JUDGMENT : J.B. PARDIWALA, J. 1. This appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent Act is at the instance of an unsuccessful writ applicant and is directed against the order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court dated 29th June 2020 in the Special Civil Application No.21449 of 2019, whereby the learned Single Judge declined to entertain the writ application filed by the writ applicant on the ground that the writ applicant has an alternative efficacious remedy of filing an appeal under Section 11 of the Gujarat Educational Institutional Services Tribunal Act, 2006 (for short, “the Act, 2006”). 2. The facts giving rise to this appeal may be summarised as under: 2.1 The appellant herein came to be appointed as a 'Postal Assistant' on the establishment of the Saurashtra University on 4th September 1997 on a fixed pay. It is the case of the appellant that at the time of his appointment, he was called for interview, and thereafter, came to be appointed. It is his case that the University had been paying salary to him till the time of his termination from the service. The salary was being paid from the grant received from the State Government. 3. It appears that the appellant herein had to come before this High Court by way of filing the Special Civil Application No.10020 of 2018 with the following prayers: ““(i) to grant the regular pay scale to the petitioner(s) as prescribed and payable by Respondent No. 1 University and / or State Government to its employees of the post which the petitioner is holding; with deemed effect by considering the entire service as rendered by him on fixed pay basis as regular service for all purpose including of pensionary benefits and all other consequential benefits, as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Gujarat High Court GLH 321 para-38 and such other decisions” (ii) to direct Respondents to grant regularization and permanency to the petitioner with deemed effect from the date of his appointment with all the consequential benefits in terms of the service conditions as applicable to similarly situated University Employees.” 4. Thus, in the first round of litigation, the appellant herein raised the issues relating to regular pay scale, regularisation in service, etc. 5. Thus, in the first round of litigation, the appellant herein raised the issues relating to regular pay scale, regularisation in service, etc. 5. The Special Civil Application No.10020 of 2018 and allied petitions came to be disposed of by a learned Single Judge of this Court vide the judgement and order dated 7th May 2019. The operative part of the judgement reads thus: “11. In view of the foregoing reasons and discussion, all the petitions and the Civil Applications are disposed of in terms of the following observations and directions. The operative part of the judgement reads thus: “11. In view of the foregoing reasons and discussion, all the petitions and the Civil Applications are disposed of in terms of the following observations and directions. (i) The petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution are not entertained inasmuch as the Court is not persuaded to exercise the writ jurisdiction in wake of availability of alternative statutory remedy under Section 11 of the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Act, 2006 available to the petitioners before Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal; (ii) The petitioners are relegated to the aforementioned alternative statutory remedy of preferring Applications/Appeals before the Gujarat Educational Institutions Services Tribunal to agitate and claim before the said forum the prayers for equal-pay for equal-work and regularization of the petitioners ; (iii) The petitioners may file their Applications/ Appeals before the Tribunal within three months from today; (iv) In the meantime, in view of what is observed and found hereinabove, all the petitioners shall be immediately taken back in service and shall be allowed to work by way of ad-interim relief which shall operate till the Applications/Appeals are placed for the first time before the Tribunal; (v) At the same time, it would be open for the petitioners to seek the continuation of the interim relief which is granted herein to allow them to continue to work during the pendency of the Applications/Appeals before the Tribunal; (vi) It would be further open for the petitioners to seek interim prayer before the Tribunal for grant of minimum of the regular pay-scale given to the employees on the similar post; (vii) The prayers for interim relief as above which may be made by the petitioners, shall be considered by the Tribunal on the first date when the Applications/Appeals are placed before it to be decided on merits and keeping in view the facts obtained on record; (viii) The Tribunal shall endeavour to decide the Applications/Appeals of the petitioners within six months; (ix) This Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case of the petitioners either for the main relief or for interim relief. It is the Tribunal which shall be deciding in accordance with law and on merits; (x) It is clarified that the above directions, observations and/or pendency of proceedings of Applications/Appeals of the petitioners before the Tribunal as may be preferred, shall not be a precluding aspect for the University to take back the petitioners in service and to address their grievance about the benefit of regularization etc. The present petitions and Civil Applications stand disposed of as above.” 6. The Saurashtra University being dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgement and order passed by the learned Single Judge challenged the same by filing the Letters Patent Appeal No.1254 of 2019. A Coordinate Bench of this High Court dismissed the appeal holding as under: “3. It is a classic case in which the employee, who though has been relegated has been victimized and as reproduced by learned Single Judge, the transcript of conversation with the Vice Chancellar and the concerned employee of the University showed that he had been victimized and his services were terminated merely because he has approached this Court. In the background of the facts, learned Single Judge while relegating the employee to the Tribunal has directed that the University should reinstate the employee. 4. We are informed by learned advocate for the appellant that employee has not been reinstated. Not complying with the said order and challenging the order suggests the vindictive stand of the University and hence, learned Single Judge has rightly reinstated him and relegated him to the Tribunal. 5. In view of the above, this Letters Patent Appeal is dismissed. The appellant being the center of education and learning is unnecessarily spending the amount of public exchequer by indulging into litigious perseverance and hence, we are imposing cost of Rs.5,000/- on the appellant. Consequently, Civil Application No.1 of 2019 also stands disposed of.” 7. It appears that the appellant herein also preferred the Letters Patent Appeal No.1343 of 2019 against the judgement and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 7th May 2019. The appeal preferred by the appellant herein also came to be dismissed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 4th July 2019. 8. It appears that the appellant herein also preferred the Letters Patent Appeal No.1343 of 2019 against the judgement and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 7th May 2019. The appeal preferred by the appellant herein also came to be dismissed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 4th July 2019. 8. It appears from the materials on record that although a specific direction was issued by the learned Single Judge in the earlier round of litigation to take back the appellant herein and similarly situated employees in service, the direction was not complied with by the Saurashtra University and the same led to the filing of the Miscellaneous Civil Application (for contempt) No.534 of 2019. The contempt proceedings came to be disposed of by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 18th June 2019. The order reads thus: “It is not in dispute that petitions filed by the writ petitioners were not entertained as reflected in para 11(i) of the order dated 07.05.2019 passed in Special Civil Application No. 10020 of 2018 and allied petitions. Considering all directions together, we are of the view that no action be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 for non compliance of directions contained in para 11(iv) which read as under: “(iv) In the meantime, in view of what is observed and found hereinabove, all the petitioners shall be immediately taken back in service and shall be allowed to work by way of ad-interim relief which shall operate till the Applications/Appeals are placed for the first time before the Tribunal;” Accordingly, applications are disposed of.” 9. It appears that after being unsuccessful in the contempt proceedings, the appellant herein approached the Tribunal, however, the Tribunal declined to entertain the proceedings initiated by the appellant on the ground of non-compliance of the provisions of Sections 11 and 11(A) respectively of the Act, 2006. It is pertinent to note at this stage that the order passed by the Tribunal declining to grant any relief to the appellant herein for want of non-compliance of Sections 11 and 11(A) respectively of the Act, 2006 was not challenged at any point of time. 10. The aforesaid prompted the appellant herein to come back before this Court by filing the Special Civil Application No.21449 of 2019 with the following prayers: “(A) Lordship may be pleased to admit and allow this petition. 10. The aforesaid prompted the appellant herein to come back before this Court by filing the Special Civil Application No.21449 of 2019 with the following prayers: “(A) Lordship may be pleased to admit and allow this petition. (B) Your Lordships may be pleased to direct the Respondent University to take the petitioner back immediately in service with all consequential benefits including backwages, continuity of service etc., from the date he is not allowed to work i.e. from further holding, declaring the directing that such discontinuation from service of Petitioner is illegal, malafide, void-ab-initio and be quashed set aside. (C) Pending admission, hearing and final disposal of this petition, LORDSHIPS be pleased to direct respondent no.1 to take the petitioner on duty on his post, allow him to work and pay him salary as per the rules. (D) LORDSHIPS be pleased to direct the Respondent (s) to pay special cost to the petitioner, for the agonies and miseries caused to him by Respondent University for period of about one year which continues till this date. (E) To pass any other Order or Order(s) which may be deemed to fit for the interest of the justice.” 11. The Special Civil Application No.21449 of 2019 was heard by a learned Single Judge and vide impugned order dated 29th June 2020, rejected the same on the ground that the appellant herein should initiate appropriate proceedings before the Gujarat Educational Institutional Services Tribunal and seek reliefs sought for in the petition. The impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge reads thus: “Earlier, the petition was filed being SCA No.10020 of 2018 with allied matters by several employees of respondent-University seeking regularization and equal pay for equal work. The petition came to be disposed of by order dated 07/05/2019 relegating the petitioners to the alternative remedy i.e. Services Tribunal. In the said petition, certain startling facts were noticed viz., that because the petitioners approached the High Court; their services were terminated. The petition came to be disposed of by order dated 07/05/2019 relegating the petitioners to the alternative remedy i.e. Services Tribunal. In the said petition, certain startling facts were noticed viz., that because the petitioners approached the High Court; their services were terminated. While relegating the petitioners to alternative remedy in the said petition, following directions were inter-alia issued: “11 (iv) In the meantime, in view of what is observed and found hereinabove, all the petitioners shall be immediately taken back in service and shall be allowed to work by way of ad-interim relief which shall operate till the Applications/Appeals are placed for the first time before the Tribunal; (v) At the same time, it would be open for the petitioners to seek the continuation of the interim relief which is granted herein to allow them to continue to work during the pendency of the Applications/Appeals before the Tribunal;” For compliance of 11(iv) as above, MCA No.1 of 2019 has been instituted which is pending consideration. Further, for the non-compliance of the aforesaid directions, proceedings for contempt of Courts were unsuccessfully preferred by the petitioners. It appears that after the said petition was disposed of, the case was filed with the tribunal and eventually the petitioner was required to comply with the procedure contemplated under Section 11 and 11A of the Gujarat Educational Institutional Services Tribunal Act, 2006 (for short “the Act”) and the said order has not been challenged. Learned Counsel for the petitioner was unable to dispute that the tribunal has the jurisdiction to order reinstatement of an employee. Therefore, in the opinion of this Court, the alternative remedy is available to the petitioners to seek the aforesaid substantial relief and so far as order rendered by this Court in above-referred SCA requiring the opponent to reinstate the petitioners and to pay the salary until the matter is first listed with the Tribunal is concerned, since the issue is pending consideration with the co-ordinate Bench, it is unnecessary for this Court to delve upon the said fact in this petition. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the compliance of section 11 and 11A of the Act would consume considerable time, and therefore, is not efficacious remedy for the petitioner. According to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, the compliance of section 11 and 11A of the Act would consume considerable time, and therefore, is not efficacious remedy for the petitioner. The submission cannot be accepted in view of the settled legal position that the statutory right to adjudicate on the dispute if conditional, the condition will have to be satisfied. In other words, if the procedure is contemplated for availing of the statutory remedy, it must be followed in its letter and spirit. In above view of the matter, this Court is not inclined to entertain the petition. Hence the petition is dismissed. Notice is discharged. The petitioner is relegated to the alternative remedy as indicated above.” 12. Being dissatisfied with the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge referred to above, the original writ applicant is here before this Court with the present appeal. SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT: 13. Mr. Anand Gogia, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant vehemently submitted that the learned Single Judge committed a serious error in declining to entertain the writ application on the ground that an efficacious alternative remedy is available to the appellant herein in the form of an appeal to be filed in the services Tribunal. 14. Mr. Gogia would vociferously submit that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to look into the matter or grant any relief to the appellant as the appellant does not fall within the ambit of “employee” as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act, 2006. According to Mr. Gogia, as his client cannot be said to be an employee of the University, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to grant any relief to the appellant. In such circumstances, according to Mr. Gogia, the only option available for his client was to come before this Court by way of a writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 15. Mr. Gogia would submit that his client is being made to run from the pillar to post since 1997. He pointed out that the obstinate attitude on the part of the University has been seriously frowned upon by this Court in the first round of litigation. In such circumstances also, his writ application should have been entertained by the learned Single Judge on its own merits. 16. Mr. He pointed out that the obstinate attitude on the part of the University has been seriously frowned upon by this Court in the first round of litigation. In such circumstances also, his writ application should have been entertained by the learned Single Judge on its own merits. 16. Mr. Gogia would submit that assuming for the moment, without admitting that his client has an alternative efficacious remedy to go before the Tribunal, the same by itself cannot be a ground to decline to entertain the writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 17. In the last, Mr. Gogia would submit that if his client has to once approach the Tribunal, then again the provisions of Sections 11 and 11(A) respectively of the Act, 2006 will have to be complied with and he will have to wait for another six months before the appeal is filed in the Tribunal. In other words, according to Mr. Gogia, his client will have to first prefer an appropriate representation and wait for the decision to be taken by the University and if no decision is taken within six months from the date of the representation, only then he can approach the Tribunal. 18. Mr. Gogia, in support of his aforenoted submissions, has placed reliance on the following case law: [1] MANU/SC/0214/2020 : 2020 (I) OLR 835 Popatrao Vinaykantrao Patil vs. State of Maharashtra & Anrs. [2] Harbanslal Sahnia and another vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd and others (2003) 2 SCC 107 [3] Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others (1998) 8 SCC 1 [4] Century Spinning and Manufacturing Company Ltd and another vs. Ulhasnagar Municipal Council and another (1970) 1 SCC 582 [5] Varshaben Parshottambhai Trivedi vs. Talaja Nagarpalika and 2 others (SCA No.5245 / 2017) [6] Director General, Youth Services and Sports Department and others vs. Sanjay Gupta and others 2017 AIR (SC) 565 SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE SAURASHTRA UNIVERSITY: 19. On the other hand, this appeal has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Avinash Thacker, the learned counsel appearing for the University. Mr. Thacker would submit that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the learned Single Judge in passing the impugned order. Mr. On the other hand, this appeal has been vehemently opposed by Mr. Avinash Thacker, the learned counsel appearing for the University. Mr. Thacker would submit that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the learned Single Judge in passing the impugned order. Mr. Thacker would submit that it is incorrect on the part of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant to contend that as the appellant is not an employee within the Section 2(d) of the Act, 2006, the Tribunal will have no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings. 20. Mr. Thacker would submit that the appellant is in the habit of filing successful writ applications and is trying to abuse the process of law. 21. Mr. Thacker invited the attention of this Court to the few relevant averments made in the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the University. The relevant averments reads thus: “11. I say that the Appellant in his petition has stated in para-6 “The petitioner submits that he has no alternative equally efficacious remedy except by way of this petition and the relief prayed for herein in sufficient remedy”. I say that the Learned Counsel for the Appellant at the time of hearing before the Learned Single Judge having accepted that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to grant the reinstatement the averment in para-6 of the petition is misleading by the Appellant. I say that in reported Judgment in 1999(3) GCD 1749 the Hon’ble Court has held in para-5 that:- “ In a case where the petitioner has a statutory right of appeal or revision or some other alternative remedy against the impugned order and where it directly approaches to this court, it is duty to candidly and fairly give out what remedy is available and then to give out clearly the reasons and the grounds for bypassing that remedy.” I say that in view of the above the appellant has made incorrect statement on oath and the petition is right rejected by the Learned Single Judge. 12. I say that the only other point argued by the Counsel for the Appellant before the Learned Single Judge was regarding compliance of Sec 11 and 11-A of the Gujarat Educational Institution Services Tribunal Act. 12. I say that the only other point argued by the Counsel for the Appellant before the Learned Single Judge was regarding compliance of Sec 11 and 11-A of the Gujarat Educational Institution Services Tribunal Act. I say that in earlier round of the litigation filed by the Appellant and others being SCA No. 10020 of 2018 Hon’ble Court disposed of the matters on 7.5.2019 and directed the Appellant to approached the Gujarat Educational Services Tribunal the order of the Hon’ble Court carried in Letters Patent Appeal by the applicant and Hon’ble Division Bench confirmed the order of the Learned Single Judge passed in SCA No. 10020 of 2018 dated 7.5.2019 and thereafter, Appellant filed the application before the Tribunal and after hearing Tribunal disposed of the application on 27.9.2019 the said judgment and order of the Tribunal has not been challenged by the Appellant before the higher form therefore, order of the tribunal dated 27.9.2019 has attained finality and binding to the Appellant. I say that the in the memo of the petition filed by the Appellant no such ground is ever taken by the Appellant and the said therefore, any such ground which is not taken in the memo of the petition the said ground cannot be permitted to be argued. I say that the Appellant herein without challenging the order of the Tribunal cannot indirectly contend that the direction given by the Tribunal are required to be set aside and relief which was prayed before the Tribunal be granted even adjudication on merits by the Hon’ble Court. I say that Appellant having not challenged the order of the Tribunal and the specific directions of the Hon’ble Court in SCA No. 10020 of 2018 and Letters Patent Appeal No. 1345 of 2019 have to approach the Tribunal and the Learned Single Judge has rightly rejected the said petition. 13. I say that the Learned Tribunal passed the order on 27.9.2019 directing the Appellant to comply with the provisions of the Sec. 11 and 11-A of the Act. I say that if the Appellant had followed the procedure under the act after the order of the Tribunal then the time limit as mentioned in the Act in would have been exhausted before filing of the present Letters Patent Appeal. Therefore, the Appellant having accepted the order of the Tribunal cannot contend regarding statutory provisions. 14. I say that if the Appellant had followed the procedure under the act after the order of the Tribunal then the time limit as mentioned in the Act in would have been exhausted before filing of the present Letters Patent Appeal. Therefore, the Appellant having accepted the order of the Tribunal cannot contend regarding statutory provisions. 14. I say that in SCA No. 10020 of 2018 the Appellant had filed Civil Application No. 1 of 2018 for challenging the termination by the outsourcing agency and seeking reinstatement in the University. I say that the said application was also not entertained and the Learned Single Judge has relegated the Appellant to the Tribunal. I say that said order is accepted by the Appellant and the present second petition filed by the Appellant is barred under the provisions of law. 15. I say that the observations of para-10.1 to 10.4 of the Hon’ble Court Judgment dated 7.5.2019 have merged in final order of the Hon’ble Court in para 11 and para 11(ix) is specific regarding merit as well as for interim relief against which an appeal filed by the Appellant and the Appellant was relegated to the alternative remedy. I say that the Hon’ble Court has granted relief and time limit was fixed by Hon’ble Court upto the applications are placed before the Tribunal for the first time filed by the appellant. I say that the present petition filed by the appellant is on the same cause of action in Civil Application No. 1 of 2018 and issue regarding reinstatement is already decided by the Hon’ble Court and which is confirmed by the Hon’ble Division Bench, therefore, said issue cannot be reopened by way of filing the subsequent petition. I say that once the issue is decided and the appellant having accepted the same cannot file the petition again.I say that the Learned Single Judge has rightly relegated the appellant to the alternative remedy. I say that provisions of law do not permit the said issue to reopen again. I say that the Hon’ble Division Bench in reported decision in 2011 (3) GLR 2681 in case of Bal Shikshan Samiti Trust V State of Gujarat from para-22 onwards has held that the successive writ petitions with different prayers on same set of facts would be barred by the principals of constructive res-judicata. I say that the Hon’ble Division Bench in reported decision in 2011 (3) GLR 2681 in case of Bal Shikshan Samiti Trust V State of Gujarat from para-22 onwards has held that the successive writ petitions with different prayers on same set of facts would be barred by the principals of constructive res-judicata. Annexed hereto and marked as “Annexure-R5” is the copy of the Judgment reported in 2011 (3) GLR 2681 . 16. I say that the Hon’ble High Court in cantenna of decisions has held that any persons claiming to be the employee of the Educational Institute have to approach the Gujarat Education Services Tribunal. I say that in SCA No. 10020 of 2018 filed by the Appellant the University with its reply annexed the Judgment of the Hon’ble Court passed in SCA No. 4715 of 2015 dated 5.5.2015 whereby Hon’ble Court relegated the employee to the Tribunal. I say that another Judgment of the Hon’ble Court passed in SCA No. 2239 of 2016 dated 11.3.2016 was also annexed which relying on the Judgment in SCA No. 4715 of 2015 has also held that the employee of the Educational Institute has to approach the Gujarat Educational Services Tribunal. Annexed hereto and marked as “Annexure-R6” is the copy of the Judgment dated 11.3.2016 passed in SCA No. 2239 of 2016. 17. I say that the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Commissioner of Income Tax and others V Chhabil Dass Agarwal reported in 2014 (1) SCC 603 has held that the when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, writ petition should not be entertained ignoring said statutory provisions. I say that in the present case the Appellant once has been relegated to the Tribunal by Hon’ble Court and even after approaching the Tribunal has again filed the petition for the same cause of action which is rightly dismissed by the Learned Single Judge. I say that the Learned Counsel for the Appellant before the Learned Single Judge has admitted that the Tribunal has power to grant reinstatement and therefore the Learned Single Judge has rightly rejected the said petition. 18. I say that the in the affidavit in reply filed by the University before the Learned Single Judge it was specifically contented regarding suppression of facts by the Appellant in the petition. 18. I say that the in the affidavit in reply filed by the University before the Learned Single Judge it was specifically contented regarding suppression of facts by the Appellant in the petition. I say that to overcome the said objection the Appellant with Appeal Memo of Letters Patent Appeal at “Annexure-C” has annexed the list of litigations filed by the Appellant. I say that the said list was never produce before the Learned Single Judge in SCA No. 21449 of 2019. I say that the Hon’ble Apex Court in cantenna of Judgments has held that all facts are required to be mentioned in the petition and petitioner has to approach Hon’ble Court with clean hands. 19. I say that in reply filed on behalf of University in para-34 of the paper-book it is contended that the Appellant has also filed SCA No. 23289 of 2019 after the order of the Tribunal and said fact in not mentioned in the present petition and has contented regarding suppression of fact. I say that the prayers made in SCA NO. 23289 of 2019 are as under:- A. Your Lordships be pleased to admit and allow the present petition. B. Your Lordships may be pleased to hold, declare and direct that the petitioner be treated as Regular Employee of the Respondent University and they may be granted pay and allowances and all other benefits as are paid to the regular University employees. It may further be held and declare that the petitioners case be decided and granted the benefit as available to them under the Scheme of the Respondent University and on the ground do parity vide order dated 4.3.1980 annexed herein below. C. Your Lordships may be pleased to hold declare and direct that the petitioners are entitled to receive minimum salary of the regular pay scale of the post on which they are working, revised from time to time and/or in terms of the Government policy in this respect. D. Your Lordships may pleased to hold, declare and direct that the petitioners are entitled to pensionary benefits after retirement in view of their long services on regular post. E. Your Lordships may pleased hold, declare and direct that the petitioner’s change of name in outsourcing Agency from 16.5.2018 is illegal, null and void and the petitioner be treated as continuing in University services during such period for all purpose. 20. E. Your Lordships may pleased hold, declare and direct that the petitioner’s change of name in outsourcing Agency from 16.5.2018 is illegal, null and void and the petitioner be treated as continuing in University services during such period for all purpose. 20. I say that the considering the prayer-(E) filed in SCA No. 23289 of 2019 filed by the Appellant which is suppressed in the present petition. The Appellant is very well aware that the Appellant was employee of the outsourcing agency and the services are terminated by the outsourcing agency. I say that on one hand the appellant accepts and contends that he has been working with outsourcing agency and on other hand is seeking reinstatement with the University which is not permissible and the Learned Single Judge has right rejected the petition on ground of alternative remedy in view of the disputed questions of facts. 21. I say that the Appellant herein worked through outsourcing agency and at present no such sanction post is available in the University therefore, he has no right to claim any relief against the respondent University. I say that the outsourcing agency terminated the service of the Appellant. I say that the Appellant was manpower of outsourcing agency. The wages was deposited in Appellant bank account by the outsourcing agency from time to time when the Appellant was in the service of the agency. 22. I say that the petition filed by the Appellant is not maintainable in view of pendency of the C.A. (MCA) No. 1 of 2019 for the same relief prayed in the present petition as stated in forgoing paras and reply in SCA. I say that therefore, petition filed by the Appellant is not maintainable and for suppression the facts as stated in reply filed by University in SCA and the same is rightly rejected by the Learned Single Judge. I say that Appellant has accepted the order of the Hon’ble Tribunal dated 27.9.2019 passed in Application No. 65 of 2019 and not challenged before the Higher Forum and therefore, the SCA filed by the Appellant is not maintainable and the Appellant have to follow the procedure laid down under the Gujarat Educational Institution Services Tribunal Act, 2006 and Learned Single Judge rightly rejected petition filed by the appellant on the ground of alternative remedy available to the appellant.” 22. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. In such circumstances referred to above, Mr. Thacker, the learned counsel appearing for the writ applicant prays that there being no merit in this appeal, the same may be dismissed. ANALYSIS: 23. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials on record, the only question that falls for our consideration is whether the learned Single Judge committed any error in passing the impugned order. 24. Before adverting to the rival submissions canvassed on either side, we may look into the few relevant provisions of law. Section 2(d) of the Act, 2006 defines the term “employee” as under: “Section 2 Definitions – In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- (d) “employee” means the any member of the teaching and non-teaching staff of the educational institution (whether confirmed or temporary or on probation) in service of such institution and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Act in relation to a dispute referred to in Section 10, includes any such member who has been dismissed or removed or whose services are otherwise terminated;” 25. Section 11 of the Act, 2006 reads thus: “11. Appeal.-(1) An employee aggrieved by an original order or appellate order or decision of the educational institution which is connected with the conditions of service of such employee or, as the case may be, the educational institution, may, within a period of sixty days from the date of such order or decision, appeal to the tribunal. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), the tribunal may entertain an appeal made to it after the expiry of the period of ninety days, if it is satisfied that the appellate has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within that period.” 26. The plain reading of the above referred provisions makes it abundantly clear that if any employee of the teaching and non-teaching staff of an educational institution is aggrieved by any order or decision relating to his service conditions, he has an efficacious alternative remedy of preferring an appeal to the Tribunal. The combined reading of the relevant provisions of the Act, 2006 reveal that the appellant herein undoubtedly falls within the ambit of an “employee” of the University constituted under Section 2(15) of the Saurashtra University Act, 1965. The combined reading of the relevant provisions of the Act, 2006 reveal that the appellant herein undoubtedly falls within the ambit of an “employee” of the University constituted under Section 2(15) of the Saurashtra University Act, 1965. Any decision or order of the educational institution connected with the condition of service of its employee is required to be challenged before the Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the Act, 1965 and the provisions of the Services Tribunal Act, 2006. 27. The aforenoted two submissions of Mr. Gogia are mutually destructive. On one hand, Mr. Gogia would submit that his client is not an employee of the Saurashtra University within Section 2(d) of the Act, 2006, and on the other, it is argued that filing an appeal before the Tribunal would not be an efficacious alternative remedy. The University has also conceded to the position that the appellant herein would fall within the ambit of “employee”, as defined under Section 2(d) of the Act, 2006. 28. The Supreme Court in the judgement reported in (2006) 12 SCC 233 (Steel Authority of India Ltd vs. Union of India and others) held that a mutually destructive plea is impermissible in law. At para 28, it has enunciated thus: “28. The workmen whether before the Labour Court or in writ proceedings were represented by the same Union. A trade union registered under the Trade Unions Act is entitled to espouse the cause of the workmen. A definite stand was taken by the employees that they had been working under the contractors. It would, thus, in our opinion, not lie in their mouth to take a contradictory and inconsistent plea that they were also the workmen of the principal employer. To raise such a mutually destructive plea is impermissible in law. Such mutually destructive plea, in our opinion, should not be allowed to be raised even in an industrial adjudication. Common law principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence are applicable in an industrial adjudication.” 29. It has time and again been held by the Constitutional Courts in India that writ petition should not be entertained if an alternative statutory remedy is available. 30. Common law principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence are applicable in an industrial adjudication.” 29. It has time and again been held by the Constitutional Courts in India that writ petition should not be entertained if an alternative statutory remedy is available. 30. In the case of Commissioner of Income Tax v. Chhabil Dass Agrawal (2014) 1 SCC 603 , the Supreme Court held that when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, the writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation subject to certain exceptions. The Apex Court further opined that non-entertainment of petitions under the writ jurisdiction by the High Courts where efficacious or alternative remedy is available, is a rule of self- imposed limitation. It is essentially a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. The Apex Court has also opined that undoubtedly, it is within the discretion of the High Court to grant relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India despite existence of an alternative remedy. However, the High Court must not interfere if there is an adequate efficacious alternative remedy available to the petitioner and he has approached the High Court without availing the same unless he has made out an exceptional case warranting such interference or if there is sufficient grounds to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 31. In the case of Harbanslal Sahnia vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. (2003) 2 SCC 107 , it was held that the rule of exclusion of writ jurisdiction by availability of an alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion. In an appropriate case in spite of availability of the alternative remedy, the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights; (ii) where there is failure of principles of natural justice or, (iii) where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act and is challenged. 32. Similar observation has been made by the High Court of Calcutta in a recent case of Mina Perween vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors (MAT 515 of 2018 decided on 25th June 2018). 32. Similar observation has been made by the High Court of Calcutta in a recent case of Mina Perween vs. The State of West Bengal & Ors (MAT 515 of 2018 decided on 25th June 2018). In this case, the Appellant had assailed High Court’s order, whereby the Single Judge of the Court had dismissed the Appellant’s writ petition holding, inter alia, that the same was not maintainable before the writ Court and relegated the writ petitioner to an appropriate statutory remedy which is available for a period of thirty days from the date of declaration of the election results. In the said case, the appellant/petitioner had challenged the election process for the post of a Gram Panchayat member. In appeal, the Court noted that the statutory mechanism for raising any dispute after participating in an election pertaining to Panchayats has been enumerated under section 79 of the West Bengal Panchayat Elections Act, 2003. The said provision allows any person who is entitled to vote in the Panchayat election to raise any dispute with regard to the validity of an election within a statutory time frame before such authorities as prescribed under section 79. With reference to the facts of the said case, the Court noted that the appellant can have her grievances adequately redressed before the competent statutory authority as provided under Section 79 of the West Bengal Panchayat Elections Act, 2003. 33. In the case of Sadhana Lodh vs. National Insurance Co.Ltd. and another reported in (2003) 3 SCC 524 , the Apex Court held that the right to appeal is a statutory right where the law provides remedy by way of filing an appeal on limited grounds and such challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. It would be profitable to reproduce the findings and observations of the Apex Court as under:- “6. The right of appeal is a statutory right and where the law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution on the premise that the insurer has limited grounds available for challenging the award given by the Tribunal. The right of appeal is a statutory right and where the law provides remedy by filing an appeal on limited grounds, the grounds of challenge cannot be enlarged by filing a petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution on the premise that the insurer has limited grounds available for challenging the award given by the Tribunal. Section 149(2) of the Act limits the insurer to file an appeal on those enumerated grounds and the appeal being a product of the statute it is not open to an insurer to take any plea other than those provided under Section 149(2) of the Act (see National Insurance Co. Ltd, Chandigarh vs. Nicolletta Rohtagi and others 2002(7) SCC 456 ). This being the legal position, the petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution by the insurer was wholly misconceived. Where a statutory right to file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open to High Court to entertain a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution. Even if where a remedy by way of an appeal has not been provided for against the order and judgment of a District Judge, the remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file a revision before the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Where remedy for filing a revision before the High Court under Section 115 of CPC has been expressly barred by a State enactment, only in such case a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. As a matter of an illustration, where a trial Court in a civil suit refused to grant temporary injunction and an appeal against refusal to grant injunction has been rejected, and a State enactment has barred the remedy of filing revision under Section 115 C.P.C., in such a situation a writ petition under Article 227 would lie and not under Article 226 of the Constitution. Thus, where the State legislature has barred a remedy of filing a revision petition before the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C., no petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie for the reason that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. Thus, where the State legislature has barred a remedy of filing a revision petition before the High Court under Section 115 C.P.C., no petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would lie for the reason that a mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or Tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an Appellate Court or the Tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior court or Tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision.” 34. If the learned Single Judge declined to entertain the writ application on the ground of alternative efficacious remedy of appeal being available to the writ applicant, then, in such circumstances, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge committed a jurisdictional error resulting into a serious miscarriage of justice, warranting interference at the end of the appeal Court. In other words, the judgement and order of the learned Single Judge does not suffer from any such palpable infirmity of reasoning or perversity which would warrant interference in an intra-Court Appeal. 35. While dealing with the present appeal, one has to bear in mind that a intra-Court appeal is really not a statutory appeal preferred against the judgment and order of an inferior to the superior Court. The appeal inter se in a High Court from one Court to another is really an appeal from one coordinate Bench to another Coordinate Bench and it is for this reason that a writ cannot be issued by one Bench of the High Court to another Bench of the High Court nor can even the Supreme Court issue writ to a High Court. Thus, unlike an appeal, in general, a intra-Court appeal is an appeal on principle and that is why, unlike an appeal, in an ordinary sense, such as a criminal appeal, where the whole evidence on record is examined afresh by the appellate Court, what is really examined, in a intra-Court appeal, is the legality and validity of the Judgment and/ or order of the Single Judge and it can be set aside or should be set aside only when there is a patent error on the face of the record or the judgment is against the established or settled principle of law. If two views are possible and a view, which is reasonable and logical, has been adopted by a Single Judge, the other view, howsoever appealing such a view may be to the Division Bench, it is the view adopted by the single Judge, which should, normally, be allowed to prevail. Hence, the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge should not be completely ignored and this Court has to consider the judgment and order in its proper perspective and if this Bench, sitting as an appellate Bench, is of the view that the decision has been arrived at by the learned Single Judge without any material error of fact or law, then, the judgment, in question, should be allowed to prevail. 36. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the learned Single Judge committed no error much less an error of law in passing the impugned order. 37. In our opinion, this appeal deserves to be dismissed, and is, accordingly, dismissed. 38. In view of the final disposal of the main matter, the connected civil application also stands disposed of. 39. Before parting with this order, with all humility at our command, we would like to convey to Mr. Gogia that he is a young, talented and upcoming lawyer with a reasonable standing at the Bar. He should well remember that there is a difference between giving up and knowing when you have had enough. Undoubtedly, a counsel has a right to argue his matter with tenacity on behalf of his client, but, at the same time, a good lawyer should always remind himself of the merits of his matter. He should well remember that there is a difference between giving up and knowing when you have had enough. Undoubtedly, a counsel has a right to argue his matter with tenacity on behalf of his client, but, at the same time, a good lawyer should always remind himself of the merits of his matter. Any lawyer to be successful should keep in mind the three elementary principles of advocacy : (i) what to argue, (ii) what not to argue, and (iii) where to draw a line and stop. It is very essential for any upcoming lawyer to keep these three elementary principles of advocacy in mind. The hearing of this appeal should have concluded within no time having regard to the main issue involved in the same. However, it took more than an hour for this Court to convince Mr. Gogia that he has no case and this Court is not inclined to disturb the discretionary order passed passed by the learned Single Judge. The members of the Bar are the backbone of the judicial system. They are naturally aware of the role expected of them in the Court proceedings. Waste of even fifteen minutes in each working session on account of unnecessary prolonged submissions at the instance of the learned advocate works out to a loss of at least two full working days in a month. If this happens in ten Courts, the loss would be twenty working days of one Court which means the effective Judge strength of the Courts is reduced by at least one Judge, if all these were single Judge benches. All this at whose cost? Lawyers and Judges should therefore conduct the work keeping foremost the interest of those who await the outcome of process and who have no say in their grooming. There has therefore to be a concerted effort of correcting each other to bring about a work culture where the Judges feel obliged to take up causes and ensure that public time is not unnecessarily wasted and the lawyers cooperate in the proceedings by their active and effective participation, by avoiding unnecessary prolonged arguments without any justifiable reasons. 40. There has therefore to be a concerted effort of correcting each other to bring about a work culture where the Judges feel obliged to take up causes and ensure that public time is not unnecessarily wasted and the lawyers cooperate in the proceedings by their active and effective participation, by avoiding unnecessary prolonged arguments without any justifiable reasons. 40. Before parting with this matter, we may observe that if the appellant prefers any representation addressed to the University as regards his grievances, then such representation shall be looked into by the University within eight days of its receipt and the appellant shall be informed accordingly in writing about the outcome of such representation. We are saying so so as to avoid any hardship that may be caused to the appellant on account of Section 11 of the Act, 2006.