JUDGMENT : MANISH PITALE, J. By these two writs petitions, the petitioners have challenged the Constitutional validity of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the University Grants Commission Regulations on minimum qualifications for appointments of teachers and other academic staff in the Universities and Colleges and measures for Maintenance of Standards in Higher Education, 2010. The petitioners have prayed for striking down of the said Clause as being arbitrary and hence, violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. It is the case of the petitioners that introduction of the said Clause and its subsequent amendment has the result of converting permanent post of Principal of a College to a tenure post of 5 years and up to a maximum of 10 years, as opposed to the earlier position, whereby a Principal once appointed could continue on the said post, till attaining age of superannuation i.e. 62 years. According to the petitioners, introduction of the said Clause is not only arbitrary, but, it has no rational nexus to the purported objective of improving the standards of higher education and administration of Colleges. 2. The petitioners were appointed as Principals in various Colleges between the years 2012 to 2016 for five year terms as per the aforesaid Clause 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations. The respondents submitted at the outset that since the term of 5 years of the petitioners was over, it was not necessary to consider challenge to the aforesaid Clause at the behest of such petitioners, whose terms of appointments were already over. But, the admitted facts on record do indicate that petitioner No.3 in Writ Petition No.1593/2017, was appointed on 08/08/2016 for 5 year term and petitioner No.5 in the said writ petition was appointed on 16/09/2016 for 5 year term and that, therefore, in so far as the aforesaid two petitioners are concerned, their term is still alive and challenge to the aforesaid Clause could certainly be considered at least at their behest. In any case, this Court is called upon to examine as to whether the aforesaid Clause is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and, therefore, liable to be struck down. Such a challenge can certainly be considered by this Court and its implications for the individual petitioners would depend on the admitted facts regarding their terms of employment. 3. Such a challenge can certainly be considered by this Court and its implications for the individual petitioners would depend on the admitted facts regarding their terms of employment. 3. There was no restriction of tenure of appointment to the post of Principal to a College prior to introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the aforesaid Regulations. The said clause was introduced by amendment in the year 2010, which specified that term of appointment of a College Principal shall be five years with eligibility of reappointment for only one more term after similar process of selection. A further amendment was introduced in the aforesaid Clause in the year 2016, as a result of which the said Clause reads as follows : ‘The term of appointment of College Principal shall be five years with eligibility for reappointment for one more term only after a Selection Committee process which shall take into account an external peer review, its recommendations and its outcomes. The framework of external peer review shall be specified by the UGC”. 4. As a consequence of introduction of the aforesaid Clause, the term of appointment of College Principal, which earlier used to be up to age of superannuation i.e. 62 years, stood reduced to a fixed period of five years with only one more term of five years and that too after facing similar selection process indicated in the aforesaid Clause. Thus, a College Principal once appointed could continue in the said post for a maximum of 10 years. It becomes apparent that the post of Principal now became a tenure post with maximum period restricted to 10 years. 5. Mr. S.P. Bhandarkar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in these writ petitions submitted that the aforesaid Clause deserves to be struck down as unconstitutional, because it reduced the post of Principal to a tenure post as opposed to the earlier regime, wherein the Principal could continue up to the age of superannuation of 62 years. It was further submitted that the Clause was discriminatory as the persons appointed in the post of Principal prior to introduction of the Clause could continue in the said post up to their superannuation, while those appointed after introduction of the said Clause could continue in the post for a period of five years and up to a maximum of 10 years, if at all they were reappointed for a further term of five years. It was further submitted that upon the term of 5 years or 10 years, as the case may be, was over a person having served as Principal would be left without any employment as he would not be able to go back to his original post, since lien could not be held for a period of 5 years or 10 years on the earlier post. In any case, during the tenure as College Principal, the person would be continuously engaged in administrative duties, reducing or completely depriving the person of teaching and research activities, thereby adversely affecting the employability of such a person. On this basis, it was submitted that what was a permanent post of College Principal was now reduced to a tenure post, without any justification and any supporting logic for the purported objective of maintenance of standards of higher education. It was submitted that the introduction of the said Clause was manifestly arbitrary, whimsical and capricious, thereby indicating that the petitions deserved to be allowed and the said Clause deserved to be struck down. 6. On the other hand, Mr. A.S. Agrawal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent – University Grants Commission (UGC) in these two writ petitions submitted that none of the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners were sustainable. It was submitted that the petitioners were not entitled, in the first place to challenge the aforesaid Clause of the Regulations because all of them had participated in the selection process knowing fully well that they were applying for appointment to the post of College Principal, which was a tenure post under the aforesaid Clause 5.1.6(d) of the Regulations. Having participated in the selection process and enjoyed the post of College Principal on the basis of the aforesaid Clause, the petitioners were not justified in turning around and challenging the said Clause as being arbitrary and unsustainable. It was submitted that the cut-off date from which the aforesaid Clause was introduced, could not be challenged by the petitioners because it was a settled position of law that such cut-off date could certainly be introduced for such a change and it could not be said to be discriminatory, unless it was found to be capricious and malicious. It was submitted that the cut-off date from which the aforesaid Clause was introduced, could not be challenged by the petitioners because it was a settled position of law that such cut-off date could certainly be introduced for such a change and it could not be said to be discriminatory, unless it was found to be capricious and malicious. It was submitted that in the present case, the petitioners had not laid down any foundation in their pleadings and contentions before this Court to claim that introduction of the aforesaid Clause under the Regulations was liable to be struck down as being discriminatory. 7. It was further submitted that since the petitioners participated in the selection process, which was initiated on the basis of and after introduction of the aforesaid Clause in the Regulations, there was no question of any legitimate expectation that they could continue in the post of Principal, till their superannuation. It was further submitted that the aforesaid Clause was introduced after the UGC accepted recommendations made by an expert committee constituted under the Chairmanship of Mr. S.P. Thyagarajan, former Vice-Chancellor of University of Madras. It was submitted that when opinion of an expert committee was accepted by the UGC, which is also an expert body and a statutory body, there were limitations for the writ Court to examine the validity of such a Clause or its sustainability. It was submitted that the contention regarding lack of opportunity for employment and the employability of College Principal after expiry of tenure was also without any substance because the post of College Principal was feeder channel for a number of posts, including that of Vice-Chancellor, Registrar, Director of Examinations, Director of Knowledge Centre and several such other posts identified under the provisions of the Maharashtra Public Universities Act, 2016. It was further submitted that the State Government had expressly accepted and implemented the aforesaid Clause in the Regulations and, therefore, it could not lie in the mouth of the petitioners that the said Clause did not apply to them merely because the Universities had not amended their Statutes and bye laws, in terms of the aforesaid Clause. It was further submitted that the State Government had expressly accepted and implemented the aforesaid Clause in the Regulations and, therefore, it could not lie in the mouth of the petitioners that the said Clause did not apply to them merely because the Universities had not amended their Statutes and bye laws, in terms of the aforesaid Clause. According to the learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 1 – UGC, such Clause was introduced to ensure that a College Principal upon being appointed for a tenure of five years would be a person always on his/her toes to achieve the standards of higher education expected under the said Regulations and that a College Principal was expected to be a leader of the College both on the administrative as well as academic side. It was submitted that the necessity to face the selection committee after the first tenure of 5 years was in tune with the object of the Regulations and it could certainly not be categorized as either arbitrary or whimsical or capricious in any manner. On this basis, it was submitted that the petitions were without any substance and that they deserved to be dismissed. 8. Ms. Tanjwar Khan, learned AGP appeared for respondents No.2, 3 and 4. She invited attention of this Court to the Government Resolutions dated 15/02/2011 and 04/03/2017, whereby the aforesaid Clause No. 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations was adopted along with subsequent amendment of the year 2016. On this basis, it was submitted that the writ petitions were without any substance and they deserved to be dismissed. 9. Mr. P.B. Patil, learned counsel appeared for respondent No.5 and Shri Sandip Marathe, learned counsel appeared for respondent No.6 and they also sought dismissal of the writ petitions. 10. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners and the respondents relied upon various judgments in support of their respective stands and they shall be referred to at the relevant place in this judgment. 11. Before dealing with the rival contentions, it needs to be appreciated that the power of the UGC to issue Regulations like the aforesaid Regulations of 2010, in question in the present case, cannot be doubted. As regards the mandatory nature of such Regulations, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Kalyani Mathivanan Vs. 11. Before dealing with the rival contentions, it needs to be appreciated that the power of the UGC to issue Regulations like the aforesaid Regulations of 2010, in question in the present case, cannot be doubted. As regards the mandatory nature of such Regulations, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its judgment in the case of Kalyani Mathivanan Vs. K.V. Jeyaraj and Others 2015(6) SCC 363 , has made it clear that the mandatory nature of such Regulations would depend on the aspect as to whether the State Government has decided to adopt and employ the same. In the present case, it is clear that by Government Resolution dated 15/02/2011, the State Government had adopted the aforesaid Regulations, including Clause 5.1.6(d) as it is and by Government Resolution dated 04/03/2017, the State Government had adopted the amendment in Clause 5.1.6(d), as it is. Therefore, with the adoption of said Regulations specifically by the State Government, it would be clear that the said Clause indeed applies to appointment to the post of Principal in Colleges in the State of Maharashtra. 12. It was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that the said Clause 5.1.6(d) introduced by the Regulations of 2010, had the effect of converting permanent post of Principal into a tenure post, restricted to a term of 5 years, which was extendable only for a further period of 5 years and that too after a similar selection process based upon peer review. According to the petitioners, when they joined service and gained experience over the years to satisfy the minimum requirement of 15 years of teaching experience to be eligible for the post of Principal, it was their expectation that they would continue in service upto the age of 62 years, as Principal. But, this expectation was dashed by the introduction of the aforesaid Clause, which had the effect of curtailment of their service period itself, even if in a given case they were to be appointed for 2 consecutive tenures as Principal. The power of respondent No.1 – UGC in introducing requirement for maintenance of minimum standards of education by specifying qualifications and length of experience, was sought to be distinguished by the petitioners by contending that introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) in the said Regulations could not be equated with exercise of power by the respondent No.1 – UGC to maintain standards of higher education. The petitioners claimed that their legitimate expectation of having a particular span of career in academic sphere was adversely affected by introduction of such tenure appointment in the post of Principal. 13. This was opposed on behalf of respondent No.1 – UGC by relying upon judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case P. Suseela and Others Vs. University Grants Commission and Others 2015(8) SCC 129 . It was submitted that argument of legitimate expectation was not available to the petitioners in the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 14. A perusal of the aforesaid judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of P. Suseela (supra) would show that the challenge was to introduction of National Eligibility Test (NET)/State Level Eligibility Test (SLET) as a minimum eligibility condition for recruitment and appointment as Lecturers in Colleges and Universities. It is in the backdrop of the aforesaid challenge and the powers of respondent No.1 – UGC under the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, that the Hon’ble Supreme Court found the doctrine of legitimate expectation sought to be invoked by the petitioners therein could not be accepted. It was held that merely by introduction of eligibility condition of clearing NET/SLET tests, it could not be said that the candidates legitimately expecting appointments as Lecturers were entitled to claim setting aside of such a condition. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that such a requirement could not be held to be bad only if from the stand point of interest of some persons it operated in a harsh manner. 15. In the present case, the petitioners are not challenging the introduction of any condition of minimum qualifications or the like for appointment to the post of Principal. There is no dispute about the fact that the petitioners do satisfy the requirements laid down by the respondent No.1 – UGC for appointment to the post of Principal. In fact, all of them were indeed appointed to the said post. Therefore, the contention pertaining to legitimate expectation is not raised in the context in which it was raised in the case of P. Suseela (supra). Hence, reliance placed on behalf of respondent No.1 – UGC on the said judgment to oppose the aforesaid contention of the petitioners is misplaced. 16. Therefore, the contention pertaining to legitimate expectation is not raised in the context in which it was raised in the case of P. Suseela (supra). Hence, reliance placed on behalf of respondent No.1 – UGC on the said judgment to oppose the aforesaid contention of the petitioners is misplaced. 16. In the present case, it needs to be examined as to whether introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) in the said Regulations did in any manner curtail or adversely affect reasonable or legitimate expectation that the petitioners and similarly situated persons had while starting their journey in academic Institutions. There can be no doubt about the fact that when a person joins a particular service, the age of retirement is known and on the basis of number of years of experience and addition of qualifications, such a person expects his/her career graph to move in a particular direction. Before introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations, a person who satisfied the requirement of 15 years of teaching experience and other such specified requirements, upon being appointed as Principal was entitled to continue in the said post till he/she moved on to other higher posts or till he/she attained the age of superannuation. But, upon the introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations, span of service of a person appointed to the post of Principal was curtailed as he/she would stand retired or discontinued from services, much before he/she would have otherwise retired from service. This is a clear assault on the legitimate expectation of petitioners and other similarly situated persons and, therefore, it can certainly be held to be an unreasonable restriction on such persons and their expectation of career progression. This would indicate that putting into operation such an unreasonable restriction amounts to abuse of power and hence, it is rendered arbitrary, thereby violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 17. The learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 – UGC emphasized that there were provisions under the erstwhile Nagpur University Act, 1974 and the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 and the present Maharashtra Public Universities Act, 2016, which provide for specific terms for which appointments were made to various posts, including Vice-Chancellor, Director of Board of Examinations and Evaluation, etc. to contend that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners could not be accepted. to contend that the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners could not be accepted. But, this Court is of the opinion that since in the present case, this Court is concerned with the challenge raised to specific Clause 5.1.6(d) of the Regulations, as accepted by the State Government, the validity of the same is being examined by this Court. Merely because the aforesaid legislations provide for term appointments to certain other posts, it would not justify the said Clause. 18. It needs to be further examined as to whether the petitioners are justified in claiming that introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations violates Article 14 of the Constitution of India and that by its very operation it is arbitrary in nature. In the replies filed by respondent No.1 – UGC to the present petitions, it is claimed that the concept of term appointments and external peer review is well founded and it is based on an internationally accepted practice. In the notes of arguments filed on behalf of respondent No.1 – UGC, it is specifically claimed that introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the Regulations had become necessary so as to ensure that a person appointed to the post of Principal was always on his/her toes to achieve minimum standards laid down under UGC Regulations so that the Principal as a leader of College excelled both in terms of academics and administration. Therefore, it appears that the post of Principal was classified separately for different treatment, with the object of classification of achieving minimum standards of education by keeping such Principals on their toes for achieving excellence in academics and administration. 19. This Court has already noted the fact that with introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations, the age of retirement of persons appointed to the post of Principal would stand curtailed and additionally, it is found that there would be absence of security of a reasonable length of tenure for Principal to associate with and lead a College academically, as well as on the front of administration. While there could be some substance in the theory that security of tenure might result in complacency and reduction in drive of a Principal leading a College, curtailing the term of a Principal, who otherwise would have continued upto the age of 62 years cannot be said to be the solution. While there could be some substance in the theory that security of tenure might result in complacency and reduction in drive of a Principal leading a College, curtailing the term of a Principal, who otherwise would have continued upto the age of 62 years cannot be said to be the solution. The second term would depend on external peer review as contemplated in the amendment introduced in the year 2016, but, it would certainly leave the Principal at the mercy of such a process and it can give scope for the Management to do away with a Principal, who may not toe the line of the Management or who may, in a given case, introduce changes perceived to be revolutionary. A shortened tenure would have a tendency of not being able to ensure introduction of long term policies with a vision for the future development of the Institution. This is an aspect, which shows the stark contrast between the manner in which appointments to the post of Principal were made prior to introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations and appointments made after implementation of the said clause. 20. It is difficult to accept the contentions raised on behalf of respondent No.1 – UGC that only by introduction of such curtailed tenure of appointment to the post of Principal that the incumbents would be kept on their toes and that only by such method they would excel in the academic and administrative fields. If the Management finds a person appointed to the post of Principal not performing and consequently having adverse effect on the College/Institution, steps can certainly be taken against such a Principal. But, by introducing the aforesaid Clause and virtually converting an appointment to a permanent post into a tenure post, the action is rendered arbitrary and unsustainable. 21. This is because the basis of classification does not appear to be based on an intelligible differentia. If the reasons for introduction of the aforesaid Clause and classifying only the post of the Principal for such treatment are to be accepted then the question would arise as to why all other posts in the academic sphere, including the post of Assistant Professor, Associate Professor and Professor are not to be treated in a similar fashion, particularly if the object is to ensure efficiency and excellence. This Court is of the opinion that not only is there absence of intelligible differentia to classify only the post of Principal for such treatment, but, the basis of such classification i.e. introducing excellence and keeping the appointees to the post of Principal “on their toes” to achieve higher standards of education, has no rational nexus with the object of the classification. Therefore, the aforesaid Clause fails the classic test envisaged under Article 14 of the Constitution of India and thereby, it is found to be violating the said Article, rendering it arbitrary and unsustainable. 22. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Navtej Singh Johar & Ors. Vs. Union of India Ministry of Law and Justice Secretary (2018) 10 SCC 1 held as follows : “Equating the content of equality with the reasonableness of a classification on which a law is based advances the cause of legal formalism. The problem with the classification test is that what constitutes a reasonable classification is reduced to a mere formula : the quest for an intelligible differentia and the rational nexus to the object sought to be achieved. In doing so, the test of classification risks elevating form over substance. The danger inherent in legal formalism lies in its inability to lay threadbare the values which guide the process of judging constitutional rights. Legal formalism buries the life-giving forces of the Constitution under a mere mantra. What it ignores is that Article 14 contains a powerful statement of values – of the substance of equality before the law and the equal protection of laws. To reduce it to a formal exercise of classification may miss the true value of equality as a safeguard against arbitrariness in State action. As our constitutional jurisprudence has evolved towards recognising the substantive content of liberty and equality, the core of Article 14 has emerged out of the shadows of classification. Article 14 has a substantive content on which, together with liberty and dignity, the edifice of the Constitution is built. Simply put, in that avatar, it reflects the quest for ensuring fair treatment of the individual in every aspect of human endeavour and in every facet of human existence.” 23. Thus, law has now developed beyond the aforesaid classification test and it has been held that jurisprudence has evolved towards recognizing content of equality, which has emerged out of the shadow of classification. Thus, law has now developed beyond the aforesaid classification test and it has been held that jurisprudence has evolved towards recognizing content of equality, which has emerged out of the shadow of classification. In other words, the action of the State can be held to be manifestly arbitrary, if it is found that such action leads to unfair treatment of the individual in every aspect to human endeavour. 24. In the present case, the introduction of the aforesaid Clause not only fails the classification test, but, it is found to be manifestly arbitrary and, therefore, it deserves to be struck down as violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 25. It was also contended on behalf of respondent No.1 – UGC that the introduction of the aforesaid Clause was based on the report of an expert committee called Thyagarajan Committee. It was submitted that when a statutory body like the respondent No.1 – UGC had accepted the recommendations of an expert committee like the Thyagarajan Committee for introducing Clause 5.1.6(d) in the Regulations, this Court while exercising writ jurisdiction ought not to judicially review the same. The limitations of exercise of writ jurisdiction were emphasized upon and it was submitted that interference in such an action could be permitted only when it was found that there was absurdity, arbitrariness and irrationality in such action. According to learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 – UGC, when none of the aforesaid features could be attributed to the action of introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the Regulations, this Court ought not to exercise writ jurisdiction in favour of the petitioners. 26. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that the writ Court ought to be slow in examining the validity of actions taken by statutory bodies on the basis of recommendations of expert committees. But, it cannot be said that the writ Court cannot examine challenge to an action based on recommendations of an expert body or that there could be no situation where the writ Court could use its power to set right an action based on recommendations of an expert body. In this case, despite opportunity granted, respondent No.1 – UGC could not place on record specific recommendations of Thyagarajan Committee, which led to introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations. In this case, despite opportunity granted, respondent No.1 – UGC could not place on record specific recommendations of Thyagarajan Committee, which led to introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations. It was not pinpointed as to what was the study conducted by the said committee and on the basis of what kind of material did the said committee come to a conclusion that only by introduction of tenure appointment to the post of Principal, the standards of higher education could be improved in our country. It was also not brought to the notice of this Court as to what was the reason for respondent No.1 – UGC to introduce such a drastic change by fixing tenure of the post of Principal. Merely by hiding behind the contention that a writ Court ought not to judicially review opinion of an expert body, the respondent No.1 – UGC cannot justify introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations. This Court has already found introduction of the said Clause not only arbitrary due to its failure to pass the classification test, but, it has been found to be manifestly arbitrary in its operation. Consequently, it is found to be irrational and absurd and, therefore, open to attack on the ground of violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, reliance placed on the judgments in the cases of Union of India and Another Vs. M/s Parameshwaran Match Works and others and Superintendent of Central Excise and Others Vs. M/s Gandhiji Cottage Match Works and Others, (1975) 1 SCC 305 and Dr. (Mrs.) Sushma Sharma and Others Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others 1985 (Supp) SCC 45, can be of no assistance to the respondent No.1 – UGC. 27. Another aspect sought to be argued on behalf of respondent No.1 – UGC was that a person appointed to the post of Principal would not be left high and dry after completion of tenure of 5 years or 10 years, as the case may be, because the post of Principal was a feeder post for appointments to other posts in the academic sphere, like Vice-Chancellor, Registrar, Director of Board of Examinations, Director of Knowledge Centre, etc. as provided under the Maharashtra Public Universities Act, 2016. as provided under the Maharashtra Public Universities Act, 2016. On this basis, it was submitted that on completion of the tenure, the person can move on to such posts and that, therefore, completion of tenure in the post of Principal before attaining the age of 62 years resulting in curtailment of service, could not be an argument available to the petitioners while challenging Clause 5.1.6(d) of the Regulations. 28. The said contention raised on behalf of respondent No.1 – UGC is found to be without any substance because in the first place, the post of Principal even before introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) was a feeder post for the afore-mentioned posts for appointment in the academic sphere and secondly, there is no guarantee that the Principal, whose tenure is over, would necessarily be appointed on any one of the said posts. Another aspect of the matter is that a person appointed on the post of Principal, may not choose to or be interested in any of the aforesaid posts and he/she may want to continue as Principal in the College/Institution to further develop it academically and on the administrative side. But, by introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations, the post of Principal, which was otherwise a permanent post in which a person continued upto the age of 62 years, has been curtailed to a mere tenure post of 5 years or at the most 10 years. Therefore, this Court finds that the aforesaid contention raised on behalf of respondent No.1 – UGC is without any substance. 29. Another aspect on which emphasis was placed on behalf of respondent No.1 – UGC was public notice dated 17/05/2017, issued by respondent No.1, wherein it was clarified that in case of a Principal, which was a tenure post, the incumbent shall be allowed to retain lien in his/her parent College/University, as per Central/State Government Rules. It was also pointed out by learned AGP appearing on behalf of respondents No.2, 3 and 4 that Government Resolution dated 15/03/2011, had been issued increasing the period of lien from 2 years to 5 years. It was also pointed out by learned AGP appearing on behalf of respondents No.2, 3 and 4 that Government Resolution dated 15/03/2011, had been issued increasing the period of lien from 2 years to 5 years. On this basis, it was submitted that a person appointed to the post of Principal could hold lien on the post of Professor and upon completion of tenure of 5 years he/she could easily go back to the original post and there could be no argument to the effect that by introduction of the aforesaid Clause 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations, the academic career of a person appointed to the post of Principal was curtailed. 30. The said contention raised on behalf of respondent No.1 – UGC and respondents No.2, 3 and 4, ignores the fact that before introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the Regulations, a person appointed to the post of Principal could continue on the said post till the age of superannuation i.e. 62 years. There was no mandatory requirement for the person to go back to any post on which he would hold a lien. Apart from this, the increase of the period of lien from 2 years to 5 years, still does not help the case of the respondents, because a person who is found to be fit for appointment for another 5 years on the post of Principal would have no opportunity to hold lien on any post and, therefore, upon completion of second term his/her service would necessarily come to an end. This aspect further demonstrates the fact that there is no substance in the contention raised on behalf of respondents on the question of holding lien to the original post. 31. On the question of discrimination as regards the persons who were appointed to the post of Principal before introduction of Clause 5.1.6(d) and those appointed thereafter, much emphasis has been placed on behalf of the respondent No.1 – UGC that introduction for cut-off date is sustainable and that the same cannot be called into question. There can be no doubt about the fact that a cut-off date could be identified, but, when it is found that the said Clause is arbitrary and unsustainable as it violates the Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it is only consequential to hold that the petitioners and other similarly situated persons have been discriminated against. There can be no doubt about the fact that a cut-off date could be identified, but, when it is found that the said Clause is arbitrary and unsustainable as it violates the Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it is only consequential to hold that the petitioners and other similarly situated persons have been discriminated against. The introduction of a cut-off date per se may not be arbitrary, but, it is discriminatory when the aforesaid Clause itself is found to be unsustainable and arbitrary. Hence, the contentions raised on behalf of the respondents cannot be accepted. 32. It was also contended on behalf of the respondents that the petitioners herein barring petitioners Nos. 3, 5 and 6 in Writ Petition No. 1593/2017, were appointed much earlier and since their tenures of 5 years were already over, challenge to the aforesaid Clause at their behest could not be entertained and that no effective relief could be granted to them. It was further submitted that since the petitioners had taken part in the process of selection as laid down in Clause 5.1.6(d) of the aforesaid Regulations, which was specifically adopted by the State Government, they could not turn around and raise challenge to the same. It was submitted that they were well aware about the introduction of the said Clause and, therefore, having participated in the process they could not challenge introduction of the said Clause. 33. On the basis of the dates of appointments of the petitioners, it becomes clear that only petitioners Nos. 3 and 5 in Writ Petition No. 1595/2017, are still serving their tenure of 5 years in the post of Principal and in that sense, these are the only two petitioners whose appointments in the said post are still in currency when the writ petitions are taken up for consideration on merits. Therefore, at least in so far as the said petitioners are concerned, they are entitled to challenge the aforesaid clause and to contest the writ petition on merits. 34. As regards the contention raised on behalf of respondent No.1 – UGC that the petitioners are not entitled to maintain challenge against Clause 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations, after having participated in the process of selection for the post of Principal, it would be necessary to appreciate the position of law in that regard. 34. As regards the contention raised on behalf of respondent No.1 – UGC that the petitioners are not entitled to maintain challenge against Clause 5.1.6(d) of the said Regulations, after having participated in the process of selection for the post of Principal, it would be necessary to appreciate the position of law in that regard. In various judgments, including in the case of G. Sarana (Dr.) Vs. University of Lucknow (1976) 3 SCC 585 , K.H. Siraj Vs. High Court of Kerala (2006) 6 SCC 395 , Vijendra Kumar Verma Vs. Public Service Commission (2011) 1 SCC 150 and Pradeep Kumar Rai Vs. Dinesh Kumar Pandey (2015) 11 SCC 493 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that a person having participated and acquiesced in a process of selection and having failed therein, cannot turn around and challenge the process of selection. 35. In the present petitions, all the petitioners were successful and they were appointed as Principals in Colleges. Thus, they were all candidates who succeeded and yet they raised a challenge and that too not to the process of selection. The petitioners were all holding the required qualifications and they were selected on merits. Thus, it cannot be said that the petitioners have turned around and raised challenge to the selection process, after having failed. 36. Apart from this, the real challenge raised by the petitioners in the writ petitions is to the illegal curtailment of their service span and consequently adverse effect on their service condition of retirement from service at the age of 62 years. The same has been already found in their favour in the earlier part of the judgment. In fact, the Clause under challenge in these petitions could have been called into question after being appointed on the post of Principal, as it was only after appointment in the said post that due to operation of the said Clause the service of the petitioners stood curtailed. Thus, there is no substance in the said contention raised on behalf of the respondent No.1 – UGC. 37. In view of above, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioners have made out a case in their favour. It is held that Clause 5.1.6(d) of the aforesaid Regulations, as amended in the year 2016 is arbitrary, unconstitutional and hence, it is struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. 37. In view of above, this Court is of the opinion that the petitioners have made out a case in their favour. It is held that Clause 5.1.6(d) of the aforesaid Regulations, as amended in the year 2016 is arbitrary, unconstitutional and hence, it is struck down as violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Consequently, those appointed in the post of Principal through due process of selection and satisfying the requirements of minimum qualifications, whose terms are continuing shall be entitled to continue in the post of Principal, without restriction of tenure introduced by way of Clause 5.1.6(d) of the aforesaid Regulations, subject to their service continuing in accordance with law. Their service would be subject to all other requirements of law as are applicable. In the present petitions, since the tenures of only the petitioners No.3 and 5 in Writ Petition No.1593/2017, are still continuing, the benefit of this judgment would follow only to them. Since, there is no dispute about the fact that the tenure appointments of all other petitioners were already over before filing of these writ petitions and in the case of petitioner No.6 in Writ Petition No.1593/2017, the term was over during pendency of the writ petition, they would not be entitled to the benefit of this judgment. 38. Rule is made absolute in above terms. 39. Upon pronouncement of judgment learned counsel appearing for respondent – University Grants Commission prayed for stay of the present judgment for a period of three months. In the facts and circumstances of the present case and particularly in view of Covid-19 crises engulfing the nation, this judgment is directed to be kept in abeyance for a period of three months. It is made clear that grant of this order shall not adversely affect the petitioners No.3 and 5 in Writ Petition No. 1593/2017. It is also made clear that no further extension of this abeyance order shall be granted. No order as to costs.