Judgment Sanjay Dhar, J.—Instant application for grant of bail has been moved by the petitioner/accused whereby he has sought bail in the case arising out of FIR No. 43 of 2020 for offence under Section 306 IPC registered with Police Station, Ramgarh. 2. The facts leading to registration of aforesaid FIR are that on 19.04.2020, one Bachan Kour lodged a written complaint with the Police of Police Station, Ramgarh alleging therein that, in the year 2018, her granddaughter, namely Nirmal Jeet Kour had solemnized marriage with petitioner/accused. It was further alleged that after the marriage, the father-in-law, mother-in-law and the husband of Nirmal Jeet Kour used to harass her and due to their cruel behaviour, she committed suicide at her matrimonial home. It was also alleged that the sister-in-law of the deceased namely Harjeet Kour, who was having two daughters, regularly pressurised the deceased to give birth to one son due to which the deceased got depressed, as a consequence whereof, she ended her life by consuming a poisonous substance. 3. On the basis of aforesaid report, the Police started investigation of the case, seized the dead body, got its post mortem conducted and recorded the statements of the witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C. After investigation of the case, offence under Section 306 IPC was found established against the accused Harjeet Kour and Darshan Kour as also against the petitioner herein, who happens to be the husband of the deceased. 4. It is contended in the present application that marriage between the petitioner and the deceased was solemnized without exchange of any dowry and out of the wedlock, one son was born. It is further averred that the petitioner and his family members are totally innocent and that the petitioner and his other relatives have been falsely implicated in the instant case. It is contended that the learned trial Court, while dismissing the bail application of the petitioner, has fallen into grave error as even from the allegations made in the subject FIR, no offence is made out against the petitioner. It is further averred that there is no material on record to even remotely suggest that the petitioner had instigated the deceased to commit suicide. Lastly, it has been contended that the petitioner is ready to abide by all the conditions that may be imposed upon him in case bail is granted to him. 5. It is further averred that there is no material on record to even remotely suggest that the petitioner had instigated the deceased to commit suicide. Lastly, it has been contended that the petitioner is ready to abide by all the conditions that may be imposed upon him in case bail is granted to him. 5. The application has been resisted by the respondent by filing objections thereto. In its objections, respondent has reiterated the allegations made in the charge-sheet against the petitioner and the co-accused. It has been contended that the petitioner has committed a heinous offence which is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years and fine and that there is sufficient material on record to disclose direct complicity of the petitioner in the alleged crime. It is further contended that the bail application has been rightly rejected by the trial Court and that there is reasonable apprehension that the petitioner will try to tamper with the prosecution evidence. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record including the copy of the charge-sheet. 7. The guidelines relating to grant of bail have been laid down in Sections 437 and 439 of Cr.P.C. While in Section 437 Cr.P.C, certain restrictions and conditions have been laid down for grant of bail by a Court, the power to grant bail under Section 439 Cr.P.C for the High Court or the Sessions Court is wider. The overriding considerations in granting bail as laid down in Section 437 (1) and Section 439(1) of Cr.P.C, are the nature and gravity of the offence, the frivolity or otherwise of the prosecution case, the position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and witnesses, the likelihood of accused fleeing from justice, the chances of repeating of offence by the accused, the chances of tampering with the witnesses, the stage of investigation and the public interest. 8. 8. The Supreme Court in the case of Mahipal vs. Rajesh Kumar and another, (2020) 2 SCC 118 , while discussing the amplitude and power of the Court under Section 439 Cr.P.C, has observed as under: “The determination of whether a case is fit for the grant of bail involves the balancing of numerous factors, among which the nature of the offence, the severity of the punishment and a prima facie view of the involvement of the accused are important. No straight jacket formula exists for courts to assess an application for the grant or rejection of bail. At the stage of assessing whether a case is fit for the grant of bail, the court is not required to enter into a detailed analysis of the evidence on record to establish beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime by the accused. That is a matter for trial. However, the Court is required to examine whether there is a prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence and on a balance of the considerations involved, the continued custody of the accused sub-serves the purpose of the criminal justice system.”. 9. From the aforesaid discussion of law on the subject, it is clear that while nature of offence and severity of punishment is an important consideration while considering the bail plea of an accused, a prima facie view of involvement of the accused in the alleged crime is a factor which is also required to be considered. On this aspect of the case, the learned counsel for the petitioner has taken me through the contents of the report lodged by the grand mother of the deceased, on the basis of which, subject FIR came to be registered. Learned counsel has contended that in the aforesaid report, the informant has not made any allegation against the petitioner, the husband of the deceased, but she has made allegations only against the accused Harjeet Kour, the sister-in-law of the deceased by stating that she was pressurising the deceased to bear a son as the said accused was having two daughters, as a consequences whereof, the deceased used to get mentally disturbed. The learned counsel has also, by referring to the statements of the prosecution witnesses recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C during the investigation of the case, contended that even in these statements there is hardly any allegation made against the petitioner and that these witnesses have reiterated the allegations contained in the FIR against the sister of the petitioner accused Harjeet Kour. 10. Although, it would be premature for this Court to deeply analyse the material collected by the investigating agency in support its charge against the petitioner, yet, for the limited purpose of deciding this application, it is necessary to take this material into consideration to test the merits of the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. Now, in this backdrop, it becomes necessary to advert briefly to the FIR and the material in support of the allegations contained therein. The FIR, as already noted, states that the deceased was being pressurized by the sister of the petitioner to bear a male child because the said sister of the petitioner was having two daughters. As per the allegations made in the FIR and the statements recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C, this became a cause of worry for the deceased ultimately driving her to commit suicide. Thus, prima facie, it appears that the petitioner herein was not responsible for abetting the suicide of the deceased. 12. The learned trial Court, while rejecting the bail application of the petitioner, has placed reliance upon Section 113-A of the Evidence Act which creates a presumption against the husband and his other relatives in a case where a woman commits suicide within seven years of her marriage. 13. It is true that Section 113-A of Evidence Act creates a presumption as stated hereinabove, but then the said presumption is rebuttable. For raising such a presumption, there has to be material on record to establish the foundational facts on the basis of which said presumption would get triggered. Without such material, the Court would not raise presumption and even in a case where there is material to establish the foundational facts for raising a presumption, it will be open to the accused to rebut the same, either by leading evidence in defence or by dislodging the case of the prosecution by subjecting the prosecution witnesses to cross-examination. Without such material, the Court would not raise presumption and even in a case where there is material to establish the foundational facts for raising a presumption, it will be open to the accused to rebut the same, either by leading evidence in defence or by dislodging the case of the prosecution by subjecting the prosecution witnesses to cross-examination. However, in the present case, the stage for leading defence evidence or cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses has not reached, but even in the bail proceedings, accused has a right to show from the material collected by the prosecution that the foundational facts for raising the presumption under Section 113-A of Evidence Act are, prima facie, not established. The same would be in accordance with the concept of due process of law which is intrinsic to our Constitutional jurisprudence. 14. As already noted and without commenting upon the merits of the case, it appears that the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the material collected by the investigating agency during the investigation of the case does not prima facie show the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged harassment of the deceased, appears to be well founded. The material collected by the investigating agency in this case does not, prima facie, establish the foundational facts for raising the presumption under Section 113-A of Evidence Act against the petitioner. The learned trial Court, while rejecting the application of the petitioner, it appears, has landed into an error by taking recourse to the provisions contained in the Section 113-A of Evidence Act. 15. Thus, from the prima facie evaluation of the material on record, the involvement of the petitioner in the alleged crime is not established. It is, however, made clear that the above is a prima facie opinion for the limited purpose of these proceedings and it shall have no bearing upon the merits of the case before the learned trial Court. 16. Apart from the above, the petitioner has been in custody since 29.04.2020 and the investigation of the case is complete. The charge sheet has already been filed before the trial Court and the co-accused have been enlarged on bail. Denying the petitioner the concession of bail, in these circumstances, would amount to inflicting punishment upon him without trial and the same may prejudice his right to prepare defence against the charge that has been laid against him. The charge sheet has already been filed before the trial Court and the co-accused have been enlarged on bail. Denying the petitioner the concession of bail, in these circumstances, would amount to inflicting punishment upon him without trial and the same may prejudice his right to prepare defence against the charge that has been laid against him. Further, there is nothing on record to even remotely suggests that in case the petitioner is granted bail, he would be fleeing or thwarting the course of justice 17. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is allowed and the petitioner is admitted to bail subject to the following conditions: (i) That he shall furnish personal bond in the amount of Rs.50,000/ with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial court; (ii) That he shall appear before the trial court on each and every date of hearing; (iii) That he shall not leave the territorial limits of Union Territory of J&K without prior permission of the learned trial court; (iv) That he shall not tamper with the prosecution witnesses. 18. Copy of this order be provided to the learned counsel for the petitioner through available mode and copy be also sent to the learned trial Court.