suffered, or suffers from legal injury can challenge the act/action/order etc. in a court of law. A writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is maintainable either for the purpose of enforcing a statutory or legal right, or when there is a complaint by the appellant that there has been a breach of statutory duty on the part of the Authorities. Therefore, there must be a judicially enforceable right available for enforcement, on the basis of which writ jurisdiction is resorted to. The Court can of course, enforce the performance of a statutory duty by a public body, using its writ jurisdiction at the behest of a person, provided that such person satisfies the Court that he has a legal right to insist on such performance. The existence of such right is a condition precedent for invoking the writ jurisdiction of the courts. It is implicit in the exercise of such extraordinary jurisdiction that, the relief prayed for must be one to enforce a legal right. Infact, the existence of such right, is the foundation of the exercise of the said jurisdiction by the Court. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. (Vide: State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 ; Saghir Ahmad & Anr. The legal right that can be enforced must ordinarily be the right of the appellant himself, who complains of infraction of such right and approaches the Court for relief as regards the same. (Vide: State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, AIR 1952 SC 12 ; Saghir Ahmad & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1954 SC 728 ; Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., AIR 1962 SC 1044 ; Rajendra Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 2736 ; and Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Shareholders Welfare Association (2) v. S.C. Sekar & Ors., (2009) 2 SCC 784 ). 10. A "legal right", means an entitlement arising out of legal rules. Thus, it may be defined as an advantage, or a benefit conferred upon a person by the rule of law. The expression, "person aggrieved" does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardised. (Vide: Shanti Kumar R. Chanji v. Home Insurance Co. of New York, AIR 1974 SC 1719 ; and State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1977 SC 1361 ). 11. In Anand Sharadchandra Oka v. University of Mumbai, AIR 2008 SC 1289 , a similar view was taken by this Court, observing that, if a person claiming relief is not eligible as per requirement, then he cannot be said to be a person aggrieved regarding the election or the selection of other persons." Furthermore, the learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General submitted that, just because the queue system of appointment has been in practice for a long time, that cannot be a reason for this Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to continue to follow the same. Because, such practice is illegal, it would amount to perpetuating an illegality. In support of his submission, Mr. Sema referred to paragraph-26 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Another -versus- Arulmozhi Iniarasu & Others, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 397 . The contents of the paragraph are given here below; "26. In support of his submission, Mr. Sema referred to paragraph-26 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Another -versus- Arulmozhi Iniarasu & Others, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 397 . The contents of the paragraph are given here below; "26. Lastly, as regards the submission that the action of the appellants is highly discriminatory in as much as some similarly situated persons have been appointed/absorbed as Sepoys, the argument is stated to be rejected. It is well settled that a writ of mandamus can be issued by the High Court only when there exists a legal right in the writ petitioner and corresponding legal obligation in the State. Only because an illegality has been committed, the same cannot be directed to be perpetuated. It is trite law that there cannot be equality in illegality. (Ref.: Sushanta Tagore & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 8; U.P. State Sugar Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Sant Raj Singh & Ors. 9; State, CBI Vs. Sashi Balasubramanian & Anr. 10 and State of Orissa & Ors. Vs. Prasana Kumar Sahoo 11.)" 8. In support of his earlier submission on legitimate expectation, Mr. Sema submitted that legitimate expectation must have the legal backing. He also submitted that, the expectation must be a legitimate one and it must be within the constitutional scheme. In support of his submission, the learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General referred to paragraph-28 & 31 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Others -versus- Hindustan Development Corporation & Others, reported in (1993) 3 SCC 499 . The relevant portions of the two paragraphs are given here below; "28. Time is a three-fold present: the present as we experience it, the past as a present memory and future as a present expectation. For legal purposes, the expectation cannot be the same as anticipation. It is different from a wish, a desire or a hope nor can it amount to a claim or demand on the ground of a right. However earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assertable expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. However earnest and sincere a wish, a desire or a hope may be and however confidently one may look to them to be fulfilled, they by themselves cannot amount to an assertable expectation and a mere disappointment does not attract legal consequences. A pious hope even leading to a moral obligation cannot amount to a legitimate expectation. The legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law or custom or an established procedure followed in regular and natural sequence. Again it is distinguishable from a genuine expectation. Such expectation should be justifiably legitimate and protectable. Every such legitimate expectation does not by itself fructify into a right and therefore it does not amount to a right in the conventional sense. 31. In R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department. ex parte Ruddock and others : [1987] 2 All E R 518, Taylor, J. after referring to the ratio laid down in some of the above cases held thus: "On these authorities I conclude that the doctrine of legitimate expectation in essence imposes a duty to act fairly. Whilst most of the cases are concerned, as Lord Roskill said, with a right to be heard, I do not think the doctrine is so confined. Indeed, in a case where ex hypothesis there is no right to be heard, it may be thought the more important to fair dealing that a promise or undertaking given by a minister as to how he will proceed should be kept. Of course such promise or undertaking must not conflict with his statutory duty, or her duty as here, in the exercise of a prerogative power. I accept the submission of counsel for the Secretary of State that the respondent cannot fetter his discretion. By declaring a policy he does not preclude any possible need to change it. But then if the practice has been to publish the current policy, it would be incumbent on him in dealing fairly to publish the new policy, unless again that would conflict with his duties. Had the criteria here needed changing for national security reasons, no doubt the respondent could have changed them. Had those reasons prevented him also from publishing the new criteria, no doubt he could have refrained from doing so. Had the criteria here needed changing for national security reasons, no doubt the respondent could have changed them. Had those reasons prevented him also from publishing the new criteria, no doubt he could have refrained from doing so. Had he even decided to keep the criteria but depart from them in this single case for national security reasons, no doubt those reasons would have afforded him a defence to judicial review as in the GCHQ case." (emphasis supplied) In Breen v. Amalgamated Engineering Union and Others [1971] 2 Law Reports Queen Bench Division 175, Lord Denning observed as under: "If a man seeks a privilege to which he has no particular claim such as an appointment to some post or other-then he can be turned away without a word. He need not be heard. No explanation need be given; see the cases cited in Schmidt v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs (1969) 2 Ch. 149 , 170-171. But if he is a man whose property is at stake, or who is being deprived of his livelihood, then reasons should be given why he is being turned down, and he should be given a chance to be heard. I go further If he is a man who has some right or interest, or some legitimate expectation, of which it would not be fair to deprive him without a hearing, or reasons given, then these should he afforded hint, according as the case may demand". 9. On the principle of promissory estoppel, Mr. Sema submitted further that, it is settled that there cannot be promissory estoppel against settled principle of law. He also submitted that, the Government or any authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by or prohibited by law. Therefore, based on the principle of promissory estoppel as claimed by the petitioners, the respondents cannot be compelled to follow the queue system of appointment in the post of nurse. In support of his submission the learned counsel, referred to paragraph-33 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited & Others -versus- State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 193 . The contents of the paragraph are given here below; "33. In support of his submission the learned counsel, referred to paragraph-33 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shree Sidhbali Steels Limited & Others -versus- State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 193 . The contents of the paragraph are given here below; "33. Normally, the doctrine of promissory estoppel is being applied against the Government and defence based on executive necessity would not be accepted by the Court. However, if it can be shown by the Government that having regard to the facts as they have subsequently transpired, it would be inequitable to hold the Government to the promise made by it, the Court would not raise an equity in favour of the promisee and enforce the promise against the Government. Where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked. Government can change the policy in public interest. However, it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled proposition of law. Doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked for enforcement of a promise made contrary to law, because none can be compelled to act against the statute. Thus, the Government or public authority cannot be compelled to make a provision which is contrary of law." 10. In support of his earlier submission that, having completed training only qualifies a person to participate in a competitive examination for appointment and it does not confer right to appointment. The learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General submitted further that, no direction can be given to the respondents to appoint the members of the association just because they have undergone their training under the sponsorship of the Government. In support of his submission, the learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General referred to paragraph-2 & 17 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Director of Horticulture, Odisha -versus- Pravat Kumar Dash & Others, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 294 . The contents of the two paragraphs are given here below; "2. Aggrieved against the said order, the State and the Director of Horticulture, Odisha filed writ petitions before the High Court. The contents of the two paragraphs are given here below; "2. Aggrieved against the said order, the State and the Director of Horticulture, Odisha filed writ petitions before the High Court. The High Court dismissed the writ petitions holding that the applicants had undergone training after being selected and sponsored by the Government. It is also held that since the posts of Gardener are lying vacant, there is no reason why the State should not consider the applicants against such vacancies. 17. We find the selection of the candidates for training was not by way of transparent procedure nor there was any commitment to appoint candidates who have completed training as Gardeners, therefore, even if a candidate has completed training, he cannot seek right of employment unless such posts are advertised and filled up by giving opportunity to all similarly situated candidates. The directions of the Tribunal, as affirmed by the High Court, that the candidates are intended to be employed are wholly unjustified as there cannot be any direction for appointment only for the reason that the candidates have undergone training. It is not necessary for this Court to examine whether the post of Gardener has been upgraded to the post of Horticulture Extension Worker or that it is the same post having a different nomenclature. The fact remains that all public posts are required to be filled up by giving an opportunity to all the candidates to apply and to compete for the post." 11. Mr. K. Sema also submitted that, it may be true that the petitioners' case may attract some sympathy in view of the fact that they have waited for an opportunity for appointment for so long under the queue system, however, that cannot be the reason good enough to bend the arm of law in a society governed by the rule of law. Sympathies cannot override the Rules and Regulations. In support of his submission, Mr. K. Sema referred to paragraph-31 & 32 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sudhir Kumar Consul -versus- Allahabad Bank, reported in (2011) 3 SCC 486 . The contents of the two paragraphs are given here below; "31. We have sympathies for the appellant but, in a society governed by Rule of law, sympathies cannot override the Rules and Regulations. The contents of the two paragraphs are given here below; "31. We have sympathies for the appellant but, in a society governed by Rule of law, sympathies cannot override the Rules and Regulations. We may recall the observations made by this Court while considering the issue of compassionate appointment in public service. 32. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Asha Ramachhandra Ambekar and Anr. (1994) 2 SCC 718 , wherein the Court observed: "The High Courts and the Administrative Tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic consideration. Yielding to instinct will tend to ignore the cold logic of law. It should be remembered that "law is the embodiment of all wisdom". Justice according to law is a principle as old as the hills. The Courts are to administer law as they find it, however, inconvenient it may be." 12. Opposing the second part of the case of the petitioners, Mr. K. Sema, at the very outset, submitted that the notification and the advertisement challenged by the petitioners were issued in consequence of the Cabinet decisions taken in a meeting held on 23.06.2020. Therefore, without challenging the Cabinet decision taken on 23.06.2020, the impugned notification and the impugned advertisement cannot be challenge. In support of his submission, Mr. K. Sema referred to paragraph-15 & 16 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kalyan Singh -versus- State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, reported in AIR 1962 SC 1183 . The contents of the relevant paragraphs are given here below; "15. Grounds 3 and 4 of the appellant that the Regional Transport Authority acted illegally in curtailing the period of renewal and that, in any event, did not apply its mind in dealing with the renewal application but mechanically followed the provisions of the scheme may now be considered. 16. The Regional Transport Authority was by the terms of the scheme left no discretion in the matter. It was by the scheme that the right of the appellant was restricted and if the scheme became final and binding the Regional Transport Authority had no authority to permit the appellant to ply his vehicle. The order passed by the Regional Transport Authority was purely consequential on the scheme, and if the scheme is not open to challenge, orders consequential thereon will not also be open to challenge. The order passed by the Regional Transport Authority was purely consequential on the scheme, and if the scheme is not open to challenge, orders consequential thereon will not also be open to challenge. We are supported in this view by the observations of this Court in Abdul Gafoor; Proprietor, Saheen Motor Service v. State of Mysore that: "It appears to us that when deciding what action to take under section 68F(1) the authority is tied down by the terms and conditions of the approved scheme and his duty is merely to do what is necessary to give effect to the provisions of the schemes. The refusal to entertain applications for renewal of permits or cancellation of permits or modification of terms of existing permits really flow from the scheme. The duty is therefore merely mechanical and it will be incorrect to say that there is in these matters any lie between the existing operators and the State Transport Authority. There is no justification therefore for saying that when taking action under s. 68F(2) is really independent of the issue of the permits under section 68F(1). Once the scheme has been approved, action under s. 68F(1) flows from it and at the same time action under section 68F(2) flows from the same scheme". We are bound by the decision." 13. Proceeding further, Mr. Sema submitted that the two Cabinet decisions and the notifications and the advertisement issued in consequence thereto should be read together as all of them relates to the needs of the medical department due to the situation arising out of the wide spread infection of Covid-19 and the measures that are being taken up for dealing with the situation. They cannot be read in isolation. He also submitted that the second Cabinet decision was taken in furtherance of the earlier decision and complementary thereto and, the impugned notification and the impugned advertisement are the results or consequential actions or steps taken to bring the decisions taken in the two Cabinet meetings to fruition. Therefore, viewing the impugned notification and the advertisement from that point of view there is nothing wrong in them and, no illegality has been committed while issuing the two which would necessitate interference. 14. I have gone through the writ petition, the affidavit-in-opposition, the reply affidavit filed by the writ petitioners and I have also perused all the judgments referred to by the learned counsels. 14. I have gone through the writ petition, the affidavit-in-opposition, the reply affidavit filed by the writ petitioners and I have also perused all the judgments referred to by the learned counsels. Further, I have considered the submissions of the learned counsels in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case and principles of law involved. 15. The first issue that needs to be settled in this case is whether the queue system of appointment which is claimed to have been followed in the appointment of nurses for the last many years is valid under the constitutional scheme and under the settled principles of law. Article 14 and Article 16 of the Constitution of India reads as follows; "14. Equality before law;- The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India." "16. Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment;- (1) There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State (2) No citizen shall, on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them, be ineligible for, or discriminated against in respect or, any employment or office under the State (3) Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from making any law prescribing, in regard to a class or classes of employment or appointment to an office under the Government of, or any local or other authority within, a State or Union territory, any requirement as to residence within that State or Union territory prior to such employment or appointment (4) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favor of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State are not adequately represented in the services under the State (4A) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation in matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class or classes of posts in the services under the State in favour of Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes which in the opinion of State are not adequately represented in the services under the State. (4B) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from considering any unfilled vacancies of a year which are reserved for being filled up in that year in accordance with any provision for reservation made under clause (4) or clause (4A) as a separate class of vacancies to be filled up in any succeeding year or years and such class of vacancies shall not be considered together with the vacancies of the year in which they are being filled up for determining the ceiling of fifty per cent, reservation on total number of vacancies of that year. (5) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any law which provides that the incumbent of an office in connection with the affairs of any religious or denominational institution or any member of the governing body thereof shall be a person professing a particular religion or belonging to a particular denomination. (6) Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any economically weaker sections of citizens other than the classes mentioned in clause (4), in addition to the existing reservation and subject to a maximum of ten per cent of the posts in each category." On mere perusal of the two Articles given above, it is clear that everyone is equal before the law and are entitled to equal protection of the laws and, every citizen is entitled to equality of opportunity in matters relating to employment or appointments' to any office under the State. In catena of cases, the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Courts in the Country has reiterated that to effectuate the provisions of these two Articles in recruitment to any State service, advertisement must be issued and such advertisement should be widely circulated so that every eligible and interested candidate is made aware and, recruitment to such post should be through fair and transparent competitive examinations. Some of the landmark judgments have been cited by the learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General which have been reproduced herein above. This being a settled principle of law I need not waste time and space any further. However, I may mention again some of the citations of the learned Sr. Addl. Some of the landmark judgments have been cited by the learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General which have been reproduced herein above. This being a settled principle of law I need not waste time and space any further. However, I may mention again some of the citations of the learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General which have been reproduced in the preceding paragraphs; (i) In the case of State of Orissa & Another vs. Mamata Mohanty, reported in (2011)3 SCC 436 , it was stated that - "Therefore, it is settled legal proposition that no person can be appointed even on a temporary or ad hoc basis without inviting applications from all eligible candidates. If any appointment is made by merely inviting names from the Employment Exchange or putting a note on the Notice Board etc that will not meet the requirement of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution." Further, it was also stated that -" The equality clause enshrined in Article 16 requires that every such appointment be made by open advertisement as to enable all eligible persons to compete on merit" The above settled principles of law makes it crystal clear that for any type of recruitment to any government job widely published advertisement is a condition precedent and the selection should be based on merit. In other words Article 14 and 16 mandates that for any type of recruitment in any government job it must be preceded by widely published advertisement and it should be based on merit. (ii) In the case of Director of Horticulture, Odisha Vs. Pravat Kumar Dash & others, reported in (2019) 8 SCC 294 it was stated that "The fact remains that all public post are required to be filled up by giving an opportunity to all candidates to apply and to compete for the post." This pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court is a reiteration of the principle of law settled in catena of cases including the one given above. In the queue system of appointment of nurses (which existence is not shown on paper except through reference to some documents) as submitted by the learned counsel, list of trained nurses are maintained in serial depending on the years of completion of their nursing training/graduation and, as and when vacancies arises those who are senior most in the list are appointed. The appointment to future vacancies continued likewise. The appointment to future vacancies continued likewise. One must remember that posts in public service are created to serve public interest in the first place and the opportunity to be appointed to such post is a consequential benefit. In other words, the first and foremost important reason or purpose for creating posts in public services is to serve the public interest and not to provide employment - per se. Therefore, when the State Government creates post, the first and foremost importance one must give is on the quality or merit of the persons to be employed and such can happen only if the opportunity is open to every eligible candidate to apply and appear in such recruitment test as required under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In the case of queue system, such opportunity is not only denied to all eligible candidate but the chance of finding the best or selecting the best for the job is already curtailed. Therefore, the queue system is not only against the scheme of equality provided in the two Articles but against the public interest. Such practice, as such, even if it had existed for a long time, must go. It is true that society evolves and law also evolves as per the need of the society. Such practice might have been suitable in the time past when there were not many people who went for nurse training. But the days have changed and so is the need of the society. The society must move on and the laws which includes the customary practices and all other practices which were relevant at one point of time have also to change. The practice of yesterday, however good and relevant at that time may not be appropriate anymore for today. The State of Nagaland needs the best medical personnel available and not every trained nurse, therefore, the best, even among the best, should be selected to serve the interest of the people of the State. And while doing so every eligible and interested person should be given the opportunity to appear in the selection process and the same should be based on merit. The interest of the people of the State should not be superseded by the interest of few. And while doing so every eligible and interested person should be given the opportunity to appear in the selection process and the same should be based on merit. The interest of the people of the State should not be superseded by the interest of few. I am unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel of the petitioners that the equality principle has not been violated by the queue system of appointment since intelligible and reasonable differentia has been taken care of by the system. Because, it is not the intelligible and reasonable differentia or classification contemplated by the constitution. In the name of such classification, the juniors among the trained nurses cannot be denied equal opportunity of facing competitive examination and of being selected for appointment. 16. The second issue involved in this case is, whether the practice of queue system of appointment, since it has been there for a long time has given right of legitimate expectation to the petitioners. The answer to this is no. Because, as rightly submitted by the learned Sr. Addl. Advocate General an expectation to be termed as legitimate expectation it must first pass the test of being legitimate. It may be true that in this case, the practice has been going on for a long time but that does not necessarily make the practice legal or valid in law as stated above while discussing the first issue. This system of appointment does not come under the constitutional scheme as already discussed. And any system outside the constitutional scheme cannot gain legitimacy in law however much acceptance it may have gained and however long it may have been in existence/practice. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the expectation of the petitioners however reasonable and morally acceptable it may sound it cannot be accepted as legitimate expectation in law. I may add here that law is embodiment of wisdom and every value that is in vogue in the society. When law is made all values including moral, religious, scientific and economic values are taken into consideration. Therefore, what the law does not permit cannot be said to be legitimate. I may add here that law is embodiment of wisdom and every value that is in vogue in the society. When law is made all values including moral, religious, scientific and economic values are taken into consideration. Therefore, what the law does not permit cannot be said to be legitimate. It may also be stated that the legitimacy of an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on the sanction of law or custom or an established procedure followed in regular and natural sequence (stated by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Union of India & Another -Vs. Arulmozhi Iniarasu & Another, reported in (2011) 7 SCC 397 ). 17. The next issue that needs to be considered is whether the State respondents are stopped from changing the method of recruitment to the post of nurse since the system i.e., queue system has been allowed to exist for such a long time. This issue has been taken care of squarely by the judgments cited by the learned Sr. Adl. AG (Shree Sidyhbali Steels Limited & Others -Vs- State of Utter Pradesh & Others, reported in : (2011) 3 SCC 193 ) wherein it was stated that "...it is well settled that taking cue from this doctrine, the authority cannot be compelled to do something which is not allowed by law or prohibited by law. There is no promissory estoppel against the settled principle of law." The Practice of queue system is outside the constitutional scheme more particularly the equality scheme as provided under Article 14 and Article 16 as already stated while discussing the first issue. Therefore, the authorities cannot be compelled to do something which is against the law just because such practice has been in existence for a long time. Principles of promissory estoppel does not envisage such a situation. Therefore, a practice, however long a duration it might have been in existence cannot be allowed to continue because a wrong cannot be perpetuated and, this Court cannot be a part of making a wrong practice to continue in perpetuity. It has been stated above the queue system of appointment is outside the constitutional scheme and it has no legal legitimacy, therefore it cannot be imposed nor perpetuated. It has been stated above the queue system of appointment is outside the constitutional scheme and it has no legal legitimacy, therefore it cannot be imposed nor perpetuated. I may also add here that, it is equally settled principle of law that where public interest warrants, the principles of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked and government can change the policy in public interest. 18. The fate of the second part of the case of the petitioners is mostly dependent on the outcome of the first part. It was submitted by the learned counsel of the petitioners that the decision of the Cabinet taken in the two Cabinet meetings i.e., one taken on 11.06.2020 and 23.06.2020 should be read separately and they should not be clubbed together. Therefore, 143 posts of nurse should be filled up 100% through the existing system i.e. queue system and only for the 78 post of nurse created in pursuance of the decision of the Cabinet meeting held on 23.06.2020 the same can be divided into two parts if it must, but that too 70%-30%; 70% through queue system and 30% through direct recruitment. It would be seen from the proceedings of the two Cabinet meetings that both the Agendas are regarding appointment to the post of Doctors, nurses etc in the Health & Welfare Department and the decisions taken were part of the measures undertaken for dealing with only the situation arising out of the Covid-19 infection. The intent and purpose of the decisions taken in the two Cabinet meetings are same i.e., to create at least some minimum number of post of medical personnel needed for the purpose of tackling the health issues arising out of the situation create by Covid-19 infection. There may be some lapses here and there in the language used but the tune and tenor of the two minutes of the Cabinet meeting shows that it is one time effort for a purpose and the later decisions and actions were taken in furtherance of the first initiative. Therefore, any of them including the consequential notifications cannot be read in isolation. As such, I find nothing illegal in the impugned notification and the impugned advertisement, in particular. In any case, as stated above, the validity of the second part of the case of the petitioners depended on the result of the findings made in the first part. Therefore, any of them including the consequential notifications cannot be read in isolation. As such, I find nothing illegal in the impugned notification and the impugned advertisement, in particular. In any case, as stated above, the validity of the second part of the case of the petitioners depended on the result of the findings made in the first part. Because, when it has been decided in the first part of the petitioners' case that appointment through queue system is not within the constitutional scheme, appointment to the post of 143 staff nurse created by the decision of the 1st Cabinet sitting on 11.06.2020 could not have been allowed through the queue system alone. Furthermore, from the reading of the minutes of the two Cabinet meetings and the notifications issued thereafter, it appears that it is an emergency and one time measure taken to deal with the health issues of the people of the State arising out of the Covid-19 spread. Therefore, this Court has no inclination to interfere with it. However, regarding the maximum age of eligibility which is extended to 45 years in the case of serving contractual employees, I am of the view that the same relaxation should be extended to all the trained nurses of Nagaland considering the fact that many of them did not have the privilege of being appointed on contractual basis and such opportunity to compete for appointment comes very rarely. Therefore, the respondents are hereby directed to extend the same benefit to all the trained nurses in Nagaland. To enable the persons who have not applied for the selection process due to overage, the respondents shall extend the last date of submission of application till 4:00 P.M. of 31-08-2020 and thereafter, conduct the examination at the earliest in view of the immediate need of the medical personnel in the present situation. The extension of the date of submission should be published in Newspapers and other medias so that the intended candidates all around the State may be able to know the same. The writ petition is disposed of in terms of the conclusions drawn, observations made and the direction given.