JUDGMENT : Bechu Kurian Thomas, J. The scope of protection which a transferee pendente lite can seek from an executing court arises for consideration. The transferees pendente lite challenge the dismissal of their petition filed under Order 21 Rule 99 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908, (for brevity 'CPC'). 2. Petitioners are transferees pendente lite. They had purchased 4.86 ares of property by Sale Deed No.1149/10 dated 8.7.2010 of the SRO Kadakkavur from respondents 3 and 4. Transferors of the petitioners are respondents 3 and 4, who had purchased the property from the 2nd respondent as per Sale Deed No.731/2008. According to the petitioners, it was only in 2015, that they came to know that the 1st respondent had secured sale certificate in E.P. No.23 of 2013, with respect to the scheduled property and even though, 1st respondent had legally ousted respondents 2 to 4, petitioners continued in physical possession and an application was filed as E.A. 100 of 2015 in E.P. No.23 of 2013 in O.P. No.1350 of 2008 under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC, to reconvey their rights and possession. However, by Ext. P8 order, the application was dismissed. This Original Petition is preferred against Ext.P8 order under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 3. 1st respondent filed an objection contending that she was the wife of the 2nd respondent and that after their marriage fell into troubled waters, to defeat her marital claims, the 2nd respondent executed Sale Deed No.731/2008 in favour of respondents 3 and 4 who are his sister and brother-in-law. O.P. No.1350 of 2008 was instituted by the 1st respondent before the Family Court, Nedumangad for setting aside Sale Deed No.731/2008 and for recovery of gold ornaments and money. An attachment of the property covered by the aforesaid sale deed was also obtained in the suit for securing the monetary claim. The suit filed as O.P. No.1350 of 2008 was allowed on 25.7.2011 and the Sale Deed No.731/08 was set aside as per Ext. P5 Judgment. The 1st respondent was found entitled to realize the amounts claimed in the suit charged on plaint 'A' schedule property. According to the 1st respondent, though the respondents 2 to 4 attempted to get the decree set aside, the same was dismissed and thus the judgment in O.P. No.1350 of 2008 on the files of the Family Court, Nedumangad, had become final. According to the 1st respondent, though the respondents 2 to 4 attempted to get the decree set aside, the same was dismissed and thus the judgment in O.P. No.1350 of 2008 on the files of the Family Court, Nedumangad, had become final. The 1st respondent purchased the scheduled property through court auction on 15.10.2013 in execution of the decree in Ext.P5. The 1st respondent further avers that petitioners are alleged purchasers by sale deed No.1149/2010, and their purchase of the property was during the pendency of the litigation in O.P. No.1350 of 2008 on the files of the Family Court, Nedumangad and during the subsistence of an attachment issued in that case. It is further pleaded that the claim of petitioners is baseless not only due to the principle of lis pendens but also due to the setting aside of their prior title deed and the petitioners have not acquired any title to the property to file a petition under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC. 4. In the executing court, Exts. A1 to A3 were marked on the side of the petitioners while the 1st respondent marked Ext. B1 to Ext. B5. Ext. A1 is the sale Deed No. 1149/2010 while Ext. B2 is the Judgment in O.P No. 1350 of 2008 of the Family Court, Nedumangad, and Ext.B5 is the Sale certificate. After considering the facts and circumstances, the Family Court, Attingal by Ext.P8 order dismissed E.A 100 of 2015 in E.P. No.23 of 2013. 5. We have heard Sri. V. Philip Mathews, learned counsel for the petitioners as well as Sri. J. Jayakumar, learned counsel for the 1st respondent. 6. Adv. Sri. Philip Mathew, assailed the impugned order and contended that at the time of purchase of the property, petitioners were not aware about the pending litigation between respondents 1 to 4 and nor was there an order of attachment or any other encumbrance over the property. According to the counsel, the petitioners were bonafide purchasers of the property and also submitted that petitioners have filed O.P. No.1362 of 2016 before the Family Court, Attingal, challenging the judgment in O.P. No.1350 of 2008 of the Family Court, Nedumangad, and an injunction had been granted, restraining the respondents in this case, from committing any waste, or causing disturbances to their peaceful possession. He also submitted that sufficient opportunity was not granted to the petitioners to adduce their oral evidence. He also submitted that sufficient opportunity was not granted to the petitioners to adduce their oral evidence. 7. Adv. Sri. J. Jayakumar, on the other hand, submitted that after the sham document was set aside, execution proceedings were initiated and 1st respondent purchased the schedule property and obtained a sale certificate. According to the learned counsel, Ext.P8 order is a deemed decree and only an appeal will lie against such an order. He further submitted that the petitioners had purchased the property in collusion with respondents 2 to 4, who are all closely related to each other, and that they had no manner of right to file a claim petition since all were aware of the pendency of the suit. Referring to the decisions in Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram and Others (2008) 7 SCC 144 ), and Jagan Singh (Dead) through Lrs. v. Dhanwanti and Another (2012) 2 SCC 628 ) he contended that transferees pendente lite cannot seek declaration of their right or title based on the pendente lite transfer. 8. At the outset of our analysis, we have to consider the question of maintainability of this original petition. An order under Rule 99 of Order 21 CPC is not an interlocutory order. The question of right, title or interest in the property is considered in a petition under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC by virtue of Order 21 Rule 101 CPC. An order under Order 21 Rule 99 CPC is certainly a final order. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent, relying upon Jineev v. Sherly Mathew ( 2011 (2) KLT 738 ), the remedy is by way of an appeal as provided under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act 1984. Appeal alone is maintainable against a judgment or order, not being an interlocutory order. Viewed in the aforesaid manner, this original petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. 9. Even though an appeal will lie against an order under Rule 99 of Order 21, still, since this case was admitted, to avoid prejudice to the parties, we deem it fit to consider the case on merits also. Viewed in the aforesaid manner, this original petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable. 9. Even though an appeal will lie against an order under Rule 99 of Order 21, still, since this case was admitted, to avoid prejudice to the parties, we deem it fit to consider the case on merits also. Further, as per Section 19(6) of the Family Courts Act 1984, the appeal is to be considered by a Bench of two Judges and since we constitute a bench of two judges, no prejudice would be caused to either of the parties by such consideration on merits and disposal of the original petition. 10. Before we consider the relative merits of the case, we note that Ext. P8 is an order passed under Order 21 Rule 99 of CPC. A reading of Rule 99 of Order 21 CPC will disclose that the occasion for making such an application would arise only after dispossession. The condition precedent for making an application under the said provision is dispossession by the holder of a decree or by the purchaser of a property sold in execution of a decree. Reference can profitably be made to the decisions in Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal and Another [ (1997) 3 SCC 694 ] as well as Tanzeem-E-Sufia v. Bibi Haliman and Others [ (2002) 7 SCC 50 ]. By the very fact that an application under Order 21 Rule 99 of CPC has been filed, it is to be assumed that, petitioners have been dispossessed. On the other hand, if petitioners had not been dispossessed, an application under Order 21 Rule 99 of CPC, was certainly not the appropriate provision to be invoked. 11. The basic document through which the vendors of Sale Deed No.1149/2010 derived title was sale deed No.731/2008. In Ext.P5 judgment, the Sale Deed No.731/2008 of the SRO Kadakkavoor was found to be a sham document and Sale Deed No.731/2008 was set aside after finding the deed to be null and void. Admittedly Ext.P5 judgment has attained finality. No rights can be created through that document. The corollary of such a finding is that the prior title holders of the petitioners i.e., respondents 3 and 4, did not have title at all to sell the property to the petitioners. Admittedly Ext.P5 judgment has attained finality. No rights can be created through that document. The corollary of such a finding is that the prior title holders of the petitioners i.e., respondents 3 and 4, did not have title at all to sell the property to the petitioners. The title set up by the petitioners in E.A. 100 of 2015 is thus bad in law. They have no claim for title. On the other hand, the 1st respondent, after getting the sale deed set aside, brought the schedule property for sale on the basis of the charged decree in Ext.P5 Judgment and by sale certificate dated 15.10.2013 acquired title over the schedule property. 1st respondent, by virtue of the sale certificate, became the owner of the property. In such circumstances, the claim of the petitioners to have title to the property is to be negatived. 12. In this context, Order 21 Rule 102, CPC has significance. The said rule provides that nothing in Rule 98 and 100 shall apply to the resistance or obstruction in execution of a decree for the possession of immovable property by a person to whom the judgment debtor has transferred the property after institution of the suit in which the decree was passed or to the dispossession of any such person. Order 21 Rule 102, CPC recognizes the principle of lis pendens. A purchaser of property, which was the subject matter of the suit, cannot resist execution of the decree, if the purchase was during pendency of the litigation. Order 21 Rule 102 CPC bars such objections. 13. The contention of the petitioner's that they were not aware about the pendency of the litigation and that they cannot be dispossessed on the basis of decree obtained behind their back, has no legal basis. By the application of the principle of lis pendens, a purchaser of property during the pendency of the litigation is treated as having constructive notice and that he will be bound by the decree to be entered into in the pending suit. As per the provisions of Order 21 Rule 102 CPC, the legislature has clearly intended that there shall not be any resistance or obstruction by a transferee pendente lite. As per the provisions of Order 21 Rule 102 CPC, the legislature has clearly intended that there shall not be any resistance or obstruction by a transferee pendente lite. When a resistance or obstruction is offered by a transferee pendente lite, or even when a complaint of dispossession is raised by a transferee pendente the lite, it is explicit from reading of rules 98, 99, 101 and 102 of order 21 CPC, that the scope of adjudication ought to be confined only to the question whether the person who resists or who was dispossessed was a transferee during the pendency of a suit in which the decree was passed. Once the finding to the above question is in the affirmative, the executing court can only hold that he had no right to resist or obstruct or complain of dispossession. Such a person -a transferee pendente lite, cannot seek protection from the executing court. 14. The principle that is deducible from Order 21 Rule 102 CPC is that when a resistance or obstruction to dispossession is raised or when the dispossession of a property is complained of under Rule 99 of Order 21, if the person resisting, obstructing or complaining is a person to whom the property was transferred after the institution of the suit, determination of the questions regarding the right, title or interest, as per Rule 101 of Order 21 CPC, is not even required to be determined except to the limited extent of identifying whether he is a transferee pendente lite. Viewed in the said perspective, the claim of the petitioner's herein, being one that is based on sale deed executed during the pendency of litigation O.P. No.1350 of 2008, petitioners cannot complain of dispossession carried out or being carried out pursuant to the decree. 15. We are fortified in the aforesaid proposition by the principles laid down in two judgments of the Supreme Court. In the decision in Silverline Forum, Pvt. Ltd v. Rajiv Trust and Another ( 1998 (3) SCC 723 ) it was held that “Rule 99 of Order 21 is not available to any person until he is dispossessed of immovable property by the decree holder and also that if resistance to execution is made by a transferee pendente lite of the judgment debtor, the scope of the adjudication would be shrunk to the limited question whether he is such a transferee.....”. It was also held that the “exclusion of such a transferee from raising further contentions is based on the salutary principle adumbrated in section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.” 16. In Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram and Others (2008) 7 SCC 144 ), following the principles laid down in the Silverline Forum Case as noted above, it was further observed that; “Bare reading of Rule 102 of Order 21 CPC makes it clear that it is based on justice, equity and good conscience. A transferee from a judgment-debtor is presumed to be aware of the proceedings before a court of law. He should be careful before he purchases the property, which is the subject-matter of litigation. It recognises the principle of lis pendens recognized by section 52 TPA. Rule 102 of order 21 CPC thus takes into account the ground reality and refuses to extent helping hand to purchasers of property in respect of which litigation is pending. If an unfair, inequitable or undeserved protection is afforded to a transferee pendente lite, a decree holder will never be able to realize the fruits of his decree. Every time the decree-holder seeks a direction from the court to execute a decree, the judgment-debtor or his transferee will transfer the property and the new transferee will offer resistance or cause obstruction. To avoid such a situation, the Rule has been enacted.” 17. Based on the aforesaid prepositions of law and applying the admitted circumstances of the case, we hold that petitioners being pendente lite transferees have no right to complain of dispossession or resist execution of the decree in O.P. No. 1350 of 2008 on the files of the Family Court, Nedumangad. The impugned order, according to us, is perfectly justified and the same needs no interference. We confirm the order of the Family Court, Attingal, dated 29.2.2020 in E.A. No. 100/2015 in E.P. No. 23 of 2013 in O.P. No. 1350 of 2008. 18. Before parting with this case, we wish to mention that we have not decided any issue that arises under O.P. No.1362 of 2016, which is pending consideration before the Family Court, Attingal, which we are informed is a petition to set aside the decree in O.P. No.1350 of 2008. Needless to say, the said case will be considered in accordance with law, on the basis of pleadings raised therein. Needless to say, the said case will be considered in accordance with law, on the basis of pleadings raised therein. If any orders are obtained in that case, the same will have to be worked out by the petitioners through the due process of law. However, we are not persuaded to force the 1st respondent to wait till the disposal of that petition to enjoy the fruits of her decree in O.P. No.1350 of 2008 of the Family Court, Nedumangad. This original petition is dismissed.