ORDER : 1. Heard learned advocates for the respective parties through Video Conferencing. 2. Mr. Vishal Awtani, learned advocate for the petitioner relies on a decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No.6942 of 2020 dated 10.6.2020 which reads as under : “1.1. By way of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, through his mother, has challenged the legality of the order of detention dated 13.04.2019 passed by respondent no.1 under the provisions of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act, 1985 (“P.A.S.A Act” for short) by detaining the detenu as a “dangerous person” with a view to prevent the detenu from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 2. The petitioner-detenu came to be detained as a “dangerous person” on the ground that his activities are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following contentions: (I) The order of detention passed against the detenu is illegal, unconstitutional and null and void; (II) There is no material on record to indicate that the alleged activities created strong fear in public, prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and the society as a whole is ever disturbed; (III) The impugned order has been passed without application of mind; (IV) The detenu has been detained on the ground that the alleged antisocial activities of the petitioner adversely affect or is likely to affect the maintenance of public order in clear abuse of the powers and process of legal machinery, which is nothing, but arbitrary and illegal. 4. Mr. Nisarg Jain, learned advocate for the petitioner, further submitted that the petitioner has been rendered as 'dangerous person' and taking into consideration the allegations levelled against him, the detention order was required to be served expeditiously and immediately rather the order dated 13.04.2019 was served upon detenue on 02.03.2020 and the last offence, which was registered against the detenue was at Khambhat City Police Station being I – C.R. No. 37 of 2018 on 23.08.2018. Taking this fact into consideration, the order was served with delay of almost one year and six months. Relying upon judgment rendered in case of P.V. Iqbal v. Union of India, 1992 Cri. Taking this fact into consideration, the order was served with delay of almost one year and six months. Relying upon judgment rendered in case of P.V. Iqbal v. Union of India, 1992 Cri. L.J. 2924 (SC), he submitted that if no prompt or sincere efforts are made to execute the order to detenue, then such order of detention would be invalid. He further submitted that in case of A. Mohammed Farook v. Jt. Secretary to G.O.I. And Ors., (2000) 2 SCC 360 , Hon'ble Supreme Court considered delay of 40 days in serving the detention order and set aside the order of detention. 5. Mr. Krutik Parikh, learned Assistant Government Pleader, submitted that the allegations against the detenue is of communal disharmony, there are allegations of unlawful assembly. He submitted that there is no embargo in PASA of considering the case of the detenue, even after delay, such delay cannot be made ground for releasing the detenue when he is a dangerous person to the society. 6. Learned AGP has supported the impugned order of detention passed by respondent no.1 and submitted that the detenu is a ''dangerous person'' and sufficient material was found during the course of investigation, indicating that the detenu is in habit of indulging himself into illegal activities, as defined under Section 2 (c) of the PASA Act and therefore, considering the facts of the case, the detaining authority has rightly passed the order of detention, which deserves to be upheld by this Court. 7. Learned AGP further contended that the detenu is a headstrong person and has indulged into anti-social activities, which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In view of this, there is sufficient material to arrive to the satisfaction that the detenue is a “dangerous person” and is involved in antisocial activities, which are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. He also contended that the order of detention is passed based on material subjective satisfaction and therefore, he prays this Court to dismiss this petition. 8. Replying to the said contention, Mr. Nisarg Jain, learned advocate for the petitioner, stated that object of the Act is to prevent the activities which are considered as 'dangerous', as per the provisions of PASA Act and if the authority wants to prevent such activities then steps have to be taken immediately and delay has to be explained. 8. Replying to the said contention, Mr. Nisarg Jain, learned advocate for the petitioner, stated that object of the Act is to prevent the activities which are considered as 'dangerous', as per the provisions of PASA Act and if the authority wants to prevent such activities then steps have to be taken immediately and delay has to be explained. The very fact that there was no such activities or continuation of the activity by the detenue since last date of registration of the FIR, itself shows that the detenue is not a threat to the society. 9. As cited by learned advocate for the petitioner, in the case of A. Mohammd Farook V. Jt. Secretary to G.O.I. and others, reported in (2002) 2 SCC 360, it has been observed in para 12 as under: “12. As indicated earlier the only explanation given by the detaining authority as regards the delay of 40 days in executing the detention order is that despite their efforts the petitioner could not be located at his residence or in his office and therefore the order could not be executed immediately. No report from the executing agency was filed before us to indicate as to what steps were taken by the executing agency to serve the detention order. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation explaining the delay of 40 days, we are of the opinion that the detention order must stand vitiated by reason of non execution thereof within a reasonable 5 time. From Annexure P.2 (the proceeding sheet of the M.M. Court Madras) it appears that the petitioner (accused) was present in the court of Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on 25.2.1999 as well on 25.3.1999. 10 Despite such opportunities neither the detaining authority nor the executing agency as well as sponsoring authority were diligent to serve the detention order on the petitioner at the earliest. In this view of the matter, we 75 are of the opinion that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in issuing detention order dated February 25, 1999 is vitiated It is in these circumstances it is not possible for us to sustain the 20 detention order.” 10. In this view of the matter, we 75 are of the opinion that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority in issuing detention order dated February 25, 1999 is vitiated It is in these circumstances it is not possible for us to sustain the 20 detention order.” 10. In the case of P.V. Iqbal V. Union of India, the Hon'ble Supreme Court expressing its views on the object of preventive detention and stating the importance of expeditious service of detention order has laid down in para 8, 9, 10 and 11 as under: “8. There is indeed a plethora of authorities explaining the purpose and avowed object of preventive detention in express and explicit language. We think that all those decisions of this Court on this aspect need not be recapitulated and recited. But it would be suffice to refer to the decision of this Court in Ashok Kumar v. Delhi Administration and Ors. wherein the following observation is made: Preventive detention is devised to afford protection to society. The object is not to punish a man for having done something but to intercept before he does it and to prevent him from doing. 9. In view of the above object of the preventive detention, it becomes very imperative on the part of the detaining authority as well as the executing authorities to be very vigilant and keep their eyes skinned but not to turn a blind eye in securing the detenu and executing the detention order because any indifferent attitude on the part of the detaining authority or executing authority will defeat the very purpose of the preventive action and turn the detention order as a dead letter and frustrate the entire proceedings. 10. Reverting to the case on hand, as we have pointed out ibid, there has been nearly 7 months' delay at the hands of the Circle Inspector in executing the warrant and a total period of one year delay in securing the detenu and serving the order from the date of the passing of the detention order by the detaining authority which delay is unreasonable and stands unexplained. In our opinion, the lucid apathetic attitude and the oblivious and contumacious conduct of the Inspector in not acting with greater promptitude in securing the detenu but conspicuously sleeping over the matter well nigh nearly 7 months have rendered the order of detention invalid. In our opinion, the lucid apathetic attitude and the oblivious and contumacious conduct of the Inspector in not acting with greater promptitude in securing the detenu but conspicuously sleeping over the matter well nigh nearly 7 months have rendered the order of detention invalid. The explanation offered by the second respondent and the police officers that the detenu was a fugitive, eluding the dragnet of the detention order is too incredulous to be swallowed. Further, no Court will implicity accept this kind of incredible explanation. 11. The adverse effect of delay in arresting a detenu has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and this Court has laid down the rule in clear terms that an unreasonable and unexplained delay in securing a detenu and detaining him vitiates the detention order.” 11. Here, in the present case the detention order of District Magistrate Anand is dated 13.04.2019. The District Magistrate, Anand in his order took into consideration two complaints filed against the present petitioner at Khambhat City Police Station on 28.02.2018 and another on 23.08.2018. The petitioner was served with the grounds of detention order 13.04.2019 on 02.03.2020. Nothing is on record by way of explanation, the cause of delay from respondent no.1, District Magistrate, Anand. As per sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Act, the authorized officer is required to forthwith send the report with facts of detention to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in, his opinion, have bearing on the matter. As per the provision under said sub section no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 months after the said has been made over to the government unless it has been approved by the State Government. It appears that the respondent no.1 has not complied with the said statutory provisions and therefore, the order of detention become invalid. 12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the material on record, now, the question remains for consideration in this petition is whether the order of detention deserves to be quashed. It appears that the authority concerned has taken note of the fact that two different FIRs; viz. 12. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having gone through the material on record, now, the question remains for consideration in this petition is whether the order of detention deserves to be quashed. It appears that the authority concerned has taken note of the fact that two different FIRs; viz. (i) I-C.R. No.08 of 2018 registered with Khambhat City Police Station under sections 143, 144, 147, 148, 149, 323, 395, 397, 452, 504, 506(2) of IPC and (ii) I-C.R. No.37 of 2018 registered with Khambhat City Police Station under sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 307, 325, 337, 427, 186 of IPC and section 135 of the GP Act, have been registered against the detenu. However, it is difficult to conclude that the alleged incidents have any direct bearing on public order or it may be termed as an activity by which the petitioner could be branded as a habitual offender. There is nothing on record to arrive at the conclusion that the activities of the petitioner had disturbed public order in any area. The alleged offences registered against the petitioner are individual in nature and it cannot be said that law and order situation would be affected by the activities of the petitioner. All the statements recorded during the course of investigation are general in nature and therefore, the alleged incidents wherein the detenu was involved, have no adverse effect prejudicial to the maintenance of public order disturbing the peace of the society. Hence, the detenu cannot be branded him as a “dangerous person” within the meaning of Section 2 (c) of PASA Act. 13. In this backdrop, it would be apposite to refer to the case of Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh Vs. M.M. Mehta, Commissioner reported in 1995 (3) SCC 237 , wherein the Apex Court has observed thus: “6. With a view to deal with the aforementioned submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner and to examine the legality/validity of the impugned order of detention it would be appropriate to look into the relevant provisions of the Act in question under which the detention order has been passed. It may be pointed out that the Act provides for preventive detention of bootleggers, dangerous persons, drug offenders, immoral traffic offenders and property grabbers for preventing their anti-social and dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It may be pointed out that the Act provides for preventive detention of bootleggers, dangerous persons, drug offenders, immoral traffic offenders and property grabbers for preventing their anti-social and dangerous activities prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. In the present case having regard to the grounds of detection the detaining authority on being satisfied that the detenu - petitioner was a 'dangerous person' within the meaning of clause (C) of Section 2 of the Act and passed the order of detention. Section 2(C) of the Act reads as under: "Dangerous person" means a person, and either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abetes the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959". Here it would also be appropriate to reproduce the relevant part of Section 3 of the Act as under:- “3(1)-The State Government may if satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained." (2) If having regard to the circumstances prevailing or likely to prevail in any area within the local limits of the jurisdiction of a District Magistrate or a Commissioner of Police, the State Government is satisfied that it is necessary so to do, it may, by order in writing, direct that the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, may also, if satisfied as provided in sub-section (1) exercise the powers conferred by the said subsection". (3).............. (4) For the purpose of this section, a person shall be deemed to be 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order when such person is engaged in or is making preparation for engaging in any activities whether as a bootlegger or dangerous person or drug offender or immoral traffic offender or property grabber, which affect adversely or are likely to affect adversely the maintenance of public order," Explanation. - For the purpose of this sub-section, public order shall be deemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely to be affected adversely inter-alia if any of the activities of any person referred to in this subsection directly or indirectly, is causing or is likely to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or a grave or widespread danger to life, property or public health. 7. A reading of the preamble of the Act will make it clear that the object of provisions contained in the Act including those reproduced above is to prevent the crime and to protect the society from anti-social elements and dangerous characters against perpetration of crime by placing them under detention for such a duration as would disable them from resorting to undesirable criminal activities The provisions of the Act are intended to deal with habitual criminal dangerous and desperate outlaws who are so hardened and incorrigible that the ordinary provisions of the penal laws and the moral fear of punishment for crime are not sufficient deterrents for them. Section 3 of the Act is, therefore, intended to deal with such criminals who cannot readily be apprehended to be booked under the ordinary law and who for special reasons, cannot be convicted under the penal laws in respect of the offences alleged to have been perpetrated by them, But this power under the Act to detain a person should be exercised with restraint and great caution. In order to pass an order of detention under the Act against any person the detaining authority must be satisfied that he is a 'dangerous person' within the meaning of Section 2(C) of the Act who habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abetes the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or XVII of the Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act as according to subsection (4) of Section 3 of the Act it is such 'dangerous person' who for the purpose of Section 3 shall be deemed to be a person 'acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order' against whom an order of detention may lawfully be made. 8. 8. The Act has defined 'dangerous person' in clause (C) of Section 2 to mean a person who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang habitually commits or attempts to commit or abetes the commission of any of the offences punishable under the chapters XVI or XVII of the Penal Code or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act. The expression 'habit' or 'habitual' has however, not been defined under the Act, According to the Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Iyyar, Reprint Edition 1987 page 499 habitually' means constant, customary & addicted to specified habit and the term habitual criminal may be applied to any one who has been previously convicted of a crime to the sentences and committed Jo prison more than twice. The word 'habitually' means 'usually' and 'generally'. Almost similar meaning is assigned to the words 'habit' in Aiyar's Judicial Dictionary, 10th Edition page 485. It does not refer to the frequency of the occasions but to the invariability of practice and the habit has to be proved by totality of facts. It, therefore, follows that the complicity of a person in an isolated offence is neither evidence nor a material of any help to conclude that a particular person is a 'dangerous person' unless there is material suggesting his complicity in. such cases which lead to a reasonable conclusion that the person is a habitual criminal. In Gopalan Chari v. State of Kerala, AIR (1981) SC 674 this Court had an occasion to deal with expressions like 'bad habit', 'habitual', 'desperate', 'dangerous', and 'hazardous'. This Court observed that the word habit implies frequent and usual practice. Again in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, [1984] 3 SCC 14, this Court construed the expression 'habitually' to mean repeatedly or persistently and observed that it implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts and that repeated, persistent and similar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. Again in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar, [1984] 3 SCC 14, this Court construed the expression 'habitually' to mean repeatedly or persistently and observed that it implies a thread of continuity stringing together similar repetitive acts but not isolated, individual and dissimilar acts and that repeated, persistent and similar acts are necessary to justify an inference of habit. It, therefore, necessarily follows that in order to bring a person within the expression 'dangerous person' as defined in clause (C) of Section 2 of the act, there should be positive material to indicate that such person is habitually committing or attempting to commit or abeting the commission of offences which are punishable under Chapter XVI or XVII of the I.P.C. or under Chapter V of the Arms Act and that a single or isolated act falling under Chapters XVI or XVII of I.P.C, or Chapter V of Arms Act cannot be characterised as a habitual act referred to in Section 2(C) of the Act.” 14. In light of the above principles propounded by the Supreme Court in the above-cited judgment and considering the facts of the present case, the detaining authority has failed to substantiate that the alleged anti-social activities of the detenu adversely affect or are likely to adversely affect the maintenance of public order. The alleged activities of the detenu cannot be termed as dangerous to the public at large. As a result, the grounds for passing such detention order cannot be sustained and therefore, it deserves to be quashed and set aside. 15. In the result, present petition is allowed. The impugned order of detention dated 13.04.2019 passed by respondent no.1 is hereby quashed and set aside. The detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith, if not required in connection with any other case. Registry is directed to communicate this order to the concerned jail authority by fax/e-mail forthwith.” 3. Mr. Antani, learned AGP vehemently opposed the petition on the ground that looking to the nature of offences and the allegations therein the petitioners are headstrong and, therefore the detention qualifying them as “Dangerous Persons” is appropriate. 4. For the reasons stated in Special Civil Application No.6942 of 2020 dated 10.6.2020 and the judgments considered therein, the petition is allowed. Mr. Antani, learned AGP vehemently opposed the petition on the ground that looking to the nature of offences and the allegations therein the petitioners are headstrong and, therefore the detention qualifying them as “Dangerous Persons” is appropriate. 4. For the reasons stated in Special Civil Application No.6942 of 2020 dated 10.6.2020 and the judgments considered therein, the petition is allowed. In the result, the order of detention dated 19.3.2020 passed by the respondent authority is hereby ordered to be quashed and the detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if he is not required in any other case. Rule is made absolute accordingly. The Registry is directed to communicate this order to the concerned jail authority by fax or e-mail.