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2020 DIGILAW 654 (GAU)

Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam

2020-09-02

AJIT BORTHAKUR

body2020
ORDER : Ajit Borthakur, J. 1. Heard Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Sr. Counsel assisted by Mr. F. Khan and Mr. B. Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the accused petitioner. Also heard Mr. P.P. Boruah, learned Public Prosecutor, Assam for the state respondent. 2. This second petition under Section 439 Cr. P.C. is filed by the accused Shri Rakesh Kumar Paul, then Chairman, Assam Public Service Commission ('A.P.S.C. for short), seeking his release on bail in connection with C.I.D. PS. Case No. 27/2018, where he is charge sheeted under Sections 420 of the Indian Penal Code ('IPC for short) read with Sections 7/13(1)(d)/13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ('P.C. Act' for short). 3. The first bail application being B.A. No. 364/2019 was dismissed by this Court vide order, dated 29.04.2019. 4. Scanned copy of the case record along with the case diary, as called for, is placed before the Court. Prosecution Case: 5. The factual matrix of the case is that an F.I.R. was lodged on 10.10.2018 by one Shon Kumar Baishya, son of late Devi Ram Baishya, a resident of village Jagara, under Belsor Police Station, Dist.- Nalbari before the Officer-in-charge, CID Police Station, Assam, Guwahati, alleging, inter-alia, that in the year 2014, he paid a cash sum of Rs. 5.5 Lakh to the accused petitioner herein, then Chairman, A.P.S.C., for selection of his nephew, Sri Dhrubajyoti Baishya for the post of Deputy Superintendent of Police, ('D.S.P.' for short) in the Assam Police Department. The accused petitioner was introduced to the informant by one Sri Ranju Baishya, a resident of Morua, Nalbari, Assam. The payment of the aforesaid sum of Rs. 5.5 Lakh was made by way of advance, out of total agreed sum of Rs. 10 Lakh and the aforesaid cash amount was handed over to the accused petitioner in presence of said Ranju Baishya within the precinct of the holy religious institution, namely, 'Sat Sang Vihar', at Bhangagarh, Guwahati, in the month of April, 2014. As the informant's nephew was not selected for the said post, the informant requested the accused to return the money paid as advance to him through said Ranju Baishya, but the accused avoided to pay back the amount, rather threatened not to pursue the matter any further. Investigation, Charge-sheet & Prosecution Sanction: 6. Initially, based on the above F.I.R., C.I.D. PS. Investigation, Charge-sheet & Prosecution Sanction: 6. Initially, based on the above F.I.R., C.I.D. PS. Case No. 27/2018 under Sections 120B/420 of the IPC read with Sections 7 and 13(2) of the P.C. Act was registered on 10.10.2018, but considering the amendment made to the P.C. Act in 2018, whereby to launch investigation prior permission of the Government is made to be required under Section 17-A of the P.C. Act, learned Special Judge, Assam, by order, dated 12.10.2018, on the prayer of the Investigating Officer, struck off the aforesaid Section of the P.C. Act and accordingly, sent back the record to the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup (M), Guwahati. However, on 15.10.2018, a prayer was made before the Addl. Secretary to the Govt. of Assam, Home and Political Deptt., for according permission to launch the investigation under the provisions of Section 17-A of the P.C. Act. Accordingly, based on the view given by the Legal Remembrancer, Assam to the effect that in the backdrop of facts of the case, Section 17-A is not attracted/applicable as the alleged illegal acts were committed prior to the amendment to the P.C. Act, which came into force on 26.07.2018. However, permission was granted to launch the investigation into the case. Therefore, a request was made to add Sections 7/13(1)(d)/13(2) of the P.C. Act to the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kamrup (M), Guwahati, which was allowed by the said Court vide order, dated 07.12.2018 and accordingly, forwarded the case to the Court of learned Special Judge, Assam for consideration. Thereafter, on completion of investigation, the investigating officer submitted charge-sheet under Section 173(2), on 11.12.2018, under Section 420 of the IPC, R/W Section 7/13(1)(d)/13(2) of the P.C. Act against the accused-petitioner keeping further investigation on under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. and to produce the prosecution sanction order before commencement of trial. The competent authority issued the Prosecution Sanction Order, dated 08.03.2019, for taking cognizance of the aforesaid offences by the Court of competent jurisdiction under Section 197 (1) Cr.P.C. against the accused petitioner. Arguments: 7. Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the accused petitioner, argued that the accused has been in jail custody since 13.10.2018, on being shown arrested in the above noted case, which was registered based on the above F.I.R. filed, after about 4 (four) years of the alleged payment of illegal gratification amount. Mr. Arguments: 7. Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the accused petitioner, argued that the accused has been in jail custody since 13.10.2018, on being shown arrested in the above noted case, which was registered based on the above F.I.R. filed, after about 4 (four) years of the alleged payment of illegal gratification amount. Mr. Mishra submitted that the accused has been subjected to harassment by way of registering a number of criminal cases, one after another, resulting in his detention continuously for more than 2 (two) years 11 (eleven) months, though he was granted default bail on 16.08.2017 by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dibrugarh P.S. Case No. 936/2016, but when he was about to be released on bail, the police of Bhangagarh P.S. registered another new case on 17.08.2017, being Bhangagarh P.S. Case No. 159/2017 and further, the instant case being CID P.S. Case No. 27/2018 with a calculated design to prevent his release on bail. Mr. Mishra vehemently argued that the CID has no jurisdiction to register the FIR filed by the private complainant and investigate there in to without prior permission of the State Government and without holding a preliminary enquiry as per Section 17-A of the P.C. Act. According to Mr. D.K. Mishra, the learned Senior Counsel, as the investigation in the case commenced on 10.10.2018 after new Section 17-A came into force on 26.07.2018, the investigation carried out without following the mandate of the said Section is a nullity and on the other hand, in view of Section 436A Cr.P.C., the accused petitioner has a right to be released on bail, after completion of maximum period of detention as under trial prisoner. 8. Per contra, Mr. P.P. Boruah, learned Public Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of the State of Assam, while seeking to oppose the bail application, contended that the accused can't claim the benefit of Section 436A Cr.P.C. as he is yet to complete ½ of the maximum period of detention provided for the offence under Section 13(2) of the P.C. Act since he was shown arrested on 13.10.2018 in connection with the case. Mr. Mr. Boruah further contended that in the backdrop of facts and the evidence, collected by the investigating officer in the case, show the accused's clear complicity in the commission of the aforesaid socio-economic offences due to malpractices and corruption in public employment process misusing his constitutional position as Chakman of the A.P.S.C. and thereby certainly downgraded the public confidence on the said institution's transparency in the overall conduct of recruitment process. Therefore, Mr. Boruah submitted that in such a serious case of public importance, the accused can't have any right to be released on bail under Section 436A Cr.P.C. and Article 21 of the Constitution. Also Mr. Boruah, learned Public Prosecutor, contended that the question of delay in filing the F.I.R. can't be a relevant factor for consideration in the instant bail application as the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again reiterated the parameters for consideration of a bail application of the accused. Further, Mr. Boruah submitted that in view of the Notification of the Government of Assam vide No. HMC 3/93/7, dated 24.10.1997, for the purpose of all cognizable offences, the C.I.D. Police Station, Assam, Guwahati is vested with the unfettered jurisdiction to inquire/investigate into such offences, committed before insertion of new Section 17-A of the P.C. Act, for which reference of the Government is not a condition precedent. Mr. Boruah submitted that the accused has preferred a writ petition being W.P. (C) No. 296/2020 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying, inter-alia, for quashing the F.I.R., dated 10.10.2018 and its consequential charge-sheet No. 19/2018, dated 11.12.2018, filed in CIDP.S. Case No. 27/2018, on the same grounds which are agitated in the present bail application, where a co-ordinated Bench of this Court, in the connected I.A. (Civil) No. 221/2020, by order, dated 18.02.2020, directed to maintain status quo as on that date and therefore, without arriving at a finality in the aforesaid writ proceeding, the instant bail application may not be decided. Mr. Boruah further contended that Section 17-A of the P.C. Act is not applicable to the case as the alleged offences committed by the accused were related to his discharge of official duty as Chairman of the A.P.S.C. and therefore, not relevant. According to Mr. Boruah, the parameters for consideration of a bail application are clearly laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanwar Singh Meena Vs. According to Mr. Boruah, the parameters for consideration of a bail application are clearly laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kanwar Singh Meena Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., reported in (2012) 12 SCC 180 . Therefore, Mr. Boruah, learned Public Prosecutor, vehemently submitted that the instant bail application being devoid of any merits, the same may be rejected. 9. In reply to the above argument of Mr. P.P. Boruah, learned Public Prosecutor, Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Sr. counsel for the accused petitioner, argued that the writ jurisdiction and the criminal jurisdiction are separate and distinct jurisdictions and as such, the instant application for bail of the accused should be decided on its own merits. According to Mr. Mishra, the basic distinctions between the aforesaid two jurisdictions being procedural, they do not bar a bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. In this context, Mr. Mishra has drawn this Court's attention to the ratio of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Bhajan Lal & Ors., reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and stated that on the face of the contents of the F.I.R. itself, the prosecution has no satisfactory foundation to prosecute the accused. Further, Mr. Mishra, learned Sr. counsel for the accused petitioner, contended that the CID P.S., Assam is notified to be a Police Station to enquire/investigate any offence on which the police can take cognizance, but in the light of the Rules framed by different states, it can be inferred that the C.I.D. P.S., Assam can assume jurisdiction to enquire/investigate any cognizable offence only when referred by the State. 10. I have given due consideration to the above arguments advanced by the learned counsel of both sides and considered the material on the case record along with the case diary and the affidavit filed by the accused on his health condition. Parameters for consideration in Bail Application: 11. This Court is conscious of the various observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions that bail is the right and committal to jail an exception. Refusal of bail is a restriction on the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and in this regard, laid the parameters that call for consideration in a bail application, some of which are extracted hereinbelow. 12. Refusal of bail is a restriction on the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and in this regard, laid the parameters that call for consideration in a bail application, some of which are extracted hereinbelow. 12. In Para No. 35 of Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy Vs. CBI, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 439 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under- "35. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations." 13. In Para No. 10 of Kanwar Singh Meena Vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2012) 12 SCC 180 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under- "10. Thus, Section 439 of the Code confers very wide powers on the High Court and the Court of Session regarding bail. But, while granting bail, the High Court and the Sessions Court are guided by the same considerations as other courts. That is to say, the gravity of the crime, the character of the evidence, position and status of the accused with reference to the victim and witnesses, the likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice and repeating the offence, the possibility of his tampering with the witnesses and obstructing the course of justice and such other grounds are required to be taken into consideration. Each criminal case presents its own peculiar factual scenario and, therefore, certain grounds peculiar to a particular case may have to be taken into account by the court. The court has to only opine as to whether there is prima facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the police and comment on the same. Such assessment of evidence and premature comments are likely to deprive the accused of a fair trial. The court has to only opine as to whether there is prima facie case against the accused. The court must not undertake meticulous examination of the evidence collected by the police and comment on the same. Such assessment of evidence and premature comments are likely to deprive the accused of a fair trial. While canceling the bail under Section 439(2) of the Code, the primary considerations which weigh with the court are whether the accused is likely to tamper with the evidence or interfere or attempt to interfere with the due course of justice or evade the due course of justice. But, that is not all. The High Court or the Sessions Court can cancel the bail even in cases where the order granting bail suffers from serious infirmities resulting in miscarriage of justice. If the court granting bail ignores relevant materials indicating prima facie involvement of the accused or takes into account irrelevant material, which has no relevance to the question of grant of bail to the accused, the High Court or the Sessions Court would be justified in canceling the bail. Such orders are against the well-recognised principles underlying the power to grant bail. Such orders are legally infirm and vulnerable leading to miscarriage of justice and absence of supervening circumstances such as the propensity of the accused to tamper with the evidence, to flee from justice, etc. would not deter the court from canceling the bail. The High Court or the Sessions Court is bound to cancel such bail orders particularly when they are passed releasing the accused involved in heinous crimes because they ultimately result in weakening the prosecution case and have adverse impact on the society. Needless to say that though the powers of this Court are much wider, this Court is equally guided by the above principles in the matter of grant or cancellation of bail." 14. In Para Nos. 24 and 25 of Nimmagadda Prasad Vs. CBI, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 466 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under- "24. Needless to say that though the powers of this Court are much wider, this Court is equally guided by the above principles in the matter of grant or cancellation of bail." 14. In Para Nos. 24 and 25 of Nimmagadda Prasad Vs. CBI, reported in (2013) 7 SCC 466 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under- "24. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has used the words "reasonable grounds for believing" instead of "the evidence" which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. 25. Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail........." 15. Also, in Sanjay Chandra Vs. CBI, reported in (2012) 1 SCC 40 , the apex Court held that the grant or refusal to grant bail lies within the discretion of the Court. The grant or denial is regulated, to a large extent, by the facts and circumstances of each particular case. The Court noted that personal liberty is a very precious fundamental right and it should be curtailed only when it becomes imperative according to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 16. To reiterate only, it needs to be pointed out that at the time of deciding a petition seeking bail, the Court is required to consider the prima facie material available instead of going into the merits of the case by appreciation of evidence, because the question of credibility and reliability of the prosecution case can be tested during trial of the case. Undoubtedly, Article 21 of the Constitution of India attaches great importance to the individual's fundamental right to liberty, but the same has to be balanced to the interest of the society or State adhering to the mandates of the above judicial pronouncements laying down the relevant factors to be taken into consideration in the context of the allegations and evidence placed before bail is granted. Disputed question of Jurisdiction of CE): 17. In the instant bail application, the petitioner has, inter-alia, raised the question of law viz. the jurisdiction of the CID, Assam to register the private complaint, dated 10.10.2018, without prior approval of the government and without conducting a preliminary enquiry as required under the new Section 17-A of the P.C. Act, which came into force on 26.07.2018 and that the case is fatal for being filed after lapse of about 4 (four) years from the time of the alleged illegal acceptance of gratification of Rs. 5,50,000/- for selection of the informant's nephew for the post of D.S.P. in the Assam Police Department, without satisfactory explanation for such inordinate delay. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Yashwant Sinha Case (Supra), Section 17-A of the PC Act constitutes a bar to any inquiry or enquiry or investigation into any offence committed by a public servant unless there is previous approval of the Government concerned. Here, the F.I.R. was registered and investigated after Section 17-A was inserted and came into force on 26.7.2018. Approval indicates Government's formal consent to or agreement to allow investigation or enquiry against a public servant's misconduct in discharge of official functions or duties. 18. It may relevantly be stated, as submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor, that in Lalita Kumari Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. 2014(2) GL(SC) 1: [W.P. (Crl.) No. 68/2008] the apex Court ruled that registration of an FIR is mandatory under Section 154 Cr.P.C. if the information received by the police discloses commission of a cognisable offence and framed eight guidelines accordingly to be followed. The CID, Assam is the investigation and intelligence bureau for the Assam Police, which is empowered to investigate important cases such as fraud, murder etc., through registering cases at CID P.S., after preliminary enquiry. The CID, Assam is the investigation and intelligence bureau for the Assam Police, which is empowered to investigate important cases such as fraud, murder etc., through registering cases at CID P.S., after preliminary enquiry. The prosecution side has stated that in this case, the formalities required under Section 17-A was done although the accused committed the offences before the said new Section was brought into force. 19. The above disputed jurisdictional issue is being related to the merits of the foundation of the prosecution case, in the opinion of this Court, the same can't be decided in aid of a proceeding for bail of the accused under Section 439 Cr.P.C. First Bail Application: 20. While dismissing the accused petitioner's first Bail Appln. No. 364/2019, this Court recorded the following observations- "A perusal of the prima facie evidence, so far collected by the investigating officer, reveals the serious nature of corruption committed with cool calculation and deliberate design for personal gain by the accused in the process of selection of persons in the civil services of the State. Therefore, as held by the Apex Court in State of Bihar Vs Amit Kumar, reported in (2017) 13 SCC 751 , considering the magnitude of the seriousness of the offences, prima facie the accused committed, the mere fact of his long detention is inconsequential. Thus, applying the principles laid in Suresh Kumar Bhikamchand Jain case (supra), the accused is not entitled to be released on bail. In that view of the matter, the bail application stands dismissed." Allegations of Malpractices & Corruption in Public Employment by the Accused: 21. A perusal of the records reveal, as submitted by the prosecution, that the accused has been facing investigations in a number of cases for commission of rampant malpractices and corruptions of serious nature of socio-economic offences while he was serving as the Chairman of the A.P.S.C. in the direct recruitment process of selecting candidates in public employment through combined civil services examinations in the State of Assam. In the instant case, as stated above, the C.I.D., Assam has submitted charge-sheet followed by the Prosecution Sanction Order, on having established, in substance, a prima facie case after investigation that he had received a sum of Rs. In the instant case, as stated above, the C.I.D., Assam has submitted charge-sheet followed by the Prosecution Sanction Order, on having established, in substance, a prima facie case after investigation that he had received a sum of Rs. 5.5 Lakh in the month of April, 2014 promising to recommend the name of one Dhrubajyoti Baishya, the nephew of the informant, to the Government for appointment to the post of D.S.P, which he failed to fulfill nor he returned the aforementioned money on demand. Thus, the accused, who was a 'public servant', defined in Section 2(c) of the P.C. Act by virtue of holding the position of Chairman of the A.P.S.C., which is a constitutional body, prima facie, performed his duties improperly and dishonestly by way of obtaining illegal gratification. Section 436-A Cr.P.C: 22. It is noticed that the accused petitioner was shown arrested in connection with the instant case, while he was in judicial custody in Bhangagarh P.S. Case No. 159/2017 vide order, dated 13.10.2018, passed by the learned C.J.M., Kamrup (M), Assam and since then, he is in judicial custody that is, for 1 year 10 months and 20 days. In this context, as strenuously submitted by the learned Sr. In this context, as strenuously submitted by the learned Sr. counsel for the accused petitioner, regarding the permissible length of detention in law, one has to look into the Section 436-A Cr.P.C., which runs as hereunder- "436-A. Maximum period for which an under trial prisoner can be detained- Where a person has, during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial under this Code of an offence under any law (not being an offence for which the punishment of death has been specified as one of the punishments under that law) undergone detention for a period extending up to one-half of the maximum period of imprisonment specified for that offence under that law, he shall be released by the Court on his personal bond with or without sureties: Provided that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order the continued detention of such person for a period longer than one-half of the said period or release him on bail instead of the personal bond with or without sureties: Provided further that no such person shall in any case be detained during the period of investigation, inquiry or trial for more than the maximum period of imprisonment provided for the said offence under that law." 23. The above provisions provide that in a case 'where punishment for the offence cannot be death and a person has undergone detention, for a period extending up to one half of the maximum period of imprisonment, specified in the offence, he may be released on bail. The fact that this is not absolute in terms is apparent from the proviso thereof which states that the Court may, after hearing the Public Prosecutor and for reasons to be recorded in writing, order the continued detention of such a person for a period longer than one-half of the period of imprisonment prescribed in law. Thus, the aforesaid liberty of the accused is balanced with the need for the protection of the interest of the society or the State making the provision a directory one. Thus, the aforesaid liberty of the accused is balanced with the need for the protection of the interest of the society or the State making the provision a directory one. Although the accused has a right to be presumed innocent, a serious case like the present one where further investigation is still on in respect of the offences under Section 173 (8) Cr.P.C., cannot be treated like an ordinary case keeping in consideration the position and standing of the accused, who allegedly abused his constitutional office in the matter of selection process of talented candidates to the civil services of the State of Assam, where the public or the community at large has an interest. Ex-facie, the dishonest conduct of the accused, who was a public servant, amounted to criminal misconduct which affected the moral fabric of the society and caused harm to the institutional reputation of the A.P.S.C. It is prima facie apparent on evidence, collected during investigation, subject, of course, to testing through cross-examination of the P. Ws during trial of the case in the event of framing of the charges, that the accused intended to make illegal selection of the informant's nephew for the post of D.S.P. in the State's police department and to accomplish that object accepted illegal gratification to the tune of Rs. 5.5 Lakh by way of inducement. The prescribed punishment for such misconduct by a public servant under Section 13(2) is imprisonment, which shall not be less than 4 (four) years, but may extend to 10 (ten) years and shall also be liable to fine. Therefore, the accused from the point of view of 'Maximum period' provided in Section 436-A Cr.P.C. is yet to be satisfied and as such, from the point of view of the proviso to the aforesaid Section as well as in the attending facts and circumstances that emerge from the evidence collected by the investigating agency in the case, the accused is yet to be entitled to secure release on bail. Writ Petition for Quashing: 24. Terming the cases as false and frivolous, Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Sr. Writ Petition for Quashing: 24. Terming the cases as false and frivolous, Mr. D.K. Mishra, learned Sr. Counsel for the accused petitioner contended that three criminal cases are filed at Dibrugarh, Bhangagarh and C.I.D. Police Stations of Assam alleging various malpractices and corruptions in the recruitment process conducted by the A.P.S.C. during the period he served as its Chairman, for which reason, he filed W.P. (C) No. 296/2020 invoking extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution praying, inter-alia, for quashing the aforesaid C.I.D. P.S. Case No. 27/2018 and the consequential charge-sheet being C.I.D. P.S. charge-sheet No. 19/2018 etc. A co-ordinated bench of this Court by order, dated 18.2.2020 passed in I.A. (Civil) No. 221/2020 in WP(C) 296/2020 has directed to maintain status quo in respect of the order, dated 11.12.2018, passed by the learned Special Judge, Assam at Guwahati, in the said CUD P.S. Case No. 27/2018 till 26.03.2020 awaiting sanction for prosecution which is presently pending for adjudication. As stated above, however, subsequently, the competent authority has issued the Prosecution Sanction Order. 25. A perusal of the contentions made in the aforesaid writ petition show that the accused has cited the grounds which are raised in the instant bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. Within the parameters for consideration of a bail application as stated above, this Court is not inclined to take into consideration the intricate legal issues touching the merits of the prosecution case raised by the learned Sr. Counsel for the accused petitioner relating to the jurisdiction of the CUD, Assam to register the case filed by the informant without preliminary enquiry under Section 17-A of the P.C. Act with reference to decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaswant Sinha & Ors. Vs. CBI, re-ported in delay in filing the FIR; various omissions done by the investigating officer to investigate into the informant's economic condition to pay Rs. 10 Lakhs for job and non-examination of some witnesses; examination details of Dhrubajyoti Baishya, which are, in this Court's view, may be relevant to the merits of the writ petition aforementioned/trial of the case on merits being the question of nullity of the whole prosecution case. 26. In Para 116 of Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs. State of Assam, reported in 2017 (5) GLT (SC) 1: (2017) 15 SCC 67 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed- "116. 26. In Para 116 of Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs. State of Assam, reported in 2017 (5) GLT (SC) 1: (2017) 15 SCC 67 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed- "116. I may hasten to add that in the present case, the allegations do not disclose merely an economic offence but it shows a transgression of the constitutional rights of the victims of the crime. The Chairman of APSC has the responsibility on behalf of the State for enforcement of the fundamental rights of equality in matters of public employment enshrined under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. If the allegations are found to be true, then the offence cannot merely be considered as an economic offence, but a fraud on the Constitution itself by the persons appointed to enforce it." Conclusion: 27. Thus, having considered the matter in its entirety, within the parameters of Section 439 Cr.P.C. this Court is of the opinion that if the liberty of bail is granted to the accused petitioner, if the trial Court at its discretion finds reasons to frame the charges against him, trial of the case may likely to be hampered. The accused as the Chairman of the A.P.S.C. held a very responsible position, which he had prima facie misused by indulging in corrupt practices in the process of recruitment. The gravamen of the offences is acceptance of illegal gratification. In such circumstances, in the opinion of this Court, the accused is not entitled to be released on bail in the case, where charges are yet to be considered. 28. Therefore, in the backdrop of peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the bail application stands dismissed. However, the accused will be at liberty to file fresh bail application before the learned Court below, at an appropriate stage of trial of the case if charges are framed. 29. This Court makes it clear that the opinions of this Court recorded in the course of this order, shall not have any bearing on the proceedings which are pending against the accused. Medical Treatment to Accused: 30. The learned Sr. 29. This Court makes it clear that the opinions of this Court recorded in the course of this order, shall not have any bearing on the proceedings which are pending against the accused. Medical Treatment to Accused: 30. The learned Sr. Counsel appearing for the accused petitioner apprised this Court about the medical condition of the accused in jail and in this regard, has drawn attention to some medical reports and prescriptions placed through filing on affidavit Therefore, this Court feels it appropriate to direct the Superintendent, Central Jail, Guwahati, to take all necessary steps to cause rendering proper medical treatment to him inside or outside the State, if deemed appropriate on competent medical advice. The scanned copy of the L.C.R. along with case diary be sent back in sealed cover. This disposes off the bail application.