ORDER : 1. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondent. 2. The point that falls for consideration for the disposal of the instant writ petition is, whether the appellate authority was right in dismissing the appeal on the ground of appeal being belated by holding that the appellate authority is not vested with the power to condone the delay beyond 60 days as provided under the proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 (for short ‘the Act’). 3. The Appellate Authority after considering the issue, has found that the appeal has been filed on the 178th day, rather there is delay of 178 days in preferring the appeal and it has held that in terms of sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Act, the appellate authority could have condoned the delay if the same was within 60 days. After the lapse of 60 days, the appellate authority may condone the delay for a further period of 60 days as provided under the proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Act. The proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Act reads as under: “7. Determination of the amount of gratuity:- (1)............ (2)............ xxx xxx xxx (7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be prescribed by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the appellate authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days.” 4. From a reading of the above, it is crystal clear that the Appellate Authority is vested with the power to condone the delay of additional 60 days over and above the 60 days period as provided under sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Act, and hence, in the opinion of this Court, the reasoning of the appellate authority cannot be found fault with. 5. 5. Learned Counsel for the petitioner would place reliance on the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of Superintending Engineer/Dehar Power House Circle Bhakra Beas Management Board (PW) Slapper and Others vs. Excise and Taxation Officer, Sunder Nagar/Association Authority, 2019 SCC Online SC 1400, wherein the Apex Court was considering the scope of Section 48 of the Himachal Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 2005, and was pleased to hold that the Limitation Act would get attracted, and hence, it was pleased to hold that the High Court erred in holding that while exercising the Revisional power under Section 48 of the said Act. The Division Bench of Himachal Pradesh High Court considering the provision of Section 48(1) of the Act, held that it could not condone the delay beyond the period of 90 days as provided under sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the said Act, and that the language contained in the provision excludes the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 6. From a reading of the provision, it is apparent that it is not in pari-materia with sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Act, wherein the first proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Act clearly mandates that the appropriate Government or the Appellate Authority as the case may be can extend the said period by a further period of 60 days i.e. the Appellate Authority could have extended the said period by an additional 60 days over and above the 60 days provided under sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Act. 7. From a reading of the first proviso, it is apparent that no discretion is vested in the Appellate Authority to invoke or enlarge the limitation period. If that be so, the Act being a self-contained Act, question of applicability of Limitation Act would not arise. In the considered opinion of this Court, reliance on the ruling cited supra by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is inapplicable in the light of the language employed in the statutory provisions. 8. If that be so, the Act being a self-contained Act, question of applicability of Limitation Act would not arise. In the considered opinion of this Court, reliance on the ruling cited supra by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is inapplicable in the light of the language employed in the statutory provisions. 8. Per contra, learned Counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the ruling of the co-ordinate bench of this Court rendered in W.P. No. 35266/2011 disposed off on 28.01.2013, whereby the learned Single Judge by placing reliance on the ruling of the Apex Court in the case of Commissioner of Customs and Central vs. M/s. Hongo India (P) Ltd. and Another, SLP (C) No. 18999/2007, held that the High Court has no power to condone the delay beyond the prescribed period of 60 + 60 days, contrary to the prescription of the statute. The learned Single Judge was also pleased to hold that Article 226 of the Constitution of India could not be invoked to negate the statutory provision providing for limitation. This Court is in agreement with the view expressed by the co-ordinate bench. 9. The said ruling came to be taken in appeal in W.A. No. 5487/2013, wherein the Division Bench was also pleased to affirm the same by holding that in view of the language employed in the proviso, there is no power to condone the delay beyond 120 days and was pleased to affirm the order of the learned Single Judge. 10. Learned Counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance on the ruling of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Warangal District Co-Operative Society Ltd. vs. Appellate Authority Under Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 and Others, (2002) 3 LLJ 616, wherein at paragraphs 8 and 9, the Apex Court has examined the applicability of Limitation Act in the light of the provision contained under Section 29 of the Limitation Act itself. The Apex Court has observed in paragraph 9 and 11 as under: “9. Looking at the scheme of the Limitation Act, Section 3 of the Act declares that every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the period prescribed for such institution, preference, etc. shall be dismissed. The Apex Court has observed in paragraph 9 and 11 as under: “9. Looking at the scheme of the Limitation Act, Section 3 of the Act declares that every suit instituted, appeal preferred and application made after the period prescribed for such institution, preference, etc. shall be dismissed. However, Section 5 stipulates that any appeal or application, except the application under Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act could still be admitted by the Court, if the Court is satisfied that such an appellant or applicant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or not making the application within the prescribed period of limitation. From the above two Sections, it appears that a suit filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation is absolutely barred, but an appeal preferred beyond the period of limitation prescribed could still be considered if the appellate Court is satisfied that such delay is by virtue of a cause which was not within the control of the appellant. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act reads as follows: Where any special or local law prescribes for any suit, appeal or application a period of limitation different from the period prescribed by the Schedule, the provisions of Section 3 shall apply as if such period were the period prescribed by the Schedule and for the purpose of determining any period of limitation prescribed for any suit, appeal or application by any special or local law, the provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) shall apply only in so far as, and to the extent to which, they are not expressly excluded by such special or local law. An analysis of the above sub-section shows that where a special period of limitation different from the one prescribed in the Schedule to the Limitation Act, 1963, is prescribed by any special or local law for the purpose of filing the suit, appeal, or application, the bar contained under Section 3 shall apply and such a suit or application is required to be dismissed as if that such a special limitation is prescribed under the Schedule to the Limitation Act. It is further provided in the sub-section that provisions contained in Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act shall apply to the cases where a special limitation is prescribed as mentioned above, to the extent to which they have not expressly excluded by such special local law. Interpreting the scope of Section 29(2), the Supreme Court in Shantilal M. Bhayani vs. Shanti Bai (supra), held that as there was no specific exclusion of application of the Limitation Act in the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960, the appellate authority under the Act was entitled to invoke the powers under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and condone the delay in preferring the appeal was preferred beyond the period of special limitation prescribed under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Obviously, their Lordships while deciding the case had in mind the last clause of Section 29 of sub-section (2) “....they are not expressly excluded.....” 10. xxx xxx 11. However, the difficulty in this case is that the limitation prescribed under the Payment of Gratuity Act, once again an enactment made by Parliament is only 60 days for the purpose of preferring an appeal. Under the proviso to Section 7, sub-section (7), the appellate authority is empowered to “extend the period” of limitation by another sixty days. In other words, the appellate authority is empowered to condone the delay to upper limit of another sixty days beyond the prescribed period of limitation. No doubt, the Payment of Gratuity Act does not expressly exclude the operation of the Limitation Act, but the fact remains that the Payment of Gratuity Act is of the year 1972 where the Limitation Act is of the year 1963. The settled principle of interpretation of statutes is that if there are two mandates by the Sovereign Legislature, the later of the two shall prevail. Therefore, the fact that there was no express exclusion of Section 5 of the limitation under the Payment of Gratuity Act makes no difference while construing the scope of the power of the appellate authority constituted under the Payment of Gratuity Act, to condone the delay in preferring the appeals. Therefore, the fact that there was no express exclusion of Section 5 of the limitation under the Payment of Gratuity Act makes no difference while construing the scope of the power of the appellate authority constituted under the Payment of Gratuity Act, to condone the delay in preferring the appeals. The legal position enunciated by the Supreme Court in Shantilal M. Bhayani vs. Shanti Bai (supra) in my view, must be understood in the context of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the special period of limitation, prescribed in any other special or local law prior to the date of the enactment of the Limitation Act. It is worthwhile mentioning that the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, which is the subject matter of the issue before the Supreme Court in the above case was of the year 1960.” 11. This Court after having examined the language employed in the proviso to sub-section (7) of Section 7 of the Act, is of the considered opinion that the application of Section 29 of the Limitation Act stands excluded. Hence, in the opinion of this Court, the order of the appellate authority cannot be found fault with, and accordingly, petition stands dismissed. No opinion is expressed on the merits of the matter and the petition is disposed off on the short ground of limitation alone.