JUDGMENT : ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY, J. 1. Heard the parties through video conferencing. 2. This writ application has been filed invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India with a prayer to set aside the Order dated 28.01.2014 passed by learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) I, Seraikella in Misc. Arbitration Case No. 05 of 2013 whereby and where under the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) I, Seraikella has condoned the delay in filing the Misc. Arbitration Case No. 05 of 2013. 3. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was awarded the work of Boulder pitching in switchyard extension area at Power Grid, Jamshedpur Sub-Station. Consequent upon the dispute between the parties, upon the petitioner approaching this Court, sole arbitrator was appointed to adjudicate the matter of dispute. The learned arbitrator passed the award on 31.03.2013, directing the respondents to pay the claimant a total claim of Rs. 14,82,263/-. The respondents filed an application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 in the principal court of Sub Judge, Ranchi and subsequently filed a petition on 22.08.2013 to withdraw the petition and to file it before the court at Seraikella; which was allowed by the Sub Judge at Ranchi on 22.08.2013. The certified copy of the said order dated 22.08.2013, was issued to the respondents on 30.08.2013 and the respondents filed Misc. Arbitration Case No. 05 of 2013 in the court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division) I at Seraikella. The learned Civil Judge (Sr. Division) I at Seraikella, vide order dated 28.01.2014, observed that the delay in filing the petition, in the court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division) I at Seraikella, was a procedural delay, resulted from filing the petition first in the court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division) at Ranchi and subsequently in the court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division) I at Seraikella. Hence, was of the opinion that the same was required to be condoned and accordingly condoned the delay in filing the said petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 4. Mr. Division) at Ranchi and subsequently in the court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division) I at Seraikella. Hence, was of the opinion that the same was required to be condoned and accordingly condoned the delay in filing the said petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 4. Mr. Jitendra Shankar Singh learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the petition for condonation of delay, the petitioner has only made the prayer to exclude the time of proceeding bona-fide in court without jurisdiction, being the court of Principal Sub Judge, Ranchi and there is no specific prayer for condonation of the delay, apart from the days, that have been spent by the said petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 remained pending in the court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division) I at Ranchi. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the petitioner that the second application at Seraikella on 06.09.2013 was filed after 159 days from the date of knowledge of the award to the respondents. It is next submitted that since the limitation period for filing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is three months which in other words can be treated as 90 days from the date of the receipt of the arbitral award by the party concerned. Hence, there is a delay of 69 days in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and even after exclusion of 65 days spent in Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Ranchi (which court has also been referred to as the court of Principal Sub Judge, Ranchi, at places in the impugned order) by filing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, still there is a delay of four days for which there is no explanation. It is further submitted that in the court below, the respondents have not stated any reason as to why they have filed the application firstly before the court of Principal Sub Judge, Ranchi. It is next submitted that the respondents intentionally choose to file the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before a wrong court. Hence, the benefit under Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not available to them. It is next submitted that the respondents intentionally choose to file the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before a wrong court. Hence, the benefit under Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not available to them. In support of its contention, learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Ramjee Power Construction Ltd. vs. Jharkhand Urja Vikas Nigam Limited and Another passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 9774-9775 of 2018 dated 19th September, 2018, wherein in the facts of that case, where the applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 were filed against three separate awards with a delay of 1005 days, 610 days and 107 days respectively. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India held that in those cases there was no scope for having the delay condoned because the application under Section 34 of the Act was well beyond even the extended period of 30 days. Learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Assam Urban Water Supply and Sewerage Board vs. Subash Projects and Marketing Limited, (2012) 2 SCC 624 wherein in the facts of that case where the awards were received by the appellants of that case on 26.08.2003 and the applications under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 were filed on 02.01.2004 that is beyond the period of 120 days and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held as under in paragraph 14: “14. Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act defines: “2. (j) ‘period of limitation’ (which) means the period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by the Schedule, and ‘prescribed period’ means the period of limitation computed in accordance with the provisions of this Act.” Section 2(j) of the 1963 Act when read in the context of Section 34(3) of the 1996 Act, it becomes amply clear that the prescribed period for making an application for setting aside an arbitral award is three months. The period of 30 days mentioned in the proviso that follows sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the “period of limitation” and, therefore, not the “prescribed period” for the purposes of making the application for setting aside the arbitral award. The period of 30 days mentioned in the proviso that follows sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is not the “period of limitation” and, therefore, not the “prescribed period” for the purposes of making the application for setting aside the arbitral award. The period of 30 days beyond three months which the court may extend on sufficient cause being shown under the proviso appended to sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the 1996 Act being not the “period of limitation” or in other words, the “prescribed period” in our opinion, Section 4 of the 1963 Act is not, at all, attracted to the facts of the present case.” 5. Mr. Singh the learned counsel for the petitioner next relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Union of India vs. Popular Construction Company, (2001) 8 SCC 470 wherein in the facts of that case where the question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India was as to whether the Provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 are applicable to an application challenging an award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has held as under in paragraph 16:- “16. Furthermore, Section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award “in accordance with” sub-section (2) and sub-section (3). Sub-section (2) relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application filed beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) would not be an application “in accordance with” that sub-section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that “where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired … the award shall be enforced under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of the court.” This is a significant departure from the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to “proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow” (Section 17). Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.” 6. Mr. Singh next relied upon the judgment of a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of M/s R.M. Sinha and Co. vs. State of Jharkhand through the Executive Engineer passed in W.P. (C) No. 3298 of 2014 wherein in the facts of that case when the award was served upon the respondent on 26.08.2010 and the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was filed on 14.02.2011, the co-ordinate Bench of this Court has held as under in paragraph 8:- “8. As noticed above, the Arbitration Application No. 01 of 2011 was filed beyond the period of limitation however, the trial court admitted the application for hearing vide order dated 18.05.2013. The trial court apparently committed an error in law in condoning the delay in filing Arbitration Application, without hearing the opposite party. The learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that, the petitioner-opposite party has filed reply to the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.” 7. Hence, it is submitted that the impugned order being not sustainable in law be set aside and quashed and the application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 by the respondents be dismissed as barred by time. 8. Mr. Brij Bihari Sinha learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand defended the impugned order and submitted that the respondents in good faith and bona-fide belief filed the application under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 well within the limitation period of three months in the court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Ranchi and there is absolutely no dispute about the same. It is next submitted by Mr. Division), Ranchi and there is absolutely no dispute about the same. It is next submitted by Mr. Sinha that the bona-fide of the petitioner is apparent from the fact that even the appellant also filed the execution petition in respect of the award in question in the said court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Ranchi. It is then submitted that though the Civil Judge (Sr. Division) being satisfied with the bona-fide conduct and good faith of the respondents has returned the original application of Misc. Arbitration Case No. 18 of 2013 to be presented before the appropriate court. Hence, the learned court below has rightly excluded the time period consumed during the pendency of the proceedings in the court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Ranchi as also the time required for obtaining the certified copy of the said order; by exercising its jurisdiction under Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is further submitted that the application filed by the respondent before the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Seraikella cannot be treated as a new filing rather it is just the continuation of the earlier proceeding vide Misc. Case No. 18 of 2013 filed before the Sub Judge-I, Ranchi, more so in view of the said order dated 28.02.2013 passed therein. It is then submitted that the said order dated 28.02.2013 in Misc. Arbitration Case No. 18 of 2013 was passed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Ranchi by allowing the petition filed under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and returning the original application of the said Misc. Arbitration Case No. 18 of 2013 to the petitioner-respondent. It is next submitted that the citations of judgments, which are relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner were of the cases, where the petitions were filed beyond the period of 120 days that too when the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 were filed in the first court itself whereas the facts of this case is entirely different. It is further submitted that here in this case admittedly, the first petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was presented before the proper court with, bona-fide belief, within the period of limitation and subsequently upon the said petition being returned, the same was presented before the Civil Judge (Sr. It is further submitted that here in this case admittedly, the first petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was presented before the proper court with, bona-fide belief, within the period of limitation and subsequently upon the said petition being returned, the same was presented before the Civil Judge (Sr. Division) I at Seraikella soon after receiving of the certified copy of the said order dated 22.08.2013 on 30.08.2013 as the said application was filed on 06.09.2013 in the Court of Civil Judge (Sr. Division) I at Seraikella upon the same being returned to be presented before the proper court by the first court where it was filed under the bona-fide belief to be the proper court. It is further submitted that excluding the period of 65 days which was consumed because of the pendency of first petition filed within time under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Ranchi, there remains only a delay of 4 days and in view of proviso to Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act which reads as under:- 34 (1).............. (2)................... (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or, if a request had been made under Section 33, from the date on which that request had been disposed of by the arbitral tribunal: Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter. (Emphasis Supplied) 9. (Emphasis Supplied) 9. It is next submitted that the learned court below was well within its jurisdiction to condone the delay of further period of 30 days beyond the limitation period of three months for entertaining an application filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the court below being apprised of the facts of the case in the application, in which of course, it was mentioned that the same was filed under Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 has in affect actually condoned the delay of at best four days, beyond the period of 65 days for the exclusion of which the appellant was entitled under Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, which was well within its discretion and as such is a case of proper application of discretion conferred upon the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), I at Seraikella. Therefore it is submitted that the impugned order ought not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India as there is neither any grave injustice nor any violation of provision of any statute unlike the facts of those cases, the citations of which were relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner. It is next submitted that the court below was having jurisdiction to condone the delay under proviso of Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and though specific prayer was not made in the application for condonation of delay but certainly the facts were placed before it by way of an application in which the specific provision under the proviso to Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, of course was not specifically mentioned, yet the impugned order cannot be termed illegal. It is further submitted that it is a settled principle of law that there is distinction between Section 5 and Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is a settled principle of law that Section 5 of the Limitation is not applicable to the applications filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 but it is also a settled principle of law that Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 is applicable to the proceedings filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In support of its contention, learned counsel for the respondents relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Consolidated Engg. Enterprises vs. Irrigation Department, (2008) 7 SCC 169 para-22 and 23 of which read as under:- “22. The policy of the section is to afford protection to a litigant against the bar of limitation when he institutes a proceeding which by reason of some technical defect cannot be decided on merits and is dismissed. While considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, proper approach will have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be interpreted so as to advance the cause of justice rather than abort the proceedings. It will be well to bear in mind that an element of mistake is inherent in the invocation of Section 14. In fact, the section is intended to provide relief against the bar of limitation in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum. On reading Section 14 of the Act it becomes clear that the legislature has enacted the said section to exempt a certain period covered by a bona fide litigious activity. Upon the words used in the section, it is not possible to sustain the interpretation that the principle underlying the said section, namely, that the bar of limitation should not affect a person honestly doing his best to get his case tried on merits but failing because the court is unable to give him such a trial, would not be applicable to an application filed under Section 34 of the Act of 1996. The principle is clearly applicable not only to a case in which a litigant brings his application in the court, that is, a court having no jurisdiction to entertain it but also where he brings the suit or the application in the wrong court in consequence of bona fide mistake or (sic of) law or defect of procedure. Having regard to the intention of the legislature this Court is of the firm opinion that the equity underlying Section 14 should be applied to its fullest extent and time taken diligently pursuing a remedy, in a wrong court, should be excluded. 23. At this stage it would be relevant to ascertain whether there is any express provision in the Act of 1996, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. 23. At this stage it would be relevant to ascertain whether there is any express provision in the Act of 1996, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. On review of the provisions of the Act of 1996 this Court finds that there is no provision in the said Act which excludes the applicability of the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act to an application submitted under Section 34 of the said Act. On the contrary, this Court finds that Section 43 makes the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 applicable to arbitration proceedings. The proceedings under Section 34 are for the purpose of challenging the award whereas the proceeding referred to under Section 43 are the original proceedings which can be equated with a suit in a court. Hence, Section 43 incorporating the Limitation Act will apply to the proceedings in the arbitration as it applies to the proceedings of a suit in the court. Sub-Section (4) of Section 43, inter-alia, provides that where the court orders that an arbitral award be set aside, the period between the commencement of the arbitration and the date of the order of the court shall be excluded in computing the time prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963, for the commencement of the proceedings with respect to the dispute so submitted. If the period between the commencement of the arbitration proceedings till the award is set aside by the court, has to be excluded in computing the period of limitation provided for any proceedings with respect to the dispute, there is no good reason as to why it should not be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996, more particularly where no provision is to be found in the Act of 1996, which excludes the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, to an application made under Section 34 of the Act. It is to be noticed that the powers under Section 34 of the Act can be exercised by the court only if the aggrieved party makes an application. The jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, cannot be exercised suo-motu. The total period of four months within which an application, for setting aside an arbitral award, has to be made is not unusually long. The jurisdiction under Section 34 of the Act, cannot be exercised suo-motu. The total period of four months within which an application, for setting aside an arbitral award, has to be made is not unusually long. Section 34 of the Act of 1996 would be unduly oppressive, if it is held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act are not applicable to it, because cases are no doubt conceivable where an aggrieved party, despite exercise of due diligence and good faith, is unable to make an application within a period of four months. From the scheme and language of Section 34 of the Act of 1996, the intention of the legislature to exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act is not manifest. It is well to remember that Section 14 of the Limitation Act does not provide for a fresh period of limitation but only provides for the exclusion of a certain period. Having regard to the legislative intent, it will have to be held that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside an arbitral award. (Emphasis Supplied) 10. Hence, it is submitted that the instant writ application, being without any merit be dismissed. 11. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after perusal of the record it is pertinent to mention that there is no dispute that when a petition is filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, it cannot be entertained beyond the extended period of thirty days after the limitation period of three months to be reckoned from the date, when the arbitral award is received by the concerned party; obviously when the same is presented for the first time before the court of competent jurisdiction. It is also a settled principle of law, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Consolidated Engg. Enterprises vs. Irrigation Department (supra), the Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside an arbitral award. 12. It is without doubt that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited. Enterprises vs. Irrigation Department (supra), the Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996 for setting aside an arbitral award. 12. It is without doubt that the jurisdiction exercised by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is very limited. Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329 formulated the following principles on the exercise of High Court’s jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution in paragraph 49 (e) to (h) as under: 49................... (e) According to the ratio in Waryam Singh, followed in subsequent cases, the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction of superintendence can interfere in order only to keep the tribunals and courts subordinate to it “within the bounds of their authority.” (f) In order to ensure that law is followed by such tribunals and courts by exercising jurisdiction which is vested in them and by not declining to exercise the jurisdiction which is vested in them. (g) Apart from the situations pointed in (e) and (f), High Court can interfere in exercise of its power of superintendence when there has been a patent perversity in the orders of the tribunals and courts subordinate to it or where there has been a gross and manifest failure of justice or the basic principles of natural justice have been flouted. (h) In exercise of its power of superintendence High Court cannot interfere to correct mere errors of law or fact or just because another view than the one taken by the tribunals or courts subordinate to it, is a possible view. In other words the jurisdiction has to be very sparingly exercised. (Emphasis Supplied) 13. In this case indisputably, the learned court below was having the power to condone the delay up to a further period of 30 days after the limitation period of three months; albeit by exercise of its jurisdiction under the proviso of Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 14. (Emphasis Supplied) 13. In this case indisputably, the learned court below was having the power to condone the delay up to a further period of 30 days after the limitation period of three months; albeit by exercise of its jurisdiction under the proviso of Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 14. The impugned order is assailed mainly on the ground that the learned court below has nowhere reflected in its order that it is condoning the delay in exercise of its power under the proviso to Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and the impugned order is also assailed on the ground that in the petition filed before the court below it has not been specifically mentioned that the said petition was filed under the proviso of Section 34 (3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. It is a settled principle of law that pleadings in muffasil courts cannot be considered too strictly, as has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Abdul Kadir Shamsuddin Bubere vs. Madhav Prabhakar Oak, AIR 1962 SC 406 (Paragraph 10). It is a settled principle of law that even if a provision of law has not been mentioned in an application or a relief has not been specifically made, still a court can grant such relief to a party, if such party is entitled to that relief under any provision of law. It is pertinent to mention here that in the petition, basing upon which by the impugned order, the learned court below has condoned the delay in filing the petition under section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, the facts under which delay has occurred was placed before the learned court below and the learned court below was well within its jurisdiction to condone the delay up to a further period of 30 days after the limitation period of three months, after excluding the period under section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 for the time spent in pursuing the case under bona-fide belief in a court not having the jurisdiction. 15. 15. Considering the fact that as there is no serious challenge to exercise of the jurisdiction by the learned court below in condoning the delay of 65 days under Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, with the break up that 57 days was consumed by the pendency of the case and 8 days was consumed for obtaining the certified copy, this Court is of the considered view that this is not a fit case warranting interference of this court with the impugned order in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, this writ application being without any merit is dismissed and the interim order, if any, also stands vacated.